Showing posts with label posek. Show all posts
Showing posts with label posek. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Permitted Rulings
The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 41b) had stated, applying the classic principle that it is preferable to render a permissible ruling. Rashi in Beitzah (2b) explains that this means that something that is permitted indicates that the Tanna is relying on his knowledge of the subject matter, and is not afraid to rule leniently. One can be strict even if he is in doubt and it does not necessarily indicate the conclusiveness of the ruling.
Rashbam in Pesachim (102a) writes that if there is no compelling logic to rule stringently, then ruling leniently is not regarded as a more preferred option. Rather, it is the only option. The Rema in his responsa (§ 54) rules that one is not allowed to be stringent regarding an issue where there is no uncertainty.
Pischei Teshuvah (Yoreh Deah 116:10) cites a dispute amongst the Acharonim if one is permitted to be stringent for himself regarding a matter that has been permitted by the Torah, such as a prohibited matter that was nullified.
Bnei Yissachar writes that it is a mitzvah not to be stringent in such a situation.
The Tzlach writes that it is preferable to record the permitted ruling regarding a situation that may be subject to a Biblical prohibition, because if there would be uncertainty, we would be compelled to rule stringently. The Tanna would not be introducing a novel ruling if the ruling was that the matter is prohibited. Regarding a matter that may be subject to a Rabbinic prohibition, however, the reverse would be true. It is preferable to record the stringent ruling because if there would be uncertainty, we would rule leniently.
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Rashbam in Pesachim (102a) writes that if there is no compelling logic to rule stringently, then ruling leniently is not regarded as a more preferred option. Rather, it is the only option. The Rema in his responsa (§ 54) rules that one is not allowed to be stringent regarding an issue where there is no uncertainty.
Pischei Teshuvah (Yoreh Deah 116:10) cites a dispute amongst the Acharonim if one is permitted to be stringent for himself regarding a matter that has been permitted by the Torah, such as a prohibited matter that was nullified.
Bnei Yissachar writes that it is a mitzvah not to be stringent in such a situation.
The Tzlach writes that it is preferable to record the permitted ruling regarding a situation that may be subject to a Biblical prohibition, because if there would be uncertainty, we would be compelled to rule stringently. The Tanna would not be introducing a novel ruling if the ruling was that the matter is prohibited. Regarding a matter that may be subject to a Rabbinic prohibition, however, the reverse would be true. It is preferable to record the stringent ruling because if there would be uncertainty, we would rule leniently.
Posted by Avromi at 8/20/2008 06:28:00 PM 0 comments
Labels: biblical, Bnei yissoschar, daf yomi, Gemora Beitzah, Gemora Gittin, Gemora Pesachim, lenient, pischei teshuva, posek, rabbinic, Rama, rashbam, Rashi, ruling, stringently, Tzlach
Sunday, July 08, 2007
HOW TO RULE - Yevamos 66 - Daf Yomi
Rabbah and Rav Yosef were sitting before Rav Nachman at the conclusion of his lecture, and they said: A braisa was taught which supports Rav Yehudah’s opinion, and a braisa was taught which support Rav Ami’s opinion. The Gemora cites those two braisos.
Rava said in the name of Rav Nachman: The halacha is in accordance with Rav Yehudah.
Rava asked Rav Nachman: But there is a braisa supporting the viewpoint of Rav Ami (why are you ruling in accordance with Rav Yehudah)?
Rav Nachman replied: Although there is a braisa that supports Rav Ami, Rav Yehudah’s reasoning is more logical, since he had stated: (the wife has a valid claim to take the tzon barzel properties back) because these properties represent the assets of her father’s house, and she has a valid claim to take them back.
The flow of the Gemora is a bit problematic. Rava was not talking to Rav Nachman when he said that the halacha is in accordance with Rav Yehudah. He said that over in his name. It seems a bit odd that he would then ask Rav Nachman.
Furthermore, why was he asking from a braisa that supports Rav Ami when the Gemora just quoted a braisa that supported Rav Yehudah as well?
Reb Yissochar Dov from Buska explains this Gemora. He states: There is a principle that whenever the Gemora cites two explanations, and introduces the second one with the terminology “v’ibais eima,” “alternatively, you can say,” the halacha follows the second opinion. This is also an established principle in Shulchan Aruch. When the Shulchan Aruch cites two opinions, the halacha follows the second one. This applies also when the Gemora cites two braisos, one supporting one viewpoint, and a second supporting the other opinion; the halacha is in accordance with the second one.
When Rabbah and Rav Yosef were sitting before Rav Nachman, Rava was there as well. The Gemora had stated that they were sitting before Rav Nachman at the conclusion of his lecture. The Likutei Maharil (78) states that whenever the Gemora uses the terminology “b’shilhei pirkei,” “at the conclusion of his lecture,” it means that the Amora was extremely tired and weak from his lecture. The Targum of the word “oyef,” meaning tired, is “shilhei.” Rav Nachman was not involved in the discussion between Rabbah and Rav Yosef when they were citing the braisos. Rava, being a disciple of Rav Nachman, remembered that Rav Nachman had ruled according to Rav Yehudah. Upon hearing the discussion between Rabbah and Rav Yosef, and realizing that the second opinion cited was according to Rav Ami, Rava questioned Rav Nachman: “How can you rule according to Rav Yehudah when the second opinion cited was according to Rav Ami, and the halacha would follow the latter opinion?” Rav Nachman, who was extremely weak, did not respond at all, and Rava himself (or the Gemora) answered that the principle does not apply when the logic follows the other opinion. Since Rav Yehudah’s reasoning is more logical, we rule according to him, even though the braisa supporting Rav Ami was cited second.
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Rava said in the name of Rav Nachman: The halacha is in accordance with Rav Yehudah.
Rava asked Rav Nachman: But there is a braisa supporting the viewpoint of Rav Ami (why are you ruling in accordance with Rav Yehudah)?
Rav Nachman replied: Although there is a braisa that supports Rav Ami, Rav Yehudah’s reasoning is more logical, since he had stated: (the wife has a valid claim to take the tzon barzel properties back) because these properties represent the assets of her father’s house, and she has a valid claim to take them back.
The flow of the Gemora is a bit problematic. Rava was not talking to Rav Nachman when he said that the halacha is in accordance with Rav Yehudah. He said that over in his name. It seems a bit odd that he would then ask Rav Nachman.
Furthermore, why was he asking from a braisa that supports Rav Ami when the Gemora just quoted a braisa that supported Rav Yehudah as well?
Reb Yissochar Dov from Buska explains this Gemora. He states: There is a principle that whenever the Gemora cites two explanations, and introduces the second one with the terminology “v’ibais eima,” “alternatively, you can say,” the halacha follows the second opinion. This is also an established principle in Shulchan Aruch. When the Shulchan Aruch cites two opinions, the halacha follows the second one. This applies also when the Gemora cites two braisos, one supporting one viewpoint, and a second supporting the other opinion; the halacha is in accordance with the second one.
When Rabbah and Rav Yosef were sitting before Rav Nachman, Rava was there as well. The Gemora had stated that they were sitting before Rav Nachman at the conclusion of his lecture. The Likutei Maharil (78) states that whenever the Gemora uses the terminology “b’shilhei pirkei,” “at the conclusion of his lecture,” it means that the Amora was extremely tired and weak from his lecture. The Targum of the word “oyef,” meaning tired, is “shilhei.” Rav Nachman was not involved in the discussion between Rabbah and Rav Yosef when they were citing the braisos. Rava, being a disciple of Rav Nachman, remembered that Rav Nachman had ruled according to Rav Yehudah. Upon hearing the discussion between Rabbah and Rav Yosef, and realizing that the second opinion cited was according to Rav Ami, Rava questioned Rav Nachman: “How can you rule according to Rav Yehudah when the second opinion cited was according to Rav Ami, and the halacha would follow the latter opinion?” Rav Nachman, who was extremely weak, did not respond at all, and Rava himself (or the Gemora) answered that the principle does not apply when the logic follows the other opinion. Since Rav Yehudah’s reasoning is more logical, we rule according to him, even though the braisa supporting Rav Ami was cited second.
Posted by Avromi at 7/08/2007 09:38:00 AM 0 comments
Sunday, November 19, 2006
Daf Yomi - Beitza 24 - Posek Changing his Mind
The Mishna states that there was an incident where a gentile brought a fish to Rabban Gamliel on Yom Tov and Rabban Gamliel ruled that the fish are permitted for use but Rabban Gamliel did not wish to accept the gift from the gentile. The Gemara discusses the reason why Rabban Gamliel permitted the fish for use.
Rav maintains that it was permitted to accept the fish and to handle the fish but the fish were not permitted for consumption. Levi disagrees and maintains that the fish were permitted for consumption.
Rav stated further that a person should not leave the Beis Medrash, even for a moment. Rav related that both he and Levi were in the Beis Medrash when Rebbi ruled on this matter. In the evening Rebbi ruled that it was permitted to eat the fish according to Rabban Gamliel. In the morning, however, Rebbi retracted his ruling and he ruled that one could handle the fish but they could not be eaten. Levi was only in the Beis Medrash in the evening but not in the morning and therefore he did not hear Rebbe's retraction.
Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha cites a similar Gemora in Shabbos (136b) where Ravina quotes Rava retracting his ruling the next morning.
The Noda BiYehudah writes that if a posek rules on a halachic inquiry and his ruling is accepted, the ruling has the effect of two witnesses in court. If one were to claim that the posek retracted his decision, he would not be believed as it is akin to the word of one witness against two witnesses.
Based on his premise, one must wonder how Rav was believed to state that Rebbi retracted his decision in the morning.
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Rav maintains that it was permitted to accept the fish and to handle the fish but the fish were not permitted for consumption. Levi disagrees and maintains that the fish were permitted for consumption.
Rav stated further that a person should not leave the Beis Medrash, even for a moment. Rav related that both he and Levi were in the Beis Medrash when Rebbi ruled on this matter. In the evening Rebbi ruled that it was permitted to eat the fish according to Rabban Gamliel. In the morning, however, Rebbi retracted his ruling and he ruled that one could handle the fish but they could not be eaten. Levi was only in the Beis Medrash in the evening but not in the morning and therefore he did not hear Rebbe's retraction.
Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha cites a similar Gemora in Shabbos (136b) where Ravina quotes Rava retracting his ruling the next morning.
The Noda BiYehudah writes that if a posek rules on a halachic inquiry and his ruling is accepted, the ruling has the effect of two witnesses in court. If one were to claim that the posek retracted his decision, he would not be believed as it is akin to the word of one witness against two witnesses.
Based on his premise, one must wonder how Rav was believed to state that Rebbi retracted his decision in the morning.
Posted by Avromi at 11/19/2006 10:47:00 PM 4 comments
Labels: beitza, daf yomi, halacha, Noda b'Yehudah, posek
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