Showing posts with label reshash. Show all posts
Showing posts with label reshash. Show all posts
Thursday, January 15, 2009
Fender Bender
By: Reb Avi Lebovitz Hearos on the Daf/
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Reuven is driving behind Shimon and smashes into Shimon’s car, destroying his fender and causing 500ドル.00 worth of damage. Shimon continues to drive home and gets into a terrible accident that completely totals his car. Reuven claims that he should not be liable for paying for the damage that he caused, because even if had he not caused the damage, it would have happened due to the later accident. Is Reuven obligated to pay?
The Reshash learns from Tosfos that Reuven is responsible. Tosfos says that although in the case of the Gemora where one throws a vessel from the roof and the other one smashes it before it hits the ground, the thrower is liable to pay and the smasher is exempt; in a case where one throws a stone at a utensil and before it hits the ground, someone else smashes it, the smasher is liable and therefore the thrower is exempt. The argument that “he broke an already broken item,” only applies to a case where the damaged item itself was thrown, not when another item was thrown at it. The logic is clear. When one throws a stone at a utensil, he has no connection to the utensil until the stone makes contact with it, so if prior to that, someone else smashes the utensil, the smasher is fully responsible.
Based on this, the Reshash says that if Reuven smashes Shimon’s vessel, but later a fire occurs and burns the broken vessel, Reuven is responsible to pay for the damage he caused. Why? Because even if Reuven would smash the vessel after the stone has been thrown, he would be obligated to pay; certainly if he broke the utensil prior to the fire heading to Shimon’s home, Reuven is liable to pay. Similarly, in the case of the car accident, Reuven would be obligated to pay, because even if at the time of the fender bender there was already a train headed right at Shimon’s car and it would definitely be destroyed, Reuven is liable for the damage he caused.
Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here. We now have a “less than ten minute” audio summary as well.
Reuven is driving behind Shimon and smashes into Shimon’s car, destroying his fender and causing 500ドル.00 worth of damage. Shimon continues to drive home and gets into a terrible accident that completely totals his car. Reuven claims that he should not be liable for paying for the damage that he caused, because even if had he not caused the damage, it would have happened due to the later accident. Is Reuven obligated to pay?
The Reshash learns from Tosfos that Reuven is responsible. Tosfos says that although in the case of the Gemora where one throws a vessel from the roof and the other one smashes it before it hits the ground, the thrower is liable to pay and the smasher is exempt; in a case where one throws a stone at a utensil and before it hits the ground, someone else smashes it, the smasher is liable and therefore the thrower is exempt. The argument that “he broke an already broken item,” only applies to a case where the damaged item itself was thrown, not when another item was thrown at it. The logic is clear. When one throws a stone at a utensil, he has no connection to the utensil until the stone makes contact with it, so if prior to that, someone else smashes the utensil, the smasher is fully responsible.
Based on this, the Reshash says that if Reuven smashes Shimon’s vessel, but later a fire occurs and burns the broken vessel, Reuven is responsible to pay for the damage he caused. Why? Because even if Reuven would smash the vessel after the stone has been thrown, he would be obligated to pay; certainly if he broke the utensil prior to the fire heading to Shimon’s home, Reuven is liable to pay. Similarly, in the case of the car accident, Reuven would be obligated to pay, because even if at the time of the fender bender there was already a train headed right at Shimon’s car and it would definitely be destroyed, Reuven is liable for the damage he caused.
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Posted by Avromi at 1/15/2009 07:49:00 PM 0 comments
Labels: daf yomi, fender bender, Gemora Bava Kamma, Gemora Bava Kamma 17, reshash
Friday, January 02, 2009
Paying Kofer
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The Gemora (Bava Kamma 4a) explained the Mishna according to Rav as follows: The nature of ox, that it pays kofer (if the ox kills a person, the owner is liable to pay a kofer payment), is not the same as the nature of a person, who does not pay kofer (and therefore, if the Torah would only write that one is liable for an ox, we would not necessarily know that one is liable for his own damaging).
Tosfos asks: Why is the fact that an ox pays kofer regarded as a stringency? The reason why a person does not pay kofer when he kills someone is because of the principle of kim leih bid’rabbah minei - (whenever someone is deserving of two punishments, he receives the one which is more severe). And since a man is executed for killing another man, he is not required to pay the kofer payment. It emerges that not paying the kofer is not a leniency, but rather, it is due to a stringency, namely – that he is put to death!?
The Riva answers that a person would not pay kofer even if he would not be executed. This would be in a case of an accidental killing.
The Darchei Dovid explains: Although this is also a type of kim leih bid’rabbah minei; whenever someone accidentally does something - and this same action, if it would have been done intentionally, would have exempted him from a monetary payment – it exempts him from the payment in this case as well; nevertheless, it must be regarded as a lenient ruling, for the bottom line is that he is not executed and he is not obligated to pay anything.
Alternatively, Tosfos answers that he is not exempt from the kofer payment due to kim leih bid’rabbah minei.
The Maharam explains: The principle of kim leih bid’rabbah minei only applies when he committed an action that he deserves to be executed for, and simultaneously, he does something else that he is required to pay money for. However, in our case, where a man killed someone, the punishment of execution and the kofer payment are both coming for the same reason. Kim leih bid’rabbah minei will not apply here.
The Reshash explains Tosfos to mean that the principle of kim leih bid’rabbah minei does not apply in this case because the kofer payment serves as an atonement for the killing. Kim leih bid’rabbah minei exempts a money obligation which is a payment because of compensation; however, it does not exempt payments on account of forgiveness.
The Gemora (Bava Kamma 4a) explained the Mishna according to Rav as follows: The nature of ox, that it pays kofer (if the ox kills a person, the owner is liable to pay a kofer payment), is not the same as the nature of a person, who does not pay kofer (and therefore, if the Torah would only write that one is liable for an ox, we would not necessarily know that one is liable for his own damaging).
Tosfos asks: Why is the fact that an ox pays kofer regarded as a stringency? The reason why a person does not pay kofer when he kills someone is because of the principle of kim leih bid’rabbah minei - (whenever someone is deserving of two punishments, he receives the one which is more severe). And since a man is executed for killing another man, he is not required to pay the kofer payment. It emerges that not paying the kofer is not a leniency, but rather, it is due to a stringency, namely – that he is put to death!?
The Riva answers that a person would not pay kofer even if he would not be executed. This would be in a case of an accidental killing.
The Darchei Dovid explains: Although this is also a type of kim leih bid’rabbah minei; whenever someone accidentally does something - and this same action, if it would have been done intentionally, would have exempted him from a monetary payment – it exempts him from the payment in this case as well; nevertheless, it must be regarded as a lenient ruling, for the bottom line is that he is not executed and he is not obligated to pay anything.
Alternatively, Tosfos answers that he is not exempt from the kofer payment due to kim leih bid’rabbah minei.
The Maharam explains: The principle of kim leih bid’rabbah minei only applies when he committed an action that he deserves to be executed for, and simultaneously, he does something else that he is required to pay money for. However, in our case, where a man killed someone, the punishment of execution and the kofer payment are both coming for the same reason. Kim leih bid’rabbah minei will not apply here.
The Reshash explains Tosfos to mean that the principle of kim leih bid’rabbah minei does not apply in this case because the kofer payment serves as an atonement for the killing. Kim leih bid’rabbah minei exempts a money obligation which is a payment because of compensation; however, it does not exempt payments on account of forgiveness.
Read more!
Posted by Avromi at 1/02/2009 06:50:00 AM 0 comments
Labels: daf yomi, Gemora Bava Kamma, kim leih b'dirabah mineih, kofer, maharam, reshash, tosfos
Thursday, November 27, 2008
Transposing the Opinions - Kiddushin Daf 44
It was stated: If a minor accepted kiddushin without the knowledge of her father, Shmuel said: She requires a get and mi’un (A girl whose father had died could be given in marriage while still a minor (under the age of twelve) by her mother or older brother. This marriage is only valid Rabbinically. As long as she has not attained the age of twelve, she may nullify the marriage by refusing to live with her husband. This act of refusal, referred to as mi’un nullifies the marriage retroactively.). Karna asked: If she needs a get, why is mi’un necessary? And if mi’un is needed, why do we require a get?
Other Amoraim replied to him: Mar Ukva and his Beis Din are in Kafri (let’s ask him). They switched the opinions of Shmuel and Karna and sent it to Rav (they did this on purpose, for Rav was a close friend of Shmuel and they wished to see if Rav would agree to Karna’s ruling if it was said in the name of Shmuel). Rav said to them: Hashem! She requires a get and mi’un and Heaven forbid that the son of Abba bar Abba (Shmuel) should say such a thing!
The Reshash asks: How can it be that they would think that Rav would be influenced to rule according to Shmuel, for he was his friend? And besides, Rav and Shmuel argue throughout Shas!? He shows that Rashi elsewhere understands the word “switched” to mean “by mistake.”
Some say that Rashi did not write this, but rather, one of his students mistakenly inserted this explanation into his commentary.
The Reshash also asks: Why doesn’t the Gemora mention what Mar Ukva answered?
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Other Amoraim replied to him: Mar Ukva and his Beis Din are in Kafri (let’s ask him). They switched the opinions of Shmuel and Karna and sent it to Rav (they did this on purpose, for Rav was a close friend of Shmuel and they wished to see if Rav would agree to Karna’s ruling if it was said in the name of Shmuel). Rav said to them: Hashem! She requires a get and mi’un and Heaven forbid that the son of Abba bar Abba (Shmuel) should say such a thing!
The Reshash asks: How can it be that they would think that Rav would be influenced to rule according to Shmuel, for he was his friend? And besides, Rav and Shmuel argue throughout Shas!? He shows that Rashi elsewhere understands the word “switched” to mean “by mistake.”
Some say that Rashi did not write this, but rather, one of his students mistakenly inserted this explanation into his commentary.
The Reshash also asks: Why doesn’t the Gemora mention what Mar Ukva answered?
Posted by Avromi at 11/27/2008 04:00:00 PM 0 comments
Labels: daf yomi, Gemora Kiddushin, reshash, talmud
Thursday, July 24, 2008
Selling a "Runaway" Slave
The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 13a) explained the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Chachamim as follows: The Gemora explains: Rabbi Meir said to them: You have answered me with regard to his food (the master has a right not to provide him with food), but you have not answered me with respect of terumah (if his master was a Kohen, he will lose the ability of eating terumah)! And if you will answer me that the master, if he wanted, could throw the document to the slave (against his will) and thereby disqualify him from eating terumah, this is not correct because the slave can run away and the master will not have the option to free him (and therefore the slave can still eat terumah)! For if the slave of a Kohen ran away (and he could not be found to free him), or the wife of a Kohen rebelled against him (and she could not be found for him to divorce her), would they not be able to still eat terumah! This slave (if someone is acquiring the document for him), however, will not be able to eat terumah!
Rava explains the Chachamim’s response in our Mishna: It is because the slave is the master’s property. The meaning is as follows: The master, if he wants, could take four zuzim from a Yisroel (selling the slave to him), which would thereby disqualify the slave from eating terumah (even if the slave runs away)!
The Reshash asks: How could the master sell his slave who ran away? This should be akin to one who stole an object from his friend. The owner is unable to sell it because it is not presently under his jurisdiction. Here too, the slave is not presently under the control of the owner!
He answers that here it is different. The slave fled from the master because he wants to remain a slave. He is therefore still regarded as being under the jurisdiction of his master.
Furthermore, the halacha is that land cannot be halachically stolen, and a slave which is compared to land has that halacha as well. Therefore, the slave, no matter where he is, would still be regarded as being under the control of the owner.
The Ayeles Hashachar answers: Since the slave is required to return himself to his master, it is considered as if he is still under his jurisdiction.
The Dvar Avraham writes that this question can be answered according to the Shitah Mikubetzes in Bava Kamma (33b). The Shitah says that if someone sells an item that was not under his control, but afterwards, it came into his jurisdiction, the sale is effective retroactively. Here too, if the slave is returned to the master, at that point the sale will be effective.
Read more!
Rava explains the Chachamim’s response in our Mishna: It is because the slave is the master’s property. The meaning is as follows: The master, if he wants, could take four zuzim from a Yisroel (selling the slave to him), which would thereby disqualify the slave from eating terumah (even if the slave runs away)!
The Reshash asks: How could the master sell his slave who ran away? This should be akin to one who stole an object from his friend. The owner is unable to sell it because it is not presently under his jurisdiction. Here too, the slave is not presently under the control of the owner!
He answers that here it is different. The slave fled from the master because he wants to remain a slave. He is therefore still regarded as being under the jurisdiction of his master.
Furthermore, the halacha is that land cannot be halachically stolen, and a slave which is compared to land has that halacha as well. Therefore, the slave, no matter where he is, would still be regarded as being under the control of the owner.
The Ayeles Hashachar answers: Since the slave is required to return himself to his master, it is considered as if he is still under his jurisdiction.
The Dvar Avraham writes that this question can be answered according to the Shitah Mikubetzes in Bava Kamma (33b). The Shitah says that if someone sells an item that was not under his control, but afterwards, it came into his jurisdiction, the sale is effective retroactively. Here too, if the slave is returned to the master, at that point the sale will be effective.
Posted by Avromi at 7/24/2008 07:50:00 PM 0 comments
Labels: daf yomi, Dvar avraham, eino birshuso, Gemora Gittin, Nesivos Hamishpat, reshash, slave
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
Nezirus of a Son - Daf 23
The Mishna states: A father can impose upon his son a nezirus vow, but a mother cannot impose a nezirus vow on her son.
Rashi comments that the son remains a nazir even after he becomes an adult.
Tosfos in Nazir (28b) disagrees and maintains that as soon as the son becomes an adult, he is no longer a nazir.
Tosfos Yom Tov asks on Rashi: If a father cannot impose nezirus on his adult son, why would the nezirus that he imposed upon him as a minor remain when he becomes an adult?
The Reshash explains that there is a clear distinction between the two cases. A father does not have the authority to impose nezirus upon his adult son. However, when the father imposed nezirus upon his minor son, the child became a nazir. Once he is a nazir, why should we say that the nezirus goes away when he becomes an adult? Since he was a nazir up until now, nothing changes and he remains a nazir.
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Rashi comments that the son remains a nazir even after he becomes an adult.
Tosfos in Nazir (28b) disagrees and maintains that as soon as the son becomes an adult, he is no longer a nazir.
Tosfos Yom Tov asks on Rashi: If a father cannot impose nezirus on his adult son, why would the nezirus that he imposed upon him as a minor remain when he becomes an adult?
The Reshash explains that there is a clear distinction between the two cases. A father does not have the authority to impose nezirus upon his adult son. However, when the father imposed nezirus upon his minor son, the child became a nazir. Once he is a nazir, why should we say that the nezirus goes away when he becomes an adult? Since he was a nazir up until now, nothing changes and he remains a nazir.
Posted by Avromi at 6/18/2008 12:01:00 AM 0 comments
Labels: daf yomi, Gemora Sotah, nazir, Rashi, reshash, tosfos, tosfos yom tov
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