http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:https://www.trustedcomputinggrou(...) TCG features could potentially enable a situation in which users are essentially
“forced” to use the TCG mechanism in order to have access to a set of services. This could result from “bundling” — where a single large provider of services could use the combination of its role as a major provider with the TCG remote attestation
capability to ensure that the user is employing a configuration that the provider
insists upon, even when there is no security reason for such a choice. Another
situation that can arise is where a significant portion of the providers of a particular
service could use their market clout (the fact that they constitute a majority of
providers of that particular type of service) to essentially force the use of TPM
Alors je t'explique: another cela veut dire une autre situation.
Par remote attestation ils n'entendent donc simplement pas le fait de forcer quelqu'un à montrer qu'il a TPM mais bien de forcer quelqu'un à montrer les hash de sa configuration.
[^] # Re: "remote attestation" avouée par TCG et aussi par IBM, refuser = gagn
Posté par free2.org . En réponse à la dépêche Sortie de Linux 2.6.12. Évalué à 2.
TCG features could potentially enable a situation in which users are essentially
“forced” to use the TCG mechanism in order to have access to a set of services. This could result from “bundling” — where a single large provider of services could use the combination of its role as a major provider with the TCG remote attestation
capability to ensure that the user is employing a configuration that the provider
insists upon, even when there is no security reason for such a choice. Another
situation that can arise is where a significant portion of the providers of a particular
service could use their market clout (the fact that they constitute a majority of
providers of that particular type of service) to essentially force the use of TPM
Alors je t'explique: another cela veut dire une autre situation.
Par remote attestation ils n'entendent donc simplement pas le fait de forcer quelqu'un à montrer qu'il a TPM mais bien de forcer quelqu'un à montrer les hash de sa configuration.
Ces hashs sont d'ailleurs aussi évoqués par ce white paper d'IBM, pourtant destiné à faire la promotion de TCPA:
http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa/tcpa_rebuttal.pdf(...)