Showing posts with label bechor. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bechor. Show all posts
Friday, January 29, 2010
Twins, Mathematics and Widow
Unexpected Birth of Twins
by: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi
Our Mishna concerns a person who wants to distribute his estate before his demise. According to Rashbam (s.v. Haomer im), he could be healthy and just wants to grant his future child a certain portion through the offices of a third party or he could be moribund (shechiv mera) and not be expecting to witness his child’s birth, in which case we must obey his wish as it is a mitzvah to execute such a person’s orders. At any rate, the person in question commanded that if his wife bears a son, he gets a maneh (100 zuz) from the estate and if she bears a daughter, the daughter should receive 200 zuz. The Mishna then adds that if she bears “a male and a female,” the son gets a maneh and the daughter 200 zuz.
The Rosh assumes that the Mishna means that she bore twins (Responsa of the Rosh, Kelal 81:2). Rashbam disagrees (s.v. Hachi garsinan im zachar; see Maharsha) and explains that the Mishna merely means that the father expressed both eventualities, but does not discuss the birth of twins. The halachah was ruled according to the Rosh (Shulchan ‘Aruch, C.M. 253:27) and the poskim discuss more questions arising from the unexpected birth of twins.
A Question of Mathematics
About 700 years ago a person commanded just before his demise that if his wife bore a son, he should get two thirds of his estate while the rest should be given to his brothers – the child’s uncles, whereas if she bore a daughter, the daughter should receive one third with the rest going to his brothers. The widow bore twins, a son and a daughter, and the question arose as to how to apportion the estate. If we succeed in understanding the father’s intention, we must divide the estate into sevenths. The son gets four sevenths, the uncles two sevenths altogether and the daughter one seventh. The father, after all, apparently wanted to leave his son twice as much as the uncles – originally giving him two thirds as opposed to one third for the uncles – and the uncles twice as much as his daughter, originally giving her one third and the uncles two thirds. We have no choice, then, but to apportion one seventh to the daughter, two sevenths to the uncles and four sevenths to the son.
This hypothetical solution was suggested to the Rosh (ibid), who ordered the whole estate to be given to the son as the father made no mention of twins! The Rosh assumes that when the father commanded “if my wife bears a son [or daughter],” he meant only a son or only a daughter and the birth of twins therefore invalidates the father’s condition. The son inherits the entire estate as a daughter does not inherit if there is a son and the halachah was ruled accordingly (Shulchan ‘Aruch, ibid, 253:28).
Donating 18 rotel for Lag BaOmer
A certain childless person recently vowed that if his wife would bear a child, he would donate 18 rotel of wine or liquor to be distributed at the tomb of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai in Meiron on Lag BaOmer. Such donations have long been customary as a segula to merit Heavenly favor and are meant to provide sustenance and merrymaking for the many thousands visiting the tomb on that day. A rotel, approximately three liters, was a common measure in the Ottoman era and persists among the descendants of families that settled in Eretz Yisroel centuries ago.
Within a year the person’s wife bore twins and some insisted that he must donate 36 rotel for the double kindness. In fact, however, he had only to give 18, as that was how much he vowed.
HALACHOS FROM THE DAF
Widow vs. Daughter
The Gemora discusses an aspect in the inheritance not mentioned in the Mishna - the widow. Where does she fit into all of this? Would it make a difference if there is a small amount of money or a large amount? Does the money that supports the widow detract from the sons’ portion?
The Shulchan Aruch (Even Ha'ezer Siman 93 Sief 4) has different opinions in a case where there is a widow and daughters, and there isn’t enough to support both the widow and the daughters. The Mechaber is of the opinion that the widow gets supported and the daughters go collecting and of course, the sons too (Bais Shmuel quoting Ran). However the Mechaber cites another opinion (Tosfos) that differentiates between cases where there is a widow and son or daughter, and cases where there is a widow and son and daughter. It is important to note that the widow getting supported is a takanah (rabbinical enactment), while inheritance is m’doiraisa (biblical commandment).
Widow and son or daughter: The child inherits the money and the widow and child support themselves with that. Even if the daughter would get married (and the money belongs to her husband) and even if the married daughter dies, the widow still gets supported from that money.
Widow and son and daughter: In a case of a small inheritance we learned in the previous Mishna that the daughters get supported and the sons go begging. That is a takanah for the daughters that they get supported and not the sons. Therefore in a case where there is not enough money to support both the sons and the daughters, and there is a widow involved, and her getting supported is also a takanah, the problem arises which takanah is stronger? The answer is - the widow’s. She alone gets supported until she collects her kesuvah.
Read more!
by: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi
Our Mishna concerns a person who wants to distribute his estate before his demise. According to Rashbam (s.v. Haomer im), he could be healthy and just wants to grant his future child a certain portion through the offices of a third party or he could be moribund (shechiv mera) and not be expecting to witness his child’s birth, in which case we must obey his wish as it is a mitzvah to execute such a person’s orders. At any rate, the person in question commanded that if his wife bears a son, he gets a maneh (100 zuz) from the estate and if she bears a daughter, the daughter should receive 200 zuz. The Mishna then adds that if she bears “a male and a female,” the son gets a maneh and the daughter 200 zuz.
The Rosh assumes that the Mishna means that she bore twins (Responsa of the Rosh, Kelal 81:2). Rashbam disagrees (s.v. Hachi garsinan im zachar; see Maharsha) and explains that the Mishna merely means that the father expressed both eventualities, but does not discuss the birth of twins. The halachah was ruled according to the Rosh (Shulchan ‘Aruch, C.M. 253:27) and the poskim discuss more questions arising from the unexpected birth of twins.
A Question of Mathematics
About 700 years ago a person commanded just before his demise that if his wife bore a son, he should get two thirds of his estate while the rest should be given to his brothers – the child’s uncles, whereas if she bore a daughter, the daughter should receive one third with the rest going to his brothers. The widow bore twins, a son and a daughter, and the question arose as to how to apportion the estate. If we succeed in understanding the father’s intention, we must divide the estate into sevenths. The son gets four sevenths, the uncles two sevenths altogether and the daughter one seventh. The father, after all, apparently wanted to leave his son twice as much as the uncles – originally giving him two thirds as opposed to one third for the uncles – and the uncles twice as much as his daughter, originally giving her one third and the uncles two thirds. We have no choice, then, but to apportion one seventh to the daughter, two sevenths to the uncles and four sevenths to the son.
This hypothetical solution was suggested to the Rosh (ibid), who ordered the whole estate to be given to the son as the father made no mention of twins! The Rosh assumes that when the father commanded “if my wife bears a son [or daughter],” he meant only a son or only a daughter and the birth of twins therefore invalidates the father’s condition. The son inherits the entire estate as a daughter does not inherit if there is a son and the halachah was ruled accordingly (Shulchan ‘Aruch, ibid, 253:28).
Donating 18 rotel for Lag BaOmer
A certain childless person recently vowed that if his wife would bear a child, he would donate 18 rotel of wine or liquor to be distributed at the tomb of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai in Meiron on Lag BaOmer. Such donations have long been customary as a segula to merit Heavenly favor and are meant to provide sustenance and merrymaking for the many thousands visiting the tomb on that day. A rotel, approximately three liters, was a common measure in the Ottoman era and persists among the descendants of families that settled in Eretz Yisroel centuries ago.
Within a year the person’s wife bore twins and some insisted that he must donate 36 rotel for the double kindness. In fact, however, he had only to give 18, as that was how much he vowed.
HALACHOS FROM THE DAF
Widow vs. Daughter
The Gemora discusses an aspect in the inheritance not mentioned in the Mishna - the widow. Where does she fit into all of this? Would it make a difference if there is a small amount of money or a large amount? Does the money that supports the widow detract from the sons’ portion?
The Shulchan Aruch (Even Ha'ezer Siman 93 Sief 4) has different opinions in a case where there is a widow and daughters, and there isn’t enough to support both the widow and the daughters. The Mechaber is of the opinion that the widow gets supported and the daughters go collecting and of course, the sons too (Bais Shmuel quoting Ran). However the Mechaber cites another opinion (Tosfos) that differentiates between cases where there is a widow and son or daughter, and cases where there is a widow and son and daughter. It is important to note that the widow getting supported is a takanah (rabbinical enactment), while inheritance is m’doiraisa (biblical commandment).
Widow and son or daughter: The child inherits the money and the widow and child support themselves with that. Even if the daughter would get married (and the money belongs to her husband) and even if the married daughter dies, the widow still gets supported from that money.
Widow and son and daughter: In a case of a small inheritance we learned in the previous Mishna that the daughters get supported and the sons go begging. That is a takanah for the daughters that they get supported and not the sons. Therefore in a case where there is not enough money to support both the sons and the daughters, and there is a widow involved, and her getting supported is also a takanah, the problem arises which takanah is stronger? The answer is - the widow’s. She alone gets supported until she collects her kesuvah.
Posted by Avromi at 1/29/2010 06:53:00 AM 0 comments
Labels: bechor, Gemora Bava Basra 140, math, twins, widow
Only Son - Is he a Bechor?
No Path?
The Sages say that if one sells a house, he retains his pit, and a pathway, while if he sells his pit, the buyer must buy access rights. Rabbi Akiva says that if one sells a house, he retains his pit, but not access rights, while if he sells his pit, the buyer gets access rights. The Reshash says that even when one does not get access rights, this simply means that he does not own a path four amos wide to his pit. However, he does have a narrow path to his pit.
The Yad Ramah asks what the buyer of a pit bought according to the Sages, if he does not have access rights. The Yad Ramah says that all the buyer bought was the right to be a bar matzra – a neighbor, with first rights to purchase adjoining land.
The Reshash is inconsistent with this Yad Ramah, since according to the Reshash, the buyer does have access to his pit, albeit in a less comfortable manner.
Does an only Son have
Firstborn Rights?
By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi
In his Devar Avraham (I,27), the Rabbi of Kovno, Rabbi A.D. Kahana-Shapira zt”l raises the question as to if an only son, without brothers, is regarded as a firstborn. In other words, when he inherits his father’s estate, does he do so just as an ordinary son or does he inherit half the estate as an ordinary son and the other half as a firstborn? And if you ask, “What’s the difference? He gets it all anyway!,” the following case shows that this seemingly theoretic inquiry has practical implications.
There used to be a custom to give a daughter a shtar chatzi zachar, a document granting her a portion of her father’s estate equal to half that of a son’s. If a father had, for instance, three sons and a daughter, all the children together would be considered as 3.5 sons and the daughter would get a seventh of the estate in conformity with her status as a chatzi zachar – “half a male.” If, though, he had only one son and a daughter, how much should she get? If the son is not defined as a firstborn, he and his sister are together regarded as 1.5 sons and she receives a third of the estate. If, however, he is also considered a firstborn, he inherits two portions, one as an ordinary son and one as a firstborn: the father is then regarded as having 2.5 sons and the daughter gets only a fifth of the estate.
The question occupied the attention of many halachic authorities, as attested by HaGaon Rav Y.S. Natanson, author of Shoel Umeshiv (Responsa, 1st edition, 123): “HaGaon Rav D. Oppenheim; HaGaon Rav Yonasan – author of Urim VeTumim and then Darshan (exponent) of Prague; the author of Shav Ya’akov and the inquiring rabbis have all failed to find an answer.”
Later poskim, though, have tried to solve the quandary by logical deduction: The Gemora (Bava Basra 124a), after all, defines a firstborn’s rights as a gift, learning from the verse “to give him twice as much” (Devarim 21:17). But who bestows the gift? His father is already deceased so it could be that the gift is bestowed by his brothers and, if he has no brothers, he has no gift and does not inherit a firstborn’s portion (see Responsa ‘Ateres Tzevi, 2).
Read more!
The Sages say that if one sells a house, he retains his pit, and a pathway, while if he sells his pit, the buyer must buy access rights. Rabbi Akiva says that if one sells a house, he retains his pit, but not access rights, while if he sells his pit, the buyer gets access rights. The Reshash says that even when one does not get access rights, this simply means that he does not own a path four amos wide to his pit. However, he does have a narrow path to his pit.
The Yad Ramah asks what the buyer of a pit bought according to the Sages, if he does not have access rights. The Yad Ramah says that all the buyer bought was the right to be a bar matzra – a neighbor, with first rights to purchase adjoining land.
The Reshash is inconsistent with this Yad Ramah, since according to the Reshash, the buyer does have access to his pit, albeit in a less comfortable manner.
Does an only Son have
Firstborn Rights?
By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi
In his Devar Avraham (I,27), the Rabbi of Kovno, Rabbi A.D. Kahana-Shapira zt”l raises the question as to if an only son, without brothers, is regarded as a firstborn. In other words, when he inherits his father’s estate, does he do so just as an ordinary son or does he inherit half the estate as an ordinary son and the other half as a firstborn? And if you ask, “What’s the difference? He gets it all anyway!,” the following case shows that this seemingly theoretic inquiry has practical implications.
There used to be a custom to give a daughter a shtar chatzi zachar, a document granting her a portion of her father’s estate equal to half that of a son’s. If a father had, for instance, three sons and a daughter, all the children together would be considered as 3.5 sons and the daughter would get a seventh of the estate in conformity with her status as a chatzi zachar – “half a male.” If, though, he had only one son and a daughter, how much should she get? If the son is not defined as a firstborn, he and his sister are together regarded as 1.5 sons and she receives a third of the estate. If, however, he is also considered a firstborn, he inherits two portions, one as an ordinary son and one as a firstborn: the father is then regarded as having 2.5 sons and the daughter gets only a fifth of the estate.
The question occupied the attention of many halachic authorities, as attested by HaGaon Rav Y.S. Natanson, author of Shoel Umeshiv (Responsa, 1st edition, 123): “HaGaon Rav D. Oppenheim; HaGaon Rav Yonasan – author of Urim VeTumim and then Darshan (exponent) of Prague; the author of Shav Ya’akov and the inquiring rabbis have all failed to find an answer.”
Later poskim, though, have tried to solve the quandary by logical deduction: The Gemora (Bava Basra 124a), after all, defines a firstborn’s rights as a gift, learning from the verse “to give him twice as much” (Devarim 21:17). But who bestows the gift? His father is already deceased so it could be that the gift is bestowed by his brothers and, if he has no brothers, he has no gift and does not inherit a firstborn’s portion (see Responsa ‘Ateres Tzevi, 2).
Posted by Avromi at 1/29/2010 06:51:00 AM 0 comments
Labels: bechor, Gemora Bava Basra 138
Sunday, December 21, 2008
Conceived First or Born first; Who is the Firstborn?
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The Gemora (Kiddushin 68) states: We have learned that kiddushin does take effect with women that are forbidden merely by a negative commandment. It is written [Devarim 21:15]: If a man has two wives, one beloved, and the other loathed. The Gemora asks: Is there a beloved or loathed wife before Hashem? Rather, the Torah is referring to their marriage. Beloved means that he is married to a permitted woman and loathed means that he is married to a prohibited woman and nevertheless, the Torah states regarding them “If a man has two wives.” We derive from here that if a man marries a woman that is forbidden to him merely by a negative commandment, the Torah recognizes and validates the marriage.
The verse mentioned above continues and states that if the loathed wife becomes the mother of the man’s firstborn son, the father is forbidden to deny that son the right to the double portion and give it instead to the son from the beloved wife.
How can the Torah refer to one of the wives as “a loathed one”? Why would it enter our mind that the father can deprive the son of the loathed one if he in fact is the firstborn? It would seem from the order of the words in the verse that the son of the beloved woman was actually born first.
The following explanation is written in the name of the Gr”a. The Torah is referring to a case where a man divorced a woman and that is why she is called “the loathed one.” He married another woman soon afterwards. His present wife gave birth to a son seven months after the marriage. The divorced woman gave birth to a son after nine months. One might think that the double portion designated for the firstborn should go to the son of the beloved woman because he was born first; the Torah teaches us that this is not the case. Since the son of the loathed woman was conceived first, by rights, he is deserving of the double portion. This is what the Torah means when it says “for he is the first-fruits of his strength.”
There are those (the Netziv) who question if the Gr”a ever said this. One of the questions that they ask is from Rashi in Bereishis (25:26), who writes from a Medrash: The interpretation is in accordance to its simple meaning: Yaakov held onto Esav’s heel lawfully, to restrain him. Yaakov was formed from the first drop and Esav from the second. We can learn from a tube that has a narrow opening. If one would insert two stones into it, one after the other, the one that entered first will emerge last, and the one that entered last will emerge first. The result is that Esav, who was formed last, emerged first, and Yaakov, who was formed first emerged last, and Yaakov came to restrain him so that he should be the first to be born as he was the first to be formed, and he would open her womb and take the birthright by law.
According to the Gr”a, this leaves us with a question: If Yaakov was the true firstborn, why was it necessary for him to purchase the birthright from Esav?
The Kli Chemda differentiates between the birthright for inheritance, which is related to the time of conception (since it is based on a relationship with the father) and between the rights to serve in the Beis Hamikdosh, which is dependent on the time of birth. This is what Yaakov wished to purchase from Esav.
The Gemora (Kiddushin 68) states: We have learned that kiddushin does take effect with women that are forbidden merely by a negative commandment. It is written [Devarim 21:15]: If a man has two wives, one beloved, and the other loathed. The Gemora asks: Is there a beloved or loathed wife before Hashem? Rather, the Torah is referring to their marriage. Beloved means that he is married to a permitted woman and loathed means that he is married to a prohibited woman and nevertheless, the Torah states regarding them “If a man has two wives.” We derive from here that if a man marries a woman that is forbidden to him merely by a negative commandment, the Torah recognizes and validates the marriage.
The verse mentioned above continues and states that if the loathed wife becomes the mother of the man’s firstborn son, the father is forbidden to deny that son the right to the double portion and give it instead to the son from the beloved wife.
How can the Torah refer to one of the wives as “a loathed one”? Why would it enter our mind that the father can deprive the son of the loathed one if he in fact is the firstborn? It would seem from the order of the words in the verse that the son of the beloved woman was actually born first.
The following explanation is written in the name of the Gr”a. The Torah is referring to a case where a man divorced a woman and that is why she is called “the loathed one.” He married another woman soon afterwards. His present wife gave birth to a son seven months after the marriage. The divorced woman gave birth to a son after nine months. One might think that the double portion designated for the firstborn should go to the son of the beloved woman because he was born first; the Torah teaches us that this is not the case. Since the son of the loathed woman was conceived first, by rights, he is deserving of the double portion. This is what the Torah means when it says “for he is the first-fruits of his strength.”
There are those (the Netziv) who question if the Gr”a ever said this. One of the questions that they ask is from Rashi in Bereishis (25:26), who writes from a Medrash: The interpretation is in accordance to its simple meaning: Yaakov held onto Esav’s heel lawfully, to restrain him. Yaakov was formed from the first drop and Esav from the second. We can learn from a tube that has a narrow opening. If one would insert two stones into it, one after the other, the one that entered first will emerge last, and the one that entered last will emerge first. The result is that Esav, who was formed last, emerged first, and Yaakov, who was formed first emerged last, and Yaakov came to restrain him so that he should be the first to be born as he was the first to be formed, and he would open her womb and take the birthright by law.
According to the Gr”a, this leaves us with a question: If Yaakov was the true firstborn, why was it necessary for him to purchase the birthright from Esav?
The Kli Chemda differentiates between the birthright for inheritance, which is related to the time of conception (since it is based on a relationship with the father) and between the rights to serve in the Beis Hamikdosh, which is dependent on the time of birth. This is what Yaakov wished to purchase from Esav.
Read more!
Posted by Avromi at 12/21/2008 06:04:00 PM 0 comments
Labels: bechor, daf yomi, Esav, firstborn, Gemora Kiddushin, Kli Chemda, Vilna Gaon, Yaakov
Sunday, May 27, 2007
Daf Yomi - Yevamos 23 - CONCEIVED FIRST OR BORN FIRST WHO IS THE FIRSTBORN?
The Gemora states: We have learned that kiddushin does take effect with women that are forbidden merely by a negative commandment. It is written [Devarim 21:15]: If a man has two wives, one beloved, and the other loathed. The Gemora asks: Is there a beloved or loathed wife before Hashem? Rather, the Torah is referring to their marriage. Beloved means that he is married to a permitted woman and loathed means that he is married to a prohibited woman and nevertheless, the Torah states regarding them “If a man has two wives.” We derive from here that if a man marries a woman that is forbidden to him merely by a negative commandment, the Torah recognizes and validates the marriage.
The verse mentioned above continues and states that if the loathed wife becomes the mother of the man’s firstborn son, the father is forbidden to deny that son the right to the double portion and give it instead to the son from the beloved wife.
How can the Torah refer to one of the wives as “a loathed one”? Why would it enter our mind that the father can deprive the son of the loathed one if he in fact is the firstborn? It would seem from the order of the words in the verse that the son of the beloved woman was actually born first.
The following explanation is written in the name of the Gra. The Torah is referring to a case where a man divorced a woman and that is why she is called “the loathed one.” He married another woman soon afterwards. His present wife gave birth to a son seven months after the marriage. The divorced woman gave birth to a son after nine months. One might think that the double portion designated for the firstborn should go to the son of the beloved woman because he was born first; the Torah teaches us that this is not the case. Since the son of the loathed woman was conceived first, by rights, he is deserving of the double portion. This is what the Torah means when it says “for he is the first-fruits of his strength.”
There are those (the Netziv) who question if the Gra ever said this. One of the questions that they ask is from Rashi in Bereishis (25:26), who writes from a Medrash: The interpretation is in accordance to its simple meaning: Yaakov held onto Esav’s heel lawfully, to restrain him. Yaakov was formed from the first drop and Esav from the second. We can learn from a tube that has a narrow opening. If one would insert two stones into it, one after the other, the one that entered first will emerge last, and the one that entered last will emerge first. The result is that Esav, who was formed last, emerged first, and Yaakov, who was formed first emerged last, and Yaakov came to restrain him so that he should be the first to be born as he was the first to be formed, and he would open her womb and take the birthright by law.
According to the Gra, this leaves us with a question: If Yaakov was the true firstborn, why was it necessary for him to purchase the birthright from Esav?
The Kli Chemda differentiates between the birthright for inheritance, which is related to the time of conception (since it is based on a relationship with the father) and between the rights to serve in the Beis Hamikdosh, which is dependent on the time of birth. This is what Yaakov wished to purchase from Esav.
Read more!
The verse mentioned above continues and states that if the loathed wife becomes the mother of the man’s firstborn son, the father is forbidden to deny that son the right to the double portion and give it instead to the son from the beloved wife.
How can the Torah refer to one of the wives as “a loathed one”? Why would it enter our mind that the father can deprive the son of the loathed one if he in fact is the firstborn? It would seem from the order of the words in the verse that the son of the beloved woman was actually born first.
The following explanation is written in the name of the Gra. The Torah is referring to a case where a man divorced a woman and that is why she is called “the loathed one.” He married another woman soon afterwards. His present wife gave birth to a son seven months after the marriage. The divorced woman gave birth to a son after nine months. One might think that the double portion designated for the firstborn should go to the son of the beloved woman because he was born first; the Torah teaches us that this is not the case. Since the son of the loathed woman was conceived first, by rights, he is deserving of the double portion. This is what the Torah means when it says “for he is the first-fruits of his strength.”
There are those (the Netziv) who question if the Gra ever said this. One of the questions that they ask is from Rashi in Bereishis (25:26), who writes from a Medrash: The interpretation is in accordance to its simple meaning: Yaakov held onto Esav’s heel lawfully, to restrain him. Yaakov was formed from the first drop and Esav from the second. We can learn from a tube that has a narrow opening. If one would insert two stones into it, one after the other, the one that entered first will emerge last, and the one that entered last will emerge first. The result is that Esav, who was formed last, emerged first, and Yaakov, who was formed first emerged last, and Yaakov came to restrain him so that he should be the first to be born as he was the first to be formed, and he would open her womb and take the birthright by law.
According to the Gra, this leaves us with a question: If Yaakov was the true firstborn, why was it necessary for him to purchase the birthright from Esav?
The Kli Chemda differentiates between the birthright for inheritance, which is related to the time of conception (since it is based on a relationship with the father) and between the rights to serve in the Beis Hamikdosh, which is dependent on the time of birth. This is what Yaakov wished to purchase from Esav.
Posted by Avromi at 5/27/2007 02:54:00 AM 11 comments
Labels: bechor, daf yomi, firstborn, Kli Chemda, Vilna Gaon, yevamos
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