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Unit Organisation and
Equipment
Armament and Vehicles
Personal
armament comprised the FN FAL self-loading selective-fire battle rifle
7.62 mm, the UZI submachine gun
9 mm and the FN Browning Hi-Power pistol 9 mm. The
FAL was
the
standard infantry weapon, whilst the UZI was widely used by vehicle
crews and other personnel for whom the size of the FAL would be
cumbersome. Personal armament is, in general, mentioned only where the
situation differs from the usual pattern or is
otherwise
noteworthy.
Unit
equipment is not listed exhaustively; communications
gear for instance is mostly not included. In many cases only weapons
and vehicles inherent to the operational role of a unit type
are
mentioned, due
to lack of
reliable and contemporary data. Regarding armament,
in 1978-1979 the
inventory of
an M109-equipped field artillery
battalion for example included, apart from what is given below, 10 x M2
hmg .50 inch (of which one
mounted on an M578
recovery vehicle) and 12 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm.1 It should also be noted that most
unit types on this page probably had a number of M72 LAWs 66
mm
in
their inventory; here they are only mentioned when actual
record of them was found.
2
Several sections
however, such as 1
Amphibious Combat Group , The
Territorial Security Infantry Battalion, 53
Light Reconnaissance Battalion and 901
Torpedo Company ,
provide
a complete overview of armament and vehicles; The
Armoured
Infantry Battalion YPR-765 includes a fairly complete
overview.
Abbreviations
used to indicate weapon
types:
atgm -
antitank guided missile
gpmg -
general purpose machine gun
hmg -
heavy machine gun
LAW - light antitank weapon
lmg
-
light machine gun
mmg
- medium machine gun
rclr -
recoilless rifle
sam - surface to air missile
saw -
squad automatic weapon
Unit
Personnel Strengths
All
unit strengths given are wartime strengths. In the Royal
Army these sometimes differed
slightly between
units of the same basic type, for example
between active-duty and mobilisable variants of a unit type,
or
because of minor differences in equipment. Officially all such
variants
were different unit types and had
different organisation
type numbers. The unit strengths given on this page are the
most
common or representative variants, for actual unit strengths refer to
the order of battle pages.
Short
Leave
In
peacetime nearly
all of the Royal Army's active-duty battalions, and quite a few units
of company or even
platoon size, had one or more subunits
on Short Leave (standby readiness) at any given time. These
are marked as
mobilisable in the organisational charts below.
3
Short Leave elements were mobilisable within twenty-four hours,
recallable by
the Minister of Defence without parliamentary consent.
4
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.13.110, inv. nr. 242, organisatietabellen
en autorisatiestaten (OTAS)
afdelingen veldartillerie M109, 1978-1979.
2.
LAWs
were
categorised as ammunition rather than as armament, hence information on
their presence is not always (readily) available.
3.
For
the sake of
clarity the subunit marked as being on Short Leave is always the one
last in line (e.g. C Company). In reality things were not that
straightforward; in most armoured infantry battalions for
instance the Short
Leave status rotated from A to B to C Company, whilst in most
cavalry battalions the Short Leave squadron was always C
Squadron. SSA-MvD,
7486, ONDAS-ritmen 1984-1988 d.d. 20
augustus 1984. The Short Leave or mobilisable status of
subunits
below company level is only indicated as far as known.
4.
Military
service officially lasted 24 months, but of these only 14
months were actually served (16 months for reserve officers and
conscript sub-officers). The following four to six months the company,
squadron, battery or platoon in question was on Short Leave, during
which its conscript personnel was still on active duty in
legal terms, and part of their unit in military
terms.
For an survey of the
Army's unit filling and reserve
system see Gijsbers, Blik in de smidse, 2222-2231;
Selles, Personele vulling; Berghuijs, Opleiding, 14-23. In
English: Isby and Kamps, Armies,
341-343; Sorrell, Je
Maintiendrai , 94-96; Van
Vuren, The
Royal Netherlands Army Today, Military Review April 1982,
23-28.
<
MARINE
CORPS
• KORPS
MARINIERS
Amphibious
Section
1
Amfibische
Sectie (AMFSIE)
One section staff
and three amphibious groups (1-2-3). The amphibious groups
would usually operate in two-men teams.
Staff section strength: 2/3/2 (7). Amphibious group strength: –/4/2
(6). Amphibious section strength: 2/15/8 (25).
The
Amphibious Section of the
Marine
Corps was an elite unit
specialised in amphibious reconnaissance,
sabotage actions and maritime counterterrorism operations. Personnel
were trained as frogmen, commandos and parachutists. The amphibious
groups and teams
would typically operate in enemy territory, isolated from friendly
forces. They would deploy to their debarkation
area by ship, boat, submarine,
aeroplane, helicopter, or by parachute. From there they would advance
on their objective(s) by Landing Craft Rubber
(LCR), Landing Craft Rubber Motorised (LCRM), kayak, or
swimming. Possible
missions included beach reconnaissance, clearing obstacles both under
and above
water, diving missions, sabotage actions both under and above water,
infiltration and
exfiltration of enemy
territory, hinterland reconnaissance (up to twenty-five kilometres
inland), and establishing and operating
observation
posts. The three amphibious groups were able to operate
independently.
The 1st Amphibious Group was trained for temperate climate operations,
and would be attached to
2
Amphibious
Combat Group if that unit would be deployed
with the
United
Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force (UK/NL
LF) in non-arctic regions; it also handled the training of frogmen and
frogmen instructors, as well as
anti-frogman and anti-sabotage
training for ships' crews. The 2nd
Amphibious Group was specialised in maritime counterterrorism
operations, notably concerning offshore oil and gas installations in
the North Sea, and could be attached to the
Marine
Corps Special Assistance Unit (BBE-M); it was also available
for
general assignments. The 3rd Amphibious Group was arctic-trained
and integrated in the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) of the British Royal
Marines (RM)
as 7 (NL) Special Boat Section (7 (NL) SBS); it was earmarked to be
attached to
1
Amphibious Combat Group for deployment to (northern)
Norway with UK/NL LF.
Personal
armament included UZI submachine
guns and combat knives. As the
Marine
Corps Special Assistance Unit
had a number of Heckler
& Koch
MP5
submachine guns 9 mm in addition to their complement of UZIs it seems
likely that the Amphibious Section had a number of these as
well.
2
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 6081, BL
4301 - 1AGGP d.d. 23 maart 1983 - 15 september 1983, voetnoten. NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 6085, BL
4215 - AMFSIE d.d. 10 november 1982 - 6 juli 1983. Ibid., inv.
nr. 2498, VVKM 412 Voorschrift betreffende
de organisatie,
de uitrusting en de tactiek van de amfibische sectie
d.d. 18
oktober 1979. NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv.
nr. 144, BL
4310 - 2AGGP d.d. 23 augustus 1983, voetnoten. MM,
Uitrustingstabellen Korps Mariniers d.d. 4 mei 1977, 36. Van
Dijk en Essink, De
mariniers,
193-194, 197. Teitler en Homan, Het
Korps Mariniers, 53.
2.
Pictures
from 1990 show frogmen of the Amphibious Section with Heckler
&
Koch HK33 assault rifles 5.56 mm. Haring, Mariniers
325 jaar,
131-133. In 1983 the two medics in the section staff had a pistol
(probably the standard FN Browning Hi-Power 9 mm) rather than an UZI as
their
personal weapon.
<
Whiskey
Infantry Company
1
Whiskey
Infanteriecompagnie (WINFCIE)
Marine Corps infantry
company, organised and
equipped identically to the infantry companies of
1
and
2
Amphibious Combat Group, but in addition the Carl Gustav rclr
team of
the command group of each infantry platoon had 1 x M47 Dragon atgm
system.
2
In 1984 the company had 5 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover, probably with 1⁄4-tonne
trailer, and 1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land
Rover ambulance.
3
For
operations in northern Norway the company had 3 x Volvo Bv 202 tracked
over-snow vehicle and various arctic equipment,
including skis. The Bv 202's were prepositioned in Kilbotn,
Norway.
4
Company
staff strength: 2/8/4
(14). Infantry platoon strength: 1/9/24 (34). Infantry platoon command
group strength: 1/3/3 (7). Rifle group strength: –/2/7 (9). Company
strength: 5/32/79 (116).
The company was specialised in mountain and arctic warfare.
In principle the entire unit was para-trained. It was
considered "probably one of the most expert NATO arctic
warfare
units, [...] equal to the best RM units in this type
of
warfare".
During training periods and exercises Whiskey Infantry Company was
fully integrated into 45 (UK)
Commando Royal Marines,
forming this unit's fourth rifle company, and it was earmarked
to
be deployed as such to northern Norway in wartime as part of
the
United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force
(UK/NL
LF). The 'W' designation (Whiskey in the NATO phonetic alphabet) was
adopted to align with the names of the other infantry
companies of the commando: X, Y and Z Company. Whiskey Infantry Company
was attached to 45 (UK) Commando RM for the
larger part of the year, and about three months a year were
spent
on joint exercises.
5
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6080, BL
4320 - WINFCIE d.d. 27 oktober 1982 - 29 december 1982. Handboek voor
de marinier, juli 1985.
2.
Ibid.
NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv.
nr. 2504, VVKM 414 Voorschrift betreffende de organisatie,
de uitrusting, de training en de tactiek van het antitankpeloton d.d.
18 augustus 1982, 2-1.
3.
NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr.
979, Landrovers d.d. 26 maart 1984. This document only lists
Land
Rovers; the company may in addition have had a four-tonne
truck
for logistic support. To compare, the rifle company of a (UK)
Royal Marines commando, after which the organisation of Whiskey
Infantry Company was modeled, had 2
x 1⁄2-tonne Land
Rover, probably with trailer, and 1 x four-tonne truck.
British
Army, SOHB 1985, 39. Ibid., SOHB 1988, 42.
4.
3 x Bv 202: NL-HaNA
2.13.141,
inv. nr. 804, Oversnow-vehicle BV 202 d.d. 3 oktober 1980.
Prepositioned in Norway: see 1
Amphibious Combat Group, footnote 11.
<
1
Amphibious Combat Group
1
Eerste
Amfibische Gevechtsgroep (1AGGP)
Amphibious infantry battalion of the Marine Corps, comprising o
ne
staff and support company (10), four infantry companies (11-12-13-14)
(of which 14 Infantry Company on mobilisation
2), and one combat support
company (15). On mobilisation a company-sized logistic support
group (1) would probably be attached.3 ¶
In 1982-1983 the staff and support company comprised the combat
group staff, a signals platoon, an administration section, a service
support platoon, a transport platoon, a medical section, a shore patrol
section, and the company staff (see the remarks on the strength and
organisation of the company further
below).
The company staff had 2 x Carl Gustav
rclr 84 mm. ¶ The four infantry companies each comprised a company
staff and three infantry platoons (1-2-3). Each infantry platoon
comprised a command group and three rifle groups (1-2-3). The command
group had 1
x Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm and 1 x mortar 60 mm; the Carl Gustav
team (gunner and helper) were double-roled as sharpshooters.4
Each
rifle group had 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm, 2 x FN FALO saw 7.62 mm, 6 x
FN
FAL battle rifle 7.62 mm and 1 x UZI submachine gun 9 mm. A rifle group
could thus operate in three fire teams formed around the FN MAG and the
two FALOs. ¶ The combat support company comprised a company staff, a
reconnaissance platoon, an antitank platoon, an anti-aircraft section,
a
mortar platoon and an infantry pioneer section. The reconnaissance
platoon comprised a command group and three reconnaissance sections,
each section comprising two reconnaissance groups. The platoon was
fully motorised and had probably 8 x 1⁄2-tonne
Land Rove
r, 2 x 1⁄4-tonne
trailer, and 8 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm.5
Possible missions included tactical and technical
reconnaissance, long range reconnaissance, infiltration and
exfiltration of enemy territory, establishing and
operating observation posts, sabotage actions, and securing
objects or areas; personnel was
partly commando and/or para-trained. The reconnaissance sections were
able to operate independently. The antitank platoon comprised
a command
group and three antitank sections, each section comprising a command
group and three antitank groups, each antitank group comprising two
antitank teams with 1 x M47 Dragon atgm system each. In addition the
command
group of each antitank section held 1 x M47 Dragon in reserve. The
platoon carried a basic load of one hundred and eight M222
Dragon
missiles, distributed as follows: eighteen with each antitank section
(first line), six with each antitank section commander (first
supplement), and thirty-six with the platoon command group (secondary
supplement). The platoon was fully motorised and had 1
x 1⁄2-tonne
Land Rover, 12 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover, 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and 1
x DAF YA-4440 four-tonne truck. The anti-aircraft section comprised a
command group and four anti-aircraft groups. Each anti-aircraft group
had
1 x FIM-92
Stinger man-portable
air defence system. In addition the command group held 1 x FIM-92
Stinger in reserve.
6 The
section carried a basic load of thirty
missiles,
distributed as follows: six missiles with each anti-aircraft group
(first line), and six missiles with the command group (first
supplement). The section was fully motorised with 5 x 3⁄4-tonne Land
Rover, each with a 1⁄2-tonne trailer. The mortar platoon comprised a
command group and three mortar sections, each mortar section comprising
a command group and two mortar groups. Each mortar group had 1 x
Hotchkiss Brandt mortar 81 mm. The platoon was fully motorised with 11
x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover, each with a 1⁄4-tonne trailer, and probably 1 x
YA-4440 carrying ammunition.
7
The infantry pioneer
section comprised a command group and three infantry pioneer groups.
The section was capable of light combat engineering
and was fully
motorised: each infantry pioneer group had a Land Rover with trailer
whilst the command group probably had 1 x Land Rover
(possibly with trailer)
and 1 x YA-4440.
7
It appears that personnel from the infantry pioneer
groups also operated the combat group's three ZB 298
battlefield surveillance radars.
|| The amphibious combat group further had a
number of M72 LAWs 66 mm.
Staff and support company strength: 19/95/78 (192). Combat group staff
strength:
10/13/2 (25). Signals platoon strength: 1/11/8 (20). Administration section strength: 1/3/5
(9). Service
support platoon strength:
1/23/23 (47). Transport
platoon strength:
2/20/23 (45). Medical
section strength:
2/9/9 (20). Shore patrol
section strength:
–/4/4 (8). Staff
and support company staff strength:
2/12/4 (18). Infantry
company strength: 5/32/79 (116). Infantry company staff
strength: 2/8/4
(14). Infantry platoon strength: 1/9/24 (34). Infantry platoon
command
group strength: 1/3/3 (7). Rifle group strength: –/2/7 (9). Combat
support company strength: 5/86/67 (158). Combat support company staff
strength: 2/9/2 (13). Reconnaissance platoon strength: 1/9/14 (24).
Reconnaissance platoon command group strength: 1/4/1 (6).
Reconnaissance
section strength: –/2/4 (6). Reconnaissance group strength: –/1/2 (3).
Antitank platoon strength: 1/24/21 (46). Antitank platoon
command group strength: 1/3/– (4). Antitank section strength: –/7/7
(14). Antitank section command group strength: –/1/1 (2). Antitank
group strength: –/2/2 (4). Antitank team strength: –/1/1 (2).
Anti-aircraft section strength: –/10/5 (15). Anti-aircraft section
command
group strength: 1/1/1 (3). Anti-aircraft group strength: –/2/1 (3).
Mortar platoon strength: 1/26/17
(44). Mortar
platoon command group strength: 1/5/2 (8). Mortar section strength:
–/7/5 (12). Mortar section command group
strength: –/3/1 (4). Mortar group strength: –/2/2 (4). Infantry pioneer
section strength: –/8/8 (16). Infantry pioneer command group strength:
–/2/2 (4). Infantry pioneer group strength: –/2/2 (4). 1 Amphibious
Combat Group strength without 1 Logistic Support Group: 44/309/461
(814). 1 Amphibious Combat Group strength including 1 Logistic Support
Group: 47/341/528 (916).
It
should be noted that all strengths above are from 1982-1983. There are
clear indications that by 1985 the total strength of both 1 and the
organisationally identical 2
Amphibious Combat Group
had increased from 814 to 821 men, possibly to 827 men. The increase
occurred in the staff and support company only. In July 1984
its
strength had
risen from 192 to 199 men, and it had been reorganised into the
following elements: the combat group staff (39 men, an increase of 14
men), a
signals platoon (20 men), an administration section (6 men, a decrease
of 3 men), a service support platoon (51 men, an increase of 4 men), a
transport platoon (45 men), a medical section (20 men), and the company
staff (18 men); the shore patrol section was apparently disbanded. By
1985 the strength of the staff and support company may have been
20/102/83 (205).
8
In 1981 the equipment inventory of 1 Amphibious Combat Group, including
1
Logistic Support Group, was listed as follows: 290 x FN
FAL battle
rifle 7.62 mm, 72 x FALO saw 7.62 mm, 63 x FN MAG
gpmg 7.62 mm, thirty-two sharpshooter rifles (probably FN FAL battle
rifle 7.62 mm with scope, see footnote 5), 378 x UZI submachine
gun 9 mm, 176 x FN Browning
Hi-Power pistol 9 mm,
thirty flare pistols (probably Geco 26,5 mm), 21 x M47 Dragon
atgm
system, 21 x Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm, 5 x FIM-92 Stinger man-portable
air defence system, 16 x mortar 60 mm, 6 x Hotchkiss Brandt mortar 81
mm, 46 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover with 36 x 1⁄4 tonne trailer, 23 x 3⁄4-tonne
Land Rover with 8 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer, 3 x 3⁄4-tonne Land
Rover ambulance, 40 x DAF YA-4440 four-tonne truck, one tow truck,
one 2-tonne fork lift truck, 5 x trailer (field kitchen), 1 x
trailer (repair), 6 x one-tonne trailer (water), twelve
shelter/container
modules for YA-4440, two motorcycles, 3 x ZB 298 battlefield
surveillance
radar, one hundred and forty-one radios, six hundred and seventy-nine
flak jackets, and various arctic equipment (including skis). For
operations in northern Norway 1
Amphibious Combat Group had 57 x Volvo Bv 202 tracked over-snow vehicle.
9
These could be used to carry equipment (main role), personnel, and for
skijoring, thus providing (limited) motorised mobility under arctic
circumstances. Possible deployment of Bv 202s during operations: 10-12
x with 10
Staff and
Support Company, 15-20 x with the infantry companies, 22 x with 15
Combat Support Company (1 x with the reconnaissance platoon, 7 x with
the
antitank platoon, 3 x with the anti-aircraft section, 8 x with the
mortar platoon, 3 x with the infantry pioneer section), and 8-10 x for
first line logistic support.
10
Nearly all Bv 202s were prepositioned in Kilbotn, Norway.
11
1 Amphibious Combat Group was one of the three amphibious
light infantry battalions of the Marine Corps.
1 and 2 Amphibious Combat Group were characterised as "quickly
displaceable, lightly
armed and mentally adjusted to limited-scale operations and operations
in
isolated situations",12
and "especially suited for operations in areas that are unsuitable for
mechanised units, for executing raids and infiltrations, repelling
attacks of enemy infantry, and destroying enemy tanks and armoured
vehicles from prepared positions"; in addition 1 Amphibious Combat
Group was "suited to operate in any climate and weather".
13 To enable full interoperability,
organisation and equipment were
closely modeled on those of the (UK) Royal Marine commandos. 1
Amphibious Combat Group was trained
in mountain and
arctic warfare, and earmarked for wartime
deployment to northern Norway as
part of
the United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force
(UK/NL LF) under
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
(SACLANT). When
deployed as such,
or as needed, elements of the
Amphibious Section and the
Boat
Company
Group would be
attached.
14
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6081, BL
4301 - 1AGGP d.d. 23 maart 1983 - 15 september 1983. Ibid.,
inv. nr. 2506,
VVKM 407 Voorschrift betreffende de amfibische gevechtsgroep
d.d. 23 november 1982. Ibid., inv. nr. 736, VVKM 408 Voorschrift
betreffende de tactiek van het verkenningspeloton d.d. 20 januari 1978.
Ibid., inv. nr. 2504, VVKM 414 Voorschrift betreffende de organisatie,
de uitrusting, de training en de tactiek van het antitankpeloton d.d.
18 augustus 1982. Ibid., inv. nr. 750, VVKM 410 Voorschrift
betreffende de organisatie, de uitrusting, de training en de tactiek
van het mortierpeloton d.d. 29 april 1981. NL-HaNA
2.13.112, inv. nr. 144, BL 4310 - 2AGGP d.d. 22
augustus 1983. NL-HaNA 2.13.141,
inv. nr. 796, voorlopige studie
"Reorganisatie mobilisabel personeel Korps Mariniers" d.d. 13
februari 1981. Handboek voor de
marinier, juli 1985. Anonymus, Beslissing genomen,
5-8. Cammaert, Enkele kanttekeningen,
30-36.
2.
On
mobilisation 14 Infantry Company would for the most part
be formed from surplus
personnel (bovenrol) at the Royal Naval Institute (Koninklijk Instituut
voor de Marine, KIM) in Den Helder, Van Braam Houckgeest
Barracks in Doorn and, predominantly, Van Ghent Barracks in Rotterdam;
in addition twenty-four reservists would be called up. NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 6081, op. cit., 40-47, 54. During operations the
company could either be used as an additional manoeuvre
element or
serve as battle casualty replacement pool with its remainder providing
security for 10 Staff and Support Company. NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 562, Oversnow mobility
concept 1 ACG d.d. 5 juli 1982, 4.
3.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, NDPP
Concept krijgsmachtdeelplan Koninklijke Marine 1984-1993 d.d. maart
1983, 74. See also the documents listed
under
The Logistic Support Group,
footnote 1 ("CDT. ROL"). A document from 1981,
NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op cit.,
shows 1 and 2 Logistic Support Group as integral parts of 1
and
2 Amphibious Combat Group respectively, but documents from 1982-1983
on the organisation of the amphibious combat group (see footnote 1) do
not.
However, on mobilisation 1 and 2 Amphibious Combat group would be
brought up to war strength "including" 1 and 2 Logistic Support Group
respectively. NL-HaNA 2.12.56 inv.
nr. 1876, VVKM 38.1
Mobilisatievoorschrift der Koninklijke Marine, deel 1: Personeel,
Bijlage 5 d.d. 26 oktober 1983. During operations with the United
Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force (UK/NL LF) the
logistic echelon of 1 Amphibious Combat Group
would be integrated into the (UK) Commando Logistic Regiment RM.
NL-HaNa 2.12.56, inv. nr. 3413, Proposed final draft of Annex B to the
Memorandum of Understanding dated 9 may 1973 between the Netherlands
Ministry of Defence and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence d.d. 20
June 1975. See also Haring,
Mariniers
325 jaar, 32. This echelon would include
elements of 10 Staff and Support Company. NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 2506, op. cit., 1-3.
It seems likely that
(elements of) 1 Logistic Support Group would likewise be
integrated into (UK) Commando Logistic Regiment RM, but I have not
found record of this.
4.
About
this combination of functions Marine Captain P.C. Cammaert,
today Marine Major-General (Rtd.), commented: "A
curious construction, to put it mildly." Cammaert, op. cit., 35. See
also Van Willigenburg, Reactie,
8-9. The Marine Corps did not have dedicated sharpshooter rifles.
Cammaert, loc. cit. Most likely FN FAL battle rifles 7.62 mm with
scopes were used (Kijker Richt Recht AI 62).
This aid enabled long-distance precision shooting (up to 800
metres). Van der Spek, Een
wapen, 97, 98.
5.
The
number of Land Rovers and FN MAGs has been extrapolated from BL
4301
(1983) and VVKM 408 (1978) (see footnote 1); in 1978 the reconnaissance
platoon had two rather than three reconnaissance sections.
6.
The
FIM-92 Stinger entered service with the Marine Corps in 1985. The
anti-aircraft section of 1 Amphibious Combat Group began training with
the weapon in April of that year, from which point it was considered
operational. Janssen Lok,
De
Stinger, 17. See also Teitler
en Homan,
Het Korps
Mariniers, 51. For the Stinger in
service with the Royal Army, see
The
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion.
7.
DAF
YA-4440 mentioned in Van Egmond, 15e
Ondersteuningscompagnie, 8-16 (1991).
8.
Increased unit strength
and reorganised staff and support company per July 1984: NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 772, Reorganisatie opleidingen en
2AGGP d.d. 2 juli 1984, Bijlage B.
Possible further increase by 1985: MM, inv.nr. 60172, VVKM 407
Voorschrift betreffende de Amfibische Gevechtsgroep d.d. 23 november
1982, 1-1 t/m 1-3, with undated handwritten corrections. See also Marine Corps,
footnote 5.
9.
Equipment
inventory: NL-HaNA 2.13.141,
inv. nr. 796, op. cit., Bijvoegsel 1. These numbers seem to include
spare weapons, for instance in case of the Carls Gustavs and the 60 mm
mortars.
10.
NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 562, Oversnow mobility
concept 1 ACG d.d. 5 juli 1982.
11.
NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 341, Opslag
sneeuwvoertuigen van het Korps Mariniers te Noorwegen d.d. 21 januari
1980. Ibid.,
inv. nr. 804, Oversnow-vehicle BV 202 d.d. 3 oktober 1980. Jaarboek KM
1986, 156. Initially all sixty Bv 202s acquired by the Marine
Corps were prepositioned in Norway, but in 1981
three vehicles were shipped to the Netherlands for training chauffeurs
and mechanics. These vehicles remained under the control of 1
Amphibious Combat Group. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 804,
BV202-opleidingen d.d. 30 maart 1981. In 1986 plans to move the
prepositioned Bv 202s to a new NATO storage
site in Rossvoll, Norway were underway. Jaarboek KM 1986, loc.
cit.
12.
NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op. cit., 7.
13.
MM, inv.nr. 60172, op.
cit., 1-4.
14.
Elements
attached:
NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6081, BL 4301 - 1AGGP d.d. 23
maart 1983, voetnoten. NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit.,
74.
<
2 Amphibious
Combat Group
1
Tweede
Amfibische Gevechtsgroep (2AGGP)
Amphibious infantry battalion of the Marine Corps, comprising o
ne
staff and support company (20), four infantry companies (21-22-23-24)
(of which 24 Infantry Company mobilisable), and one combat
support
company (25). On mobilisation a company-sized logistic support
group (2) would probably be attached.2
Organised identically to 1
Amphibious Combat Group .
In peacetime partly
dispersed over naval bases and
installations in the Netherlands Antilles
(NA) and in the
Netherlands, and
partly mobilisable. In Juli 1984 the situation was as
follows. ¶ 20 Staff and Support Company: forty-five men stationed at Van
Braam Houckgeest Barracks, Doorn; two men at Headquarters Marine Corps,
Rotterdam; nine men at Van Ghent Barracks, Rotterdam;
twenty-five men
at Marine Barracks Savaneta, Aruba
(NA); twenty-four men at Naval Base
Parera, Curaçao (NA); and ninety-four men mobilisable. ¶ 21
Infantry
Company: stationed at Naval Base Parera. ¶ 22
Infantry Company: stationed at Marine Barracks Savaneta.
¶ Company staff, 23 Infantry Company: one man stationed at Van Braam
Houckgeest Barracks; one man at Van Ghent Barracks;
two men at the Royal Naval Institute in Den Helder
(Koninklijk Instituut voor de Marine, KIM); and ten men mobilisable.
1st Platoon, 23 Infantry Company: one man stationed with Marine
Detachment Den Helder, Division Willemsoord; and thirty-three
men with
Marine
Detachment Den Helder, Division De Kooy. 2nd Platoon, 23
Infantry
Company: stationed with the Marine
Detachment at Naval Air Station Valkenburg. 3rd Platoon, 23
Infantry
Company: one man stationed at Van Braam Houckgeest Barracks; one man at
Van Ghent Barracks; and thirty-two men mobilisable. ¶ 24
Infantry Company: mobilisable. ¶ 25 Combat Support Company: twenty-one
men stationed at Van Braam Houckgeest Barracks; sixty-seven men
stationed with the Marine
Detachment at Naval Air Station Valkenburg (constituting the larger
parts
of the antitank platoon, the anti-aircraft section and the infantry
pioneer section); thirty-seven men with Marine
Detachment Den Helder, Division De Kooy (constituting the larger part
of
the mortar platoon); the reconnaissance platoon at
Naval Base Parera; and nine men mobilisable.3 In peacetime the reconnaissance
platoon had 3 x M47 Dragon
atgm
system
.4
Equipped identically to 1
Amphibious Combat Group,
with the following differences: one hundred and twenty-eight radios of
different types; no arctic equipment; and no over-snow vehicles.
2 Amphibious
Combat Group was one of the three amphibious light infantry
battalions of the Marine Corps. Unlike
its sister unit, 1 Amhibious Combat Group, it was not trained in
mountain and arctic warfare. Further information, including
equipment, characterisation and observations regarding unit strength
and organisation, can be found under 1
Amphibious Combat Group.
For its
national role regarding the territorial defence of the Netherlands Antilles 2 Amphibious Combat
Group could be
concentrated
there; for its NATO role under Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
(SACLANT) the unit would be
concentrated in the Netherlands. This could only happen after 3
Amphibious Combat Group had been mobilised and deployed to
the Antilles. 2 Amphibious Combat Group could be assigned to
the United Kingdom/Netherlands
Landing Force
(UK/NL LF), but only for deployment
in non-arctic regions. In such case, or as
needed, elements of the Amphibious
Section and the Boat
Company
Group would be
attached.5
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv. nr. 144, BL
4310 - 2AGGP d.d. 23 augustus 1983. NL-HaNA 2.13.141,
inv. nr. 796, voorlopige studie
"Reorganisatie mobilisabel personeel Korps Mariniers" d.d. 13
februari 1981. Ibid., inv. nr.
772, Reorganisatie opleidingen en 2AGGP d.d. 2 juli 1984, Bijlage
B. Handboek voor de marinier,
juli 1985.
3.
Peacetime
locations: NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 772, loc. cit.
4.
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv.
nr. 2504, VVKM 414 Voorschrift betreffende de organisatie,
de uitrusting, de training en de tactiek van het antitankpeloton d.d.
18 augustus 1982, 2-1.
5.
Elements attached:
NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv. nr. 144, BL 4310 - 2AGGP d.d. 22
augustus 1983, voetnoten. NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, NDPP
Concept krijgsmachtdeelplan Koninklijke Marine 1984-1993 d.d. maart
1983,
74.
<
3 Amphibious
Combat Group
1
Derde
Amfibische Gevechtsgroep (3AGGP)
Mobilisable amphibious infantry
battalion of the Marine Corps, comprising three
company groups (31-32-33). It had no staff and support company. ¶ Each
company
group comprised a company
staff, three infantry platoons (1-2-3), a combat support group and a
service support group. Each infantry platoon
comprised a command group and three
rifle groups (1-2-3). The command
group had 1
x Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm and 1 x mortar 60 mm. Each
rifle group had 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm, 1 x FN FALO saw 7.62 mm, and
probably 7 x
FN
FAL battle rifle 7.62 mm and 1 x UZI submachine gun 9 mm.
¶ The combat support group basically comprised a mortar section: a
command group and two mortar groups. Each mortar
group had 1 x
Hotchkiss Brandt mortar 81 mm.
Company group strength: 5/49/94 (148). Company
staff strength: 2/7/5 (14). Infantry platoon strength: 1/9/24 (34).
Command group strength: 1/3/3 (7). Rifle group
strength: –/2/7 (9). Combat support group / mortar section
strength: –/7/5 (12). Command group strength: –/3/1 (4).
Mortar group strength: –/2/2 (4). Service support group strength:
–/7/13 (20). 3 Amphibious
Combat Group strength: 15/147/282 (444).
3 Amphibious
Combat Group was one of the three amphibious light infantry
battalions of the Marine Corps.
It was earmarked to be mobilised and deployed to
the Netherlands
Antilles to
relieve
2 Amphibious Combat Group
if that unit would be concentrated in
the Netherlands for its NATO role. The three company groups appear to
be
designed to operate independently, with the service support group
handling logistic support.
2
Once deployed to the Antilles its three company groups would
probably operate directly
under
Naval Command
Netherlands Antilles.
3
31 and 32 Company Group would be
stationed at
Naval Base
Parera ,
Curaçao whilst 33 Company Group
would be
stationed at
Marine Barracks Savaneta,
Aruba. To maintain
proficiency parts of 3
Amphibious Combat Group were periodically called up for a four-week
refresher training: each company group was probably called up
once every four years, after being filled with new reservists
.4
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.13.112, inv. nr. 145, BL
4340 - 3AGGP (-) (concept), undated, probably 1982. Ibid., BL 4340 -
3AGGP d.d. 1 augustus 1983. Also NL-HaNA 2.12.56,
inv. nr. 6099 (Bemanningslijsten 3 Amfibische Gevechtgroep, 1982-1983).
2.
This
probably explains why in the source documents (see footnote 1) a minus
sign is added to the unit name: "3AGGP (-)". Since the unit was
designed this way, and does not otherwise appear diminished, the minus
sign is not applied here.
3.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, NDPP
Concept krijgsmachtdeelplan Koninklijke Marine 1984-1993 d.d. maart
1983, 35.
<
The Logistic
Support Group
1
De logistieke
ondersteuningsgroep (LOGOSTGRP)
One command group, one administration
group, one supply group, one transport group, one repair group, and one
medical group.
Command
group strength: 3/9/6 (18). Administration group strength: –/2/5 (7).
Supply group strength: –/9/24 (33). Transport group strength: –/7/22
(29). Repair group strength: –/2/10 (12). Medical group strength:
–/3/– (3). Logistic support group strength: 3/32/67 (102).
The Royal Navy's war plans included the
mobilisation of two of these
units: 1 and 2 Logistic Support Group.
These would probably be placed
under the operational command of 1
and 2
Amphibious Combat Group
respectively.2
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 5960,
BL4302 - 1LOGOSTGRP d.d. 3 november 1982. Ibid., inv. nr.
6089, BL
4311 - 2 LOGOSTGRP d.d. 10 november 1982 - 22 december 1982.
<
Boat
Company Group
1
Compagniesbootgroep
(CIEBOOTGP)
One
command group and ten boat teams (1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10). Each boat
team operated 1 x Landing Craft
Assault (LCA) Mk 1 or Mk 2 (each with 1 x FN MAG
gpmg 7.62 mm).2
Command group strength: 1/3/– (4). Boat team strength: –/1/2 (3).
Company Boat Group strength: 1/13/20 (34).
The Boat Company Group provided the
Marine Corps
with limited amphibious
movement capability (ship
to shore, both tactical and logistical). The unit was
integrated in 539 (UK)
Assault
Squadron Royal Marines. Five LCA Mk 1 were 'winterised' for deployment
to northern Norway: fitted with a roof and probably heating. The Mk 1
could transport twenty-five marines with arctic equipment, or
thirty-four marines (one infantry platoon) with 'European' equipment,
or 1 x Land Rover. The Mk 2 was slightly larger than the Mk 1 and could
instead of the aforementioned loads also carry 1 x Volvo Bv-202
over-snow vehicle. It had a roof, heating and a coastal navigation
radar
.2
See also Royal Navy, List of Ships,
Landing Craft.
Five boat teams (winterised) were earmarked for
arctic operations with
1
Amphibious Combat Group and
would in wartime deploy to northern
Norway as part of the
United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force
(UK/NL LF).
In this
context these teams were jointly referred
to as the LCA-detachment (LCADET).
Five boat teams (not winterised) were
intended for operations in non-arctic areas with 2
Amphibious Combat Group. Besides the
LCAs the unit also
had a number of Landing Craft Rubber
Motorised (LCMR)
.3
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 5963, BL 4325 - CIEBOOTGP d.d. 17 november 1982.
Ibid., inv. nr. 6091, BL 4801 - AOK d.d. 10 november 1982 - 2 februari
1983.
3.
Anonymus,
Mariniers
van vandaag, 15.
Haring, Mariniers
325 jaar, 31.
Hakkert,
Het
Korps Mariniers,
466. See also Teitler en Homan,
Het
Korps Mariniers, 53-54.
<
Marine
Corps Special Assistance Unit / Shore Patrol Division Netherlands
1
Bijzondere
Bijstandseenheid Korps Mariniers / Afdeling Marinepatrouilles Nederland
(BBE/MP)
Comprising the command group, the Alert
Platoon BBE/1st MP
Platoon (ALARM/1 MP), and the Reserve Platoon BBE/2nd MP Platoon
(RESERVE/2 MP). ¶ Each platoon comprised a
three-men command group and six five-men special assistance
/ shore patrol teams (1
BBE/MP - 2 BBE/MP - 3 BBE/MP - 4 BBE/MP - 5 BBE/MP - 6 BBE/MP). In
their special assistance role (antiterrorism) these teams were
referred to as assault teams
(aanvalsploegen). For such operations personal armament comprised
1 x
UZI submachine gun 9 mm, 1 x
revolver (Ruger, .38 inch or .357 inch), and 1 x combat knife per man.
In
addition each platoon had 6 x Heckler & Koch MP5A3 submachine
gun 9
mm with target pointer/aiming light (richtpuntprojector) and 6
x Heckler & Koch
MP5SD with integrated suppressor.
2
The unit further had 6 x shotgun, only to be used with special
permission. Other armament included hand grenades; noise/stun,
tear gas and smoke grenades; and various types of demolition
charges. In 1982 the unit acquired two command
vehicles, probably
GMC Suburbans, and
two Chevrolet busses,
by which the command group and the Alert Platoon could
be deployed in one
move. Probably also in use or assigned were 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover with
1⁄4-tonne trailer for ammunition and explosives, 2 x DAF YA-4440
four-tonne truck for BBE-equipment, and 1 x Unimog ambulance.
3 ¶
During antiterrorism operations a three-men medical
section (probably with the aforementioned ambulance) and a
detachment of the Royal
Navy Audiovisual Service (Audiovisuele Dienst Koninklijke Marine,
AVD-KM) (AVD) would be attached to the unit. Also
attached would be, if required, the 2nd Group
of the
Amphibious
Section
(2) which was specialised in maritime counterterrorism operations. For
prolonged or extensive operations a third organic (reserve)
platoon could
be formed from BBE-trained marines (3 BBE). ¶ For
MP duties personal armament comprised a pistol (probably
the standard FN Browning Hi-Power 9 mm) and a baton, whilst Land Rovers
and possibly motorcycles were used for transportation.
4
Command
group strength: 2/4/2 (8). Platoon strength: 1/13/19
(33). Command group strength: 1/1/1 (3).
Team strength: –/2/3 (5). Marine
Corps Special Assistance Unit / Shore Patrol Division Netherlands
strength: 4/30/40 (74). Total strength with third BBE platoon:
5/43/59 (107).
As its name indicates, the BBE/MP was double-roled
as counterterrorism/navy policing unit. As
Marine Corps
Special Assistance Unit
(Bijzondere Bijstandseenheid Mariniers, BBE-M, also BBE-MARNS) it was
one of three
high-readiness Special Assistance Units (Bijzondere Bijstandseenheden,
BBE) available
to the Minister of Justice for counterterrorism
operations. BBE-M
was specialised in close quarters
combat and was operational in both peace and
wartime. In wartime (part of) BBE-M could be deployed as part of a
regular marine combat unit, for instance
1
Amphibious Combat Group.
Personnel consisted of hand-picked
marines that had passed
psychodiagnostic tests and were thoroughly trained in close combat
techniques. Training and
exercises emphasised controlled
application of force. The unit was deployed several
times
during the
1970s and saw action in 1974, 1977 and 1978. Apart from
regularly
exercising with its two sister units BBE-M regularly
cross-trained
with foreign counterterrorism
units such as SAS (UK), GSG 9 (GE) and US special forces. As
Shore
Patrol Division Netherlands (Afdeling Marinepatrouilles Nederland,
AMPNED)
the unit performed limited military policing duties, messenger services
and ceremonial duties within the
Royal Navy .
5
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 5961, BL 4230 - BBE/MP d.d. 2 november 1983;
see
also ibid., inv. nr. 6096, BL 4401 - DETHLDRWD d.d. 17 november 1982
and ibid., inv. nr. 6098, BL 4803 - VBHKAZ d.d. 5 september 1983.
NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 672, Herziening standaardpakket materiaal
BBE-MP d.d. 13 juli 1983.
2.
A hundred
Ruger
revolvers and thirty-five Heckler & Koch submachine
guns were
acquired for BBE-M through the Ministry of Justice in 1982.
NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 773, Informatiebulletin Commandant Korps Mariniers
d.d. 22 november 1982, 22. This document does not further specify the
revolver type. Previously the Smith & Wesson Police
Special
revolver .38
inch had
been in use, which by 1977 appears to have been replaced by the Colt
Lawman Mk III Magnum. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 8576, Bijzondere
Bijstandseenheid
Korps Mariniers d.d. 16 oktober 1973. MM, inv. nr. MR08594.
3.
Command
vehicles and busses: NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 773, loc. cit. Other vehicles: ibid., inv. nr. 673
(Stukken betreffende het verzoek om uitbreiding van de dislocatiestaat
voertuigen Van Braam Houckgeestkazerne ten behoeve van de BBE-MP,
1980-1982).
4.
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 8567, Circulaire voor de
zeemacht D64 Voorschrift betreffende de Bijzondere
Bijstandseenheid van het Korps Mariniers - Marinepatrouille in
Nederland (BBE-MP) d.d. 6 oktober 1983. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 923,
Bevoorrading d.d. 29 november 1979, Bijlage V.
5.
See
further Marine Corps, Part I, note i, and
footnotes 10 and 12.
<
Shore
Patrol Company
Netherlands
1
Marinepatrouillecompagnie
Nederland (MPCIE)
One
company staff, and five shore patrol platoons (1-2-3-4-5). Each platoon
comprised a command group, and three shore patrol groups
(1-2-3).
Each shore patrol group comprised one group commander (GC) and six
shore patrols.
Each shore patrol comprised a patrol commander and one patrol
member. In 1977 each patrol commander was armed with
an UZI
submachine gun, and each patrol member was armed with a FAL battle
rifle
7.62 mm.
Company
staff strength: 2/2/2 (6). Shore patrol platoon strength: 1/28/22 (51).
Command group strength: 1/7/4 (12). Shore patrol group strength: –/7/6
(13). Shore patrol strength: –/1/1 (2). Shore Patrol Company
Netherlands
strength: 7/147/107 (261).
Shore
Patrol Company Netherlands was a mobilisable
Marine Corps unit, tasked
to guard wartime headquarters of the
Royal
Navy in the Netherlands, probably in addition to its normal
policing
role. Its platoons would be mobilised at
different locations and the company would probably not operate as a
single unit
. It
seems likely
that in
wartime the company would take over some or all MP duties that were in
peacetime carried out by the
Marine
Corps Special Assistance Unit / Shore Patrol Division Netherlands.
2
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 5967, BL 4203 - MPCIE d.d. 20 juli
1983. MM,
Uitrustingstabellen Korps Mariniers d.d. 4 mei 1977, 30-32.
2.
See further Marine Corps,
Part I, note j and footnotes 11 and
12.
<
The
Security Detachment
1
Het bewakingsdetachement
(BEWDET)
One
staff section, and three security platoons. Each security
platoon comprised a platoon commander (PC) and three security groups.
Each security group had 1 x FN
FALO saw 7.62 mm.
In 1981 unit equipment included 9 x FN FALO saw 7.62 mm, 77 x FN
FAL battle rifle 7.62 mm, 12 x UZI submachine
gun 9 mm, 5 x FN Browning
Hi-Power pistol 9 mm, and two radios.
Staff
section strength: 1/5/4 (10). Security platoon strength: 1/6/24 (31).
Security group strength: –/2/8 (10). Security detachment strength:
4/23/76 (103).
On
mobilisation twenty-five of these Marine Corps security detachments,
numbered A-Y, would be called
up. They would operate under the authority of Naval Commander
Netherlands ,
guarding and securing naval bases and installations.
2
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 5975, BL 4410 - BEWDET A d.d. 1
juni 1983 - 3 augustus 1983. Ibid.,
inv. nr. 5976, BL
4411 - BEWDET B d.d. 1 juni 1983
- 3 augustus 1983. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, voorlopige studie
"Reorganisatie mobilisabel personeel Korps Mariniers" d.d. 13
februari 1981, 4, 16, Bijlage 1,
Bijvoegsel 5.
2.
See further Marine Corps,
Part III and footnote 17. See also
footnote 16 there for Marine Band personnel assigned to
mobilisable security detachments.
<
The
Security Detachment Netherlands Antilles
1
Het bewakingsdetachement
Nederlandse Antillen (BEWDETNA)
One
staff section, and three security platoons. Each security
platoon comprised a platoon commander (PC) and three security groups.
Unit organisation was identical to that of the Marine Corps Security Detachments in the Netherlands,
but with a smaller staff section and without FN FALO
squad automatic weapons. Armament comprised FN FAL battle rifles 7.62
mm, and probably
UZI submachine
guns 9 mm and FN Browning
Hi-Power pistols 9 mm.
Staff
section strength: 1/1/3 (5). Security platoon strength: 1/6/24 (31).
Security group strength: –/2/8 (10). Security detachment strength:
4/19/75 (98).
On mobilisation eight of these detachments, numbered A-H, would be
called up and operate under Naval Command Netherlands Antilles,
guarding naval installations and other vital
objects.
The detachments
comprised conscript reservists of the Antillean Militia led by
reservist Marine Corps
cadre: one captain commanding the detachment, with one sergeant-major
as deputy detachment commander, and three 1st lieutenants commanding
the three platoons (4/1/0 (5)). These would be mobilised in
the
Netherlands, probably in the warning phase preceding mobilisation, and
flown in by airline. In the Antilles the detachments would be filled
out by Antillean Militia reservists. These
included sub-officers in the rank of sergeant and corporal, who would
be group commanders and deputy group commanders respectively. The
Antillean Militia were trained by the Marine Corps, see
further Naval Command Netherlands Antilles , note h.
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 5909 (Bemanningslijsten bewakingsdetachementen
Nederlandse Antillen, 1983). NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv.
nr. 796, voorlopige studie
"Reorganisatie mobilisabel personeel Korps Mariniers" d.d. 13
februari 1981, 4, 16, Bijlage 1,
Bijvoegsel 5.
<
ROYAL
ARMY •
KONINKLIJKE LANDMACHT
The Brigade Staff and Staff Company
1
Staf en stafcompagnie
pantser(infanterie)brigade (ststcie pa(inf)brig)
Comprising the brigade staff, one
signals platoon, one staff guard platoon, one brigade
reconnaissance platoon, and the company staff. ¶ The brigade
staff comprised the brigade command group with 1 x M577A1 armoured
command post carrier and 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover; the deputy brigade command group with
1 x M577A1 and 1 x DAF 66 YA light utility vehicle; Section S1
(personnel) with 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover and 1 x DAF 66 YA; Section S2
(intelligence) with 1 x M577A1 and 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover; Section S3
(operations and training) with
1 x M577A1, 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover and 1 x M2 hmg .50 inch
; Section S4 (logistics) with 1 x DAF
YA-4440 four-tonne truck and 2 x DAF 66 YA; a signals section
with 1 x DAF 66 YA; a
traffic and transport section with 1 x Volkswagen Transporter Combi; an NBC section with 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land
Rover; a medical
section with 1 x DAF 66 YA; an
information service section; a chaplain group with 2 x DAF 66 YA; and
three liaison teams with 1 x DAF 66 YA each. ¶ The signals platoon
comprised a command group with 1 x DAF 66 YA and 1 x YA-4440; a radio
group with 2 x DAF YA-126 one-tonne truck and 2 x one-tonne trailer
(generator); a line group with 2 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover; and a
message office with 1 x DAF 66 YA, 1 x YA-4440 and two
motorcycles. ¶ The staff guard platoon comprised a command group with 1
x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover, 1 x YA-4440, one motorcycle and 1 x M2
hmg .50 inch
; two staff guard
groups sharing 1 x YA-4440 2
and having 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm each
; and one mobile staff guard group
with 2 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover, three motorcycles and 2 x FN
MAG gpmg 7.62 mm
. ¶ The
company staff comprised a command group with 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover and
1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover; an administration and supply group with 1 x
1⁄2-tonne Land Rover, 2 x YA-4440, 1 x one-tonne trailer (water) and 1 x M2 hmg .50 inch
; a maintenance group with 2 x YA-4440
and 1 x M2
hmg .50 inch
; and a kitchen group with 1 x YA-4440,
1 x trailer (field kitchen) and 1 x M2 hmg .50 inch
. || The company had 30
x M72 LAW 66 mm.
Company
strength: 32/34/148/2 (216).
Each armoured (infantry) brigade had one
company of this type. During
operations the brigade staff would be organised into a coordinating
staff and a special staff. The coordinating staff included the
deputy brigade commander and the sections S1, S2, S3 and S4.
The special staff comprised the remaining five specialist sections,
whose work would be directed by the coordinating staff. In the field
the company would usually be divided into the brigade command post, for
the brigade commander and his staff, and the company area, in
which the remainder of the company would operate.3
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110
inv. nr. 185, organisatietabellen en
autorisatiestaten (OTAS) staf en stafcompagnie
pantserinfanteriebrigade, 1978. VS 17-145, 1-11 (also VS
17-142 and VS 17-143). The data
regarding vehicles and armament comes from the aforementioned NL-HaNA
document from 1978, which means that it is probably not entirely
accurate for 1985. Some or all of the DAF 66
YA vehicles for instance may have been replaced with Land Rovers.
2.
Sharing
1 x YA-4440: one of the staff guard groups would probably travel in the
YA-4440 of the command group, as they were only five men strong; the
two staff guard groups were nine and ten men strong respectively, the
latter having a truck chauffeur.
3.
VS
2-1392 (±1971), II-29. VS 17-142, A-6-2 t/m A-6-5 (also VS 17-143).
Felius, Einde Oefening,
157.
<
104 Observation and Reconnaissance
Company 1
104 Waarnemings- en verkenningscompagnie (104 Wrnverkcie)
One company staff,
four observation and reconnaissance platoons (1-2-3-4) (of which 4th
Platoon on Short Leave), a signals platoon and a logistic support
platoon. ¶ The company staff, with 2 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover and
1 x M20 or M20B1 Bazooka 3.5 inch for self-defence, comprised a command
group and an administration group.2
¶ Each observation and reconnaissance platoon comprised a command group
of two men and nine observation and reconnaissance teams of four men
each. Their armament included UZI submachine guns (possibly with
suppressors), hand grenades, white phosphorus grenades and possibly
mines (two per team). ¶ The signals platoon comprised a command group
with 1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover, 1 x DAF YA-4440
four-tonne truck and 3 x M20 or M20B1 Bazooka 3.5 inch for
self-defence; one telex group/technical reserve with 1 x DAF
YA-126 one-tonne truck and 1 x one-tonne trailer (generator); four
radio groups with 1 x YA-126 and 1 x one-tonne trailer
(generator) each; and one replacement group with 1 x DAF
YA-314 three-tonne truck and 1 x one-tonne trailer.2
The replacement group enabled the signals platoon to remain operational
around the clock by applying crew rotations. ¶ The logistic support
platoon comprised a command group with 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover; a supply
group with 3 x YA-4440 and 1 x one-tonne trailer (water); a maintenance
group with 2 x YA-4440 and 1 x one-tonne trailer; a transport group
with 12 x YA-4440; and a kitchen group with 1 x YA-4440 and 1
x trailer (field kitchen).2
|| Throughout the company personal armament consisted mainly of UZI
submachine guns.3
Company
staff strength in 1980: 2/2/3 (7).2
Observation and reconnaissance platoon strength: 3/8/27 (38). Signals
platoon strength in 1980: 1/8/18 (27).2
Logistic support platoon strength in 1980: 1/13/23 (37).2
Company strength: 13/49/199 (261).
104
Observation and Reconnaissance Company was a dedicated Long
Range Reconnaissance Patrol unit (LRRP) and as such would operate in a
tactical military intelligence-gathering role for the staff of
1 (NL) Corps. To this end its
observation and reconnaissance teams would be covertly
deployed behind enemy lines in the Corps Area of Intelligence
Responsibility by means of paradrop, infiltration on foot or,
preferably, by stay-behind method.4
From concealed dugouts the four-man teams would send their observations in the
form of digitally coded 'burst' messages to the signals platoon back in
the Netherlands, which would relay them to 1 (NL) Corps Staff. The company
constituted the main operational element of the Commando Corps (Korps
Commandotroepen) and was largely composed of
hand-picked conscripts who went through a tough selection
procedure and the basic commando training before being allowed
to wear the coveted green beret. Each commando was then further trained
to
be an accomplished parachutist, telegraphist, code-expert, marksman and
survival expert. Much emphasis was placed on survival techniques and
endurance, and training in this field was particularly tough. Advanced
training further included recognition of NATO and Warsaw Pact
materiel, parachute jumping, mountain and winter training, and
escape & evasion techniques. The company was largely
self-supporting and had its own chauffeurs, cooks, mechanical
engineers, parachute riggers and medical and administrative personnel.5
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110 inv. nr. 1369,
Reorganisatie 104 Wrnverkcie d.d. 15 februari 1976. Ibid.,
Stafbespreking IGK: Problematiek 104
Wrnverkcie d.d. 2 maart 1978. NL-HaNA 2.13.110 inv. nr. 217,
Reorganisatie 104 Wrnverkcie d.d. 21 november 1978. SSA-MvD,
7486, ONDAS-ritmen 1984-1988 d.d. 20 augustus
1984. VS-2 1351 (1985)
17-1, 17-2. Krijger en Elands,
Commandotroepen,
104-106.
2.
It
should be noted that the personnel strengths and equipment
data for the company staff, the signals platoon and the
logistic platoon are taken from official tables of
organisation and equipment from November 1978 (to be
effectuated in September 1980) and must therefore be considered at
least partly outdated for 1985: the company's war strength rose from
223 men in 1980 to 261 men in 1985, which increase
probably occurred in the aforementioned subunits.
3.
In
1980 the only exceptions to this were the company commander and the
medic of the logistic support platoon's command group,
both armed with a pistol (FN Browning Hi-Power 9 mm).
NL-HaNA 2.13.110 inv. nr. 217, op. cit.
4.
In
1975 the Area of Intelligence Responsibility for 1 (NL)
Corps extended eastward from the corps FEBA (Forward
Edge of Battle Area; roughly along the
Elbe-Seitenkanal) across the Inner German Border to, roughly,
the line Parchim-Havelberg-Stendal (see the map
here). NL-HaNA 2.13.110 inv. nr.
1369, Memorandum 104 Waarnemings- en verkenningscompagnie d.d. 7 mei
1975.
5.
For
this paragraph: ibid. Krijger en Elands, op.
cit., 102-128. Walthuis,
Commando's, 102-105. An
army information film,
Van
Mutsdas tot Groene Baret (1991), on the selection and
training of the company's conscript commandos, can be viewed
here.
<
The Reconnaissance Platoon of the
Tank/Armoured Infantry Battalion 1
Het verkenningspeloton
van het tank- en het pantserinfanteriebataljon (verkpel)
One command group, one
reconnaissance group, and one radar group. ¶ The command group had 2 x
3⁄4-tonne Land Rover and three motorcycles. ¶ The reconnaissance group
comprised two reconnaissance teams, each with 2 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover
(with FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm on mount). ¶ The radar group comprised three
radar teams, each mounted in a YPR-765 PRRDR (with M2 hmg .50 inch)
with a ZB 298 battlefield surveillance radar, which could be either
mounted on the vehicles or deployed separately on the ground. || YP-408
equipped armoured infantry battalions had YP-408 PWRDRs (with M2 hmg
.50 inch) rather than YPRs, likewise with a ZB 298 radar.
Command
group strength: 1/1/5 (7). Reconnaissance group Strength: -/2/10 (12).
Radar group strength: -/3/12 (15). Platoon strength: 1/6/27 (34).
Each tank
battalion and each armoured infantry battalion had a platoon of this
type in its staff and support company.
________________________________________________
<
The Brigade Reconnaissance Platoon 1
Het
brigadeverkennerspeloton (bvp)
One command group
and three reconnaissance teams (of which one on Short Leave). ¶ The
command group, with 1 x M113A1 armoured personnel carrier
(probably with M2 hmg .50
inch), 1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover and one motorcycle, had 2 x FN
MAG gpmg 7.62 mm and 2 x Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm. ¶ The three
reconnaissance teams each had 2 x M113 C&V command and
reconnaissance vehicle (with KBA-B
autocannon 25 mm) and 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm.
Command
group strength: 1/1/8 (10). Reconnaissance team strength: -/2/4 (6).
Platoon strength: 1/7/20 (28).
Each armoured (infantry) brigade had one
reconnaissance platoon of this type in its staff
and staff company.
________________________________________________
1.
VS 17-142, hoofdstuk 6. VS 17-143,
hoofdstuk 6. VS 17-145, 1-1 t/m 1-2, 1-12 t/m 1-14. Mulder,
Verkenningseenheden, 123. Rens,
Huzaren van Boreel,
399. Rens writes that the M113A1 had a ZB 298 battlefield surveillance
radar, but I believe this to be an error as I have not found
any record of
this in the aforementioned sources, and Mulder (op. cit., 122)
actually notes the absence of radars.
<
The Reconnaissance Battalion
1
Het
verkenningsbataljon (verkbat)
One staff and
support squadron and three reconnaissance squadrons (A-B-C) (of which C
Squadron on Short Leave). ¶
The staff and support squadron
comprised
the battalion staff,
a
signals platoon, a supply platoon, a maintenance platoon,
a
medical platoon, and the squadron staff. The
battalion staff had 1 x M113A1 armoured personnel
carrier (with M2 hmg .50 inch) and 3 x M577A1 armoured command
post
carrier. The maintenance platoon had 1 x M578 armoured light recovery
vehicle (with M2 hmg .50 inch) and 1 x Leopard
Bergepanzer 2 armoured recovery vehicle (with 2 x gpmg 7.62 mm). The
medical platoon had 3
x M113A1 GWT armoured ambulance vehicle.2
¶ The three reconnaissance
squadrons each comprised a squadron staff and three
reconnaissance platoons (1-2-3). The squadron staff comprised
a command group with 1 x M113 C&V command and
reconnaissance vehicle
(with
Oerlikon KBA-B02 autocannon 25 mm),
3
1 x
M577A1, 2 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover and two motorcycles; a radar
group with 2 x M113A1 (each with a ZB 298 battlefield surveillance
radar and an M2 hmg .50 inch); an administration and supply group with
1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover, 2 x DAF YA-4440 four-tonne truck and 1 x
trailer (water); a maintenance group with 1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land
Rover and 2 x YA-4440; and a kitchen group with 1
x YA-4440 and 1 x trailer (field kitchen). The three
reconnaissance platoons each comprised a command group with 1 x M113
C&V (
with
Oerlikon KBA-B02 autocannon 25 mm); a
reconnaissance group comprising two reconnaissance
teams, each with 2 x M113 C&V
(with
Oerlikon KBA-B02 autocannon 25 mm);
a tank group with two main
battle tanks; a rifle group mounted in an M113A1 (with M2 hmg
.50 inch) with 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm and 1 x Carl
Gustav rclr 84 mm; and a mortar group with 1 x M106A1
(with M30 mortar 4.2 inch and M2 hmg .50 inch). || The
battalion's inventory further included a number
of M72 LAWs 66 mm, and probably a DAF
YEE-2000 SB treadway bridge.
4
Staff and
support squadron strength: 15/34/192/2 (243). Reconnaissance squadron
strength: 5/31/127 (163). Reconnaissance platoon strength: 1/8/31
(40). Battalion strength: 30/127/573/2 (732).
The large number of
radios in use within the battalion enabled commanders to regroup their
assets in order to adapt to the tactical situation. The most common
alternative organisation was referred to as POSO, being the Dutch
acronym for Platoon Organisation Suspended (Pelotons-Organieke
Samenstelling Opgeheven). POSO involved a function-based regrouping of
the platoons' subunits within the reconnaissance squadron,
concentrating the squadron's combat power in five platoons,
as illustrated in the chart below. The disadvantage
of POSO was that the squadron command structure was not really
suited to it.5
Distribution
of tank types per battalion:
103
Reconnaissance Battalion: Leopard 2.6
104 Reconnaissance Battalion:
transitioning from Leopard 1 to Leopard 1V. A Squadron was re-equipped
in June 1985, B Squadron was to be re-equipped in October 1985 and C
Squadron (the Short Leave squadron) in April 1986 (as per the planning
of July 1985; however, given the persistence of the technical problems
with the Leopard 1 upgrading programme and the delays these had already
caused, it is quite possible that the re-equipping of B and C Squadron
was further delayed). The battalion was formed between November 1983
and March 1984.6 7
102 Reconnaissance Battalion:
Leopard 1. To transition to Leopard 1V as follows (as per the planning
of July 1985): A Squadron to be re-equipped in August 1986, B Squadron
in February 1987 and C Squadron in June 1987; as noted above it is
however quite possible that delays occurred.6
7
105 Reconnaissance Battalion:
Leopard 2. The battalion was formed between November 1983 and March
1984 without tanks; B and C Squadron received their complement of six
Leopard 2 tanks in October 1984 and April 1985 respectively, C Squadron
was complemented in August 1985.6
_________________________________________________
1.
VS 17-133/2, A-6-2 t/m A-6-7. VS
17-135, 1-5, 1-7. VS 17-143, A-5-2, B-6-1 t/m B-6-25. VS 17-144, B-6-1.
Mulder,
Verkenningseenheden, 123.
Additional information kindly provided by
Brigadier-General
J.R. Mulder (Rtd.), squadron commander with 103
Reconnaissance Battalion in
1981-1982 and author of the aformentioned article (emails 27.08.2019,
03.09.2019).
2.
Information
on the vehicles of the staff and support squadron kindly provided by
Reserve Corporal 1st Class Eric Boot (Rtd.), techical specialist with 103
Reconnaissance Battalion
from 1982 to 1988 (emails March-April 2018).
3.
The
M113 C&V
(Commando en
Verkenning) was the Dutch version of the
Lynx/M113 Command and Reconnaissance Vehicle. Foss,
Jane's
Armour and Artillery, 234, 842-843.
5.
VS
17-136, 1-4 t/m 1-9. Smit,
Leopard 1, 74-75.
Rens en Reitsma:
Verkenningseenheden, waarheen?,
2329. Another alternative organisation which might be called EOSO,
Squadron Organisation Suspended (Eskadrons-Organieke Samenstelling
Opgeheven), was for sometimes used for practical
reasons during
firing exercises at the firing ranges of the NATO Bergen Hohne Training
Area in West Germany. It was an enlarged version of POSO, with
battalion subunits organised by weapon type. This was however not a
tactical formation. Information kindly provided by Royal Army
Brigadier-General J.R. Mulder (Rtd.), squadron commander with
103
Reconnaissance Battalion in 1981-1982
(emails 22.08.2019, 27.08.2019).
6.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 514, Planningsmemorandum Reorganisatie Tank- en
Verkenningseenheden d.d. 1 november 1982, Bijlage I-B.
SSA-MvD, CLAS/BLS 7486, Memorandum Realisatie Legerplan 149-5B d.d. 10
Juli 1985, Bijlage B, 14. For the
formation of 104 Reconnaissance Battalion see also Rens, Huzaren van Boreel,
402-403.
7.
The last
of the 468 Leopard 1Vs was delivered on 16 December
1987. Smit, op. cit., 95-96. For a detailed analysis
of the problems with the Leopard 1 upgrading programme and their
consequences see NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 682, Aantekening
DMKL "Het wapensysteem Leopard 1V" d.d. 28 augustus 1986,
6-8; HTK
1989-1990,
kamerstuknr. 21610 ondernr. 2
(Rapport Leopardtanks Algemene
Rekenkamer), 52-61, 68-71; Smit, op. cit., 95-100.
<
53 Light Reconnaissance Battalion
1
53 Licht
Verkenningsbataljon (53 Ltverkbat)
One staff and
support squadron and three light reconnaissance squadrons (A-B-C). ¶
The staff and support squadron comprised the battalion staff, a signals
group, a supply platoon, a maintenance platoon, a medical platoon, and
the squadron staff. ¶ The three light reconnaissance squadrons each
comprised a squadron staff and three light
reconnaissance platoons (1-2-3). The squadron staff comprised
a command group with 2 x M38A1 "Nekaf" Jeep, 1 x DAF
YA-328 three-tonne truck, 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and two
motorcycles; an administration and supply group with 1 x DAF
YA-126 one-tonne truck, 1 x YA-328, 1 x one-tonne trailer and
1 x trailer (water); a maintenance group with 1 x M38A1, 1 x
YA-328 and 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer; a kitchen group with
1 x YA-328 and 1 x trailer (field kitchen); and a replacement holding
group comprising one three-men jeep crew and one extra jeep chauffeur.
The three light reconnaissance platoons each comprised a command group
and two reconnaissance groups, each reconnaissance group comprising two
reconnaissance teams. The command group had 1 x M38A1, 1 x
YA-126 with trailer, six inflatable reconnaissance boats for
three to four men, and 1 x Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm.
Each reconnaissance team had 2 x M38A1 (with FN MAG gpmg 7.62
mm on mount). || The battalion's inventory further included 16 x M2 hmg
.50 inch and a number of M72 LAWs 66 mm.2
Staff and
support squadron strength: 16/29/127/2 (174). Light
reconnaissance squadron strength: 5/21/97 (123). Light reconnaissance
platoon strength: 1/5/25 (31). Battalion strength: 31/92/418/2
(543).
When the
battalion was disbanded in 1985-1986 total equipment included: 106 x
M38A1 "Nekaf" Jeep, nine motorcycles, eightteen
inflatable reconnaissance boats for three to four men, 22 x
DAF YA-126 one-tonne truck, 1 x DAF YA-324 three-tonne truck, 33 x DAF
YA-328 three-tonne truck, 31 x one-tonne trailer, 4 x
one-tonne trailer (water), 18 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer, 4 x trailer (field
kitchen), 2 x YB-616/626 six-tonne tow truck, 2 x DAF 66 YA light
utility vehicle, 6 x M38A1 ambulance, 3 x YA-126 ambulance, 16
x M2 hmg .50 inch, 80 x FN
MAG gpmg 7.62 mm,
245 x FN FAL battle rifle 7.62 mm, 265 x UZI submachine gun 9 mm, 31 x
FN Browning Hi-Power pistol 9 mm, 27 x Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm.3
The
battalion would operate in the corps or divisional rear areas,
chiefly in an area security role; any reconnaissance missions
would be executed within such context. Missions could include
observation, traffic control assistance, disaster relief assistance,
securing convoys and lines of communications; and operations against
saboteurs, fifth column elements and small, lightly armed
enemy units that had infiltrated or airdropped.4
After 105
Reconnaissance Battalion (RIM) had become fully operational,
in August 1985, disbandment of 53 Light Reconnaissance
Battalion began the next month and was completed in January
1986.5
_________________________________________________
1.
VS 17-137, 1-1 t/m 1-5. VS 17-139,
1-2 t/m 1-4. VS 17-146, A-6-1 t/m A-6-2, A-6-4 t/m A-6-7, A-6-10 t/m
A-6-11.
2.
SSA-MvD,
CLAS/BLS 7486, Memorandum Realisatie Legerplan 149-9B d.d. 13 februari
1986.
3.
Ibid.,
Bijlage A.
4.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 626, Planningsmemorandum opheffen 53 Licht
Verkenningsbataljon d.d. 15 februari 1985. VS 17-137, 1-1.
5.
SSA-MvD,
CLAS/BLS 7486, op. cit. See also
1
(NL) Corps, note e.
<
The
Territorial Light Reconnaissance Squadron 1
Het lichte
territoriale verkenningseskadron (ltverkesk)
One
squadron staff and three light
reconnaissance platoons (1-2-3). ¶ The squadron staff
comprised
a command group with 3 x M38A1 "Nekaf" Jeep, 2 x M38A1
ambulance, 1 x DAF
YA 126 one-tonne truck, 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and 1 x one-tonne trailer;
an administration and supply group with 3 x DAF
YA-328 three-tonne truck and 3 x one-tonne trailer; a maintenance group
with 1 x M38A1, 1 x YA-126, 1 x
YA-328, 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and 2 x one-tonne
trailer; a kitchen group with
1 x YA-328 and 1 x trailer (water); and a replacement holding
group comprising one three-men jeep crew and one extra jeep chauffeur.
¶ The three light reconnaissance platoons (1-2-3) were organised
identically to those of 53
Light Reconnaissance Battalion, with M20
or M20B1 Bazooka 3.5 inch
and M1919A4 mmg .30
inch instead of Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm and FN MAG gpmg
7.62 mm respectively. Each platoon had
a
number of
Energa antitank rifle grenades.
Squadron staff strength: 4/7/30 (41).
Light reconnaissance
platoon strength: 1/5/25 (31). Squadron
strength: 7/22/105 (134).
Personal armament probably followed
the standard
pattern but with
M1
Garand semi-automatic
rifles
.30 inch rather than FN FAL battle rifles 7.62 mm.
302 and 304 Infantry Brigade each had two
units of this type.
_________________________________________________
1.
VS
17-146, A-6-1, A-6-7
t/m A-6-11.
<
The Tank Battalion of
the Armoured Brigade 1
Het
tankbataljon van de pantserbrigade (tkbat)
One
staff and support squadron and three tank squadrons (A-B-C) (of which C
Squadron on Short Leave
2).
¶ The staff and support squadron, with one main battle tank and 3 x
Leopard Bergepanzer 2 armoured recovery vehicle (with 2 x gpmg
7.62 mm), comprised the battalion staff, a
reconnaissance
platoon, a signals group, a supply platoon, a maintenance
platoon, a medical platoon, and the squadron staff. ¶ The three tank
squadrons each comprised a squadron staff and four tank platoons
(1-2-3-4). The squadron staff comprised a command group with
one main battle tank, 1 x YPR-765 PRCO-C1 (with M2 hmg .50 inch), 1 x
3⁄4-tonne Land Rover, 3 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover and two motorcycles; an
administration and supply group with 1 x DAF YA-4440 four-tonne truck;
and a maintenance group with 1 x YA-4440, 1 x trailer
(workshop) and 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover. Each tank platoon comprised four
main battle tanks. In combat a tank platoon would be divided
into two sections of two tanks each, one section led by the
platoon commander and the other by the
platoon second-in-command.
Tank
battalion equipped with Leopard 2: Staff and support squadron strength:
16/41/236/2 (295). Tank squadron strength: 7/19/69 (95). Battalion
strength: 37/98/443/2 (580).
Tank
battalion equipped with Leopard 1V: Staff and support squadron
strength: 17/40/227/2 (286). Tank squadron strength: 7/19/69 (95).
Battalion strength: 38/97/434/2 (571).
3
Total
number of main battle tanks: 52.
This unit
type superseded the
old battalion organisation. In 1985 it was still
being implemented in 13 and 51 Armoured Brigade as part
of the comprehensive re-equipping and reorganisation programme
for cavalry units known as Army Plan 149. The tank battalions of 41 Armoured Brigade had completed
the transition in 1984.4
See also Mixed Battalions
and Company Teams .
_________________________________________________
1.
VS 17-131 (1983), VS 17-133/1, VS
17-133/2. Foss, Jane's
Armour and Artillery, 25. Smit, Leopard 1, 53, 73.
Spielberger, The Leopard,
147.
3.
These
are the authorised strengths for
11 Tank Battalion per December 1985
as given in NIMH 430, inv. nr. 55 (Slagorde
KL stand 23 december 1985), in which the battalion is prematurely
listed as being equipped with Leopard 1V, probably due to the
delays in the Leopard 1 upgrading programme.
4.
For
a comprehensive overview of Army Plan 149 (Legerplan 149, Reorganisatie
cavalerie-eenheden) see NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 514,
Planningsmemorandum Reorganisatie Tank- en Verkenningseenheden d.d. 1
november 1982. Regarding
this planning document it should be noted that realisation met
with considerable delays where Leopard 1-V equipped battalions
were concerned, due to the continuous
problems with the Leopard 1 upgrading programme. For a detailed
analysis of these problems and their consequences see NL-HaNA 2.13.182,
inv. nr. 682, Aantekening DMKL "Het
wapensysteem Leopard 1V" d.d. 28 augustus 1986, 6-8; HTK
1989-1990,
kamerstuknr. 21610 ondernr. 2
(Rapport Leopardtanks Algemene
Rekenkamer), 52-61, 68-71; Smit, op. cit., 95-100.
The last of the 468 Leopard 1Vs was delivered on 16 December 1987.
Smit, op. cit., 95-96.
<
The Tank Battalion of
the Armoured Infantry Brigade 1
Het
tankbataljon van de pantserinfanteriebrigade (tkbat)
One
staff and support squadron and four tank squadrons (A-B-C-D) (of which
C Squadron on Short Leave and D
Squadron mobilisable). ¶ The staff and support squadron, with
one main battle tank and 3 x Leopard Bergepanzer 2 armoured
recovery vehicle (with 2 x gpmg 7.62 mm), comprised the
battalion staff, a
reconnaissance
platoon, a signals group, a supply platoon, a maintenance
platoon, a medical platoon, and the squadron staff. ¶ The two
active-duty tank squadrons (A and B) each comprised a squadron
staff and four tank platoons (1-2-3-4). The squadron
staff comprised a command group with one main battle tank, 1 x
YPR-765 PRCO-C1 (with M2 hmg .50 inch), 1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover, 3 x
1⁄2-tonne Land Rover and two motorcycles; an administration and supply
group with 1 x DAF YA-4440 four-tonne truck; and a maintenance group
with 1 x YA-4440, 1 x trailer (workshop) and 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land
Rover. ¶ The Short Leave squadron (C) and the mobilisable
squadron (D) each comprised a squadron staff (as above, but
with 2 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover) and three tank platoons (1-2-3). Each tank
platoon comprised four main battle tanks. In combat a tank platoon
would be divided into two sections of two tanks each, one
section led by the platoon commander and the other by the
platoon second-in-command.
Tank
battalion equipped with Leopard 2: Staff and support squadron strength:
18/40/268/2 (328). A and B Squadron strength: 7/19/69 (95). C and D
Squadron strength: 6/16/56 (78). Battalion strength:
44/110/518/2 (674).
2
Tank
battalion equipped with Leopard 1V: Staff and support squadron
strength: 17/40/256/2 (315).A and B Squadron strength: 7/19/69 (95). C
and D Squadron strength: 6/16/56 (78). Battalion strength: 43/110/506/2
(661).
3
Total
number of main battle tanks: 61.
This unit
type would supersede the
old battalion organisation. In 1985 it was still
being implemented as part of Army Plan 149, and no battalion
had yet been augmented with a fourth tank squadron.4
Until the D Squadrons would be added, the C Squadrons would
retain a strength of seventeen main battle tanks, which effectively
meant that up to that point the tank battalions of this type would be
organised as the tank
battalion of the armoured brigade. In February 1986 42 Tank Battalion was the
first battalion of this type to reach its full war
strength with the addition of its D Squadron. For the actual
state of affairs in the battalions concerned during
1985 refer to the armoured infantry brigade pages via
the 1 (NL) Corps page.
See also Mixed Battalions
and Company Teams .
_________________________________________________
1.
VS 17-131 (1983), VS 17-133/1, VS
17-133/2. Foss, Jane's
Armour and Artillery, 25. Smit, Leopard 1, 53, 73.
Spielberger, The Leopard,
147.
2.
These
are the authorised strengths for
42 Tank Battalion per February 1986.
NIMH 430, inv. nr. 55 (Slagorde KL stand 23 december 1985).
3.
These
are the authorised strengths for
101 Tank Battalion per December
1986. NIMH 430, inv. nr. 57 (Slagorde KL stand 29 december 1986).
<
The
Tank Battalion (old
organisation)
1
Het
tankbataljon (oude organisatie) (tkbat)
One
staff and support squadron and three tank squadrons (A-B-C) (of which C
Squadron on Short Leave). ¶ The staff and support squadron, with two
main battle tanks and either three or four armoured recovery vehicles,
2
comprised the battalion staff, a tank group, a
reconnaissance
platoon, a signals group, a supply platoon, a maintenance
platoon, a medical platoon, and the squadron staff. ¶ The three tank
squadrons each comprised a squadron staff and three tank platoons
(1-2-3). The squadron staff, with two main battle tanks, comprised a
command group, an administration and supply group, a
maintenance group, and a replacement holding group comprising one or
two tank crews. Each tank platoon comprised five main battle
tanks. In combat a tank platoon would be divided into two
sections of two tanks each, with the platoon commander's tank
joining one of both sections as needed.
Tank
battalion equipped with Leopard 1: Staff and support squadron strength:
18/36/219/2 (275). Tank squadron strength: 6/22/73 (101). Battalion
strength: 36/102/438/2 (578).
3
Tank
battalion equipped with Centurion Mk 5/2: Staff and support squadron
strength: 18/36/220/2 (276). Tank squadron strength: 6/20/71 (97).
Battalion strength: 36/96/433/2 (567).
4
Total
number of main battle tanks: 53.
Under
Army Plan 149 this organisation type was superseded by the
tank battalion of the armoured brigade and the tank battalion of the armoured
infantry brigade. In 1985 11 Tank Battalion was the only tank
battalion still completely equipped with the Leopard 1, since its
transition to the Leopard 1V had been deferred to
1986 due to the continuous problems with the upgrading
programme; as such the battalion probably retained this
organisation type into 1986. The Centurion-equipped 52 Tank Battalion and 58 Tank Battalion had not yet begun
the transition to Leopard 1V, again due to the aforementioned problems,
and hence may have retained this organisation well into 1987. 57 Tank Battalion transitioned from
Centurion to Leopard 2 in 1985-1986 and thus adopted the new
organisation in or prior to this period.5
See also Mixed Battalions
and Company Teams .
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv.nr. 232,
organisatietabellen en autorisatiestaten (OTAS) staf, staf- en
verzorgingseskadrons, 1976. VS 17-131 (1978), 1-11 t/m 1-12.
VS 17-132, 1-4. VS 17-133, 1-5 t/m 1-10. VS 2-1351- B/1, XVII-7. Foss, Jane's Armour and Artillery,
25, 97-98. Ruys, Centuriontank,
221. Smit, Leopard 1,
53, 73. Spielberger, The
Leopard, 147.
2.
Leopard
1-equipped battalions had 3 x Leopard Bergepanzer 2 (with 2 x
gpmg 7.62 mm), Centurion-equipped battalions had 4 x Centurion Mk 2 ARV
(probably with 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm).
3.
These
are the authorised strengths for
11 Tank Battalion per Juli 1984.
NIMH 430, inv. nr. 51 (Slagorde KL stand 1 juli 1984). The official
orders of battle of July and December 1985 erroneously list this
battalion as already being (partly) equipped with Leopard 1V, probably
due to the delays in the Leopard 1 upgrading programme. See also
The
Tank Battalion of the Armoured Brigade, footnote 3.
4.
An
illustrated radio net diagram for a Centurion-equipped tank battalion
per 1980 can be seen
here.
5.
It
appears that at least some tank battalions adopted the new organisation
well in advance of the influx of the new tanks.
43 Tank Battalion seems to have
adopted the new four-tank platoon organisation in 1981,
two years prior to the transition from Leopard 1 to Leopard 2
in 1983-1984. Website 43 Tankbataljon,
tanknamen.
41 Tank Battalion reportedly adopted
the new platoon organisation in 1982. Westerhuis,
Een
tankeskadron, 11.
<
The
Armoured Infantry Battalion YPR-765
1
Het
pantserinfanteriebataljon YPR-765 (painfbat)
One staff and support
company, three armoured infantry companies (A-B-C) (of which one on
Short Leave
2),
and one armoured combat support company (Paost). ¶ The staff and
support company comprised the battalion staff, a reconnaissance
platoon, a
supply platoon, a maintenance platoon, a medical platoon, and the
company staff. The battalion staff had 3 x YPR-765 PRCO-C armoured
command vehicle (with M2 hmg .50 inch). The
reconnaissance
platoon had 3 x YPR-765 PRRDR armoured radar reconnaissance
vehicle (with M2 hmg .50 inch) and
4
x MAG gpmg 7.62 mm. The supply platoon had 3 x YPR-765 PRV armoured
cargo vehicle (with M2 hmg .50 inch) and 2 x M2 hmg .50 inch. The
maintenance platoon had 3 x YPR-806 PRB armoured recovery vehicle (with
M2 .50 hmg .50 inch) and 1 x M2 hmg .50 inch. The
medical platoon had 3
x YPR-765 PRGWT armoured
ambulance vehicle. The company staff had 1 x M2 hmg. 50
inch.¶ The three armoured infantry
companies each comprised a
company staff and three armoured infantry platoons (1-2-3). The company
staff comprised a command group, an administration and supply group,
and a maintenance group. The command group had 2 x YPR-765 PRCO-B
armoured command vehicle
(with
Oerlikon KBA-B02 autocannon 25 mm and coaxial FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm).
Each armoured infantry platoon comprised four
groups (Pc-A-B-C). The Pc Group (with the platoon commander) had 1 x
YPR-765 PRI armoured infantry fighting vehicle (with
Oerlikon KBA-B02 autocannon 25 mm and coaxial FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm) and
had 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm and 2 x M47 Dragon atgm system. A,
B and C Group, each with 1 x YPR-765 PRI, had 1 x FN
MAG gpmg 7.62 mm and 1 x Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm each. ¶ The armoured
combat support company comprised a company staff, three antitank
platoons (A-At, B-At, C-At) (of which one on Short Leave
2), and three mortar
platoons (A-Mr, B-Mr, C-Mr) (of which one on Short Leave
2).
The company staff comprised
a command group, an administration and supply group, and a maintenance
group. The command group had 1 x YPR-765 PRCO-C, the administration and
supply group had 1 x M2 hmg .50 inch. The three antitank platoons each
comprised a command group and four antitank teams. Each antitank team
had 1 x YPR-765 PRAT armoured tank destroyer
(with dual TOW atgm launcher and FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm
on mount. In addition each YPR-765 PRAT had 1 x TOW atgm launcher on
board to deploy dismounted
3).
The three mortar platoons each comprised a command group and three
mortar teams. The command group had 2 x YPR-765 PRCO-C. The mortar
teams each had 1 x MO-120-RT mortar 120 mm and 1 x YPR-765
PRMR
armoured mortar tractor (with M2 hmg .50 inch). || The battalion's
inventory
further included 253 x M72 LAW 66 mm.
Staff and
support company strength: 18/36/210/2 (266). Armoured infantry company
strength: 5/17/122 (144). Armoured infantry platoon strength: 1/4/34
(39). Pc-Group strength: 1/1/7 (9). A-B-C-Group strength: -/1/9 (10).
Armoured combat support company strength: 11/38/140 (189). Battalion
strength: 44/125/716/2 (887).
In 1986
battalion equipment included: 42 x YPR-765 PRI/PRCO-B armoured infantry
fighting vehicle (with KBA-B02 autocannon 25 mm and
coaxial FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm), 12 x YPR-765 PRAT tank destroyer
(with dual TOW atgm launcher and FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm
on mount), 9 x YPR-765 PRMR (with M2 hmg .50 inch) towing 9
x MO-120-RT mortar 120 mm, 18 x YPR-765 of other types (of
which
15 x with M2 hmg .50 inch), 18 x M47 Dragon atgm system, 27
x Carl Gustav rclr 84
mm, 253 x M72 LAW 66 mm, 61 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm,
302 x FN FAL battle rifle 7.62 mm, 512 x UZI submachine gun 9 mm, 105 x
FN Browning Hi-Power pistol 9 mm, thirty-five rifle/machine gun image
intensification devices, one hundred and eighty-seven radios,
two (inflatable) reconnaissance boats, fourteen motorcycles, 44 x Land
Rover, 51 x
DAF
YA-4440 four-tonne truck, five mobile field kitchens with
water trailer; generators, tool sets, individual equipment, and
ammunition (including hand grenades).
4
This unit
type was organic to the armoured (infantry) brigade. During
operations the armoured combat support company would only comprise the
mortar platoons, the antitank platoons being detached to the armoured
infantry companies or placed under direct command of the battalion
commander. See also Mixed Battalions
and Company Teams .
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.13.110, inv. nr.
213, 219, 223, 227, organisatietabellen
en autorisatiestaten (OTAS) pantserinfanteriebataljons YPR-765, 1978,
1979.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 563, Briefing Legerraad vervanging
pantserwielvoertuig YP-408 d.d. 1 november 1983, slide 10. VS
7-210, 2-1 t/m 2-2. VS 7-216,
1-6 t/m 1-8, 5A-1 t/m 5A-2. Felius, Einde Oefening,
277. NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 563,
loc. cit. shows that, contrary
to Staarman, De
YPR-765, 134 [190 in the printed version], the
platoon command group (Pc) of the armoured infantry company did not
have a YPR-765 PRCO-B but a YPR-765 PRI; at least in the
1980s. See
also Staarman, op. cit., Afb. 6 [printed version].
2.
With
the exception of
42 Armoured Infantry Battalion of
which all three armoured infantry companies, mortar and
antitank platoons were on active duty. SSA-MvD, 7486, ONDAS-ritmen
1984-1988 d.d. 20 augustus 1984.
3.
Additional
TOW: Staarman,
op. cit., 130-131 [186-187 in the
printed version].
4.
Felius,
loc. cit. Regarding the eightteen YPR-765s of other
types: in the
source material available to me I count nineteen;
those documents however date from 1978-1979 (see footnote 1).
The Legerraad (Army Board) briefing document
from 1983
(see footnote 1) indicates that the company staffs of the
three armoured
infantry companies were to have 1 x YPR-765 PRCO-B and 1 x
YPR-765 PRCO-C rather than 2 x YPR-765 PRCO-B. Felius, loc. cit.
however shows that this was not yet the case in 1986.
<
The
Armoured Infantry Battalion YP-408
1
Het
pantserinfanteriebataljon YP-408 (painfbat)
One
staff and support company, three armoured infantry companies (A-B-C)
(of which one on Short Leave
2),
and one armoured combat
support company (Paost). ¶ The staff and support company comprised the
battalion staff, a reconnaissance
platoon, a supply platoon, a maintenance platoon, a medical
platoon, and the company staff. The battalion staff had 3 x DAF YP-408
PWCO armoured command vehicle
(with M2 hmg .50 inch). The
reconnaissance
platoon had 4 x MAG gpmg 7.62 mm and 3 x DAF
YP-408
PWRDR armoured radar reconnaissance vehicle (with M2 hmg
.50 inch). The supply platoon had 2 x M2
hmg .50 inch and 3 x DAF YP-408 PWV armoured cargo
vehicle
(with M2 hmg .50 inch). The
maintenance platoon had 1 x M2 hmg .50 inch. The
medical platoon had 3
x DAF YA-408 PWGWT armoured
ambulance vehicle.
The company staff had 1 x M2 hmg. 50
inch. ¶
The three armoured infantry companies
each comprised a company staff and three armoured infantry platoons
(1-2-3). The company staff comprised a command group, an
administration and supply group, and a maintenance group. The command
group had 2 x YP-408 PWCO
. Each
armoured
infantry platoon comprised four groups (Pc-A-B-C). The Pc
Group (with the platoon commander) had 1 x DAF YP-408 PWI-PC
armoured personnel carrier (with M2 hmg .50 inch), 1 x FN MAG
gpmg 7.62 mm and 2 x M47 Dragon atgm system. A, B and C Group each had
1 x YP-408 PWI-GR armoured personnel carrier (with M2 hmg .50
inch), 1 x FN MAG gpmg
7.62 mm and 1 x Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm. ¶ The armoured combat
support company comprised a company staff, one antitank platoon (At)
and three mortar platoons (A-B-C) (of which one on Short Leave). The
company staff comprised a command group, an administration and supply
group, and a maintenance group. The command group had 1 x YP-408 PWCO,
the administration and supply group had 1 x M2 hmg .50 inch. The
antitank platoon comprised a command group and six antitank teams. The
command group had 1 x YP-408 PWCO and 3 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm.
Each antitank team had 1 x DAF YP-408
PWAT (with TOW atgm launcher on mount). The three mortar
platoons
each comprised a command group and three mortar teams. The command
group had 2 x YP-408 PWCO. The mortar teams each had 1 x
MO-120-RT
mortar 120 mm and 1 x DAF YP-408 PWMR
armoured mortar tractor (with M2 hmg .50 inch). || The battalion's
inventory further included ±
253 x M72 LAW 66 mm. For an idea of remaining equipment see the
second-last paragraph of
The
Armoured
Infantry Battalion YPR-765 .
Staff and
support company strength: 17/33/182/2 (234). Armoured infantry company
strength: 6/18/122 (146). Armoured infantry platoon strength: 1/4/34
(39). Pc-Group strength: 1/1/7 (9). A-B-C-Group strength: -/1/9 (10).
Armoured combat support company strength: 6/30/113 (149). Battalion
strength: 41/117/661/2 (821).
This unit
type was organic to the armoured (infantry) brigade. During
operations the armoured combat support company would only comprise the
mortar platoons, the antitank platoon being detached to the armoured
infantry companies or placed under direct command of the battalion
commander. The antitank platoon could be split into two or
three sections for such purposes. See
also Mixed Battalions
and Company Teams .
_________________________________________________
2.
The
official Royal Army orders of battle from 1985 to 1989
show
44 Armoured Infantry Battalion as
having three rather than two armoured infantry companies on
active-duty in this period. NIMH 430, inv. nrs. 54 t/m 64
(Slagordes KL stand 1 juli 1985 t/m stand 1 januari 1990). Further
research has shown this to be a (rather persistent) error in the files.
Thanks to Colonel G.I. Onderstal (Rtd.), commander of the battalion
from 1986 to 1988, Colonel A. de Munnik, commander of the battalion
from 1990 to 1992, and T.W. Brocades
Zaalberg of the Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH).
<
The
Armoured Antitank Company 1
De
pantserantitankcompagnie (paatcie)
One company staff,
six antitank platoons (1-2-3-4-5-6) (of which two on Short
Leave), and one service support platoon. The six antitank
platoons each comprised 4 x YPR-765 PRAT tank destroyer
(with dual TOW atgm launcher and FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm
on mount. In addition each YPR-765 PRAT had 1 x TOW atgm launcher on
board to deploy dismounted 3).
Company
strength: 9/26/135 (170).
Total
number of tank destroyers: 24
Each armoured infantry brigade had
one company of this type, the antitank platoons of which would
usually be assigned to the brigade's armoured infantry battalions
during operations.2
See also Mixed Battalions
and Company Teams .
________________________________________________
1.
VS 17-145, 1-10. Vuyk, Kwant en
Jansen, 11 Paatcie,
1. Anonymus, Pantserantitankcompagnieën,
13.
2.
Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, Met de
blik, 389. Elands, Van Gils en Schoenmaker, Geschiedenis 1 Divisie,
234.
3.
Staarman,
De YPR-765,
186-187.
<
The
Infantry Battalion of the Infantry Brigade
1
Het
infanteriebataljon van de infanteriebrigade (infbat)
One
staff and support company, three infantry companies (A-B-C), and one
combat support company (Ost). ¶ The staff and support company comprised
the battalion staff, a reconnaissance group, a signals platoon, a
service support platoon, a medical platoon, and the
company staff.2
¶ The three infantry companies each comprised a company staff with 2 x
Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm, three infantry platoons (1-2-3), and
one mortar platoon with 3 x M1 mortar 81 mm. The company staff
comprised a command group and an administration and supply
group.2
Each infantry platoon comprised a command group,
three infantry groups (A-B-C), each with 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm, and
one combat support group (Ost) with 2 x tripod-mounted FN MAG gpmg 7.62
mm and 2 x Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm. ¶ The combat support company
comprised a company staff, a machine gun platoon with 8 x FN MAG gpmg
7.62 mm, a recoilless rifle platoon with 8 x M40A1 rclr 106 mm mounted
on an M38A1 "Nekaf" Jeep, and a heavy mortar platoon with 4
x M30 mortar 4.2 inch. The company staff comprised a
command group and an administration and supply group.2
Staff and
support company strength: 14/29/153/2 (198). Infantry company strength:
6/21/135 (162). Infantry group strength: 0/1/8
(9). Combat support company strength: 5/21/123 (149).
Battalion strength: 37/113/681/2 (833).
This unit
type was found exclusively in 101 Infantry Brigade, which in
wartime would be tasked with securing the Corps Rear Area. It did not have
organic means of troop transport.3
Between 1988
and 1990 the role, organisation and equipment of 101 Infantry
Brigade were redefined, reorganised and improved (see further here), as a consequence of which the
unit type described above was superseded by two new types:
- The armoured infantry battalion, with YPR-765s (with
M2 hmg .50 inch), comprising a company staff, three armoured infantry
companies with 12 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm, 9 x Carl Gustav rclr
84 mm and 4 x M38A1 Jeep-mounted M40A1 rclr 106 mm each, and
one armoured combat support company with 12 x YPR-mounted TOW atgm
launcher and 9 x YPR-towed M30 mortar 4.2 inch. Staff and
support company strength: 20/34/207/2 (263). Armoured infantry company
strength: 6/17/132 (155). Armoured combat support company strength:
11/38/142 (191). Battalion strength: 49/123/745/2 (919).4
- The infantry battalion, with DAF
YA-328 three-tonne trucks (with M2 hmg .50 inch) for troop
transport, comprising a company staff, three infantry companies with 24
x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm, 9 x Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm
and 4 x M40A1 rclr 106 mm each, and one combat
support company with 12 x TOW atgm launcher and 9 x M30 mortar
4.2 inch. The M40A1s and TOWs were mounted on M38A1 Jeeps.
Staff and support company strength: 19/28/175/2 (224). Infantry company
strength: 6/20/144 (170). Combat support company strength: 11/35/129
(175). Battalion strength: 48/123/736/2 (909).4
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.182 inv. nr.
544, Voordracht Legerraad op 31 mei 1983: Reorganisatie Infanterie,
slide 9 (D-9169). NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 643,
Planningsmemorandum Legerplan 162 d.d. 1 augustus 1985, 8. VR
7-266, 1-1 t/m 1-2. VS 7-205, 11, 15.
2.
Due
to lack of data the organisation of the staff and support company
and the company staffs have been extrapolated from the
territorial infantry battalion organisation, and are therefore not
entirely certain; this uncertainty does however not pertain to
the armament indicated.
3.
NL-HaNA 2.13.182,
inv. nr. 643, op. cit., 4, 7.
4.
Ibid.,
65, 66, 86-130. VS 7-205, 15.
<
The Infantry
Battalion of the Territorial Infantry Brigade
1
Het
infanteriebataljon van de territoriale infanteriebrigade (infbat)
One
staff and support company, three infantry companies (A-B-C),
and one
combat support company (Ost). ¶ The staff and support company comprised
the battalion staff, a reconnaissance group, a signals platoon, a
service support platoon, a
medical
platoon, and the
company staff.
The battalion staff had four (civilian) passenger cars, 5 x M38A1
"Nekaf" Jeep, 2 x DAF YA-314 three-tonne truck, 5 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer, 2
x one-tonne trailer, and 1 x Bren lmg .303 inch. The reconnaissance
group (comprising three reconnaissance teams) had
three (civilian) passenger cars, 3
x M38A1 with M1919A4 mmg .30 inch mounted, and
three
inflatable reconnaissance boats. The
signals platoon had 3 x M38A1, 1 x Volkswagen Transporter Combi, 1 x
DAF YA-126 one-tonne truck, 1 x YA-314, 3 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer, and 1 x
one-tonne trailer. The
service support platoon had 3 x M38A1, 15 x YA-314, 3 x 1⁄4-tonne
trailer, 10 x one-tonne trailer, 5 x one-tonne trailer (water), and 2 x
Bren lmg .30 inch. The medical
platoon had 1 x M38A1, 7 x M38A1 ambulance, 1 x YA-314, and 1 x 1⁄4-tonne
trailer. The company staff had 1 x M38A1, 1 x YA-314 and 1 x one-tonne
trailer. The company staff had 1 x M38A1, 1 x YA-314, 1 x 1⁄4-tonne
trailer and 1 x one-tonne trailer.
¶
The three infantry companies each comprised a company staff
and three rifle platoons (1-2-3). The company staff
comprised a command group and an administration and supply group. It
had 1 x M38A1, 1 x YA-126, 1 x YA314, 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer, 2 x
one-tonne trailer, and 3 x Bren lmg .303 inch. Each rifle platoon
comprised a command group, three rifle groups (A-B-C), and one combat
support group (Ost). Each rifle group had 1 x Bren lmg .303
inch, each combat support group had 1 x Bren lmg .303 inch
with tripod mount and 1 x Carl Gustav
rclr 84 mm.¶
The combat support company comprised a company staff, one machine gun
platoon, two heavy mortar platoons, and one recoilless rifle platoon.
The company
staff comprised a command group and an administration and supply group.
It had 2 x M38A1, 1 x YA-126, 1 x YA-314, 2 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and 2
x one-tonne trailer.The machine gun platoon comprised a
command group and two machine gun groups. The command group had 1 x
M38A1 and 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer. Each machine gun group had
2 x M38A1 and 2 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and comprised
a command team and four machine gun teams. Each machine gun team had 1
x M1919A4 mmg .30 inch with tripod mount (platoon total: 8 x
M1919A4). The
two heavy mortar platoons each comprised a command group and
four heavy mortar
teams.
The command group had 2 x M38A1, 2 x YA-126, 2 x 1⁄4-tonne
trailer and 2 x M1919A4
mmg .30 inch (Jeep-mounted). Each heavy mortar
team had 1 x YA-126, 1 x one-tonne trailer and 1 x M30
mortar 4.2 inch (combat support company total: 8 x M30
mortar 4.2 inch).
The
recoilless rifle platoon comprised a command group and
four recoilless rifle groups. The command group had 1 x M38A1, 1 x
YA-126, 1 x
1⁄4-tonne trailer and 1 x one-tonne trailer. Each recoilless rifle group
comprised a command team
and two recoilless rifle teams. The command team had 1 x M38A1 and 1 x
1⁄4-tonne trailer, each recoilless rifle team had 1 x M38A1 with 1 x
M40A1 rclr 106 mm mounted (platoon total: 8
x M40A1).
Staff
and support company strength: 13/33/139/2 (187). Battalion
staff
strength: 7/8/16/2 (33).
Reconnaissance group
strength: -/3/9 (12). Signals platoon strength: 1/3/19 (23). Service
support platoon
strength: 2/12/53 (67). Medical
platoon strength: 2/2/37 (41). Company staff strength: 1/5/5 (11).
Infantry company strength: 5/19/106 (130).
Company
staff strength: 2/4/10 (16). Rifle platoon strength: 1/5/32 (38).
Command group strength: 1/1/1 (3). Rifle group strength: -/1/8 (9).
Combat support group strength: -/1/7 (8). Combat support company
strength: 6/28/140 (174). Company
staff strength: 2/6/8 (16). Machine gun platoon strength: 1/2/34 (37).
Heavy mortar platoon strength: 2/15/56 (73). Recoilless
rifle platoon strength: 1/5/42 (48). Battalion strength: 34/118/597/2
(751).2
There were eight battalions of this type, part of 302 and 304 Infantry Brigade of National
Territorial Command .
Personal armament in
these battalions probably
differed from the standard
pattern, with
M1
Garand semi-automatic
rifles
.30 inch rather than FN FAL battle rifles 7.62 mm.3
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv.
nr.
226, Reorganisatie Infbat d.d. 28 maart
1979. VS 7-205, figuur 2-1. VS 7-265, 10.
2.
Between
1979 and 1985 the staff and support company lost one sub-officer; these
are the 1979 strengths.
3.
NL-HaNA
2.13.110, inv. nr. 1365, Studie bewapening territoriale sector d.d. 10
mei 1976.
See also The
National Reserve Platoon, footnote 4.
<
The
Territorial Security Infantry Battalion
1
Het
infanteriebeveiligingsbataljon (infbevbat)
One
staff and support company, three security infantry companies (A-B-C),
and one
combat support company (Ost). ¶ The staff and support company comprised
the battalion staff, a reconnaissance group, a signals platoon, a
service support platoon, a transport platoon, a
medical
platoon, and the
company staff.
The battalion staff had four (civilian) passenger cars, 5 x M38A1
"Nekaf" Jeep, 2 x DAF YA-314 three-tonne truck, 5 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer, 2
x one-tonne trailer, and 1 x Bren lmg .303 inch. The reconnaissance
group (comprising three reconnaissance teams) had
three (civilian) passenger cars, 3
x M38A1 with M1919A4 mmg .30 inch mounted, and
three
inflatable reconnaissance boats. The
signals platoon had 3 x M38A1, 1 x Volkswagen Transporter Combi, 1 x
DAF YA-126 one-tonne truck, 1 x YA-314, 3 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer, 1 x
one-tonne trailer, and 1 x one-tonne trailer (generator). The
service support platoon had 3 x M38A1, 15 x YA-314, 3 x 1⁄4-tonne
trailer, 10 x one-tonne trailer, 5 x one-tonne trailer (water), and 2 x
Bren lmg .30 inch. The transport platoon had 1 x M38A1, 15 x YA-126, 10
x YA-314, 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer, and 10 x one-tonne trailer. The medical
platoon had 1 x M38A1, 7 x M38A1 ambulance, 1 x YA-314, and 1 x 1⁄4-tonne
trailer. The company staff had 1 x M38A1, 1 x YA-314, 1 x 1⁄4-tonne
trailer and 1 x one-tonne trailer. ¶
The three infantry security companies each comprised a company staff,
three rifle platoons (1-2-3) and one mortar platoon. The company staff
comprised a command group and an administration and supply group. It
had 1 x M38A1, 1 x YA-126, 1 x YA314, 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer, 2 x
one-tonne trailer, and 3 x Bren lmg .303 inch. Each rifle platoon
comprised a command group, three rifle groups (A-B-C), and one combat
support group (Ost). Each rifle group had 1 x Bren lmg .303
inch, each combat support group had 1 x Bren lmg .303 inch
with tripod mount and 1 x
M20 or M20B1 Bazooka 3.5 inch. The
mortar platoon comprised a command group and thee mortar
teams.
The command group had 1 x M38A1 and 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer, each mortar
team had 1 x M38A1, 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and one mortar 81 mm (probably
M1). ¶ The combat support company comprised a company staff, three
machine gun platoons and one recoilless rifle platoon. The company
staff comprised a command group and an administration and supply group.
It had 2 x M38A1, 1 x YA-126, 1 x YA-314, 2 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and 2
x one-tonne trailer. The three machine gun platoons each comprised a
command group and two machine gun groups. The command group had 1 x
M38A1 and 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer. Each machine gun group had
2 x M38A1 and 2 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and comprised
a command team and four machine gun teams. Each machine gun team had 1
x M1919A4 mmg .30 inch (combat support company total: 24 x
M1919A4, of which 12 x Jeep-mounted and 12 x tripod-mounted). The
recoilless rifle platoon comprised a command group and
four recoilless rifle groups. The command group had 1 x M38A1, 1 x
YA-126, 1 x
1⁄4-tonne trailer and 1 x one-tonne trailer. Each recoilless rifle group
comprised a command team
and two recoilless rifle teams. The command team had 1 x M38A1 and 1 x
1⁄4-tonne trailer, each recoilless rifle team had 1 x M38A1 with 1 x
M40A1 rclr 106 mm mounted (platoon total: 8
x M40A1).
Staff
and support company strength: 14/36/199/2 (251). Battalion staff
strength: 7/8/21/2 (38). Reconnaissance group strength: -/3/9 (12).
Signals platoon strength: 1/3/23 (27). Service support platoon
strength: 2/12/54 (68). Transport platoon strength: 1/3/50 (54).
Medical
platoon strength: 2/2/37 (41). Company staff strength: 1/5/5 (11).
Infantry
security company strength: 6/21/122
(149). Company
staff strength: 2/4/10 (16). Rifle platoon strength: 1/5/32 (38).
Command group strength: 1/1/1 (3). Rifle group strength: -/1/8 (9).
Combat support group strength: -/1/7 (8). Mortar platoon strength:
1/2/16 (19). Command group strength: 1/2/4 (7). Mortar team strength:
-/-/4 (4). Combat support company strength: 6/16/158 (180). Company
staff strength: 2/6/9 (17). Machine gun platoon strength: 1/2/35 (38).
Command group strength: 1/-/3 (4). Machine gun group strength: -/1/16
(17). Command team strength: -/1/- (1). Machine gun team strength:
-/-/4 (4). Recoilless rifle platoon strength: 1/4/44 (49). Command
group strength: 1/-/4 (5). Recoilless rifle group strength: -/1/10
(11). Command team strength: -/1/2 (3). Recoilless rifle team strength:
-/-/4 (4). Battalion strength: 38/115/723/2 (878).
The three battalions of this type were part of National
Territorial Command
and were earmarked for specific missions. 324 and 327 Security Infantry Battalion
would secure the Zestienhoven and Schiphol Airports respectively,
whilst 323 Security Infantry Battalion
would secure Headquarters Allied
Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), which in wartime would be
located in a hill in the Eifel .2
The secondary role of 324 and 327 Security Infantry Battalion was to
serve as a (mobile) general reserve for National Territorial Commander.
Personal armament in these two battalions probably
differed from the standard
pattern, with
M1
Garand semi-automatic
rifles
.30 inch rather than FN FAL battle rifles 7.62 mm.3Because
of its assignment
to HQ AFCENT
it may be that 323 Security Infantry Battalion
had the standard infantry weaponry of 1 (NL) Corps
units, including the FN MAG
gpmg 7.62 mm
and possibly the Carl Gustav
rclr 84 mm.4
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv.
nr.
1370, Reorg 324 en 327 Infbat tot 324 en 327 Infbevbat d.d. 17 maart
1977. VS 7-205, figuur 2-2. VS 7-265, 10. VS 7-266, 1-1 t/m
1-2.
2.
Felius,
Einde
Oefening, 210. In peacetime Headquarters
AFCENT was
located in Brunssum. Ibid.
4.
Information
on infantry weapons is incomplete and appears contradictory. NL-HaNA
2.13.110, op. cit. lists the M1 Carbine as part of the
inventory of 324 and 327 Security Infantry Battalion. This document is
from 1977, but the unit organisation type number was
still
valid in 1985. On the other hand, for the territorial security infantry
battalion in general VS 7-265
(1985) lists UZI submachine guns,
and
VS 7-266 (1985)
lists "Bazooka or Carl Gustav" and "Bren Gun or FN MAG".
It would appear that infantry weaponry was partly modernised without
the organisation type number being altered because unit organisation
remained the same.
425,
434
and 435 Mobile Security Infantry
Company were equipped with UZI, FN FAL and FN
MAG because of their NATO 'nuclear' security role. Bevaart
et al., Vijftig jaar,
96,
98. In addition, 435 Mobile Security Infantry Company had a number of
Carl Gustavs. VS 2-266, 1-5.
<
425
and 434 Mobile Security Infantry Company
1
425 en 434
Infanteriebeveiligingscompagnie Mobiel (425 en 434 Infbevcie Mbl)
One company staff,
four security infantry platoons (1-2-3-4), and one service support
platoon. ¶ The company staff, probably comprising a command group and
an administration and supply group, had 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land
Rover, 1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover and two motorcycles. ¶
Each security infantry platoon comprised a command group with 1
x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover, and four security infantry groups
(A-B-C-D). Each security infantry group had 2 x 3⁄4-tonne Land
Rover, of which one with 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm on mount. In
addition two of these groups each had 1 x mortar 2
inch, which would be mainly used for terrain illumination but could
also fire high explosive bombs.2
¶ The service support platoon had 6 x DAF YA-4440 four-tonne
truck, 1 x one-tonne trailer, 2 x one-tonne trailer
(water), and 2 x trailer (field kitchen). || The
company further had a number of M72 LAWs 66 mm.
Company
staff strength: 2/3/4 (9). Platoon command group strength: 1/1/1 (3).
Security infantry group strength: 0/1/9 (10). Security infantry platoon
strength: 1/5/37 (43). Service support platoon strength: 1/4/20 (25).
Company strength: 7/27/172 (206).
In
wartime 425 and 434 Mobile Security Infantry Company, part of 1 (NL) Corps Artillery, would secure
nuclear deployments of 19 and 129
Field Artillery Battalion. Apart from regular infantry drills
their training comprised object and area security (patrolling on foot
or in Land Rovers), transport operations, and ambush
and exfiltration tactics. They were expected to come up
against Warsaw Pact airborne troops and/or special forces such
as Soviet Spetsnaz units. See further at
1 (NL) Corps Artillery, Dual Capable Artillery.
_________________________________________________
1.
VR 7-266, 1-4. VS 7-266,
1-6. VS 7-265, 11. VS 30-1, 14-13,
14-15. Additional information kindly
provided by J.W. van de Langemheen, conscript sergeant in 425
Mobile Security Infantry Company in 1988
(email 28.12.2013, 31.03.2014). Also thanks
to R. Kreuger, conscript soldier 1st class in 434 Mobile
Security Infantry Company in 1987 (email 16.04.2014, 19.04.2014).
2.
The
2-inch mortar, of World War II vintage, had been replaced with
the L9A1 mortar 51 mm by 1988. For some reason the mortars are not
mentioned in VS 7-266 (1985); they are however in VR 7-266 (1983) and
VS 7-265 (1985).
<
436
and 437 Mobile Security Infantry Company
1
436
en 437 Infanteriebeveiligingscompagnie Mobiel (436 en 437 Infbevcie Mbl)
One company staff,
four security infantry platoons (1-2-3-4), and one service support
platoon. Organised like the
active-duty
counterpart of this unit type, but with partly different
(i.e. older) equipment. ¶ The company staff, probably comprising a
command group and an administration and supply group, likely had two or
three vehicles, perhaps one M38A1 "Nekaf" Jeep and one DAF YA-126
one-tonne truck, and probably two motorcycles. ¶ Each security infantry
platoon comprised a command group with 1 x M38A1, and four
security infantry groups (A-B-C-D). Each security infantry
group had 2 x DAF YA-126 and 1 x FN MAG gpmg
7.62 mm. In addition each security infantry platoon had 1
x M20 or M20B1 Bazooka 3.5 inch. ¶ The service
support platoon probably had about eight DAF YA-314 or possibly YA-328
three-tonne trucks.
Company
staff strength: ± 2/3/4 (9). Platoon command group strength:
1/1/1 (3). Security infantry group strength: 0/1/9 (10). Security
infantry platoon strength: 1/5/37 (43). Service support platoon
strength: ± 1/4/20 (25). Company strength: 6/26/170
(202).
Like
their active-duty
counterparts, the mobilisable 436 and 437 Mobile
Security Infantry Company would operate under the command of
Commander, 1 (NL) Corps Artillery. 436
Mobile Security Infantry Company would secure (the deployment of)
NORTHAG Ammunition Supply Point A for
nuclear munitions somewhere in the Rear Combat Zone,
whilst 437 Mobile Security Infantry Company would be
held in reserve as reinforcement/quick reaction force.2
In wartime these units were expected to come up against Warsaw
Pact airborne troops and/or special forces such as
Soviet Spetsnaz
units. See further at
1 (NL) Corps Artillery, Dual Capable Artillery.
_________________________________________________
1.
VR 7-266, 1-4. VS 7-266,
1-6. VS 7-265, 11. VS 30-1, 14-13,
14-15.
2.
Information
kindly provided by artillery Lieutenant-Colonel H. Molman
(Rtd.) (email 16.06.2014).
<
The
Territorial Mobile Security Infantry Company
1
De infanteriebeveiligingscompagnie
mobiel (infbevcie mbl)
One
company staff and four rifle platoons (1-2-3-4) (of which one on Short
Leave). ¶
The company staff comprised one command group, one administration and
supply group, one transport
group, and one kitchen group. It had one
(civilian) passenger car, 2 x M38A1 "Nekaf" Jeep,
4 x Volkswagen Transporter Combi, 9 x DAF YA-314
three-tonne truck, 1
x one-tonne trailer (water), and 3 x Bren lmg .303 inch. ¶
Each rifle platoon comprised one
command group and three rifle groups (A-B-C).
The command group had 1
x M38A1 and 1
x M20 or M20B1 Bazooka
3.5 inch. Each rifle group had 1 x Bren lmg .303 inch. The company
probably had three or four bicycles.
Company staff strength: 2/4/24/1 (31). Rifle platoon command group
strength: 1/1/5 (7). Rifle group strength: -/1/8 (9). Rifle platoon
strength: 1/4/29 (34). Company strength: 6/20/140/1 (167).
In peacetime the mobile territorial
security infantry
companies, falling under the Provincial
Military Commands/Garrison
Commands of National
Territorial Command,
would periodically perform guard and security duties at Royal Army
objects and locations in their province. In wartime they would serve
as a mobile reserve for their Provincial
Military Commander/Garrison Commander, who might also call upon them to
carry out special assignments.
Contrary
to the mobilisable security infantry companies (see further below),
personal armament followed the standard
pattern .2
The company staff
had 3 x FN
Browning Hi-Power 9 mm pistol
, 18 x
UZI submachine gun 9 mm, and 9
x FN FAL battle rifle 7.62
mm.
Each rifle platoon had five pistols, four
submachine guns and twenty-five rifles, divided as follows: two
pistols, four submachine guns and one rifle in the command group, and
one pistol and eight rifles in each rifle group.
435 Mobile Security Infantry Battalion
had a different, enlarged organisation because of its assignment to Special Ammunition
Storage
(SAS) Stöckerbusch in Germany. It
would appear that in peacetime the company comprised one, possibly two
company staffs and five security infantry platoons of which two on
leave, but information is sketchy.3
Platoon organisation was as follows:
one command group (1/1/4 (6)) with 1 x M38A1 or 1⁄2-tonne
Land Rover and
1 x Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm; three rifle groups (-/1/11 (12)) with 1 x
DAF YA-314 or YA-328 three-tonne truck and 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm
each; a replacement group (-/1/6 (7)) would be added in wartime. Each
platoon had one tripod mount for FN MAG. Personal armament followed the
standard
pattern .4
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.13.110 inv. nr. 212, Organigrammen infbevcie mbl d.d. 3 november 1977. Bicycles: NL-HaNA
2.13.182 inv. nr. 546, Planningsmemorandum verdere uitbreiding NATRES
d.d. 10 juni 1983, Bijlage H.
3.
Oosterboer,
Kernwapenopslag,
179-180. Bremer, 435
Infanterie Beveiligingscompagnie, 29. Wikipedia, 435 IBC.
4.
VS
7-266, 1-5. Bevaart et al., op. cit., 96, 98.
<
The
Territorial Light Security Infantry Company
1
De lichte
infanteriebeveiligingscompagnie (ltinfbevcie)
One
company staff and three rifle platoons (1-2-3). ¶
The company staff comprised one command group, one administration and
supply group, one transport
group, and one kitchen group. It had one
(civilian) passenger car, 4 x M38A1 "Nekaf" Jeep,
2 x DAF YA-126 one-tonne truck, 8 x DAF YA-314 or YA-328
three-tonne truck, 1
x 1⁄4-tonne trailer, 2 x Volkswagen Transporter Combi and one field
kitchen. ¶ Each rifle platoon comprised one
command group and three rifle groups (A-B-C).
The command group had 1
x M38A1 and 1
x M20 or M20B1 Bazooka
3.5 inch. Each rifle group had 1 x Bren lmg .303 inch, each platoon had
one Bren tripod
mount. The company had a number of Energa antitank
rifle grenades.
Company staff strength: 2/4/22 (28). Rifle platoon command group
strength: 1/1/5 (7). Rifle group strength: -/1/8 (9). Rifle platoon
strength: 1/4/29 (34). Company strength: 5/16/109 (130).
The territorial security infantry
companies, falling under the Provincial
Military Commands/Garrison
Commands of National
Territorial Command,
would secure important objects or
areas, or serve as a mobile reserve for their Provincial
Military Commander/Garrison Commander. During operations one
or more
National
Reserve platoons might be attached.
Personal armament followed the standard pattern, except
that this unit type still had the
M1
Garand semi-automatic
rifle
.30 inch instead of the FN FAL battle rifle 7.62 mm. The company staff
had 5 x FN
Browning Hi-Power 9 mm pistol
,
14 x UZI submachine gun 9 mm, 9
x M1 Garand rifle .30 inch and three
flare pistols
(probably
Geco 26,5 mm). For personal armament in the rifle platoons see The
National Reserve Platoon.
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182 inv. nr. 546, Planningsmemorandum verdere uitbreiding NATRES
d.d. 10 juni 1983, 9, Bijlage E, Bijlage H. VS
7-265, 12. VS 7-266,
1-4.
Bevaart et al., Vijftig
jaar, 123, 125. Energa: Dutch
military designation ATB nr 4.
Each rifle platoon had six rifle grenade launchers
for the M1
Garand, probably two per rifle group. NL-HaNA, op. cit., Bijlage E. Dutch
designation schiettap, in this document
"lanceerinrichting energa". Thanks
to Leo Slager of the Stichting
Regimentscollectie Technische Troepen for identifying the
"lanceerinrichting".
<
The
Territorial Heavy Security Infantry Company
1
De zware
infanteriebeveiligingscompagnie (zwinfbevcie)
One
company staff, three rifle platoons (1-2-3) and one mortar
platoon. ¶
The company staff comprised one command group, one administration and
supply group, one transport
group, and one kitchen group. It had one
(civilian) passenger car, 2 x
M38A1 "Nekaf" Jeep,
2 x DAF YA-126 one-tonne truck, 8 x
DAF YA-314 or YA-328
three-tonne truck, 1
x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and one field
kitchen. ¶ The three rifle platoons were
organised and equipped as the rifle platoons of the
Territorial Light Security Infantry
Company,
but they had no antitank rifle grenade launchers. ¶ The mortar platoon
comprised one command group and three mortar groups, each group with
one mortar 81 mm (probably M1). It had 1 x M38A1, 1 x 1⁄4-tonne
trailer and 3 x Volkswagen Transporter Combi.
Company
staff strength: 2/4/20 (26). Rifle platoon command group
strength: 1/1/5 (7). Rifle group strength: -/1/8 (9). Rifle platoon
strength: 1/4/29 (34). Mortar platoon command group strength: 1/2/4
(7). Mortar group strength: -/-/4 (4). Mortar platoon strength: 1/2/16
(19). Company strength: 6/18/123 (147).
The territorial security infantry
companies, falling under the Provincial
Military Commands/Garrison
Commands of National
Territorial Command,
would secure important objects or
areas, or serve as a mobile reserve for their Provincial
Military Commander/Garrison Commander. During operations one
or more
National
Reserve platoons might be attached.
For personal armament see The
Territorial Light Security Infantry Company.
In comparison with that unit type, the company staff had three rather
than five pistols. The mortar platoon had six pistols, eight submachine
guns, and five rifles.
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182 inv. nr. 546, Planningsmemorandum verdere uitbreiding NATRES
d.d. 10 juni 1983, 9, Bijlage D. VS
7-265, 12.
<
The
Territorial Security Infantry Company
1
De infanteriebeveiligingscompagnie
(infbevcie)
One
company staff and four rifle platoons (1-2-3-4). ¶
The company staff comprised one command group, one administration and
supply group, one transport
group, and one kitchen group. It had one
(civilian) passenger car, 1 x M38A1 "Nekaf" Jeep,
3 x DAF YA-126 one-tonne truck, 9 x DAF YA-314
three-tonne truck, 1
x 1⁄4-tonne trailer, 1 x one-tonne trailer (water). ¶
Each rifle platoon comprised one
command group and three rifle groups (A-B-C).
The command group had 1
x M20 or M20B1 Bazooka
3.5 inch. Each rifle group had 1 x Bren lmg .303 inch,
each platoon had
one Bren tripod
mount. The company had a number of Energa antitank rifle grenades, and
probably four bicycles.
Company staff strength: 2/5/23 (30). Rifle platoon command group
strength: 1/1/5 (7). Rifle group strength: -/1/8 (9). Rifle platoon
strength: 1/4/29 (34). Company strength: 6/21/139 (166).
The territorial security infantry
companies, falling under the Provincial
Military Commands/Garrison
Commands of National
Territorial Command,
would secure important objects or
areas, or serve as a mobile reserve for their Provincial
Military Commander/Garrison Commander. During operations one
or more
National
Reserve platoons might be attached.
Between 1983 and 1985 twenty-two companies of this unit type were
reorganised into The
Territorial Light Security Infantry Company and
The Territorial Heavy Security
Infantry Company unit types.
The remaining sixteen
companies of this unit type were
scheduled to be disbanded between 1987 and 1990, in which period
forty-eight National Reserve platoons
and sixteen National Reserve
Company Staffs were to be raised; this was however never
realised.2
Personal armament followed
the standard
pattern, except
that this unit type still had the
M1
Garand semi-automatic
rifle
.30 inch instead of the FN FAL battle rifle 7.62 mm.3
The company staff
had 3 x FN
Browning Hi-Power 9 mm pistol
, 16 x
UZI submachine gun 9 mm, and 11
x M1 Garand rifle .30 inch. Each rifle platoon had five pistols, two
submachine guns and twenty-seven rifles, divided as follows: two
pistols, two submachine guns and three rifles in the command group, and
one pistol and eight rifles in each rifle group.
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.13.110 inv. nr. 1365, Reorganisatie Infbevcien d.d. 28 maart
1979. Energa:
see The Territorial Light Security Company, footnote
1. Bicycles: NL-HaNA
2.13.182 inv. nr. 546, Planningsmemorandum verdere uitbreiding NATRES
d.d. 10 juni 1983, Bijlage H.
2.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182 inv. nr. 546, op. cit., 6-7. Hoffenaar
en Schoenmakers, November
Romeo, 120.
<
The
National Reserve Company Staf
f
1
De
compagniesstaf Nationale Reserve (NATRES) (ciestnatres)
One
command group, one administration and supply group, one transport
group, and one kitchen group. The command group had one
(civilian)
passenger car, 2 x M38A1 "Nekaf" Jeep and 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer. The
administration and supply group had 1 x DAF
YA-314 or YA-328
three-tonne truck. The transport group had 4
x Volkswagen Transporter Combi
and 2 x DAF YA-314 or YA-328. The kitchen group had 1 x DAF
YA-314 or YA-328 and one field kitchen.
Command
group strength: 2/1/4 (7). Administration and supply group strength:
-/2/3 (5). Transport group: -/1/6 (7). Kitchen group: -/-/4 (4).
Company staff strength: 2/4/17 (23).
A National Reserve (NATRES) company
staff would command three or more NATRES
platoons. NATRES
units were composed of part-time volunteer
reservists.
Personal armament comprised 3 x FN Browning
Hi-Power 9 mm pistol
,
12 x UZI submachine gun 9 mm, eight rifles, and two flare
pistols
(probably Geco 26,5 mm). These were divided as follows: three pistols,
four submachine guns and two flare pistols in the command group; one
submachine gun and four rifles in the administration and supply group;
seven submachine guns in the transport group; and one submachine gun
and three rifles in the kitchen group. For rifle types see The
National Reserve Platoon.
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182 inv. nr. 546, Planningsmemorandum verdere uitbreiding NATRES
d.d. 10 juni 1983, 9, Bijlage F. VS
7-265, 13. Hoffenaar
en Schoenmakers, op. cit., 83, 112-113, 154, achterzijde stofomslag.
<
The
National Reserve Platoo
n
1
Het
peloton Nationale Reserve (NATRES) (pelnatres)
One
command group and three rifle groups (A-B-C). ¶ The command group had 1
x M38A1 "Nekaf" Jeep, 1
x M20 or M20B1 Bazooka
3.5 inch, and one bicycle. ¶ Each rifle group had either 1 x Bren lmg
.303 inch or 1 x FN MAG
gpmg 7.62 mm, and one bicycle. When equipped with Bren lmg the platoon
had one Bren tripod
mount. The platoon had a number of Energa antitank rifle
grenades.2
Command group strengh: 1/1/5 (7). Rifle group strength: -/1/8 (9).
Platoon strength: 1/4/29 (34).
National Reserve (NATRES)
platoons, falling under the Provincial
Military Commands/Garrison
Commands of National
Territorial Command,
would guard
important objects and secure relatively small areas prior to, during
and after
mobilisation, or serve as a mobile reserve for their company
commander. They would
be placed under command of a NATRES
company staff, a
territorial security infantry company, or operate directly
under their
Provincial Military Command/Garrison Command.
NATRES units were composed of part-time volunteer
reservists.3
Personal armament followed the standard
pattern with exception of rifles: in
1985 more than half of the platoons were
still equipped with
the M1 Garand semi-automatic
rifle
.30 inch. The replacement with
the FN FAL battle rifle 7.62
mm, begun in 1978, became problematic
when twenty-two new
platoons were raised between 1983 and 1988. In 1984 it
was decided that only the platoons and nearly all company staffs under
the Zeeland, North Brabant and Limburg Provincial
Military Commands/Garrison Commands would
be issued the FN FAL. All other units would receive or continue to use
the
M1 Garand, which weapon remained in use until 1987. The replacement
of the Bren lmg with FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm began in
1985 and took until 1988.4
Personal armament comprised 5 x FN
Browning Hi-Power 9 mm pistol
, 14 x UZI submachine
gun 9 mm, and fifteen rifles. These were divided as follows: two
pistols and five
submachine guns in the command group; and one pistol, three
submachine guns and five rifles in each rifle group.
In wartime means of transport (trucks, bicycles) would be requisitioned
or provided from the national stockpile (landsvoorraad).5
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182 inv. nr. 546, Planningsmemorandum verdere uitbreiding NATRES
d.d. 10 juni 1983, Bijlage G. VS 7-265, 13. VS 7-266,
1-4.
2.
Energa:
NL-HaNA, op. cit., Bijlage G, Bijlage H.
Hoffenaar
en Schoenmakers, November
Romeo, 85. Dutch
military designation ATB nr 4. NL-HaNA, loc. cit. shows that the
platoon had three rifle grenade launchers (schiettap, in this document
"lanceerinrichting energa") for the M1 Garand, probably one per rifle
group. As the platoons were at that time (1983) all still supposed to
have FN FAL battle rifles, which do not require a separate launcher, it
may be that each rifle group had 1 x M1 Garand with "fixed" grenade
launcher in order to avoid the accident-prone loading procedure with
the FAL; see Knip,
Geweergranaten,
72-73. Thanks to Leo Slager of the
Stichting
Regimentscollectie Technische Troepen for identifying the
"lanceerinrichting".
3.
NL-HaNA,
op.cit., 8-9. VS
7-265, loc. cit. Hoffenaar en Schoenmakers, op. cit., 83, 112-113, 154,
achterzijde stofomslag.
4.
Hoffenaar
en
Schoenmakers, op. cit., 120, 143. The
UZI replaced the M1 Carbine .30 inch, which replacement began in
1978. Hoffenaar
en Schoenmakers, op. cit., 143. It
appears that by 1985 there was no
shortage in
UZI submachine guns 9 mm. The FN FAL rifle
meanwhile had
only been introduced on a very limited scale within National
Territorial Command; as these weapons became available
NATRES units got priority. NL-HaNA, op. cit., 13, Bijlage H,
Bijvoegsel
1 bij Bijlage H.
See also NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr. 1365, Studie bewapening
territoriale sector d.d. 10 mei 1976.
For what it is worth, the June 1986
issue of the semi-official army magazine Legerkoerier
announced that all
NATRES units with the M1 Garand would be equipped with FN FAL directly
after the summer of that year.
Bren
lmg:
Schoenmakers, 40 jaar, 75. The December 1987 issue of Legerkoerier
notes that the Bren Gun was expected to be phased out completely in
1988. Schoenmakers, loc. cit. lists four rather than three Bren Guns per platoon but this does not
correspond with VS 7-265 (1985) and VS 7-266 (1985) so this must be an
error.
5.
Hoffenaar
en
Schoenmakers, op. cit., 126.
<
305 Commando Battalion
1
305
Commandotroepenbataljon (305 Cotrbat)
One
staff and staff detachment, and three commando companies (403-406-412).
¶ The staff and staff detachment comprised the battalion command group
with 1 x M38A1 "Nekaf" Jeep and 1 x 1⁄4-tonne
trailer; section S2/S3
(intelligence/operations and training) with 2 x DAF YA-314 three-tonne
truck and 1 x one-tonne trailer;
section S1/S4 (personnel/logistics) with 1 x M38A1, 1 x YA-314, 1 x
1⁄4-tonne trailer and 1 x one-tonne trailer; a signals group
with 1
x DAF YA-126 one-tonne truck and 1 x one-tonne trailer (generator); and
the staff detachment with 1 x M38A1 ambulance. ¶ The three commando
companies each comprised a company staff and three commando platoons
(1-2-3). The company staff comprised a command group with 2 x
M38A1, 1 x YA-314, 2 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and 1 x one-tonne trailer; an
administration and supply group with 1 x M38A1 ambulance, 1 x YA-314
and 1 x one-tonne trailer; a transport group with 7 x YA-314, 6 x
one-tonne trailer and 1 x one-tonne trailer (water), two four-men
inflatable reconnaissance boats (Zephyr), one six-men inflatable boat
(Zephyr) and one 25 hp outboard motor; and a kitchen group with 1 x
YA-314 and 1 x one-tonne trailer (mobile field kitchen). Each commando
platoon comprised a command group and three commando groups (A-B-C).
Each commando group had 2 x Bren lmg .303 inch.
Staff
and staff detachment strength: 5/5/10 (20). Commando company strength:
5/16/120 (141). Company staff strength: 2/4/21 (27). Command group
strength: 2/2/4 (8). Administration and supply group strength: -/2/6
(8). Transport group strength: -/-/7 (7). Kitchen group strength: -/-/4
(4). Commando platoon strength: 1/4/33 (38). Command group
strength: 1/1/3 (5). Commando group strength: -/1/10 (11). Battalion
strength: 20/53/370 (443).
After
mobilisation 305 Commando Battalion would operate within the framework
of territorial security. Its operational role was to provide military
assistance, in particular in keeping open the lines of
communications (LOCs); to locate, bind and neutralise enemy
reconnaissance and sabotage units; and to serve as a mobile
general reserve for National
Territorial Commander . Missions
might include direct action (DA)
against
enemy airborne or seaborne elements and securing,
destroying or retaking vital objects.
The battalion's relatively small command element served as a
tactical staff, enabling the independent commando companies to
operate as a
combined force if needed. The
battalion was made up from Commando Corps cadre and reservists from
104 Observation
and Reconnaissance Company.
Personal armament probably followed the standard
pattern.Within
a commando group (A-B-C) personnel and weapons were distributed as
follows: 1 x
group commander (sergeant), rifle; 1 x deputy group commander
(corporal), rifle; 2 x lmg team commander (corporal), rifle; 2 x lmg
gunner (soldier), pistol and lmg; 2 x lmg helper (soldier),
submachine gun; 1 x
rifle team commander (corporal), rifle; 2 x rifleman (soldier), rifle
with scope. The Bren lmg was replaced by the FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm in 1988.2
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.13.110 inv. nr. 1371 (reorganisatie
305 Commandotroepenbataljon,
1975-1976). Krijger
en Elands, Commandotroepen, 72, 102.
The NL-HaNA source
documents are quite dated for
1985; however, comparison with organisation type numbers and
personnel strengths in the official 1985 order of battle (NIMH
430, inv. nr. 54)
shows that, at least regarding organisation and strength, no
major changes occurred between
1976 and 1985. In 1976 the staff and staff detachment strength was
4/6/13 (23), so by 1985 that subunit had lost three soldiers.
2.
NL-HaNA,
op. cit., Reorganisatie 305 Cotrbat d.d. 28 oktober 1975, Bijlage C. The
documents in NL-HaNA, op. cit., note that at that time, 1976,
no
modern weapons (UZI,
FN FAL, FN MAG) were yet available for the battalion; the M1 Garand
semi-automatic rifle .30 inch and the M1 Carbine .30 inch must still
have
been part of its inventory. The documents
also note that weapons were expected to become available after the
reorganisation and mechanisation of 5 Division, which was completed in
1979. In
1983 the three commando companies were registered as having
UZI submachine
guns 9 mm. NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr. 546, Planningsmemorandum verdere
uitbreiding NATRES d.d. 10 juni 1983, Bijvoegsel 1 bij Bijlage H.
In
a picture from 1987, showing 403 Commando Company during a
refresher training, UZI, FN FAL and Bren Gun can be seen. Krijger
en Elands, op. cit.,
103. Bren Gun replaced in 1988: see The National Reserve Platoon,
footnote 4. In
1976 the battalion inventory included 72 pistols, 138
submachine guns, 236 rifles, 54 rifle scopes, and 54 light
machine
guns. NL-HaNA, op. cit.
<
G
Military Constabulary Squadron
1
G
Marechaussee-eskadron (G Maresk)
One
squadron staff, two reconnaissance teams, and six armoured car teams. ¶
The squadron staff comprised a command group and a deputy command
group. The command group had 1 x DAF YP-408 PWCO armoured
command
vehicle (with M2 hmg .50 inch), 1 x Volkswagen Transporter Combi, and
two motorcycles. The deputy command group had
1 x DAF YP-408 PWCO armoured command vehicle (with M2 hmg .50 inch), 1
x DAF YA-126 one-tonne truck (radio
vehicle), 1
x Volkswagen Transporter Combi, and two motorcycles. ¶ The two
reconnaissance teams each had 2 x M38A1 (with FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm on
mount) and two motorcycles. ¶ The six
armoured car teams
each had 1 x DAF YP-408 PWI-GR armoured personnel carrier (with M2 hmg
.50 inch). The armoured car teams together had four motorcycles.
Command
group strength: 1/3/5 (9). Deputy command group strength: 1/3/6 (10).
Squadron staff strength: 2/6/11 (19). Reconnaissance team strength:
-/2/6 (8). Armoured car team strength: -/2/2 (4). Armoured car team
motorcyclists: -/-/4 (4). Squadron strength: 2/22/39 (63).2
G-Squadron
fell directly under the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. It
was a
temporary unit to be formed on mobilisation from professional personnel
on active duty, with the single mission to secure and evacuate
the
Royal Family. See further Royal Army, Part
IV,
note b. Because of its special mission the squadron had some unusual
radio equipment. The
two command vehicles were fitted with three-stage amplifiers and
six-metre
long antennas for their radios in order to enable a direct
link
with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army over long distances.
The amplifier was mounted on the rear, the antennas would be
arched over the length of the vehicle during driving
and had to be built up from a stationary position for use. The
engine had to be kept running and the vehicle had to be closed
up
because of the high voltage involved. The YA-126 carried an
additional single-sideband radio, one other being installed in
the
squadron commander's YP-408 PWCO.3
Personal
armament comprised 63 x FN Browning Hi-Power 9 mm pistol and 61 x UZI
submachine gun 9 mm: all personnel had both a pistol and a
submachine gun except for the squadron commander and deputy commander
who had a pistol only.
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.13.110, inv. nr. 1338, Aantekeningen
bij ontwerp otas
Marechaussee-eskadron G d.d. 1 maart 1978. Ibid, Reorganisatie
Maresk (G) orgtnr. 25.1013.02
d.d. 12 september 1978 (the aforementioned organisation type number was
still used in 1985, which indicates that no significant organisational
changes occurred in the meantime). Website
DAF YP-408 Forgotten Hero, G-Eskadron
Koninklijke Marechaussee. Ibid., Fotoalbum Peter Nijmeijer.
Additional information kindly provided by Peter Nijmeijer who served
with the squadron from 1974 to 1985 (emails 19.03.2019 and
30.03.2019).
2.
These
personnel strengths are from 1978 (see footnote 1). Squadron strength
in 1985: 2/22/38 (62). It seems likely that the deputy command group
assumed the same strength as the command group.
3.
In
his article
Verplaatsing
onder pantser, partly included on
Website
DAF YP-408 Forgotten Hero, G-Eskadron
Koninklijke Marechaussee,
the author Jan Gaasbeek, who served with the squadron, reports
that all YP-408's of the squadron were equipped with RT-3030/GRC-3030
radios (rather than the usual RT-3600 series radios, see
Website
DAF YP-408 Forgotten Hero, Radio's
in de YP-408). By 1985 the RT-3030/GRC-3030 would
have been a more or less vintage radio, as this type was in
service from 1958 to 1970. Website PA3ESY, RT-3030 of GRC-3030. The 1983
edition of VS 2-1392/11 does not include this radio type.
<
Special Security Assignments Brigade
1
Brigade Speciale
Beveiligingsopdrachten (BSB)
One command group and six military
constabulary groups. The
"brigade" was a platoon-sized Special Forces unit designed to
fill the operational gap between the civilian police and the Marine
Corps Special Assistance Unit. It was under administrative
command of 2 Division Royal Military Constabulary,
but during operations it would fall directly under the Commander of the Royal Military
Constabulary. Composed of picked men mastering a variety
of weapons and trained in close protection, unarmed
combat, forced entry, close quarters combat, operating with armoured
vehicles, knowledge of
subversive organisations and long range/precision shooting.
Command group strength: 2/1/1 (4). Military constabulary group
strength: -/2/3 (5). Brigade strength: 2/13/19 (34).2
In 1978 personal armament comprised a Smith & Wesson revolver
.357 inch, a Heckler & Koch pistol 9 mm and the
standard FN Browning Hi-Power pistol 9 mm for all personnel. In
addition the men in the six military constabulary groups and the
non-officers in the command group had a standard UZI
submachine gun 9 mm. By 1985 these had most likely
been replaced by Heckler & Koch MP5 submachine guns 9 mm.
The
Brigade's armory further included M1
Carbines (teargas), and probably FN
30-11 sniper rifles 7.62 mm and/or Heckler
& Koch HK33-SG1 (sniper) assault rifles
5.56 mm.3Each of the seven groups had a Range
Rover capable of transporting a group with all its equipment.
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.13.110,
inv. nr. 154, Oprichting BSB KMar orgtnr: 25.1074.01 d.d. 22 september
1977. Roozenbeek et al., Een krachtig instrument, 150.
Timmermans, De Brigade,
15.
2.
These
personnel strengths are from 1977 (see footnote 1). In
1985 unit strength was 2/15/19
(36). Possibly in 1979 or 1980 the
command group was enlarged with two sub-officers. NL-HaNA 2.13.175,
inv. nr. 140, Wijziging
OTAS d.d. 28 augustus 1979.
3.
Heckler & Koch
MP5 and HK33 probably in use in 1985: the first
of these weapons were acquired by the Ministry of Justice as early as
1978. HTK 1978-1979, 16de vergadering, 1
november 1978.
It does not seem unlikely that the UZI remained in use for
some
time alongside the MP5, but the UZI was considered "not really
suitable" for BSB operations. Timmermans, loc. cit. In 1989
armament included multiple variants of the Heckler & Koch MP5
as
well as HK33-SG1 assault rifles. During the violent riots in Amsterdam on 30 April 1980
(investiture of Queen Beatrix) two BSB teams were
deployed as
snipers on the roofs around Dam Square (de Dam) in protection of the
Royal Palace, equipped with Heckler & Koch HK33-SG1 assault
rifles
or FN 30-11 sniper rifles. Roozenbeek et al., op.
cit., 155. Timmer, Politiegeweld,
350.
<
The Armoured Anti-Aircraft Artillery
Battery
1
De
pantserluchtdoelartilleriebatterij (paluabt)
One battery staff, three armoured anti-aircraft artillery
platoons (1-2-3) (of which one on Short Leave
2), and one service support
platoon. ¶ The battery staff had 2 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover, 1 x 3⁄4-tonne
Land Rover, 4 x DAF YA-4440 four-tonne truck, 1 x one-tonne
trailer (generator), two motorcycles and 2 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62
mm.3
¶ During operations the three armoured anti-aircraft
artillery platoons each comprised a command group, 3 x PRTL
self-propelled anti-aircraft gun system (with 2 x 35 mm Oerlikon KDA
autocannon),4
three Stinger teams, and and one replacement group. The command
group had 1 x YPR-765 PRCO-C4 (with M2 hmg .50 inch)
and
2 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover. The three-men Stinger teams
each had 1 x FIM-92 Stinger man-portable air defence system
with six missiles and 1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover with 1⁄4-tonne
trailer.5
The replacement group, with 1 x YA-4440, held three extra PRTL/Stinger
crews. This group enabled the anti-aircraft platoon to maintain
operational readiness around the clock through crew rotations.6
¶ The service support platoon comprised a command group, an
administration group, a supply group, a maintenance group, a kitchen
group, and a medical group. The command group and the administration
group shared 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover. The supply group had 10
x YA-4440, of which one with 1 x one-tonne trailer (water) and
six with loader crane (for loading/unloading
ammunition); it further had 6 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm. The maintenance
group had 3 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover, 3 x YA-4440, of which one with 1 x
one-tonne trailer, 1 x Volkswagen Transporter Combi, and 1 x Leopard
Bergepanzer 2 Armoured Recovery Vehicle (with 2 x
gpmg 7.62 mm). The kitchen group had 1 x YA-4440 with 1 x one-tonne
trailer (field kitchen). The medical group had 3 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover
ambulance.3
|| Throughout the battery personal armament consisted mainly of UZI
submachine guns.
Battery
staff strength: 3/3/14 (20).3
Armoured anti-aircraft artillery platoon strength: 2/10/23 (35).
Service
support platoon strength: 1/9/52 (62).3
Battery strength: 10/42/133 (185).
Total
number of anti-aircraft weapon systems: 9 x PRTL, 9 x Stinger.
With the
introduction of the FIM-92 Stinger man-portable air defence
system the old
battery organisation was superseded by this unit type. The
Stinger, ordered in 1982, was delivered in 1984-1985
and entered service in 1985-1987.7
In 1985 all active-duty batteries were incorporating the
Stinger teams, which were partly formed from the PRTL crews in
the replacement group. The mobilisable batteries followed in 1986-1987.
For the actual state of affairs per battery in 1985 see 101 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group.8
For early
warning and tactical control the Stinger teams relied on the long-range
scanning capacity of the PRTL's search radar, which had been the
principal reason to incorporate the Stingers in the PRTL batteries.9
This incorporation was seen as a temporary measure, to be
undone when a separate warning and tactical control system for Stinger
would become operational.10
Indeed the situation was not ideal, given the different
cross-country capabilities of the Leopard 1-based PRTL and the
Land Rover-with-trailer.11
The PRTL
self-propelled anti-aircraft gun was a technologically highly advanced
weapon system, the maintenance requirements of which
forced the Royal Army through a steep learning curve
during the early 1980s, when it became apparent that inefficiencies in
the maintenance and materiel support system seriously
compromised the operational readiness of the batteries. In
1982 only fifty to sixty percent of the PRTLs in active-duty batteries
were deployable, whilst even PRTLs in mobilisation stores were found to
be affected, with a mere eighty-five percent of these being deployable.
From December 1984 on several measures were put in place to improve the
situation, after which the system's operational readiness began to
climb back to acceptable levels: seventy-five percent
of PRTLs in active units and about ninety to a hundred
percent of PRTLs in mobilisation stores were reported
deployable at the end of 1985. In 1986 the overall operational
readiness of the systems was at eighty percent.12
_________________________________________________
1.
VS
44-32, I-4 t/m I-7, III-30. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 497,
Memorandum Reorganisatie Luchtverdediging d.d. 14 juli 1982, Bijlagen C
en D.
3.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 497, op. cit. Given the date of this planning
document this information may not be entirely accurate for 1985.
4.
PRTL
(pantserrups tegen luchtdoelen) was the Dutch military designation for
the Dutch version of the West German Leopard 1-based Gepard
self-propelled anti-aircraft gun system. See for instance VS 2-1351,
10-28 t/m 10-29. For an extensive description see Foss, Jane's Armour and Artillery,
514-515.
5.
Six
missiles: 4 x Stinger Basic Weapon Round and 2
x Stinger Basic Missile Round. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv.
nr. 561, Planningsmemorandum Invoering Stinger Basic d.d. 30 september
1983, 7. Klinkert, Otten en Plasmans, Luchtdoelartillerie,
212.
6.
The
Stinger teams and their equipment were administratively part of the
replacement group, which in total comprised six commanders PRTL/Stinger
team, six gunners PRTL/Stinger, three chauffeurs PRTL, three chauffeurs
Land Rover and one chauffeur for the group's YA-4440.
Thus all in all nine PRTL/Stinger crews, comprising a commander and a
gunner, would rotate via the replacement group, alternately
manning a PRTL, operating as part of a Stinger team, and resting. Each
crew was in principle linked to a PRTL and a Stinger team. The
chauffeurs PRTL and Land Rover were not interchangeable, but there was
an extra chauffeur for each PRTL. VS 44-32, III-30.
Ballegooij, Pantserluchtdoelartillerie,
3.20, 3.26. Klinkert, Otten en Plasmans, op. cit., 222.
7.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 561, op. cit, 29. Klinkert, Otten
en Plasmans, op. cit., 211. All in all 486 Stingers
were ordered for the Royal Army: 324 x Stinger Basic Weapon
Round and 162 x Stinger Basic Missile Round. NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 561, loc. cit. Klinkert, Otten
en Plasmans, loc. cit.
8.
The
Royal Army official order of battle per 1 July 1985 shows
all Stinger teams as being already in place,
both in terms of the batteries' personnel strengths and their
organisation type number. NIMH 430, inv. nr. 54 (Slagorde KL stand 1
juli 1985). Those organisation type numbers however refer to tables of
organisation and equipment (organisatietabellen en autorisatiestaten,
OTAS) that were updated in advance of the actual introduction
of the weapon. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 561, op. cit., 10.
9.
Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 399. Klinkert, Otten en Plasmans,
op. cit., 212.
10.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 561, op. cit., 6. HTK
1986-1987,
kamerstuknr. 19700 X ondernr. 7,
2. In 1985 the
acquisition of such a system, referred to as WAGEL (Waarschuwings- en
gevechtsleidingssysteem Stinger) was still subject of study. At that
time its introduction was foreseen for 1990-1991. NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 642, Waarschuwings- en gevechtsleidingssysteem
Stinger, Bijlage 1 behorende bij aantekening CG nr. CG
850725/Conf "Aanbieding DMP-B document." It further appears
that the Stinger teams were still part of the armoured anti-aircraft
artillery batteries in 1992. Klinkert, Otten en Plasmans, loc.
cit.
11.
Klinkert,
Otten en Plasmans, op. cit., 222.
12.
HTK 1985-1986,
kamerstuknr. 19200 X ondernr. 31.
Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker,
Met
de blik, 358,
398. Klinkert, Otten en Plasmans, op. cit., 209-210. Hooiveld,
Pruttels paraat,
4-7. Equipment was considered deployable (operationally ready) when
combat-ready within twelve hours. Klinkert, Otten en Plasmans, op.
cit., 209. For a brief outline of problems and improvements in
the materiel support system see Corps Logistic Command,
Reorganisations 1984-1990s.
<
The Armoured Anti-Aircraft Artillery
Battery (old organisation) 1
De
pantserluchtdoelartilleriebatterij (oude organisatie) (paluabt)
One battery staff,
three armoured anti-aircraft artillery platoons (1-2-3), one
replacement group, and one service support platoon. ¶ The organisation
and equipment of the battery staff and the service support platoon were
very similar to those of the
superseding
organisation type. ¶ The three armoured
anti-aircraft artillery platoons (1-2-3) each comprised a command group
and 3 x PRTL self-propelled anti-aircraft gun system (with 2 x
35 mm Oerlikon KDA autocannon). The command
group had 1 x YPR-765 PRCO-C4 (with M2 hmg .50 inch)
and
1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover. The replacement group comprised three
replacement teams, each with 1 x DAF YA-4440 four-tonne truck. During
operations each replacement team would be assigned to one of the
armoured anti-aircraft artillery platoons, enabling them to maintain
operational readiness around the clock through crew rotations.
2
|| Throughout the battery personal armament consisted mainly of UZI
submachine guns.
Battery
staff strength: 3/2/12 (17). Armoured anti-aircraft artillery platoon
strength: 1/4/9 (14). Replacement group strength: -/9/15 (24). Service
support platoon strength: 1/8/57 (66). Battery strength: 7/31/111 (149).
Total
number of anti-aircraft weapon systems: 9 x PRTL.
This
organisation type was superseded by a new
battery organisation that incorporated Stinger teams, which
were partly formed from the PRTL crews in the replacement
group. In 1985 only the three mobilisable batteries of 35 Armoured Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion
(RIM) still retained the old organisation, which is why
this unit type is shown as mobilisable here. In
case of mobilisation these batteries would probably have
received some sort of crash course in the use of the
FIM-92 Stinger; see 101 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group,
footnote 11.
_________________________________________________
2.
The
three replacement teams each comprised three commanders PRTL, three
gunners PRTL, one chauffeur PRTL and one chauffeur for the
team's YA-4440. Each replacement crew (commander and chauffeur
PRTL) would in principle be linked to a PRTL. Thus each platoon had a
replacement crew for each PRTL and one replacement chauffeur PRTL. VS
44-39, 7-12. Van Randwijk, loc. cit.
<
The Light Anti-Aircraft Artillery
Battalion
1
De afdeling
lichte luchtdoelartillerie (afdltlua)
One staff and support battery and three field
batteries (A-B-C). ¶ The staff and support battery comprised
the battalion staff, a meteorological and radar platoon, a signals
platoon, a supply platoon, a maintenance platoon, a medical platoon,
and the battery staff. The meteorological and radar platoon,
comprising a command group, two meteorological groups and one
radar group, held 1 x HSA L4/5 anti-aircraft fire control
radar
in reserve.2
¶ The three field batteries each comprised a
battery staff and two firing batteries (1-2). The battery
staff comprised a command group, an administration and supply group, a
maintenance group, and a kitchen group. Each firing battery comprised a
command group, a radar fire control group with 1 x HSA L4/5; 3
x Bofors 40L70 anti-aircraft autocannon 40 mm; 1 x M55 Quad
anti-aircraft hmg .50 inch for the battery's own close proximity air
defence; and a (forward) observation group. The firing
battery's three 40L70s were controlled by the HSA L4/5, to
which they were linked by cable.
Staff and
support battery strength: 18/25/98/2 (143). Field battery
strength: 8/21/117 (146). Battalion strength: 42/88/449/2 (581).
Total
number of anti-aircraft weapon systems: 18 x Bofors 40L70, 6 x
M55 Quad.
Though
the battalion did not include dedicated replacement groups like the armoured anti-aircraft artillery batteries,
it would similarly operate on a twenty-four hour basis by
working in shifts.3
By
1985 the Bofors 40L70 anti-aircraft gun and the HSA
L4/5 fire control radar were at the end of their life span.4
The last active-duty battalions (15 and 25) had been disbanded in
1983 because of the high exploitation costs and degrading
performance of the obsolescent main equipment,5
which meant that filling the three remaining mobilisable
battalions (45, 115 and 125) with able personnel
would become problematic after 1989. In 1986 it was decided that the
three mobilisable battalions would be replaced by one
active-duty battery and two mobilisable batteries, each battery
equipped with eighteen modernised 40L70s, nine HSA
Flycatcher anti-aircraft fire control radar systems and nine Stingers.
The active-duty battery became operational in 1991.6
_________________________________________________
1.
VS 44-26, 1-3, 6-2, 6-3, 7-1, 7-2.
Klinkert, Otten en Plasmans,
Luchtdoelartillerie,
187, 189. De Rochemont, Rooding en Van der Veer,
Heden en toekomst, 234-235.
2.
The
Dutch military designation of the HSA L4/5 was KL/MSS-3012.
3.
VS
44-26, 5-12, 7-11. Klinkert, Otten en Plasmans, op. cit., 189.
4.
The
40L70 (in service since 1958) in terms of rate of fire, the HSA L4/5
(in service since 1966) in terms of radar performance, technical
reliability and resistance against enemy electronic
warfare measures. Klinkert, Otten en Plasmans, op. cit., 170,
205, 212.
5.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 502, Planningsmemorandum Reorganisatie
Luchtverdediging d.d. 14 juli 1982, Deel II. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, Met de blik, 399.
Klinkert, Otten en Plasmans, op. cit., 205.
6.
Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, op.cit., 402. Klinkert, Otten en Plasmans, op.
cit., 212-213. The three anti-aircraft batteries were numbered
105 (active), 115 (RIM) and 125 (mobilisable). Klinkert, Otten en
Plasmans, ibid.
<
The Quadruple Anti-Aircraft Machinegun
Platoon
1
Het peloton
vierlingmitrailleurs (pelvm)
One
command group, three quadruple anti-aircraft machine gun groups, one
supply groop, one maintenance group and one kitchen group. The command
group had 1
x M38A1
"Nekaf" Jeep and 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer. The three quadruple
anti-aircraft machine gun groups each comprised a command team with 1
x M38A1 and 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and 4 x M55 Quad anti-aircraft hmg .50
inch with 1 x DAF YA-328 three-tonne truck (with loading ramps) and 1 x
one-tonne
trailer. The supply group had 1 x DAF YA-126 one- tonne truck, 1 x
YA-328, 1 x one-tonne trailer and 1 x two-tonne trailer (ammunition).
The maintenance group had 1 x YA-126 and 1 x one-tonne trailer. The
kitchen group had 1 x YA-328 with 1 x one-tonne trailer (water).
Command group strength: 1/-/1 (2). Quadruple anti-aircraft machine gun
group
strength: -/5/18 (23). Command team strength: -/1/2 (3). Quad gunner
team strength: -/1/4 (5). Supply group strength: -/1/7 (8). Maintenance
group strength: -/1/3 (4). Kitchen group strength: -/-/4 (4). Platoon
strength: 1/17/69 (87).
Total number of anti-aircraft weapons: 12 x M55 Quad.
The three
platoons of this type fell directly under National
Territorial Commander, who could assign them to subordinate
commanders as needed. Personal
armament followed
the standard
pattern, except
that this unit type probably still had the
M1
Garand semi-automatic
rifle
.30 inch instead of the FN FAL battle rifle 7.62 mm.2
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr. 1383
(101 Peloton Vierlingmitrailleurs, 1977-1978).
2.
In
1983 the platoons were registered as having UZI submachine guns 9 mm.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr. 546, Planningsmemorandum verdere uitbreiding
NATRES d.d. 10 juni 1983, Bijvoegsel 1 bij Bijlage H. See also
The
National Reserve Platoon, footnote 4.
<
The Field/Horse Artillery
Battalion M109A2/A3 1
De afdeling veld-
/rijdende artillerie M109A2/A3 (afdva/afdra)
One staff and support battery and three field
batteries (A-B-C) (of which one on Short Leave).2
¶ The staff and support battery comprised the battalion staff with 2 x
M18 FADAC gun direction computer, a terrain survey group, a signals
group, a supply platoon, a maintenance platoon, a medical platoon, the
brigade liaison group, three battalion liaison groups,3
nine forward observation groups,4
and the battery staff. ¶ The three field batteries each
comprised a battery staff, a signals group, a terrain survey
group, and a firing battery. The battery staff comprised a command
group, an administration and supply group, and a maintenance
group. The firing battery comprised a command
group, 6 x M109A2 or A3 self-propelled howitzer 155 mm (with
M2 hmg .50 inch), and an ammunition group. || The battalion's inventory
further included 105 x M72 LAW 66 mm for self-defence.
Staff and
support battery strength: 19/40/153/2 (214). Field battery
strength: 4/17/95 (116). Battalion strength: 31/91/438/2 (562).
Total
number of guns: 18.
With the
exception of the mobilisable 44 Field Artillery Battalion, each of
the M109-equipped battalions was organic to an armoured (infantry) brigade, for
which they would mainly perform direct-support
missions. 44 Field Artillery Battalion was part of the Corps Artillery. It was organised as
described above, except that its staff and support battery had
only one liaison group and two forward observation groups.
During operations a possible role for this
battalion would have been to reinforce the
direct-supporting fires of other (brigade) artillery units.
See also Mixed Battalions
and Company Teams .
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr.
242, organisatietabellen en autorisatiestaten (OTAS)
afdelingen veldartillerie M109, 1978-1979. VS 6-20/1, 3-3 t/m
3-4. VS 6-101, 1-1 t/m 1-2. VS 6-140, 6-A-1 t/m 6-A-3. VS 17-145, 1-8.
Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor,
Vuur
in beweging, 238-239. Schoenmaker en Van Hoof,
Rijdende Artillerie,
156-157, 182. Thanks to Major D. van Zuidam (Rtd.) of
the
Netherlands
Artillery Museum ,
captain of the Staff and Support Battery of 44 Field Artillery
Battalion in 1984.
3.
One
for each of the brigade's three (tank or armoured infantry) battalions.
4.
Each
three of which would be assigned to one of the brigade's three (tank or
armoured infantry) battalions under operational circumstances, one to
each squadron/company staff. VS 17-145, 1-1 t/m 1-2. Schoenmaker en Van
Hoof, op. cit., 191-192. Forward observation groups
assigned to YP-408 equipped armoured infantry battalions
operated in Land Rovers, the others
in YPR-765 PRCO C5s (with M2 hmg .50 inch). The Land
Rover-equipped groups would transition to YPR-765 PRCO C5 concurrent
with the YP-408 battalions' transition to YPR-765 in 1987-1989.
Schoenmaker en Van Hoof, op. cit., 192. Website DAF YP-408
Forgotten Hero,
Pantserinfanteriebataljons YP-408.
<
The Field Artillery Battalion M110A2 /
M107
1
De afdeling
veldartillerie M110A2 / M107 (afdva)
One staff and support battery and three field
batteries (A-B-C) (of which one on Short Leave). ¶ The staff
and support battery comprised the battalion staff with 2 x M18 FADAC
gun direction computer, a terrain survey group, a signals group, a
supply platoon, a maintenance platoon, a medical platoon, two liaison
groups, and the battery staff. ¶ The three field batteries
each comprised a battery staff, a signals group, a terrain
survey group, and a firing battery. The battery staff comprised a
command group, an administration and supply group, and a
maintenance group. The firing battery comprised a command
group, 4 x M110A2 self-propelled howitzer 8 inch or 4 x M107
self-propelled gun 175 mm, and an ammunition group. || The battalion's
inventory further included 90 x M72 LAW 66 mm for self-defence.
Staff and
support battery strength (M107-equipped battalion): 16/38/141/2 (197).
Staff and support battery strength (M110A2-equipped battalion):
16/38/146/2 (202). Field battery strength: 4/15/83 (102).
Battalion strength (M107): 28/83/390/2 (503). Battalion strength
(M110A2): 28/83/395/2 (508).
Total
number of guns: 12.
This unit
type was exclusively found in the Corps Artillery and would
mainly be tasked with general-support
missions and general-support reinforcing missions, often at divisional level. Only 107 Field
Artillery Battalion was equipped with the M107 in 1985; it transitioned
to M110A2 in 1986.2
It was also the only active-duty unit of this type.
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr.
242, organisatietabellen en autorisatiestaten
(OTAS) afdelingen veldartillerie M107, 1978. VS
6-20/1, 3-3. VS 6-101, 1-1 t/m 1-2. VS 6-140, 6-A-1 t/m
6-A-3. Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor,
Vuur in beweging,
238-239. Schoenmaker en Van Hoof,
Rijdende
Artillerie, 156-157, 182. Additional information kindly
provided by Rob Meinen of
107afdva.nl (email 20.05.2012).
2.
Langhenkel, Veger
en Ueberschaer,
FOFA, 577. Website 107
Afdva,
Geschiedenis.
<
The Field Artillery Battalion M114A1 1
De afdeling
veldartillerie M114A1 (afdva)
One staff and support battery and three field
batteries (A-B-C). ¶ The staff and support battery comprised
the battalion staff, a terrain survey group, a signals group, a supply
platoon, a maintenance platoon, a medical platoon, one liaison group,
two forward observation groups, and the battery staff. ¶
The three field batteries each comprised a
battery staff, a signals group, a terrain survey group, and a
firing battery. The battery staff comprised a command
group, an administration and supply group, and a maintenance
group. The firing battery comprised a command
group, 6 x M114A1 towed howitzer 155 mm, and an ammunition
group. || The battalion's inventory further included 105 x M72 LAW 66
mm for self-defence.
Staff and
support battery strength: 18/39/169/2
(228). Field battery strength: 4/17/99 (120).
Battalion strength: 30/90/466/2 (588).
Total
number of guns: 18.
With the
exception of 54 Field Artillery Battalion all M114-equipped battalions
were part of the Corps Artillery, where they would
mainly be tasked with reinforcing direct-support
missions of other artillery units. 54 Field Artillery
Battalion was organic to 101 Infantry Brigade, for which
it would mainly perform direct-support missions. As
such its staff and support included one brigade liaison group,
four battalion liaison groups and twelve forward observation groups.2
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr.
252, organisatietabellen en autorisatiestaten (OTAS)
afdelingen veldartillerie M114, 1978. Ibid., OTAS 54 Afdeling
Veldartillerie, 1974, 1977, 1978. VS 6-20/1, 3-4. VS 6-101, 1-1 t/m
1-2. VS 6-140, 6-A-1 t/m 6-A-3. From the aforementioned OTAS
documents (TO&E) it appears that this unit type did not have
FADACs, which is also implied in NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr.
642, Memorandum Organisatie Artillerie Vuursysteem Eerste Legerkorps
d.d. 18 juli 1985, I.7.
2.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 643, Planningsmemorandum Legerplan 162 d.d. 1
augustus 1985, 7. The OTAS documents regarding 54 Field Artillery
Battalion mentioned in the previous footnote show that, at least at
that time (mid to late 1970s), nine of the twelve forward
observation groups were part of the field batteries (three per
battery).
<
19 Field Artillery
Battalion, Nuclear Deployed 1
19 Afdeling
Veldartillerie, nucleair ontplooid (19 Afdva)
One staff and support battery and two field batteries (A-B). ¶
The staff and support battery comprised the battalion staff, a terrain
survey group, a signals group, a supply platoon, a maintenance platoon,
a medical platoon, two liaison groups, and the battery staff. ¶
The two field batteries each comprised a
battery staff, a signals group, a terrain survey group, a fire
direction group with 1 x M18 FADAC gun direction computer, two
howitzer sections (1-2), and an assembly and transport group. The
battery staff comprised a command group, an administration and
supply group, a maintenance group, and a kitchen group. The
two howitzer sections each comprised a command group, 2 x
M110A2 self-propelled howitzer 8 inch, and an ammunition group. ¶
During nuclear deployment the following units would be placed under the
command of the battalion:
425 Mobile Infantry Security Company,
2
23rd US Army Field Artillery Detachment (23th USAFAD), the
Royal Army Detachment
to 23rd US Army Field Artillery Detachment,
two radio relay detachments and one
Military Constabulary detachment. ||
The battalion's inventory included 90 x M72 LAW 66 mm for
self-defence.
Staff and
support battery strength: 17/33/132/2 (184). Field battery
strength: 5/21/104 (130). Battalion strength: 27/75/340/2 (444).
Total
number of guns: 8.
The
aforementioned units reinforcing the battalion during nuclear
deployment would be distributed over the batteries. Their
tasks would include providing area security; managing and
securing (the relocation of ) Field Storage Sites
(FSS) for the US Army W33 nuclear artillery
shells; maintaining communications with 1 (NL) Corps Artillery staff (under
whose operational command a nuclear mission would likely be executed
3); and traffic control.
The warhead(s) would be hand-assembled in the field
and adjusted to the required yield. The
W33 is reported to have existed in a low yield and a
high yield modification; 5 to 10 kilotons and 40 kilotons
respectively.4
During
non-nuclear deployment the battalion would mainly be tasked
with general-support and general-support reinforcing
missions, mostly at divisional level. The two howitzer
sections would then likely be combined in one regular firing battery,
comprising a command group, eight howitzers and an ammunition group.5
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr.
243, organisatietabellen en autorisatiestaten (OTAS) 19
Afdeling Veldartillerie, 1979. VS 6-20/1, 3-3. VS 6-101, A-1-1
t/m A-1-2. Additional
information kindly provided by artillery Lieutenant-Colonel H.
Molman (Rtd.) (various emails, June 2014).
2.
Dorrestijn,
Vuur
geëindigd, 168. Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor,
Vuur in beweging,
160. Hoksbergen en Kroon,
Nederlandse
Artillerie, 88-90.
4.
The W33
shell to be used by 19 Field Artillery Battalion: Cochran,
Arkin and Hoenig,
Nuclear
Weapons, 47. Hoffenaar,
Van Hoof en De Moor, op. cit., 159. Website 8th
Missile Detachment,
23rd Missile Detachment. The
reported yields of the W33 differ somewhat; see for instance Cochran,
Arkin and Hoenig, loc. cit.; Mechtersheimer und Barth,
Militarisierungsatlas,
341; website The Nuclear Weapon Archive,
Complete List of All U.S. Nuclear Weapons.
For reference: the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 had a yield
of 15 to 16 kilotons.
Ibid.
5.
VS
6-101, A-1-1, punt 7.
<
129 Field Artillery
Battalion, Nuclear Deployed 1
129 Afdeling
Veldartillerie, nucleair ontplooid (129 Afdva)
One staff and support battery and two
launching batteries (A-B) operating six MGM-52C
Lance surface-to-surface missile systems. ¶ The staff and
support battery comprised the battalion staff, a signals
group, a supply platoon, a maintenance platoon, a medical platoon, and
the battery staff. ¶ The two launching batteries each
comprised a battery staff, a terrain survey platoon, a fire
direction group with 1 x HP 9825A programmable calculator and 1 x
Monroe 1920 scientific calculator; three launching platoons
(1-2-3), and one assembly and transport platoon. The battery staff
comprised a command group, a signals group, an administration
and supply group, and a maintenance group. The three launching platoons
each comprised a command group and one launching group with 1
x M752 Self-Propelled Launcher (SPL). The assembly and transport
platoon comprised a command group, three assembly and
transport groups, and one transport group for
the custodial 8th US Army Field Artillery Detachment.
Each assembly and transport group had 1 x M688 Loader-Transporter (LT)
(capacity: two missiles, assembled),
3 x DAF YA-5442 DT six-tonne truck
(capacity: two missiles, unassembled) and 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover. In
addition the platoon had 1 x
DAF YA-4440 four-tonne truck capable of carrying two warhead
sections with fins.
2
¶ During nuclear deployment the
following units would be placed under the command of the
battalion:
434 Mobile Security Infantry Company,
3
8th US Army Field Artillery Detachment (8th USAFAD),
two contact teams of a maintenance platoon, two
or three radio relay detachments, and one
Military Constabulary detachment. ||
The battalion's inventory included 90 x M72 LAW 66 mm for self-defence.
Staff and
support battery strength: 14/33/118/2 (167). Launching battery
strength: 8/24/89 (121). Battalion strength: 30/81/296/2 (409).
Total
number of Lance systems: 6, plus 1 x M752 SPL in reserve.
4
The
aforementioned units reinforcing the battalion during nuclear
deployment would be distributed over the batteries. Their
tasks would include providing area security; managing and
securing (the relocation of ) Field Storage Sites (FSS) for
the US Army W70 nuclear warheads; transporting, storing
and and securing nuclear ammunition not under the
control of the battalion and establishing an Ammunition Supply Point
(ASP) in the field; providing Lance-specific electronic maintenance
support; maintaining communications with 1 (NL) Corps Artillery staff (under
whose operational command a nuclear mission would likely be executed
5); and traffic control.
The
battalion was able to carry along a total of forty-eight missiles:
twelve in assembled state in the Loader-Transporters
6 and the components of a
further thirty-six missiles loaded in the six-tonne trucks.
Two types of warhead sections were available: the M251 (conventional,
with high explosive submunitions) and the M234 (nuclear). The latter
would incorporate the W70 nuclear warhead, which is reported
to have had three yield settings in the range of 1-100
kilotons.7
The nuclear warhead section(s) would be
hand-assembled in the field and adjusted to the
required yield.
During
non-nuclear deployment the battalion would be tasked
with general-support missions.
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr. 1376,
plan-OTAS (organisatietabel en autorisatiestaat) 129 Afdeling
Veldartillerie, 1977. VS 6-42, 1-1 t/m 2-6, 4-1, 4-6 t/m 4-6a, 5-4,
6-1, Bijlagen A, C, D, E. Dorrestijn,
Vuur
geëindigd, Hoofdstuk 6. Loukes,
Afdeling Lance, passim.
Additional
information kindly provided by artillery Lieutenant-Colonel H.
Molman (Rtd.) (various emails, June 2014).
2.
The
DAF YA-5442 DT was a modified
YA-5441 five-tonne truck with a reinforced cargo floor that effectively
turned it into a six-tonne truck. The additional YA-4440 was referred
to as "the buffer", forming the platoon's reserve warhead
transport capacity. Information
kindly provided by artillery Lieutenant-Colonel H.
Molman (Rtd.) (email June 2018).
See also Foss and Gander, Jane's
Military Logistics, 457.
3.
Dorrestijn,
op.
cit., 168. Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor,
Vuur in beweging,
160. Hoksbergen en Kroon,
Nederlandse
Artillerie, 88-90.
4.
Dorrestijn,
loc. cit.
6.
VS
6-42, 6-1.
7.
Cochran,
Arkin and Hoenig,
Nuclear
Weapons,
72-73. Mechtersheimer und Barth,
Militarisierungsatlas,
335. Website The Nuclear Weapon Archive,
Complete List of All U.S. Nuclear Weapons.
For reference: the atomic bomb
dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 had a yield of 15 to 16 kilotons.
Ibid.
<
101 Artillery Survey Battalion 1
101
Artilleriemeetafdeling (101 Ama)
One staff and support battery and one terrain survey
battery (Tmd). ¶ The staff and support battery comprised the
battalion staff, a meteorological platoon with 4 x QR-MX-2 Sirocco
meteorological radar station;
2
three mortar locating radar platoons (of which two mobilisable),
3
each with 2 x AN/TPQ-36 weapon locating radar;
4 three
sound ranging platoons (of which two mobilisable),
3
each with 1 x Plessey sound ranging system;
5
a supply platoon, a maintenance platoon and the battery staff.
¶ The terrain survey battery comprised a battery staff, one
base terrain survey platoon (Btm) and two terrain survey
platoons (Tm). The battery staff comprised a command group, an
administration and supply group, and a maintenance group. The base
terrain survey platoon would maintain the common grid in
the
corps sector, the two
terrain survey platoons refining the common grid as needed. || For
self-defence the battalion's inventory included 45 x M72 LAW
66 mm.
Staff and
support battery strength: 23/75/253 (351). Terrain survey battery
strength: 7/45/117 (169). Battalion strength: 30/120/370 (520).
In
wartime the battalion would not operate as a singe unit but,
for the larger part, serve as a grouping of artillery survey
assets for 1 (NL) Corps Artillery. As
needed, mortar locating radar platoons, sound ranging platoons
and terrain survey platoons would be detached to the field
artillery groups, under whose command they would then
operate. For the radar groups of the mortar locating platoons it was
also possible to be attached to a field artillery
battalion. The meteorological platoon and the base terrain survey
platoon would normally remain under command of the battalion.6
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr.
250, organisatietabellen en autorisatiestaten
(OTAS) 101 Artilleriemeetafdeling, 1977-1978. Ibid., inv. nr.
1694, Memorandum Realisatie Legerplan 60H d.d. 16 juli 1978.
VS 6-20/1, 3-4 t/m 3-5, 3-7. Hoffenaar, Van Hoof en De Moor, Vuur in beweging,
235, 239, 241. Hoksbergen en Kroon, Nederlandse Artillerie,
93-94. Pretty, Jane's
Weapon Systems, 260, 505-506. Ariaans, 101 Artillerie Meetafdeling,
182-192.
2.
Dutch
military designation KL/MMQ-5420.
3.
The
battalion largely filled its own mobilisable subunits under the GRIM
system. NIMH 205A/10, Aflossing van
mobilisabele eenheden en -aanvullingen d.d. 11
november 1983. Ibid., d.d. 17 juni 1985. One mobilisable sound
ranging platoon was filled under the RIM system (NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv.
nr. 1694, op. cit.), which was probably also the case for one of the
two mobilisable mortar locating radar platoons. GRIM was a
variant of RIM, the Dutch acronym for Direct Influx into Mobilisable
Units (Rechtstreekse Instroming in Mobilisabele Eenheden); GRIM meant
"Largely RIM" (Grotendeels Rechtstreekse Instroming in Mobilisabele
Eenheden). For an survey of the Army's unit filling and reserve
system see Gijsbers,
Blik in de smidse, 2222-2231;
Selles,
Personele vulling; Berghuijs,
Opleiding, 14-23. In
English: Isby and Kamps,
Armies,
341-343; Sorrell,
Je
Maintiendrai , 94-96; Van
Vuren, The
Royal Netherlands Army Today, Military Review April 1982,
23-28.
4.
Dutch
military designation KL/TPQ-6098.
5.
Sound
Ranging Link No. 2 Mk 1; Dutch military
designation KL/GND-4914.
6.
VS
6-20/1, 3-2, 3-4 t/m 3-5.
<
The Armoured Engineer Company 1
De
pantsergeniecompagnie (pagncie)
One company staff, three armoured engineer platoons (1-2-3) (of which
one on Short Leave) and one support platoon (Ost). ¶ The company staff
comprised a command group with 1 x M577A1 armoured command post carrier
and 2 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover, a
reconnaissance group with 1 x M113A1 armoured personnel carrier
(with M2 hmg .50
inch), an administration and supply group, a maintenance group, and a
kitchen group; the last three of these groups each had 1 x M2
hmg .50 inch. ¶ Each armoured engineer platoon comprised a command
group and three armoured engineer groups (A-B-C). The command group had
1 x M113A1 (with M2 hmg .50 inch) and 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover.
The armoured engineer groups, each mounted in an
M113A1 (with M2 hmg .50 inch), had 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm
each. ¶ The support platoon comprised a command group, a tank
bridge group (Tkbr), a tankdozer group (Tkdoz), a mechanical equipment
group (Mu)2
and an equipment group (Uitr). The tank bridge group had 2
x Leopard Biber armoured vehicle-launched bridge, each with
two spans, of which one carried on a semi-trailer truck (DAF, YT-616
or a later model from the YA-2300 series), and 2 x FN MAG gpmg
7.62 mm. The tankdozer group had 2 x Leopard
Pionierpanzer 1 armoured engineering vehicle (with 2 x gpmg 7.62 mm).3
The mechanical equipment group held 2 x International Hough H65C wheel
loader, the equipment group held 1 x DAF YEE-2000 SB treadway
bridge.4
|| Besides various engineer equipment the company's inventory
further included three ten-tonne trucks of the DAF YA-2300 series, ten
four-tonne trucks of the DAF YA-4440 series, three motorcycles, four
inflatable reconnaissance boats for three to four men,
and 90 x M72 LAW 66 mm.5
Armoured
engineer platoon command group strength: 1/1/3 (5). Armoured engineer
platoon group strength: -/1/11 (12). Armoured
engineer platoon strength: 1/4/36 (41). Company strength: 7/27/182
(216).
Each armoured (infantry) brigade included
a company of this type, capable of light combat engineering. In wartime
it would likely not operate as a single unit, but have
platoons and/or groups placed under the command of the
brigade's tank or armoured infantry battalions.6
The armoured engineer company was able to fight as an armoured infantry
company, though this was only to happen if the
brigade would be "threatened in its existence" during battle.7
Armoured engineer platoons or groups attached to manoeuvre units
however would be more likely to become involved in combat
situations. Personal armament in each armoured engineer platoon
comprised 30 x UZI submachine gun 9 mm and 93 x FN FAL battle
rifle 7.62 mm.
See also Mixed Battalions
and Company Teams .
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr.
266, organisatietabel en autorisatiestaat (OTAS)
pantsergeniecompagnie , 1978-1979. VR 5-157, 2, 4, 10. VS 17-145, 1-9.
Bremer, 41
Pantsergeniecompagnie, 4-6.
2.
By
1985 the designation of this subunit may have changed to 'construction
machine group' (bouwmachinegroep). Elands et al., 250 jaar, 234.
3.
Up
to 1983
11,
12,
51 and
53 Armoured Engineer Company had
been equipped with Centurion AVLBs and AEVs, which were
replaced by Leopard vehicles in 1983-1985. It may be
that in 1985 Centurions were still in use,
if so probably by 51 and/or 53 Armoured Engineer Company.
SSA-MvD, CLAS/BLS 7486, Planningsmemorandum Instroming Leopard 1V,
Leopard 2 (etc.) d.d. 29 december 1982, 16-17. HTK
1982-1983,
kamerstuknr. 17600 X ondernr. 2,
27. Anonymus,
Eenhoorn
Brigade,
33. Ruys,
Centuriontank,
234. Smit,
Leopard 1,
53. The Dutch Centurion AVLB was a converted Mk 5 fitted with
an M48 scissors bridge. Likewise the Dutch Centurion AEV was a
converted Mk 5 fitted with the dozer blade of an M48 tankdozer; the
20-pounder gun was removed in the 1970s once the ammunition stocks were
depleted. Ruys, op. cit., 227-228.
4.
Dutch
designation rijsporenbrug. Comprising two separate treadways, each
transported on a two-wheeled trailer. Designed by major H.C. Camman in
the mid-1960s, it had a maximum span of twelve metres and a military
load class of 20 (MLC 20). VS 2-1350-E1, 17-1 t/m
17-6. Foss and Gander, Jane's
Military Logistics, 156. Elands et al., op. cit., 193-194.
5.
Alternatively,
some units probably still had a number of DAF YA-126 one-tonne trucks
and/or DAF YA-314 (dump) trucks in use.
6.
Bremer,
op. cit., 4. Elands et al., op.cit., 268. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, Met de blik, 384.
Elands, Van Gils en Schoenmaker, Geschiedenis
1 Divisie, 230.
7.
VR
5-157, 33-34.
<
The Engineer Battalion 1
Het geniebataljon
(gnbat)
One staff and support company and three engineer
field companies (A-B-C) (of which one on Short Leave
2). ¶ The staff and support
company comprised the battalion staff, a reconnaissance group, a
signals group, a construction machine group, a medium girder bridge
group,3
a water supply platoon, a supply platoon, a maintenance platoon, a
medical platoon, and the company staff. ¶ The three field engineer
companies each comprised a company staff and three engineer field
platoons (1-2-3). The company staff comprised a command group, an
administration and supply group, a maintenance group, a kitchen group,
and a support group (Ost). Each engineer field platoon comprised a
command group and three engineer groups (A-B-C). || Vehicle types used
included DAF YA-4440 four-tonne trucks and Land Rovers.
Engineer equipment was limited. Apart from a DAF YEE-2000 SB treadway
bridge the battalion had no bridging materiel in its wartime
organisation.4
Armament was likewise limited and merely intended for self-defence,
comprising FN MAG gpmgs 7.62 mm, M2 hmgs .50 inch and M72 LAWs
66 mm.
Staff and
support company strength: 16/38/168/2 (224). Engineer field company
strength: 5/17/128 (150). Battalion strength: 31/89/552/2 (674).
The
engineer battalion was personnel-heavy and had, as said, only
limited engineer equipment. For most operations it would
rely on the support of specialist engineer units such
as bridge, construction, or dump truck companies (see 101 and 201 Engineer Combat Group). Its
light armament and lack of cross-country capable or
armoured vehicles made the engineer battalion unsuitable
for combat engineering or operating beyond the road network.
It would be able to operate as infantry but was to be used as such only
in situations of utmost emergency.
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr. 263,
organisatietabellen en autorisatiestaten (OTAS) staf, staf- en
verzorgingscompagnieën 11 en 41 Geniebataljon, 1976. VS 5-154,
hoofdstuk I t/m III. It will be noted that the source material for this
section, dating from 1976 and 1972 respectively, is not exactly
contemporary; I have as yet not been able to retrieve better data. It
is apparent however that the general layout and
role of the engineer battalion did not change before the end
of the Cold War. See for instance Elands et. al.,
250 jaar, hoofdstuk
5; Dekker, Dorrestijn en Visser,
Geniesteun, 488.
2.
In
September 1986 the Short Leave company of 41 Engineer
Battalion was placed on active-duty. See
101 Engineer Combat Group, note c.
3.
Present
only in peacetime and only in 11 and 41 Engineer Battalion; would go to
104 Medium Girder Bridge Company in wartime. See
101 Engineer Combat Group,
note g.
<
The
Diver Platoon 1
Het
duikerpeloton (dkrpel)
One command group,
one diver group (dkr), and four underwater reconnaissance
groups (owv) of which probably one on Short Leave. Each underwater
reconnaissance group comprised two underwater reconnaissance teams.
Apart from various diving equipment, which included rather
sophisticated wireless underwater communication devices, the
platoon had a number of DAF YA-4440 four-tonne trucks (five,
possibly more) and probably a number of Land Rovers
and (small) boats. Personal armament appears to
have consisted mainly of UZI submachine guns.
Diving
group strength: 0/1/8 (9). Underwater reconnaissance team strength:
0/1/4 (5). Platoon strength: 1/11/44 (56).
The
underwater reconnaissance teams would reconnoitre underwater locations
in advance of deep fording operations or amphibious
crossings, clearing obstacles and mines, if necessary
with explosives. They used light, scuba-type diving equipment and were
able to operate independently. The diver group, using heavier,
surface-supplied diving equipment, would support engineer operations in
the Corps Rear Area,
predominantly bridging operations and the emplacing or
clearing of obstacles, using equipment
like underwater
cutting torches and heavy explosives.
Requirements
for military divers were, and
are, demanding. Selection and training of personnel
were such that out of a hundred volunteering conscripts a mere ten
would end up serving their active-duty period with 108 Diver Platoon. This unit had one
mobilisable counterpart, 109 Diver Platoon (RIM).
_________________________________________________
1.
Elands et. al.,
250 jaar, 259-260.
Anonymous,
108
Duikerpeloton, 6-8. Website
VOPET,
genieduikers
(page now defunct). The presence of a command group, not
indicated
in
these publications, was confirmed by D. Ramerman, commander of 108
Diver Platoon from 1988 to 1990 (email
12.08.2014).
<
901
Torpedo Company
1
901
Torpedistencompagnie (901 Torpcie)
One
company staff, one vessel platoon (vatgn), two mobile diver platoons
(dkr), one salvage platoon (berg), and one maintenance platoon. ¶ The
company staff comprised one command group, one administration and
supply
group, and one kitchen group. The command group had 1 x M38A1
"Nekaf" Jeep, 1 x DAF
YA-126 one-tonne truck, 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and 1 x one-tonne trailer.
The administration and supply group had 1 x DAF
YA-314 three-tonne truck and 1 x one-tonne
trailer. The kitchen group had 1 x YA-314 and 1 x one-tonne
trailer. ¶
The vessel platoon comprised one command group, two riverboat groups
(rvv) and one support group (ost). The command group had 1
x M38A1, 1 x YA-126,
1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and 1 x one-tonne trailer. The
two riverboat groups each comprised one tugboat team (sleepb) and one
bridging boat team (bbrb). The tugboat teams each had two 350-500 hp
tugboats, two cargo barges and four ± one-tonne workboats powered by
outboard motors. The bridging boat team had six bridging boats. The
support group comprised one tugboat team and one transport team. The
tugboat team had six
350-500 hp tugboats.
The transport team had two 250-tonne cargo ships, two
500-tonne
cargo ships and one tank raft (Rhino Ferry). ¶ The two mobile diver
platoons each comprised a command group, two diver groups (dkr) and one
underwater reconnaissance group (owv). The command groups each had 1 x
M38A1 and one 1⁄4-tonne trailer. The diver groups each had 2 x YA-314
and one M53 21⁄2-tonne trailer, two ± one-tonne workboats with outboard
motors, and diving equipment. The underwater reconnaissance groups each
had 2 x YA-314
and one M53 21⁄2-tonne trailer, two ± one-tonne workboats with outboard
motors, and underwater reconnaissance diving equipment.
They probably each comprised two underwater reconnaissance teams (see The Diver Platoon). ¶ The salvage
platoon comprised one command group, one diver group
(dkr), two salvage diver groups (berg dkr) and one support group (ost).
The command group had 1
x M38A1, 1 x YA-126,
1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer and 1 x one-tonne trailer. The diver group had 2
x YA-314 three-tonne truck and one M53
21⁄2-tonne trailer, and two ±
one-tonne
workboats with outboard motors. The two salvage diver groups together
had 1 x YA-314 and 1 x one-tonne trailer and diving equipment. The
support group had one salvage vessel, one auxiliary salvage vessel,
four cargo barges and two small patrol boats.
¶
The maintenance platoon comprised one command group and one maintenance
group. The command group had 1 x M38A1 and 1 x 1⁄4-tonne trailer. The
maintenance group had 1 x M38A1, 4 x YA-314 (one with compressor) and 4
x one-tonne trailer. || In 1978 personal armament comprised 9 x
FN Browning Hi-Power pistol 9 mm
and 237 x M1 Carbine .30 inch. By 1985 the carbines may have been
replaced with UZI submachine guns 9 mm.
Company
staff strength: 3/5/14 (22). Vessel platoon strength: 1/22/63 (86).
Mobile diver platoon strength: 1/4/30 (35). Salvage platoon strength:
1/9/33 (43). Maintenance platoon strength: 1/6/18 (25). Company
strength: 8/50/188 (246).
901 Torpedo Company, subordinate to 460 Engineer Combat Group of National
Territorial Command, was
a mobilisable waterway engineer unit. Its name dates back to the
nineteenth century, when underwater mines were called torpedoes.2
In
wartime the company would perform various engineer operations on the
inland waters, such as river bottom reconnaissance, underwater
detection of materiel, removing obstacles in waterways, underwater
destruction by explosives, and creating river barriers or
obstructions; it would also provide
military transport by
water and assist in other waterway-related operations such as
bridging,
patrolling and disaster relief. The two riverboat groups of the vessel
platoon were intended to operate together with the two mobile
diver platoons, with one riverboat/diver formation operating north and
one south of the major rivers (approximately
Waal-Nieuwe Maas). The
vessel platoon's support group was intended to operate together
with the salvage platoon, which formation would operate from a
central location. Some of the water craft listed above would be
requisitioned; additional craft might be requisitioned, in
particular for patrolling.
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110,
inv. nr. 1390, Memorandum 901 Torpedistencompagnie d.d.
januari
1978. Ibid. Aanvullend memorandum 901 Torpedistencompagnie d.d. 13
februari 1979. Ibid., Plan-OTAS Torpedistencompagnie d.d. 25 juli
1979. These documents are
not
entirely accurate for 1985; company strength at least rose
from
8/50/188 (246) in 1979 to 8/57/195 (260) in 1985.
2.
Elands
et al., 250 jaar, 41-43.
<
The
Brigade Supply Company 1
De
bevoorradingscompagnie pantser(infanterie)brigade (bevocie pa(inf)brig)
One company staff,
one supply platoon, one replacement holding platoon (not present in
51,
52 and
53 Brigade Supply Company, see
below), two
transport
platoons (1-2), one mixed transport platoon (gem), one secondary field
post office, and one burial group. ¶ The company
staff comprised a command group with 1 x M2 hmg .50 inch, an
administration and supply group with 1 x M2 hmg .50 inch, a maintenance
group with 1 x M2 hmg .50 inch, a cashier group, and a kitchen group
with 1 x M2 hmg .50 inch. ¶ The supply platoon comprised a command
group, a Class I supply group, a Class III supply group and a Class V
supply group, each supply group with 1 x M2 hmg .50 inch. ¶ The two
transport platoons (1-2) each comprised a command group and two
transport groups (1-2), each transport group with 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62
mm. ¶ The mixed transport platoon comprised a command group, two
transport groups (1-2) and one mixed transport group (gem) with 1 x FN
MAG gpmg 7.62 mm. || The company had the following vehicle
types in use: 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover, 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover, DAF
YA-126 one-tonne truck, DAF YA-314 three-tonne truck, DAF YA-4440
four-tonne truck, DAF YF-616 six-tonne 7,000 liter fuel tanker truck,
DAF YAZ-2300 ten-tonne
truck with
loader crane (or possibly its
predecessor, the DAF YA-616 VL six-tonne truck), DAF
YB-616 six-tonne tow truck, DAF 66 YA light utility vehicle. The
company had 15 x M72 LAW 66 mm, personal armament consisted
mainly of UZI submachine guns 9 mm.
Company
strength: 8/29/288 (325).
Each armoured (infantry) brigade had one
company of this type. This is the organisation of 11 Brigade
Supply Company of 11 Armoured Infantry Brigade for
1985. Given the large difference between peace and war strength (150
versus 325 men) some subunits were probably permanently on Short Leave
in peacetime, for instance one transport platoon and one of the two
transport groups of the mixed transport platoon.2
The supply companies of the three armoured brigades had a
somewhat different organisation: in 1985 12 Brigade Supply
Company of 13 Armoured Brigade had one rather
than two transport platoons, comprising a command group and three
transport groups, whilst its mixed supply platoon comprised a command
group, a transport group, a heavy transport group and a fuel tanker
group.3
During
operations the company would deploy brigade distribution points for
Class I and III goods. Regarding Class V goods the company's
role was limited to holding in reserve part of the brigade's basic load
of mortar and artillery ammunition (120 and 155 mm respectively).4
This reserve, about one hundred and sixty tons,
was kept on wheels in the transport platoon(s). It
would only be used in emergencies, and only on order of the brigade
commander. In such case a mobile distribution point would be formed,
from which the ammunition would be delivered to the combat units.5
Class II and IV supplies were handled by the brigade
repair company.
In
logistic terms the replacement of combat casualties was also a supply
matter, which task was handled for the brigade by the replacement
holding platoon. It appears that this platoon, on mobilisation quickly
filled with personnel that would otherwise be sent home after
completing their active-duty period, merely served to cover initial
shortages. After that the platoon would only distribute the individual
replacements requested and received from 101 Personnel Replacement Battalion ;
it would not maintain a buffer. The supply companies of the mobilisable
51 Armoured Brigade
and 52 and 53 Armoured Infantry Brigade
did not include a
replacement holding platoon, as the authorised overstrength of these
formations upon mobilisation (mobilisatieopkomstverloop) was supposed
to cover initial shortages.6
Human body disposal was
taken care of by the burial
group, which would set up a collection point for this purpose.
Another task to be handled by the company was the collection
of enemy prisoners of war.7
The secondary field post office likely handled all field post for the
brigade.
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110
inv. nr. 1415, Reorg 11 Bevocie d.d. 2 april 1979. Ibid., inv. nr.
328, organisatietabellen en
autorisatiestaten (OTAS) bevoorradingscompagnieën
pantser(infanterie)brigade, 1978-1979. Bremer, 13 Bevocompagnie,
28-29. Hooiveld, 13de Bevoorradingscompagnie,
4-6. Janssen Lok, 11 Brigade Bevoorradingscompagnie,
8-9.
2.
In 1985 11 Brigade Supply Company would,
on mobilisation, receive an additional sixty-eight men from the general
pool of mobilisable reserves (vrij-indeelbaar bestand); these would
have fulfilled their active-duty period in relevant functions
up to three and a half years prior to mobilisation.
NIMH 205A/10,
Aflossing van mobilisabele eenheden en -aanvullingen d.d. 11
november 1983.
3.
The
organisation type numbers to which some of the NL-HaNA documents
mentioned in footnote 1 pertain are the same as
those listed for
11
and
12 Brigade Supply Company in the
official Royal Army orders of battle for 1985 (NIMH
430, inv. nrs. 54, 55). Nonetheless the
description of these organisation types may not be entirely accurate
for 1985, as the aforementioned NL-HaNA documents contain only parts of
their tables of organisation and equipment. These parts had to
be combined with the other sources mentioned in footnote 1. In addition
to the differences between the supply companies of armoured and
armoured infantry brigades the gradual influx of new vehicle
types may also have caused differences in organisation. See also Corps
Logistical Command,
Reorganisations 1984-1990s.
4.
Class
I: food, water; Class III: petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL), paint
and chemicals; Class V: ammunition, explosives. Roos,
Van
marketentster, 356. Roozenbeek, In dienst, 122.
5.
The
other part of the brigade's basic load of ammunition (organieke
munitieuitrusting, OMU) was carried by the combat units. These would
normally pick up their ammunition
from the ammunition
supply points in the Corps
Rear Area . This was far from
ideal, and as of 1988 the brigade supply companies
would handle all ammunition supplies through a
brigade ammunition supply point. See
also Corps Logistical Command,
Reorganisations 1984-1990s.
In total the
brigade's basic load was meant to cover five days of combat. Roos,
Van
marketentster, 327.
Roozenbeek,
In dienst,
169-170. Bremer,
loc. cit. Hooiveld, loc. cit. Janssen Lok, loc. cit.
6.
NL-HaNA
2.13.182,
inv. nr. 629, Memorandum betreffende de personeelsaanvulling in
oorlogstijd binnen de Koninklijke Landmacht d.d. 9 april 1985
(drawn up in September 1984), met Aantekening voor de
Legerraad, 7-8.
7.
Hooiveld,
loc. cit. Janssen Lok, loc. cit.
<
The
Brigade Repair Company 1
De
herstelcompagnie pantser(infanterie)brigade (hrstcie pa(inf)brig)
One company staff;
one workshop staff platoon (wkplst); one tracked vehicle repair platoon
(rvtgn); one wheeled vehicle repair platoon (wvtgn); one gunnery,
weaponry and instruments/electronic materiel repair platoon
(gwi/eltromat); and one supply platoon. ¶ The company staff comprised a
command group with 2 x DAF 66 YA light utility vehicle; an
administration and supply group with 3 x DAF YA-4440 four-tonne truck,
2 x one-tonne trailer (water) and 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62
mm; a maintenance group with 1 x YA-4440 and 1 x one-tonne
trailer; and a kitchen group with 1 x YA-4440 and 1 x trailer (field
kitchen). ¶ The workshop staff platoon comprised a command
group with 1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover and 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm;
an operations office (bdf) with 1 x Volkswagen Transporter Combi, 1 x
DAF YA-314 three-tonne truck and 1 x one-tonne trailer; an
inspection group (insp) with 1 x DAF 66 YA and 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover;
a workshop store group (wkplmag) with 2 x YA-4440, 2 x DAF
YT-514 five-tonne tractor with ten-tonne trailer and 1 x forklift
truck; and a towing group (takel) with 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover,
3 x DAF YB-616 six-tonne tow truck, 2 x DAF YT-616 tractor with
twenty-three-tonne trailer and 1 x Leopard Bergepanzer 2 Armoured
Recovery Vehicle (with 2 x gpmg 7.62 mm). ¶ The tracked vehicle repair
platoon comprised a command group with 1 x DAF 66 YA, 1 x
YA-4440 and 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm; a Leopard repair
group (leop) with 1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover and 1 x YA-4440; a
YPR repair group (YPR) with 1 x YA-4440; a Leopard/YPR repair group
(leop/YPR) with 1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover and 1 x
YA-4440; and a various tracked vehicles repair group
(div) with 1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover and 1 x
YA-4440. ¶ The wheeled vehicle repair platoon comprised a command group
with 1 x DAF 66 YA, 1 x YA-4440 and 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm;
an auxiliary workshop group (hlpwkpl) with 2 x 3⁄4-tonne Land
Rover and 2 x YA-4440; and four wheeled vehicle repair groups with 2 x
YA-4440 each. ¶ The gunnery, weaponry and instruments/electronic
materiel repair platoon comprised a command group with 1 x DAF 66 YA
and 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm; a gunnery repair group (gt) with 1 x DAF
66 YA, 2 x YA-314 and 2 x one-tonne trailer; a PRTL repair group (PRTL)
with 1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover, 3 x YA-4440 and 1 x one-tonne trailer
(generator); a small arms repair group (drbrwpn) with 1 x DAF 66 YA, 1
x YA-314 and 1 x one-tonne trailer; an instrument repair group (instrm)
with 3 x YA-314 and 3 x one-tonne trailer; and an electronic materiel
repair group (eltromat) with 1 x DAF 66 YA, 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover, 1 x
3⁄4-tonne Land Rover, 3 x YA-314, 1 x YA-4440 and 1 x one-tonne trailer
(generator). ¶ The supply platoon comprised a command group with 1 x
Volkswagen Transporter Combi and 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm; a
registration group (rgs) with 1 x YA-314 and 1 x one-tonne trailer; a
storage group (mag) with 11 x YA-314, 11 x one-tonne trailer and 1 x
DAF YT-514 five-tonne tractor with ten-tonne trailer; and a transport
group (afv) with 1 x YA-4440. || The company had 15 x M72 LAW 66
mm, personal armament consisted mainly of UZI submachine guns
9 mm.
Company
staff strength: 3/8/26 (37). Workshop staff platoon strenght: 1/9/26
(36). Tracked vehicle repair platoon strength: 1/5/38 (44). Wheeled
vehicle repair platoon strength: 1/7/42 (50). Gunnery, weaponry and
instruments/electronic materiel platoon strength: 1/13/37 (51). Supply
platoon strength: -/7/18 (25). Company strength: 7/49/187
(243).
Each armoured (infantry) brigade had one
company of this type. This is the wartime organisation of 41 Brigade Repair Company for the
period of June 1980 to September 1985.2
In peacetime this company had a sizeable detachment at Hohne (GE)
(4/22/88 (114)) which would rejoin the company on mobilisation. Like
all active-duty brigade repair companies its repair
platoons each had one to three supplementary repair groups in
peacetime, in addition to one or two small peacetime units at company
level. In wartime their personnel would go to other (repair)
units, predominantly in Corps Logistic Command. The
organisation of the vehicle repair platoons differed slightly between
companies because of different vehicle types being in use (e.g.
Centurion versus Leopard and YPR-765 versus YP-408).
Apart
from providing direct repair and maintenance support to the units of
its brigade, the brigade repair company also handled Class II
and Class IV supplies for these units through its supply platoon.3
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110
inv. nr. 295, organisatietabellen en
autorisatiestaten (OTAS) 11 Hrstcie, 1978-1979. Ibid., inv. nr. 308,
OTAS 13 Hrstcie, 1979. Ibid., inv. nr.
312, OTAS 41 Hrstcie, 1978, 1980. Ibid., OTAS 43 Hrstcie,
1979. Bremer,
42
Brigadeherstelcompagnie, 28-30. See also Van der Laan,
Het
functioneren, 571-574.
2.
Compare
the company's unit type number in NIMH 430, inv. nr. 54 (Slagorde KL
stand 1 juli 1985) and NL-HaNA 2.10.110 inv. nr. 312, OTAS 41
Hrstcie, 1980.
3.
Class
II: items included in a unit's Table of Organisation and Equipment
(OTAS) such as weapons, vehicles, tools, spare parts
and individual equipment including clothing. Class IV:
items a unit needs to perform a specific task but not falling
under Class II, for instance construction materials or additional
vehicles and weapons. Roos, Van marketentster,
356. Roozenbeek, In
dienst, 122.
<
The
Brigade Medical Company 1
De
brigade geneeskundige compagnie (briggnkcie)
One company staff;
one collection point platoon (vzpl); one field dressing station platoon
(vbpl); and one ambulance platoon (zau). ¶ The company staff comprised
a command group with 2 x DAF 66 YA light utility vehicle, 1 x DAF
YA-4440 four-tonne truck and one motorcycle; an administration and
supply group with 1 x YA-4440 and 1 x one-tonne trailer (water); a
maintenance group with 2 x YA-4440; a distribution point group with 4 x
YA-4440; a chaplain service group with 2 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover; and a
kitchen group with 3 x YA-4440, 1 x one-tonne trailer (water)
and probably one mobile field kitchen. ¶ The collection point platoon
comprised a command group with 1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover; and
three collection point groups (1-2-3) with 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover, 2 x
YA-4440 and 1 x one-tonne trailer (water) each. ¶ The field dressing
station platoon comprised a command group, two field dressing station
groups (1-2) with 1 x DAF 66 YA, 3 x YA-4440 and 1 x one-tonne trailer
(water) each; and one specialist group (spec) with 1 x DAF YA-314
three-tonne water tanker truck, 6 x YA-4440 and 1 x Volkswagen
Transporter Combi. ¶ The ambulance group comprised one command group
with 1 x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover and two motorcycles; and
two ambulance groups (1-2) with 1 x 1⁄2-tonne Land Rover and 10
x 3⁄4-tonne Land Rover ambulance each. Personal armament
consisted mainly of FN Browning Hi-Power pistols 9 mm and UZI
submachine guns 9 mm.
Company
strength: 19/21/144/2 (186).
Each armoured (infantry) brigade had one
company of this type. Given the difference between peacetime and
wartime strength (148 versus 186 men) some subunits were probably on
Short Leave or otherwise mobilisable, for instance a collection point
group, a field dressing station group and an ambulance group.
The
company's field dressing station platoon provided the
brigade's second-echelon medical treatment capacity,
deploying a field dressing station in the rear of the brigade
during operations. There, wounded personnel would receive such medical
treatment as to prepare them for either further
evacuation (to a transit hospital in the Corps Rear Area) or a return to
their unit. The necessary surgical capacity was provided by the
specialist group. One field dressing station group would
be held in reserve to enable (tactical) relocation of the
station. The collection point groups would act as starting points
for evacuation chains close behind the front line, or
as intermediate stations between battalion first aid stations and the
field dressing station; they could also be used to reinforce or replace
a battalion first aid station or to assist the field dressing
station during (tactical) relocation. The ambulance platoon
would transport wounded personnel from collection points and battalion
first aid stations to the field dressing station, provide messenger
services between the company's subunits, and transport medical supplies
to the brigade's first-echelon medical units (e.g. the medical
platoon of an armoured infantry
battalion). The distribution of medical goods throughout the
brigade was handled by the company staff's distribution group.
During
exercises brigade medical companies frequently used alternative unit
organisations, for instance with the collection point platoon and the
ambulance platoon reorganised into two mixed platoons.2 From
1988 the brigade medical companies adopted a new organisation which,
amongst other things, no longer longer incorporated surgical capacity
and had twenty-four rather than twenty ambulances.3
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.110
inv. nr. 350, organisatietabellen en
autorisatiestaten (OTAS) briggnkcie, 1978. Mohr,
Quo
vadis, 437-439. The data regarding vehicles and
armament comes from the aforementioned NL-HaNA document from 1978,
which means that it is probably not entirely accurate for 1985; between
1978 and 1985 this organisation type's OTAS was altered once
(compare the organisation type number with NIMH
430, inv. nr. 54 (Slagorde KL stand 1 juli 1985)).
A comparison between the data provided in the article by Mohr and the
1978 OTAS for instance suggests that by 1983 the DAF 66 YA vehicles
were replaced with Land Rovers.
2.
Mohr,
op. cit., 440-444, and subsequent
discussion in
Militaire
Spectator nr. 3, 1984,
133-143.
<
Mixed
Battalions and Company Teams 1
Gemengde
bataljons en teamverbanden
During
operations battalion and company organisations within the armoured (infantry) brigades would
usually be broken up to form combined-arms battle groups tailored to
specific missions.2
Tank battalions and armoured infantry battalions would detach or
exchange tank squadrons and armoured infantry companies, resulting in
either reinforced or mixed battalions that were characterised as
"tank-heavy", "armoured infantry-heavy" or "balanced". Within these
battalions, tank squadrons and armoured infantry companies would
subsequently detach or exchange platoons to form company-sized combat
teams, the main components of which were tank
platoons, armoured infantry platoons and armoured antitank platoons.
Company teams (shortly called "teams" in the Royal Army) could
be complemented by forward observer groups from the
brigade's field artillery
battalion and armoured engineer groups from the brigade's armoured engineer company.
After a
new concept of operations for 1 (NL) Corps came info effect in
July 1985, a preliminary version of a new tactical doctrine
(gevechtshandleiding) followed in November of that year.3
The new doctrine formalised the modus operandi described above,
recognising that terrain and expected enemy tactics would
require battalions to fight in mixed order most of the time.
The mixed or reinforced battalion and the company team became the key
combat formations of the brigade. It was found that company teams, once
formed, should be kept together as much as possible, and by 1987 basic
brigade-level order of battle models had been developed which
were built from interchangeable company teams that were, in principle,
fixed. Each company team would typically comprise four platoons and the
organic company or squadron staff. To illustrate, the chart
below shows the basic mixed order of battle model for an armoured
brigade, applied to 41 Armoured Brigade (showing only
those units directly involved):
In this model 42 Armoured Infantry Battalion has detached A Company to
41 Tank Battalion (A-42) and B Company to 43 Tank Battalion (B-42),
receiving A Squadron from 41 Tank Battalion (A-41) and B Squadron from
43 Tank Battalion (B-43) in return. Subsequently each armoured infantry
company has detached an armoured infantry platoon to
each of the two tank squadrons now part of the mixed battalion, whilst
these two tank squadrons have each detached a tank platoon to
the armoured infantry company. The armoured combat support
company of 42 Armoured Infantry Battalion (Paost) has detached
its three (armoured) antitank platoons to the three armoured infantry
companies (of which two now detached), retaining only its three mortar
platoons. Apart from this mortar support the brigade now has three
identical mixed battalions, each with three company teams: two teams
with three tank platoons and one armoured infantry platoon each; and
one team with two tank platoons, one armoured infantry platoon and one
antitank platoon.
By 1989
combined-arms battalion formations were no longer referred to as
"mixed" or "reinforced", but as "manoeuvre battalions". The composition
of manoeuvre battalions and company teams was now indicated by
a three-digit code, representing the number of, subsequently,
tank, armoured infantry, and antitank platoons. In the model
above 41 Armoured Brigade thus has three type 831 manoeuvre battalions,
each with two type 310 teams and one type 211 team.
For the
armoured infantry brigades the possibilities to form manoeuvre
battalions and company teams were greatly increased between
1987 and 1989. The introduction of a new tank
battalion type for the armoured infantry brigades
(1986-1987) added two platoons worth of main battle tanks to these
units, whilst the transition of the remaining eight DAF YP-408 equipped armoured infantry
battalions to the YPR-765
armoured infantry fighting vehicle (1987-1989) meant
that these battalions now each had four antitank platoons (each with 4
x YPR-765 PRAT) rather than one (with 6 x YP-408 AT).4
These enhancements enabled a basic order of battle model of
two type 484 manoeuvre battalions, each with four type 121 teams; and
one type 620 manoeuvre battalion with two type 310 teams. To
meet different tactical situations four other models
could be used.5
For the
Royal Army the adoption of non-organic combined-arms formations as the
basic combat units of its main fighting force was not without
challenges. With conscript soldiers and sub-officers serving
fourteen and sixteen months respectively, training company teams to
operate as effective, integrated units was no simple matter. In
wartime the addition and incorporation of mobilisable units
and subunits would be at least as challenging, and certainly
time-consuming. Apart from certain logistical bottlenecks, the greatest
challenge however lay with the captains and their small staffs
commanding the company teams: they had to be thoroughly familiar with
the equipment and operational procedures of all participating unit
types. Moreover, company teams were fixed only in
principle and their commanders would need to know how to
operate effectively with different types of company teams.6
To conclude, the chart below again
shows 41 Armoured Brigade
in basic mixed order of battle, now including its
organic
engineer, artillery and
logistic support. 42 Armoured Infantry Battalion
demonstrates further possible augmentation of its company
teams, each having an
armoured engineer group from 41 Armoured Engineer Company and
a
forward observation group from 41 Field Artillery Battalion attached.
_________________________________________________
1.
VS 44-32, IV-6. Elands,
Van Gils en Schoenmaker,
Geschiedenis
1 Divisie, 230, 234, 239-240. Felius,
Einde
oefening, 188-189. Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker,
Met de
blik, 384. Elands et al.,
250 jaar, 268. Isby
and Kamps,
Armies,
327. Egter van Wissekerke,
Het
vaste team, 155-167, and subsequent discussion
in
Militaire Spectator
nr. 7, 1987,
316-318.
2.
The
practice of forming combined-arms task groups is already
described in the Royal Army's tactical doctrine of 1968. VS 2-1386,
28-29, 68, 166, 258, 307.
3.
VR 2-1386. This document
superseded the tactical doctrine of 1968 mentioned in footnote 2; the
definitive version of VS 2-1386 was issued in December 1988.
Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 382. For the new concept of
operations (Operatieplan nr. 1), see 1 (NL) Corps,
Operational Role.
4.
It
appears that the enlargement of the tank battalions in the armoured
infantry brigades may have been partly motivated by the fact that the
number of TOW atgm systems originally found to be required by a 1978
study, three hundred seventy-five, was not met due to spending
cuts initiated in 1981. The
total number of TOW systems eventually acquired
by the Royal Army was three
hundred and thirty (including war/technical
reserves). NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 682,
Aantekening DMKL "Het wapensysteem Leopard 1V" d.d. 28 augustus 1986,
1-3. HTK
1984-1985,
kamerstuknr. 18600 X ondernr. 56,
4. Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 350, 389. Hoffenaar
and Schoenmaker, in op. cit., 389, report three hundred and fifty TOW
systems acquired. Four antitank platoons: as the DAF YP-408 was phased
out,
the armoured
antitank companies were disbanded and their YPR-765
PRATs were redistributed; an armoured infantry battalion in an armoured
infantry brigade got four antitank platoons (16 x YPR-765 PRAT), an
armoured infantry battalion in an armoured brigade kept its three
antitank platoons (12 x YPR-765 PRAT).
NL-HaNA 2.13.182,
inv. nr. 643,
Planningsmemorandum Legerplan 162 d.d. 1 augustus 1985, 9 and Bijlage
A "Herverdeling TOW-systemen" bij Deel I.
5.
See
Egter van Wissekerke,
op. cit., 159-161.
6.
Problems
and challenges regarding command, training and logistic support are
described in more detail in Egter
van Wissekerke,
op. cit., 164-167. Regarding
command, Egter van Wissekerke notes
that structural, adequate training for team commanders was not
yet in place.
Ibid., 164. Lieutenant-colonel
Blomjous, commander of
101 Tank Battalion, had similar
findings during a field exercise in 1986. Elands, Van Gils en
Schoenmaker, op. cit., 239-240. As a juxtaposition it is interesting to
quote Isby and Kamps on battle groups and combat teams in the British
Army: "The British believe they can make such two-level combined arms
integration [at battalion and company level, HB] work because of the
training and experience of their commanders. British mechanised
infantry and tank squadron commanders are senior majors, rather than
captains as in the U.S. Army [and the Royal Army, HB]. They can be
expected to have the knowledge and experience to use combined-arms
forces effectively." Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 244. See also the
recommendations in Egter van Wissekerke,
op. cit.,
167.
<
ROYAL AIR FORCE
• KONINKLIJKE LUCHTMACHT
The
Air Base
1
De vliegbasis (vlb)
One
staff unit, apparently called (air base) command (commando, CO), and
five services: the Flying Service (Vliegdienst, VD), the Logistic
Service (Logistieke Dienst, LD), the Ground Operations Service
(Grondoperationele Dienst, GROD), the Personnel Service
(Personeelsdienst, PD) and the Medical Service (Geneeskundige Dienst,
GD). Also directly under the air base commander (Commandant Vliegbasis,
C-Vlb) were one or more Rapid Runway Repair units (RRR). ¶ The
staff unit included four bureaux: the Adjutant's Bureau
(Bureau Adjudant, BA), the Economic Management Bureau (Bureau
Bedrijfseconomie, BBE), the Unit Operational Safety Bureau (Bureau
Onderdeelsbedrijfsveiligheid, BOB) and the Information Bureau (Bureau
Voorlichting). ¶ The Flying Service comprised the Intelligence and
Security Bureau (Bureau Inlichtingen en Veiligheid, BIV), the Signals
Bureau (Bureau Verbindingen, BVERB), the Flying Service Bureau (Bureau
Vliegdienst, BVD), the Flying Service Squadron (Vliegdienstsquadron,
VDSQ), and one or two (combat) aircraft squadrons (Squadron, SQ). ¶ The
Logistic Service comprised the Administration Bureau (Bureau
Administratie, BADM), the Operational Management Bureau
(Bedrijfsbureau, BB),
the Quality Management Bureau (Bureau Kwaliteitszorg, BKZ), the
Operational Management Rationalisation Bureau (Bureau
Bedrijfsrationalisatie, BBR), the Infrastructural Management
Bureau (Bureau Infrastructureel Beheer, BIB), the Armament and
Electronics Squadron (Bewapening en Electronicasquadron, BESQ), the
Technical Squadron (Technisch Squadron, TECHSQ), the Materiel Squadron
(Materieelsquadron, MATSQ), and the Motorised Transport Squadron
(Motortransportsquadron, MTSQ). ¶ The Ground Operations Service
comprised the Ground Operations Bureau (Bureau Grondoperatiën, BGRO),
the Active Air Defence Squadron (Actieve Luchtverdedigingssquadron, ALVDSQ)
(individually with unit number and without ALVD designation), the
Passive Defence Division (Afdeling Passieve
Verdediging, APV), the Base Security Post (Basis Beveiligingspost,
BBP), one or two Air Force Security squadrons (Luchtmachtbeveiligingssquadron, LBSQ), one to seven mobilisable independent Air Force Security platoons (Luchtmachbeveiligingspeloton, LBPEL), two to five mobilisable object security squadrons [Royal Army] (objectbewakingssquadron, objbewsq), and one to four mobilisable independent object security platoons
[Royal Army] (objectbewakingspeloton, objbewpel). The ALVD squadron
included an I-HAWK equipped assault firing unit (AFU) and a Flycatcher-40L70 equipped short range air defence flight
(SHORAD). ¶ The Personnel
Service comprised the Personnel Management Bureau (Bureau
Personeelsbeheer, BPB), the Personnel Care and Coaching Bureau (Bureau
Personeelszorg en Begeleiding, BPZB), the Sports Bureau (Bureau Sport,
BP) and the Service Support Squadron (Verzorgingssquadron, VZSQ). ¶ The
Medical Service comprised a staff, the Medical Care Division
(Afdeling Geneeskundige Verzorging, AGV) and the Dental Care Division
(Afdeling Tandheelkundige Verzorging, ATV). Also part of the Medical
Service was the First Echelon Medical Formation (1e Echelons
Geneeskundige Formatie, EEGF), which comprised a staff detachment, one
or more ambulance groups (Ambulancegroep, AMBGP), one or more satellite
groups (satellietgroep, SATGP), medical aid posts (geneeskundige
hulppost, GHP), one or more mobile medical aid posts (geneeskundige
hulppost mobiel, GHPM), and two or more dental groups (tandheelkundige
groep, THKGP).2
This
is a generic air base organisation. Some air bases, in particular those
where no combat aircraft squadrons were stationed in peacetime, had
organisations which to some extent deviated from the organisation
shown here. Size and operational role determined the individual air
base organisations, but the five-service organisation was standard. For
this generic organisation the Leeuwarden, Gilze-Rijen and Eindhoven air
bases have served as models. Again depending size and operational role,
air bases tended to be personnel-heavy organisations: in 1983
Leeuwarden Air Base had a peacetime strength of 1,280 military and 128
civilians, and a wartime strength of 2226 military and 108 civilians.3
_________________________________________________
1.
NIMH
723, inv. nr. 75, Organisatie en organisatieschema's m.b.t. de KLu d.d.
1 augustus 1984, 28-30. De Jong et al., Voor vriend, 93, 94.
2.
For some abbreviations educated guesses had to be made; corrections are welcome.
3. Personnel strengths: NL-HaNA 2.13.113, inv. nr. 1126 (organisatietabel Vliegbasis Leeuwarden d.d. 15 juni 1983).
<
The
Active Air Defence Squadron
1
Het actieve-luchtverdedigingssquadron (ALVDSQ)
One
squadron command group, one Assault Firing Unit (AFU), one
Technical Flight (TECHVL), and one Short Range Air Defence Flight
(SHORAD). ¶ The Assault Firing Unit comprised a Platoon Command Post
(PCP), and three launching groups. The Platoon
Command Post was basically the platoon-level version of the Battery Control Center/Information and
Coordination Central (BCC/ICC), the fire control centre normally found at
the squadron (battery) level not present here. From the PCP the radars
and launchers were operated. The two radars, 1 x AN/MPQ-55
Improved Continuous Wave
Acquisition Radar (ICWAR) for searching, and 1 x AN/MPQ-46 High
Power Illumination Radar (HIPIR) for tracking and
illuminating targets and missile guidance, were unmanned during
operations. The three launching
groups each had 1 x M192 launcher, each launcher armed with 3 x MIM-23B
I-HAWK (Improved Homing All The Way Killer) medium range surface-to-air
missile. The three launchers were directed by 1 x Launcher Section
Control Box (LSCB). The AFU had one full reload for each launcher, so
another nine
missiles, in stock.2 ¶ The Technical Flight was responsible for the
maintenance and repair of both the I-HAWK systems and the
Flycatcher-40L70 systems of the SHORAD Flight. ¶ The SHORAD Flight
comprised three
sections.
Above these there was no command unit: fire control was handled at
section level. The three sections each had a command post with 1 x HSA
Flycatcher anti-aircraft fire control radar system, and 3 x Bofors 40L70 automatic anti-aircraft gun 40 mm.
Squadron
command group: (± 1-4). Assault Firing Unit strength: (30-35).
Technical Flight strength: (10). SHORAD Flight strength: (30-35).
Active Air Defence Squadron strength: (± 80). In wartime this strength
would be increased with (mobilised) personnel to ensure round-the-clock
readiness. This would amount to a squadron strength of some 200 men.3
ALVD
squadrons were responsible for the ground based air defence of Royal
Air Force air bases in the Netherlands. Since 1981 individual ALVD
squadrons were numbered and had dropped the ALVD designation, though it
continued to be used informally.
'Assault
Fire Unit' was a NATO
designation left over from before the late 1970s, when these units had
been withdrawn from NATO's surface-to-air missile belt in
West Germany.
Individual units retained their NATO unit number, as they were
still assigned to NATO (NATO command forces). An
AFU was basically one of two launching sections of an I-HAWK
squadron; in
US Army terms an Assault Platoon of an I-HAWK missile battery. Because the
squadron (battery) level was lacking, the AFUs had, contrary to the
squadrons in West Germany, no Pulse Acquisition Radar (PAR) and no
Range-Only Radar (ROR). For a complete air picture the AFU depended on
the air surveillance radar of the air base. Compared to the squadrons
in West Germany both fire power and mobility were limited. Within the
confines of the air base
the launchers were positioned at about ninety to one
hundred meters from the Platoon Command Post. The distances between the
equipment elements were a compromise between security, maximum
spread and cable lengths.
For
the SHORAD flights the Royal Air Force in the late 1970s acquired
twenty-six new Flycatcher radar and fire control systems manufactured by Hollandse
Signaal Apparaten (HSA) and eighty-six Bofors
40L70 anti-aircraft guns acquired from the Royal Army
and the West German Bundeswehr. The Flycatcher system was mounted in a
mobile container (shelter) which could be towed by a truck, and
operated by two fire controllers: a Battery Control Officer (BCO) and a
Fire Control Operator (FCO). The Bofors 40L70 guns had been thoroughly modernised: they were fitted with a power generator, their ammunition capacity was
doubled and their maximum rate of fire was increased from 240 to 300
rounds per minute. The firing process was highly automated: fire
control (searching, identification, tracking and lock-on) was handled
by the Flycatcher. The two gunners of a 40L70 only had to feed the
piece with ammunition. However, the guns could be fired manually if
necessary. The three guns of a section were positioned in a circle
around the Flycatcher at a maximum radius of two kilometers. Contrary
to the Assault Firing Units the SHORAD flights were under national
control.
In 1985 one or two air bases had SHORAD flights with two
rather than three Flycatcher-40L70 sections. In 1987 only Eindhoven Air Base had two sections. By 1990 all air base SHORAD flights had
three sections: with the disbandment of 12 Guided Weapons Group in West
Germany between 1983 and 1988 eight Flycatcher-40L70 sections
became available for deployment in the Netherlands. In 1983-1984 the four SHORAD sections of 12 Guided Weapons Group's 120 en 223 Squadron (two sections per squadron) were distributed over air bases in the Netherlands.4
It
should be noted that the squadron organisation as depicted here is to a
large extent administrative. The squadron command group had no
operational command role and basically comprised the squadron commander
and a handful of (sub)officers with
logistic-administrative functions who, moreover, were normally
posted elsewhere on the air
base. The Assault Fire Unit was under operational command of the Control and Reporting Centre/Military Air Traffic
Control Centre (CRC/MilATCC) in Nieuw
Milligen, which had a SAM (surface-to-air-missile)
allocator for the coordinated control of all Assault Firing Units. The SHORAD flight was directed from the Air Base Commander's Local Air Defence Command Post (LADCP),
which was part of his Base Command Post (BCP).4
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA
2.13.113, inv. nr. 1124, (Reorganisatie) ALVD Squadron d.d. 29 januari
1981, Bijlage. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 663, Concept
krijgsmachtdeelplan Koninklijke Luchtmacht 1987-1996 d.d. 20 december
1985, 53-54, 63. Van Loo, Crossing, 340-342. Van Loo et al., 100 jaar, 116-118. Van Loo et al., Verenigd, 250. Nederlof, Blazing Skies,
Bijlage I (containing detailed information about
personnel, armament and equipment of the I-HAWK and
Flycatcher-40L70 units in West Germany). De Winter, Een Eeuw, 159-160.Thanks
to Royal Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel R. Dorenbos (Rtd.) for providing
additional information and preventing mistakes (emails April 2023); see also De Vliegende Hollander nr. 11, 2022, Luchtmachter beschrijft geschiedenis geleide wapens.
2.
Behind the basic load of eightteen missiles there was virtually no stock. A
prolonged air defence of the air bases would, in case of persistent or
massive air attacks, have been problematic. No doubt financial
constraints played a part in this, but another factor appears to have
been that the survivability of this sort of units in wartime was
thought to be low. See also Royal Air Force,Air Force Tactical Command,
Part VII, note c.
3. Nederlof,
op. cit., 451, reports a crew of 13 men for one I-HAWK launching
section (platoon) in West Germany, which is markedly different from the
35 men reported for the AFU's in the Netherlands by Van Loo, op. cit.,
341, and other
books mentioned in footnote 1. Lieutenant-Colonel Dorenbos (Rtd.)
reports nine men for one AFU crew in peacetime, operators only. In peacetime an AFU would usually have two crews. Apart
from this there was some logistical personnel for signals, equipment,
fuel supply, kitchen etc., so that would explain the 35 men strength.
In wartime round-the-clock readiness required at least three
crews, and preferably a fourth for reconnoitering new
positions. Dorenbos, email 10.04.2023. Regarding the SHORAD
flight, Van
Loo et al., 100 jaar, 118,
reports "about 30 men" rather than the 35 men reported in the other
books mentioned in footnote 1. In peacetime a section of the SHORAD
flight would have
two fire controllers and five gunners per 40L70, so 21 men in total. In
wartime this would be tripled. Dorenbos, emails
10.04.2023 and 13.04.2023. Like
with the AFU there was probably
some personnel for logistical support as well. For the squadron's
wartime strength mobilisable personnel would be called up; these
regularly followed refresher training in peacetime. Ibid.
4. Additional
information kindly provided by Lieutenant-Colonel R. Dorenbos (Rtd), email 08.04.2023. Given the number of
available Flycatchers and in particular 40L70 guns it seems very
unlikely that a third airbase would (still) have had a SHORAD flight
with two rather than three sections in 1985. Apart from Eindhoven Air
Base another, yet unidentified air base, may have had two sections.
5. Website Grondgebonden luchtverdediging, SIAD's, AFU's, ALVD, OLVD & GRO. Additional information kindly provided by Lieutenant-Colonel R. Dorenbos, emails 08.04.2023.
<
The
Air Force Security Squadron
1
Het Luchtmacht Beveiligingssquadron
(LBSQ)
One
squadron staff, one squadron administration group (not always present), and three platoons (1-2-3). ¶ The squadron staff had 1 x one-tonne vehicle, probably a Volkswagen T2 Transporter, and 1 x DAF A-1600 five-tonne truck. ¶ Each platoon comprised a
platoon staff and three groups. The platoons each had 1x Volkswagen
T2 and 1x DAF A-1600. Each group had 1 x FALO saw 7.62 mm.
Armament further included hand grenades, rifle grenades and probably a
number of M72 LAWs. This depicts the situation in 1980; by 1985 the T2s
had probably at least partly been replaced by T3s, and the A-1600 may
have been (partly) replaced by DAF YA-5441 five tonne-trucks. In
addition (some) squadrons probably had a number of 3⁄4-tonne Land Rovers with 1 x M2 hmg 0.50 inch on M61 mount.2
Squadron staff strength: 2/1/3 (6). Administration group strength: -/1/1 (2). Platoon staff
strength: two platoons 1/1/2 (4), one platoon -/2/2 (4). Group strength: -/1/13 (14). Platoon
strength: 1/4/41 (46). Squadron strength: 5/14/127 (146), without administration group 5/13/126 (144).
The security
infantry units of this type were to secure the air bases of Air Force
Tactical Command in peace and wartime. This is the wartime
organisation. Peacetime organisations tended to differ from this,
sometimes considerably so as organisations were tailored to the various air
bases. The LB squadrons were largely filled
with conscript personnel. Most squadrons worked with a security
dog group which was considered part of the squadron; strength of these
sections varied from 5 to 36 men (above organic squadron strength).
Total armament comprised 15 x FN Browning Hi-Power pistol 9 mm, 14 x UZI submachine gun 9 mm (12 x without administration group), 117 x
FN
FAL battle rifle 7.62 mm and 9 x FN FALO squad automatic weapon 7.62 mm.
_________________________________________________
1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.113, inv. nr. 814, Indeling LB/OB-eenheden d.d. 18 februari 1980, Bijlagen C, D en E. By 1985 there may have been some differences
in organisation and equipment. Luchtmacht Beveiliging: Air Force
Security units were previously designated 'Luchtmacht Bewaking'; in various publications the old designation persists.
2.
Probably
Volkswagen T2/T3: these
can be seen in contemporary photographs. In ibid., Bijlage C, the
vehicle is listed as "truck 1 tonne, 4x2 drive" (vau 1t 4x2).
Though the maximum load of the T2/T3 was somewhat below one tonne, it
appears to be the only candidate. Likewise the DAF A-1600 can be seen
in photographs; in the aforementioned document it is listed as "vau 5t
4x2". LAWs: these are mentioned in Nederlof, Blazing Skies,
241; however, this book is about the guided weapon (air defence) groups
in West-Germany, which had LB units attached as well. It may
therefore be that the LB squadrons in the Netherlands had no LAWs. Land
Rovers with M2 hmg 0.50 inch: Beeldbank NIMH, obj. nr. 2157_046839. The soldier can be identified as belonging to an LB unit by his red neck scarf.
<
The Air Force Security Platoon
Het Luchtmacht Beveiligingspeloton (LBPEL)
Mobilisable security infantry unit, organised and, probably, equipped as the platoon of the
Air Force Security Squadron. There was one partly (marginally) active platoon, attached to the
Electronic Materiel Depot.
<
The Object Security Squadron
1
Het Objectbewakingssquadron (objbewsq)
One
squadron staff, one administration and supply group, and three platoons. ¶ The squadron staff had 1 x Volkswagen T2 or T3 Transporter. The administration and supply group had 3 x T2/T3 and 4 x DAF A-1600 five-tonne truck. ¶ Each platoon comprised a platoon staff and three groups.
The platoon staff had 1 x M2 hmg 0.50 inch on an M61 mount. Each group
had 1 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm or quite possibly 1 x Bren Gun lmg .303.
Armament probably further included hand grenades
and perhaps a number of M72 LAWs. (The number of) vehicles would differ
in relation to the security task of a squadron. Platoons would perhaps
get a number of Land Rovers, or M38A1 "Nekaf" Jeeps from Royal Army stocks.2
Squadron staff strength: 2/1/4 (7). Administration and supply group strength: -/2/8 (10). Platoon staff
strength: 1/1/4 (6). Group strength: -/1/9 (10). Platoon
strength: 1/4/31 (36). Squadron strength: 5/15/105 (125).
Mobilisable security
infantry units of this type were made up of Royal Army reservists, tasked with providing additional object security to Royal Air Force air bases and installations. The squadrons would operate under local air force commanders. If Air Force Security
units (Luchtmacht Beveiliging, LB) were present, such as at air bases,
the mobilised object security squadrons would in general probably form
the outer ring of the security area. Personnel would wear army rather
than air force outfits, as on mobilisation they would bring their
duffel bags from home.
Total armament comprised 17 x FN Browning Hi-Power pistol 9 mm, 20 x UZI submachine gun 9 mm, 88 x
FN
FAL battle rifle 7.62 mm and 9 x FN MAG gpmg 7.62 mm or Bren Gun lmg .303 inch.
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1.
NL-HaNA 2.13.113, inv. nr. 814, Indeling LB/OB-eenheden d.d. 18 februari 1980, Bijlage A.
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The Object Security Platoon
Het Objectbewakingspeloton (objbewpel)
Mobilisable security infantry unit, manned, organised and equipped as the platoon of the
Object Security Squadron,
except that the platoon staff was augmented with two chauffeurs in the
rank of soldier, and 1 x Volkswagen T2/T3 Transporter and 1 x DAF
A-1600 five tonne truck.
Platoon
strength: 1/4/33 (38).
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