Pentecostal Evangelicals as a vehicle of political mobilisation

Across the globe, far-right movements have been gaining ground, challenging established parties. Scholars have identified many drivers of this trend, including migration (Bazzi et al. 2023), exposure to refugees (Steinmayr 2021), austerity reforms (Dal Bó et al. 2023), trade flows (Autor et al. 2020), and public service deprivation (Cremaschi et al. 2023). Religious movements have also attracted attention as an additional potential factor.

This factor is especially relevant in Latin America, where the rapid growth of Pentecostal evangelicalism is transforming the religious landscape of a region long dominated by Catholicism (Figure 1). Compared to Catholics, Pentecostals emphasise a literal interpretation of the Bible, frequent worship, and strict morals (Pew Research Center 2006). They have also become increasingly active politically, supporting candidates and encouraging pastors to run for office. Politicians increasingly recognise the strength of Pentecostal groups in mobilising voters. A notable example is Brazil’s far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro, who converted to Pentecostalism two years before his successful 2018 presidential campaign.

Figure 1 Religious composition in Latin America

Note: Data obtained from Pew Research Center (2014).

As a result, understanding the roots and consequences of Pentecostal growth has become a subject of growing academic and policy interest. For instance, Costa et al. (2023) show that regions more exposed to economic distress experienced a persistent rise in both in Pentecostal affiliation and in the vote share of candidates connected to Pentecostal churches. Furthermore, Buccione and Mello (2024) examine the role of Pentecostal media in shaping different socio-economic outcomes, especially for women. While the media often describes Pentecostalism as a driver of the far right’s rise worldwide, evidence of a causal link is limited. In recent research (Solá 2025), I use a new empirical approach to study how Pentecostal growth affects political outcomes in Brazil.

Identifying variation in Pentecostal growth

I develop an empirical strategy to identify the causal impact of Pentecostal expansion on electoral outcomes in Brazil. I focus on a unique historical driver: the activities of the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), an evangelical missionary organisation founded in the US that specialises in Bible translation. Most members belonged to the conservative wing of US evangelicalism and aimed to promote their values where they worked (Hvalkof and Aaby 1981). While Latin America has been SIL’s main field of operation, it has also worked in Asia and Africa.

Around 1960, SIL began translating the Bible into indigenous languages across Brazil. The process of Bible translation is highly involved and typically takes about ten years. Although missionaries lived in central towns and were not permitted to establish churches or schools, they maintained continuous contact with indigenous populations. Through these interactions and the availability of the Bible in local languages, SIL missionaries spread their beliefs and conservative views. Even for bilingual indigenous individuals, contact with SIL members meant exposure to proselytising efforts.

The translation of the Bible into a specific indigenous language is used as a proxy to measure SIL’s activities. As shown in Figure 2, between 1980 and 2010, SIL activities expanded into new linguistic regions through a staggered rollout across Brazil. This timing and geography variation allows for an empirical analysis of SIL’s influence on religious affiliation.

Figure 2 SIL activities rollout

Note: Each polygon represents the geographic region of a distinct language spoken in Brazil, according to the 14th edition of Ethnologue (2000). Data on the timing of Bible translations were obtained from the Joshua Project, an evangelical organisation based in the US. Red polygons indicate languages with a Bible translation, while blue polygons represent those without one.

Measuring the impact of SIL activities

Focusing on municipalities where indigenous languages are spoken, I examine religious affiliation and voting outcomes before and after the first Bible translation into the local languages. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I compare outcomes across time and municipalities to isolate SIL’s effects and test for pre-existing trends.

Figure 3 presents event-study estimates for four outcomes: (a) the share of Pentecostal affiliations, (b) the share of other (non-Pentecostal) evangelical affiliations, (c) the vote share of far-right candidates in presidential elections, and (d) the vote share of evangelical candidates in federal elections. Across all panels, there is no evidence of pre-trends, supporting the assumption that, conditional on controls, the timing of SIL activities is effectively random.

Pentecostal affiliation rises notably following SIL’s first translation (Panel a), while other evangelical affiliation remains flat (Panel b). Political outcomes also increase, but more gradually: both far-right vote share and evangelical candidate vote share rise following SIL engagement (Panels c and d).

Figure 3 Pre-trend analysis

Note: These graphs display estimated coefficients from event-study regressions measuring the impact of SIL Bible translations on religious affiliation and voting outcomes. The x-axis shows years relative to the first Bible translation in each municipality. Confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered at the language level.

Next, I construct a municipality-level measure of SIL exposure between 1980 and 2010. This measure accounts for multiple indigenous languages within a municipality and 1980 population size, varying over time only with the timing of translations. I use this measure as my main independent variable in models that control for fixed municipal differences, overall time trends, and interactions between time trends and baseline characteristics such as income, urbanisation, school attendance, and ethnic composition.

Results show that SIL exposure led to higher Pentecostal affiliation. This rise mainly reflected people switching from other religious groups. A breakdown by ethnic group indicates that the effects occurred mainly among indigenous and mixed-race populations.

Despite finding no evidence that SIL targeted municipalities where Pentecostalism was already growing, some potential threats to the identification strategy remain. For example, SIL might have targeted municipalities based on factors that were predictive of future evangelical growth and visible to missionaries but unobserved by researchers.

To address this, I construct an expected exposure measure based on an exogenous translation cost shifter. As translating the Bible into a language requires significant investment, new translations were more likely in languages linguistically similar to those that already had a translation. Accordingly, I build this measure by replacing the timing of translations into Brazilian indigenous languages with the timing of translations into similar languages spoken outside Brazil and its neighbours. In this setup, time variation mainly reflects Bible translations in North America, Asia, and Africa. Results using expected exposure closely mirror those with actual SIL exposure, reinforcing the causal interpretation.

From conversion to votes

Leveraging the Pentecostal variation driven by SIL exposure, I assess the electoral effects of Pentecostal expansion. I focus on two main outcomes: the vote share of far-right candidates in presidential elections and the vote share of candidates affiliated with evangelical churches in federal elections.

A 10 percentage point increase in Pentecostal affiliation, about the average change between 1990 and 2010, is associated with a 13 percentage point rise in evangelical candidates’ vote share in federal elections and a 2 percentage point rise for far-right presidential candidates.

These estimates rely on the assumption that SIL exposure affects political outcomes only through its impact on religious affiliation. Consistent with this, I find no significant effects of SIL exposure on other key municipal characteristics, such as literacy, school attendance, urbanisation, or agricultural employment. Moreover, event-study estimates show a more gradual increase in evangelical and far-right voting compared to the sharper rise in Pentecostal affiliation.

I also analyse the extent to which SIL-driven Pentecostal growth contributed to Bolsonaro’s 2018 success. While surveys indicate nearly 70% of evangelicals supported him, this correlation could reflect underlying characteristics. I employ a cross-sectional analysis linking SIL-driven Pentecostal growth to Bolsonaro’s vote share in 2018. This analysis suggests that he received about 9.8 percentage points more votes in municipalities that experienced a one standard deviation larger increase in Pentecostal affiliation.

Spillovers beyond indigenous regions

Although SIL’s work focused on indigenous-language communities, their influence may have spread more widely. Using a market-access approach that accounts for geographic proximity, I find evidence of Pentecostal increases in nearby municipalities without indigenous-language communities. This likely reflects the role of migrants, commuters, and social networks in transmitting religious practices. Furthermore, in municipalities where no indigenous languages are spoken, increases in Pentecostal affiliation also appear linked to greater support for evangelical and far-right candidates, though the magnitudes are smaller than in regions with direct SIL exposure.

Why do Pentecostal communities wield such political influence?

One key mechanism is the organisational capacity of Pentecostal churches. These churches often hold frequent services where pastors discuss politics, endorse candidates, and host blessing ceremonies. The findings indicate that candidates endorsed by major Pentecostal churches are significantly more successful in capturing votes. In contrast, candidates affiliated with smaller Pentecostal churches do not experience the same electoral advantage. These results suggest that identifying with any Pentecostal church does not automatically guarantee electoral support; rather, the organisational strength is a key element. This advantage might be especially relevant since Brazil’s 2015 campaign finance reforms imposed strict spending limits (Avis et al. 2022), making grassroots mobilisation critical for electoral success.

Conclusion

According to a Latinobarómetro survey (2018), in Latin America, the Church – regardless of denomination – is considered the most trusted institution. The rapid growth of Pentecostalism and its strong political involvement may have far-reaching implications for the region’s social and political landscape. This evidence shows that when SIL lowered barriers to Pentecostal expansion, electoral support for evangelical and far-right candidates increased. More broadly, the findings illustrate how religious institutions can significantly influence politics.

Many questions remain. For example, understanding how Pentecostalism shapes attitudes toward militarised policies or sexual education is important, given how central these issues are in today’s political debates.

Editors’ note: This column is published in collaboration with the International Economic Associations’ Women in Leadership in Economics initiative, which aims to enhance the role of women in economics through research, building partnerships, and amplifying voices.

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