On 4/3/2015 3:19 PM, Obrst, Leo J. wrote:
> This is a point of disagreement, I think, between logicians and
> ontologists (qua metaphysicians). The former think that expressing
> / representing something is equivalent to it being so, and that
> the "being so" doesn't matter that much. The latter think not.  (01) 
But there are three things to distinguish, not just two. Following
is an excerpt from a previous note I wrote on this thread:  (02)
> We have to distinguish
>
> A) The way the world (or universe) actually happens to be
> -- about which all of us have some shared opinions and
> scientists have more detailed analyses and theories.
>
> B) The way people talk in everyday language or in any
> artificial notation, such as formal logic.
>
> C) An ontology about the world that happens to be useful
> for some particular task or group of related tasks.  (03) 
Category B includes any kind of language or logic. Category C
includes any theory about the world by ontologists, by scientists,
or by engineers who apply ontology or science to a particular task.  (04)
But we have to recognize that the world A is not identical to
the way B we talk about it or the way C that some scientists,
engineers, or ontologists characterize it.  (05)
Every mapping to the world A from any language B or any theory C
is an *approximation* whose usefulness depends on the application.
When the application changes, we may need to use a different
approximation -- i.e., different theory of ontology or science.  (06)
John  (07)
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