Improperly handled case sensitive data can lead to several possible consequences, including:
| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
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Bypass Protection Mechanism |
Scope: Access Control |
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
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Architecture and Design |
Strategy: Input Validation Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if those resources can have alternate names.
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Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. |
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Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
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| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 706 | Use of Incorrectly-Resolved Name or Reference |
| PeerOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 1289 | Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input |
| CanPrecede | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 289 | Authentication Bypass by Alternate Name |
| CanPrecede | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 433 | Unparsed Raw Web Content Delivery |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 19 | Data Processing Errors |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 706 | Use of Incorrectly-Resolved Name or Reference |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Implementation |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
In the following example, an XSS neutralization method intends to replace script tags in user-supplied input with a safe equivalent:
The code only works when the "script" tag is in all lower-case, forming an incomplete denylist (CWE-184). Equivalent tags such as "SCRIPT" or "ScRiPt" will not be neutralized by this method, allowing an XSS attack.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
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Application server allows attackers to bypass execution of a jsp page and read the source code using an upper case JSP extension in the request.
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The server is case sensitive, so filetype handlers treat .jsp and .JSP as different extensions. JSP source code may be read because .JSP defaults to the filetype "text".
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The server is case sensitive, so filetype handlers treat .jsp and .JSP as different extensions. JSP source code may be read because .JSP defaults to the filetype "text".
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A URL that contains some characters whose case is not matched by the server's filters may bypass access restrictions because the case-insensitive file system will then handle the request after it bypasses the case sensitive filter.
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Server allows remote attackers to obtain source code of CGI scripts via URLs that contain MS-DOS conventions such as (1) upper case letters or (2) 8.3 file names.
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Task Manager does not allow local users to end processes with uppercase letters named (1) winlogon.exe, (2) csrss.exe, (3) smss.exe and (4) services.exe via the Process tab which could allow local users to install Trojan horses that cannot be stopped.
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chain: Code was ported from a case-sensitive Unix platform to a case-insensitive Windows platform where filetype handlers treat .jsp and .JSP as different extensions. JSP source code may be read because .JSP defaults to the filetype "text".
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Leads to interpretation error
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Directories may be listed because lower case web requests are not properly handled by the server.
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File extension check in forum software only verifies extensions that contain all lowercase letters, which allows remote attackers to upload arbitrary files via file extensions that include uppercase letters.
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Web server restricts access to files in a case sensitive manner, but the filesystem accesses files in a case insensitive manner, which allows remote attackers to read privileged files using alternate capitalization.
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Case insensitive passwords lead to search space reduction.
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HTTP server allows bypass of access restrictions using URIs with mixed case.
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Mixed upper/lowercase allows bypass of ACLs.
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Bypass malicious script detection by using tokens that aren't case sensitive.
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Mixed case problem allows "admin" to have "Admin" rights (alternate name property).
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Chain: uppercase file extensions causes web server to return script source code instead of executing the script.
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| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 992 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Input Transformation |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1416 | Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.Research Gap
| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLOVER | Case Sensitivity (lowercase, uppercase, mixed case) |
| Submissions | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
PLOVER | ||
| Modifications | |||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | |
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Mapping_Notes | |||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2023年01月31日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description | |||
| 2022年10月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples | |||
| 2021年03月15日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | |||
| 2020年06月25日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | |||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | |||
| 2019年06月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Affected_Resources, Applicable_Platforms, Functional_Areas, Relationships | |||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples, Relationships | |||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences | |||
| 2011年03月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2010年12月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Name | |||
| 2010年06月21日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | |||
| 2009年07月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2009年03月10日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description | |||
| 2008年11月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples | |||
| 2008年10月14日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples | |||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Relationships, Observed_Example, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2008年07月01日 | Eric Dalci | Cigital | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction | |||
| 2008年07月01日 | Sean Eidemiller | Cigital | |
| added/updated demonstrative examples | |||
| Previous Entry Names | |||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | ||
| 2008年04月11日 | Case Sensitivity (Lowercase, Uppercase, Mixed Case) | ||
| 2010年12月13日 | Failure to Resolve Case Sensitivity | ||
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