draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-25

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HTTPbis Working Group R. Fielding, Ed.
Internet-Draft Adobe
Obsoletes: 2616 (if approved) J. Reschke, Ed.
Updates: 2617 (if approved) greenbytes
Intended status: Standards Track November 17, 2013
Expires: May 21, 2014
 Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication
 draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-25
Abstract
 The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-level
 protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypermedia information
 systems. This document defines the HTTP Authentication framework.
Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
 Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTPBIS working group
 mailing list (ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at
 <http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/>.
 The current issues list is at
 <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/report/3> and related
 documents (including fancy diffs) can be found at
 <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/>.
 The changes in this draft are summarized in Appendix D.1.
Status of This Memo
 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
 This Internet-Draft will expire on May 21, 2014.
Copyright Notice
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 Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors. All rights reserved.
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 This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
 Contributions published or made publicly available before November
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 material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
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 Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
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Table of Contents
 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
 1.1. Conformance and Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
 1.2. Syntax Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
 2. Access Authentication Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
 2.1. Challenge and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
 2.2. Protection Space (Realm) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
 3. Status Code Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
 3.1. 401 Unauthorized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
 3.2. 407 Proxy Authentication Required . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
 4. Header Field Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
 4.1. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
 4.2. Proxy-Authenticate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
 4.3. Proxy-Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
 4.4. WWW-Authenticate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
 5.1. Authentication Scheme Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
 5.1.1. Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
 5.1.2. Considerations for New Authentication Schemes . . . . 10
 5.2. Status Code Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
 5.3. Header Field Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 6.1. Authentication Credentials and Idle Clients . . . . . . . 12
 6.2. Protection Spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 Appendix A. Changes from RFCs 2616 and 2617 . . . . . . . . . . . 15
 Appendix B. Imported ABNF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
 Appendix C. Collected ABNF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
 Appendix D. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before
 publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
 D.1. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-24 . . . . . . . . . . . 16
 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Introduction
 This document defines HTTP/1.1 access control and authentication. It
 includes the relevant parts of RFC 2616 with only minor changes
 ([RFC2616]), plus the general framework for HTTP authentication, as
 previously defined in "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access
 Authentication" ([RFC2617]).
 HTTP provides several OPTIONAL challenge-response authentication
 schemes that can be used by a server to challenge a client request
 and by a client to provide authentication information. The "basic"
 and "digest" authentication schemes continue to be specified in RFC
 2617.
1.1. Conformance and Error Handling
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
 Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are
 defined in Section 2.5 of [Part1].
1.2. Syntax Notation
 This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
 notation of [RFC5234] with the list rule extension defined in Section
 7 of [Part1]. Appendix B describes rules imported from other
 documents. Appendix C shows the collected ABNF with the list rule
 expanded.
2. Access Authentication Framework
2.1. Challenge and Response
 HTTP provides a simple challenge-response authentication framework
 that can be used by a server to challenge a client request and by a
 client to provide authentication information. It uses a case-
 insensitive token as a means to identify the authentication scheme,
 followed by additional information necessary for achieving
 authentication via that scheme. The latter can either be a comma-
 separated list of parameters or a single sequence of characters
 capable of holding base64-encoded information.
 Parameters are name-value pairs where the name is matched case-
 insensitively, and each parameter name MUST only occur once per
 challenge.
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 auth-scheme = token
 auth-param = token BWS "=" BWS ( token / quoted-string )
 token68 = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT /
 "-" / "." / "_" / "~" / "+" / "/" ) *"="
 The "token68" syntax allows the 66 unreserved URI characters
 ([RFC3986]), plus a few others, so that it can hold a base64,
 base64url (URL and filename safe alphabet), base32, or base16 (hex)
 encoding, with or without padding, but excluding whitespace
 ([RFC4648]).
 The 401 (Unauthorized) response message is used by an origin server
 to challenge the authorization of a user agent. This response MUST
 include a WWW-Authenticate header field containing at least one
 challenge applicable to the requested resource.
 The 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response message is used by a
 proxy to challenge the authorization of a client and MUST include a
 Proxy-Authenticate header field containing at least one challenge
 applicable to the proxy for the requested resource.
 challenge = auth-scheme [ 1*SP ( token68 / #auth-param ) ]
 Note: Many clients fail to parse challenges containing unknown
 schemes. A workaround for this problem is to list well-supported
 schemes (such as "basic") first.
 A user agent that wishes to authenticate itself with an origin server
 -- usually, but not necessarily, after receiving a 401 (Unauthorized)
 -- can do so by including an Authorization header field with the
 request.
 A client that wishes to authenticate itself with a proxy -- usually,
 but not necessarily, after receiving a 407 (Proxy Authentication
 Required) -- can do so by including a Proxy-Authorization header
 field with the request.
 Both the Authorization field value and the Proxy-Authorization field
 value contain the client's credentials for the realm of the resource
 being requested, based upon a challenge received in a response
 (possibly at some point in the past). When creating their values,
 the user agent ought to do so by selecting the challenge with what it
 considers to be the most secure auth-scheme that it understands,
 obtaining credentials from the user as appropriate.
 credentials = auth-scheme [ 1*SP ( token68 / #auth-param ) ]
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 Upon receipt of a request for a protected resource that omits
 credentials, contains invalid credentials (e.g., a bad password) or
 partial credentials (e.g., when the authentication scheme requires
 more than one round trip), an origin server SHOULD send a 401
 (Unauthorized) response that contains a WWW-Authenticate header field
 with at least one (possibly new) challenge applicable to the
 requested resource.
 Likewise, upon receipt of a request that requires authentication by
 proxies that omit credentials or contain invalid or partial
 credentials, a proxy SHOULD send a 407 (Proxy Authentication
 Required) response that contains a Proxy-Authenticate header field
 with a (possibly new) challenge applicable to the proxy.
 A server receiving credentials that are valid, but not adequate to
 gain access, ought to respond with the 403 (Forbidden) status code
 (Section 6.5.3 of [Part2]).
 HTTP does not restrict applications to this simple challenge-response
 framework for access authentication. Additional mechanisms can be
 used, such as authentication at the transport level or via message
 encapsulation, and with additional header fields specifying
 authentication information. However, such additional mechanisms are
 not defined by this specification.
 A proxy MUST forward the WWW-Authenticate and Authorization header
 fields unmodified and follow the rules found in Section 4.1.
2.2. Protection Space (Realm)
 The authentication parameter realm is reserved for use by
 authentication schemes that wish to indicate the scope of protection.
 A protection space is defined by the canonical root URI (the scheme
 and authority components of the effective request URI; see Section
 5.5 of [Part1]) of the server being accessed, in combination with the
 realm value if present. These realms allow the protected resources
 on a server to be partitioned into a set of protection spaces, each
 with its own authentication scheme and/or authorization database.
 The realm value is a string, generally assigned by the origin server,
 which can have additional semantics specific to the authentication
 scheme. Note that a response can have multiple challenges with the
 same auth-scheme but different realms.
 The protection space determines the domain over which credentials can
 be automatically applied. If a prior request has been authorized,
 the user agent MAY reuse the same credentials for all other requests
 within that protection space for a period of time determined by the
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 authentication scheme, parameters, and/or user preferences (such as a
 configurable inactivity timeout). Unless specifically allowed by the
 authentication scheme, a single protection space cannot extend
 outside the scope of its server.
 For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted-string
 syntax. Recipients might have to support both token and quoted-
 string syntax for maximum interoperability with existing clients that
 have been accepting both notations for a long time.
3. Status Code Definitions
3.1. 401 Unauthorized
 The 401 (Unauthorized) status code indicates that the request has not
 been applied because it lacks valid authentication credentials for
 the target resource. The origin server MUST send a WWW-Authenticate
 header field (Section 4.4) containing at least one challenge
 applicable to the target resource. If the request included
 authentication credentials, then the 401 response indicates that
 authorization has been refused for those credentials. The user agent
 MAY repeat the request with a new or replaced Authorization header
 field (Section 4.1). If the 401 response contains the same challenge
 as the prior response, and the user agent has already attempted
 authentication at least once, then the user agent SHOULD present the
 enclosed representation to the user, since it usually contains
 relevant diagnostic information.
3.2. 407 Proxy Authentication Required
 The 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) status code is similar to 401
 (Unauthorized), but indicates that the client needs to authenticate
 itself in order to use a proxy. The proxy MUST send a Proxy-
 Authenticate header field (Section 4.2) containing a challenge
 applicable to that proxy for the target resource. The client MAY
 repeat the request with a new or replaced Proxy-Authorization header
 field (Section 4.3).
4. Header Field Definitions
 This section defines the syntax and semantics of HTTP/1.1 header
 fields related to authentication.
4.1. Authorization
 The "Authorization" header field allows a user agent to authenticate
 itself with an origin server -- usually, but not necessarily, after
 receiving a 401 (Unauthorized) response. Its value consists of
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 credentials containing the authentication information of the user
 agent for the realm of the resource being requested.
 Authorization = credentials
 If a request is authenticated and a realm specified, the same
 credentials are presumed to be valid for all other requests within
 this realm (assuming that the authentication scheme itself does not
 require otherwise, such as credentials that vary according to a
 challenge value or using synchronized clocks).
 See Section 3.2 of [Part6] for details of and requirements pertaining
 to handling of the Authorization field by HTTP caches.
4.2. Proxy-Authenticate
 The "Proxy-Authenticate" header field consists of at least one
 challenge that indicates the authentication scheme(s) and parameters
 applicable to the proxy for this effective request URI (Section 5.5
 of [Part1]). It MUST be included as part of a 407 (Proxy
 Authentication Required) response.
 Proxy-Authenticate = 1#challenge
 Unlike WWW-Authenticate, the Proxy-Authenticate header field applies
 only to the next outbound client on the response chain that chose to
 direct its request to the responding proxy. If that recipient is
 also a proxy, it will generally consume the Proxy-Authenticate header
 field (and generate an appropriate Proxy-Authorization in a
 subsequent request) rather than forward the header field to its own
 outbound clients. However, if a recipient proxy needs to obtain its
 own credentials by requesting them from a further outbound client, it
 will generate its own 407 response, which might have the appearance
 of forwarding the Proxy-Authenticate header field if both proxies use
 the same challenge set.
 Note that the parsing considerations for WWW-Authenticate apply to
 this header field as well; see Section 4.4 for details.
4.3. Proxy-Authorization
 The "Proxy-Authorization" header field allows the client to identify
 itself (or its user) to a proxy that requires authentication. Its
 value consists of credentials containing the authentication
 information of the client for the proxy and/or realm of the resource
 being requested.
 Proxy-Authorization = credentials
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 Unlike Authorization, the Proxy-Authorization header field applies
 only to the next inbound proxy that demanded authentication using the
 Proxy-Authenticate field. When multiple proxies are used in a chain,
 the Proxy-Authorization header field is consumed by the first inbound
 proxy that was expecting to receive credentials. A proxy MAY relay
 the credentials from the client request to the next proxy if that is
 the mechanism by which the proxies cooperatively authenticate a given
 request.
4.4. WWW-Authenticate
 The "WWW-Authenticate" header field consists of at least one
 challenge that indicates the authentication scheme(s) and parameters
 applicable to the effective request URI (Section 5.5 of [Part1]).
 It MUST be included in 401 (Unauthorized) response messages and MAY
 be included in other response messages to indicate that supplying
 credentials (or different credentials) might affect the response.
 WWW-Authenticate = 1#challenge
 User agents are advised to take special care in parsing the field
 value, as it might contain more than one challenge, and each
 challenge can contain a comma-separated list of authentication
 parameters. Furthermore, the header field itself can occur multiple
 times.
 For instance:
 WWW-Authenticate: Newauth realm="apps", type=1,
 title="Login to \"apps\"", Basic realm="simple"
 This header field contains two challenges; one for the "Newauth"
 scheme with a realm value of "apps", and two additional parameters
 "type" and "title", and another one for the "Basic" scheme with a
 realm value of "simple".
 Note: The challenge grammar production uses the list syntax as
 well. Therefore, a sequence of comma, whitespace, and comma can
 be considered either as applying to the preceding challenge, or to
 be an empty entry in the list of challenges. In practice, this
 ambiguity does not affect the semantics of the header field value
 and thus is harmless.
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5. IANA Considerations
5.1. Authentication Scheme Registry
 The HTTP Authentication Scheme Registry defines the name space for
 the authentication schemes in challenges and credentials. It will be
 created and maintained at (the suggested URI)
 <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-authschemes>.
5.1.1. Procedure
 Registrations MUST include the following fields:
 o Authentication Scheme Name
 o Pointer to specification text
 o Notes (optional)
 Values to be added to this name space require IETF Review (see
 [RFC5226], Section 4.1).
5.1.2. Considerations for New Authentication Schemes
 There are certain aspects of the HTTP Authentication Framework that
 put constraints on how new authentication schemes can work:
 o HTTP authentication is presumed to be stateless: all of the
 information necessary to authenticate a request MUST be provided
 in the request, rather than be dependent on the server remembering
 prior requests. Authentication based on, or bound to, the
 underlying connection is outside the scope of this specification
 and inherently flawed unless steps are taken to ensure that the
 connection cannot be used by any party other than the
 authenticated user (see Section 2.3 of [Part1]).
 o The authentication parameter "realm" is reserved for defining
 Protection Spaces as defined in Section 2.2. New schemes MUST NOT
 use it in a way incompatible with that definition.
 o The "token68" notation was introduced for compatibility with
 existing authentication schemes and can only be used once per
 challenge or credential. New schemes thus ought to use the "auth-
 param" syntax instead, because otherwise future extensions will be
 impossible.
 o The parsing of challenges and credentials is defined by this
 specification, and cannot be modified by new authentication
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 schemes. When the auth-param syntax is used, all parameters ought
 to support both token and quoted-string syntax, and syntactical
 constraints ought to be defined on the field value after parsing
 (i.e., quoted-string processing). This is necessary so that
 recipients can use a generic parser that applies to all
 authentication schemes.
 Note: The fact that the value syntax for the "realm" parameter is
 restricted to quoted-string was a bad design choice not to be
 repeated for new parameters.
 o Definitions of new schemes ought to define the treatment of
 unknown extension parameters. In general, a "must-ignore" rule is
 preferable over "must-understand", because otherwise it will be
 hard to introduce new parameters in the presence of legacy
 recipients. Furthermore, it's good to describe the policy for
 defining new parameters (such as "update the specification", or
 "use this registry").
 o Authentication schemes need to document whether they are usable in
 origin-server authentication (i.e., using WWW-Authenticate),
 and/or proxy authentication (i.e., using Proxy-Authenticate).
 o The credentials carried in an Authorization header field are
 specific to the User Agent, and therefore have the same effect on
 HTTP caches as the "private" Cache-Control response directive
 (Section 5.2.2.6 of [Part6]), within the scope of the request they
 appear in.
 Therefore, new authentication schemes that choose not to carry
 credentials in the Authorization header field (e.g., using a newly
 defined header field) will need to explicitly disallow caching, by
 mandating the use of either Cache-Control request directives
 (e.g., "no-store", Section 5.2.1.5 of [Part6]) or response
 directives (e.g., "private").
5.2. Status Code Registration
 The HTTP Status Code Registry located at
 <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-status-codes> shall be updated
 with the registrations below:
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 +-------+-------------------------------+-------------+
 | Value | Description | Reference |
 +-------+-------------------------------+-------------+
 | 401 | Unauthorized | Section 3.1 |
 | 407 | Proxy Authentication Required | Section 3.2 |
 +-------+-------------------------------+-------------+
5.3. Header Field Registration
 HTTP header fields are registered within the Message Header Field
 Registry maintained at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/
 message-headers/message-header-index.html>.
 This document defines the following HTTP header fields, so their
 associated registry entries shall be updated according to the
 permanent registrations below (see [BCP90]):
 +---------------------+----------+----------+-------------+
 | Header Field Name | Protocol | Status | Reference |
 +---------------------+----------+----------+-------------+
 | Authorization | http | standard | Section 4.1 |
 | Proxy-Authenticate | http | standard | Section 4.2 |
 | Proxy-Authorization | http | standard | Section 4.3 |
 | WWW-Authenticate | http | standard | Section 4.4 |
 +---------------------+----------+----------+-------------+
 The change controller is: "IETF (iesg@ietf.org) - Internet
 Engineering Task Force".
6. Security Considerations
 This section is meant to inform developers, information providers,
 and users of known security concerns specific to HTTP/1.1
 authentication. More general security considerations are addressed
 in HTTP messaging [Part1] and semantics [Part2].
6.1. Authentication Credentials and Idle Clients
 Existing HTTP clients and user agents typically retain authentication
 information indefinitely. HTTP does not provide a mechanism for the
 origin server to direct clients to discard these cached credentials,
 since the protocol has no awareness of how credentials are obtained
 or managed by the user agent. The mechanisms for expiring or
 revoking credentials can be specified as part of an authentication
 scheme definition.
 Circumstances under which credential caching can interfere with the
 application's security model include but are not limited to:
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 o Clients that have been idle for an extended period, following
 which the server might wish to cause the client to re-prompt the
 user for credentials.
 o Applications that include a session termination indication (such
 as a "logout" or "commit" button on a page) after which the server
 side of the application "knows" that there is no further reason
 for the client to retain the credentials.
 User agents that cache credentials are encouraged to provide a
 readily accessible mechanism for discarding cached credentials under
 user control.
6.2. Protection Spaces
 Authentication schemes that solely rely on the "realm" mechanism for
 establishing a protection space will expose credentials to all
 resources on an origin server. Clients that have successfully made
 authenticated requests with a resource can use the same
 authentication credentials for other resources on the same origin
 server. This makes it possible for a different resource to harvest
 authentication credentials for other resources.
 This is of particular concern when an origin server hosts resources
 for multiple parties under the same canonical root URI (Section 2.2).
 Possible mitigation strategies include restricting direct access to
 authentication credentials (i.e., not making the content of the
 Authorization request header field available), and separating
 protection spaces by using a different host name (or port number) for
 each party.
7. Acknowledgments
 This specification takes over the definition of the HTTP
 Authentication Framework, previously defined in RFC 2617. We thank
 John Franks, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker, Jeffery L. Hostetler, Scott D.
 Lawrence, Paul J. Leach, Ari Luotonen, and Lawrence C. Stewart for
 their work on that specification. See Section 6 of [RFC2617] for
 further acknowledgements.
 See Section 10 of [Part1] for the Acknowledgments related to this
 document revision.
8. References
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8.1. Normative References
 [Part1] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
 draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-25 (work in progress),
 November 2013.
 [Part2] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content",
 draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-25 (work in progress),
 November 2013.
 [Part6] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
 Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
 draft-ietf-httpbis-p6-cache-25 (work in progress),
 November 2013.
 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
 Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
8.2. Informative References
 [BCP90] Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration
 Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864,
 September 2004.
 [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
 Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
 Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
 [RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
 Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
 Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
 RFC 2617, June 1999.
 [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
 RFC 3986, January 2005.
 [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
 Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
 May 2008.
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Appendix A. Changes from RFCs 2616 and 2617
 The framework for HTTP Authentication is now defined by this
 document, rather than RFC 2617.
 The "realm" parameter is no longer always required on challenges;
 consequently, the ABNF allows challenges without any auth parameters.
 (Section 2)
 The "token68" alternative to auth-param lists has been added for
 consistency with legacy authentication schemes such as "Basic".
 (Section 2)
 This specification introduces the Authentication Scheme Registry,
 along with considerations for new authentication schemes.
 (Section 5.1)
Appendix B. Imported ABNF
 The following core rules are included by reference, as defined in
 Appendix B.1 of [RFC5234]: ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return),
 CRLF (CR LF), CTL (controls), DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double
 quote), HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9/A-F/a-f), LF (line feed), OCTET (any
 8-bit sequence of data), SP (space), and VCHAR (any visible US-ASCII
 character).
 The rules below are defined in [Part1]:
 BWS = <BWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.3>
 OWS = <OWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.3>
 quoted-string = <quoted-string, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.6>
 token = <token, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.6>
Appendix C. Collected ABNF
 In the collected ABNF below, list rules are expanded as per Section
 1.2 of [Part1].
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 Authorization = credentials
 BWS = <BWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.3>
 OWS = <OWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.3>
 Proxy-Authenticate = *( "," OWS ) challenge *( OWS "," [ OWS
 challenge ] )
 Proxy-Authorization = credentials
 WWW-Authenticate = *( "," OWS ) challenge *( OWS "," [ OWS challenge
 ] )
 auth-param = token BWS "=" BWS ( token / quoted-string )
 auth-scheme = token
 challenge = auth-scheme [ 1*SP ( token68 / [ ( "," / auth-param ) *(
 OWS "," [ OWS auth-param ] ) ] ) ]
 credentials = auth-scheme [ 1*SP ( token68 / [ ( "," / auth-param )
 *( OWS "," [ OWS auth-param ] ) ] ) ]
 quoted-string = <quoted-string, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.6>
 token = <token, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.6>
 token68 = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~" / "+" / "/" )
 *"="
Appendix D. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)
 Changes up to the IETF Last Call draft are summarized in <http://
 trac.tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-24#appendix-D>.
D.1. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-24 
 Closed issues:
 o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/510>: "SECDIR review
 of draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-24"
 o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/513>: "APPSDIR
 review of draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-24"
 o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/516>: "note about
 WWW-A parsing potentially misleading"
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Index
 4
 401 Unauthorized (status code) 7
 407 Proxy Authentication Required (status code) 7
 A
 Authorization header field 7
 C
 Canonical Root URI 6
 G
 Grammar
 auth-param 5
 auth-scheme 5
 Authorization 8
 challenge 5
 credentials 5
 Proxy-Authenticate 8
 Proxy-Authorization 8
 token68 5
 WWW-Authenticate 9
 P
 Protection Space 6
 Proxy-Authenticate header field 8
 Proxy-Authorization header field 8
 R
 Realm 6
 W
 WWW-Authenticate header field 9
Authors' Addresses
 Roy T. Fielding (editor)
 Adobe Systems Incorporated
 345 Park Ave
 San Jose, CA 95110
 USA
 EMail: fielding@gbiv.com
 URI: http://roy.gbiv.com/
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Internet-Draft HTTP/1.1 Authentication November 2013
 Julian F. Reschke (editor)
 greenbytes GmbH
 Hafenweg 16
 Muenster, NW 48155
 Germany
 EMail: julian.reschke@greenbytes.de
 URI: http://greenbytes.de/tech/webdav/
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