True arithmetic
In mathematical logic, true arithmetic is the set of all true first-order statements about the arithmetic of natural numbers.[1] This is the theory associated with the standard model of the Peano axioms in the language of the first-order Peano axioms. True arithmetic is occasionally called Skolem arithmetic, though this term usually refers to the different theory of natural numbers with multiplication.
Definition
[edit ]The signature of Peano arithmetic includes the addition, multiplication, and successor function symbols, the equality and less-than relation symbols, and a constant symbol for 0. The (well-formed) formulas of the language of first-order arithmetic are built up from these symbols together with the logical symbols in the usual manner of first-order logic.
The structure {\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}} is defined to be a model of Peano arithmetic as follows.
- The domain of discourse is the set {\displaystyle \mathbb {N} } of natural numbers,
- The symbol 0 is interpreted as the number 0,
- The function symbols are interpreted as the usual arithmetical operations on {\displaystyle \mathbb {N} },
- The equality and less-than relation symbols are interpreted as the usual equality and order relation on {\displaystyle \mathbb {N} }.
This structure is known as the standard model or intended interpretation of first-order arithmetic.
A sentence in the language of first-order arithmetic is said to be true in {\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}} if it is true in the structure just defined. The notation {\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}\models \varphi } is used to indicate that the sentence {\displaystyle \varphi } is true in {\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}.}
True arithmetic is defined to be the set of all sentences in the language of first-order arithmetic that are true in {\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}, written Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}). This set is, equivalently, the (complete) theory of the structure {\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}.[2]
Arithmetic undefinability
[edit ]The central result on true arithmetic is the undefinability theorem of Alfred Tarski (1936). It states that the set Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}) is not arithmetically definable. This means that there is no formula {\displaystyle \varphi (x)} in the language of first-order arithmetic such that, for every sentence θ in this language,
- {\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}\models \theta \quad {\text{if and only if}}\quad {\mathcal {N}}\models \varphi ({\underline {\#(\theta )}}).}
Here {\displaystyle {\underline {\#(\theta )}}} is the numeral of the canonical Gödel number of the sentence θ.
Post's theorem is a sharper version of the undefinability theorem that shows a relationship between the definability of Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}) and the Turing degrees, using the arithmetical hierarchy. For each natural number n, let Thn({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}) be the subset of Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}) consisting of only sentences that are {\displaystyle \Sigma _{n}^{0}} or lower in the arithmetical hierarchy. Post's theorem shows that, for each n, Thn({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}) is arithmetically definable, but only by a formula of complexity higher than {\displaystyle \Sigma _{n}^{0}}. Thus no single formula can define Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}), because
- {\displaystyle {\mbox{Th}}({\mathcal {N}})=\bigcup _{n\in \mathbb {N} }{\mbox{Th}}_{n}({\mathcal {N}})}
but no single formula can define Thn({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}) for arbitrarily large n.
Computability properties
[edit ]As discussed above, Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}) is not arithmetically definable, by Tarski's theorem. A corollary of Post's theorem establishes that the Turing degree of Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}) is 0(ω), and so Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}) is not decidable nor recursively enumerable.
Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}) is closely related to the theory Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {R}}}) of the recursively enumerable Turing degrees, in the signature of partial orders.[3] In particular, there are computable functions S and T such that:
- For each sentence φ in the signature of first-order arithmetic, φ is in Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}) if and only if S(φ) is in Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {R}}}).
- For each sentence ψ in the signature of partial orders, ψ is in Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {R}}}) if and only if T(ψ) is in Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}).
Model-theoretic properties
[edit ]True arithmetic is an unstable theory, and so has {\displaystyle 2^{\kappa }} models for each uncountable cardinal {\displaystyle \kappa }. As there are continuum many types over the empty set, true arithmetic also has {\displaystyle 2^{\aleph _{0}}} countable models. Since the theory is complete, all of its models are elementarily equivalent.
True theory of second-order arithmetic
[edit ]The true theory of second-order arithmetic consists of all the sentences in the language of second-order arithmetic that are satisfied by the standard model of second-order arithmetic, whose first-order part is the structure {\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}} and whose second-order part consists of every subset of {\displaystyle \mathbb {N} }.
The true theory of first-order arithmetic, Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}), is a subset of the true theory of second-order arithmetic, and Th({\displaystyle {\mathcal {N}}}) is definable in second-order arithmetic. However, the generalization of Post's theorem to the analytical hierarchy shows that the true theory of second-order arithmetic is not definable by any single formula in second-order arithmetic.
Simpson (1977) has shown that the true theory of second-order arithmetic is computably interpretable with the theory of the partial order of all Turing degrees, in the signature of partial orders, and vice versa.
Notes
[edit ]- ^ Boolos, Burgess & Jeffrey 2002, p. 295
- ^ see theories associated with a structure
- ^ Shore 2011, p. 184
References
[edit ]- Boolos, George; Burgess, John P.; Jeffrey, Richard C. (2002), Computability and logic (4th ed.), Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-00758-0 .
- Bovykin, Andrey; Kaye, Richard (2001), "On order-types of models of arithmetic", in Zhang, Yi (ed.), Logic and algebra, Contemporary Mathematics, vol. 302, American Mathematical Society, pp. 275–285, ISBN 978-0-8218-2984-4 .
- Shore, Richard (2011), "The recursively enumerable degrees", in Griffor, E.R. (ed.), Handbook of Computability Theory, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, vol. 140, North-Holland (published 1999), pp. 169–197, ISBN 978-0-444-54701-9 .
- Simpson, Stephen G. (1977), "First-order theory of the degrees of recursive unsolvability", Annals of Mathematics , Second Series, 105 (1), Annals of Mathematics: 121–139, doi:10.2307/1971028, ISSN 0003-486X, JSTOR 1971028, MR 0432435
- Tarski, Alfred (1936), "Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen". An English translation "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages" appears in Corcoran, J., ed. (1983), Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938 (2nd ed.), Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., ISBN 978-0-915144-75-4