| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Bypass Protection Mechanism |
Scope: Access Control |
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Architecture and Design |
Strategy: Input Validation Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if those resources can have alternate names.
|
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. |
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 1390 | Weak Authentication |
| CanFollow | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 46 | Path Equivalence: 'filename ' (Trailing Space) |
| CanFollow | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 52 | Path Equivalence: '/multiple/trailing/slash//' |
| CanFollow | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 173 | Improper Handling of Alternate Encoding |
| CanFollow | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 178 | Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1211 | Authentication Errors |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1010 | Authenticate Actors |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic. |
| Implementation |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
Protection mechanism that restricts URL access can be bypassed using URL encoding.
|
|
|
Bypass of authentication for files using "\" (backslash) or "%5C" (encoded backslash).
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 845 | The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 2 - Input Validation and Data Sanitization (IDS) |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 947 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Authentication Bypass |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1134 | SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 00. Input Validation and Data Sanitization (IDS) |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1396 | Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.Relationship
Theoretical
| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLOVER | Authentication bypass by alternate name | ||
| The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) | IDS01-J | CWE More Specific | Normalize strings before validating them |
| SEI CERT Oracle Coding Standard for Java | IDS01-J | CWE More Specific | Normalize strings before validating them |
| Submissions | ||
|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
PLOVER | |
| Modifications | ||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Mapping_Notes | ||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2023年01月31日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description, Type | ||
| 2022年10月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2020年06月25日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | ||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | ||
| 2019年01月03日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | ||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships | ||
| 2017年05月03日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | ||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | ||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | ||
| 2011年03月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | ||
| 2009年07月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Theoretical_Notes | ||
| 2008年11月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Observed_Examples | ||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings | ||
| 2008年07月01日 | Eric Dalci | Cigital |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction | ||
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