extraits de documents maintenant retirés du site officiel TCPA (les anciennes adresses sont fournies, des copies existent, et de nombreux témoins les ont lu)
lire ma conclusion tout en bas
www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/14_industry_1.pdf
hashing is employed to extend trust
from the BIOS to other areas of the
platform, in the following simplified
sequence:
1. The PC is turned-on.
2. The TCPA-compliant "BIOS Boot
Block" and TPM have a "conversa-
tion."This attests that the BIOS can
be trusted.
3. BIOS queries to ensure that user is
authorized to use the platform.
4. The BIOS then has a "conversa-
tion" with the operating system
(OS) loader and the TPM. This
attests that the OS loader can be
trusted.
---------------------------------------------
1.2.5 Initial Program Loader (IPL)
Start of informative comment:
This is the code that executes during the Post-Boot state. The purpose of this code is to load the
Post-Boot environment.
End of informative comment
page 9 du pdf PC
-------------------------
www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TCPA_PCSpecificSpecification_v100.pdf
Entities to be Measured:
· Each IPL that is attempted and executed.
page 20 du pdf
---------------------------
2.1.2 Transferring Control
Prior to transferring control an executing entity MUST measure the entity to which it will transfer
control.
pdf PC
------------
page 24 PC
In general, any
code that is loaded and jumped to from the BIOS must be hashed and extended into PCR[4] prior to
turning control of the system over to that code. The BIOS MUST not hash any data areas.
---------------------------------------------------
tout cela sert à stocker un checksum de l'OS loader qui pourra ensuite être signé par la la puce TCG et envoyé à un tiers pour qu'il soit sûr de l'OS qu'on utilise actuellement (j'ai deja donné l'algo exact utilisé tout à l'heure dans des réponses à cet article)
[^] # identification de l'OS : les preuves
Posté par free2.org . En réponse à la dépêche TCPA/Palladium continuent d'avancer. Évalué à 1.
lire ma conclusion tout en bas
www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/14_industry_1.pdf
hashing is employed to extend trust
from the BIOS to other areas of the
platform, in the following simplified
sequence:
1. The PC is turned-on.
2. The TCPA-compliant "BIOS Boot
Block" and TPM have a "conversa-
tion."This attests that the BIOS can
be trusted.
3. BIOS queries to ensure that user is
authorized to use the platform.
4. The BIOS then has a "conversa-
tion" with the operating system
(OS) loader and the TPM. This
attests that the OS loader can be
trusted.
---------------------------------------------
1.2.5 Initial Program Loader (IPL)
Start of informative comment:
This is the code that executes during the Post-Boot state. The purpose of this code is to load the
Post-Boot environment.
End of informative comment
page 9 du pdf PC
-------------------------
www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TCPA_PCSpecificSpecification_v100.pdf
Entities to be Measured:
· Each IPL that is attempted and executed.
page 20 du pdf
---------------------------
2.1.2 Transferring Control
Prior to transferring control an executing entity MUST measure the entity to which it will transfer
control.
pdf PC
------------
page 24 PC
In general, any
code that is loaded and jumped to from the BIOS must be hashed and extended into PCR[4] prior to
turning control of the system over to that code. The BIOS MUST not hash any data areas.
---------------------------------------------------
tout cela sert à stocker un checksum de l'OS loader qui pourra ensuite être signé par la la puce TCG et envoyé à un tiers pour qu'il soit sûr de l'OS qu'on utilise actuellement (j'ai deja donné l'algo exact utilisé tout à l'heure dans des réponses à cet article)