Avril Styrman wrote:

According to Harre p351-2 mereology?s lack of the ability to model 

contexts has led to mereological fallacies, where contexts are 

confusingly mixed:

?the brain is not a part of a person in the way that a grain of sand 

is part of a beach. It is part of a person?s body and a person?s body 

is not a part of that person in the relevant sense.? In contrast, when 

a granular theory is used as a foundation of ?part?, this 

automatically makes the user to think more

carefully about the context under which the term ?part? is used: some 

parts are flat, some are granular.

Granular theories of course do not solve all problems, but they are an 

advancement.

-Avril

There is presently a discussion of an analogy to Mereology in linguistic syntactic parses.  A similar situation is now being discussed on the Link Grammar Parser email list, which is maintained by Linas Veptas, who has been doing a terrific job on maintaining the Link Grammar Parser. 

Linas wrote:

this is the fundamental idea behind dependency grammars (as opposed to the NP VP crapola that people seem to like so much, for ahem, inexplicable reasons) If you will notice: link-grammar is very distinctly NOT hierarchical !

The oldest thing I can think of is "Meaning-Text Theory", started in the 1960's in Soviet Russia, but didn't get to the West until the 1980's.  The link-grammar README file mentions it. I'm sort-of trying to move link-grammar so it goes back into the deeper directions (its part of what RelEx was all about).

So, again, my knee-jerk reaction is that these guys actually have an experiment that *measures* an actual effect in humans; which is good, in a sense, as otherwise one could accuse the linguists of "making stuff up out of thin air".  viz: linguists are really theorists, they need good experimental data to hold up their theories.

Interested ontologists might enjoy that list as well.  The list is at Link-Grammar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx if you want to subscribe.  The problem being addressed is the proper parse of “but” in a sentence which doesn’t parse well.  The discussion talks about “context” as being difficult to dissect from language. 

-Rich

Sincerely,

Rich Cooper

EnglishLogicKernel.com

Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com

9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2

-----Original Message-----
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Avril Styrman
Sent: Wednesday, September 26, 2012 12:42 PM
To: [ontolog-forum] ; Rich Cooper
Cc: '[ontolog-forum] '
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Universal Basic Semantic Structures

Hi,

discrete mereology is the simplest flat collection theory. I inform 

the list of a new article by Rom Harré: Behind the mereological 

fallacy. Philosophy, 87(341):329?352, 2012.

According to Harre p351-2 mereology?s lack of the ability to model 

contexts has led to mereological fallacies, where contexts are 

confusingly mixed:

?the brain is not a part of a person in the way that a grain of sand 

is part of a beach. It is part of a person?s body and a person?s body 

is not a part of that person in the relevant sense.? In contrast, when 

a granular theory is used as a foundation of ?part?, this 

automatically makes the user to think more

carefully about the context under which the term ?part? is used: some 

parts are flat, some are granular.

Granular theories of course do not solve all problems, but they are an 

advancement.

-Avril

Quoting "Rich Cooper" <rich@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>:

> John Sowa wrote:

>

> The fundamental principle is that there is a

> reason for every

>

> distinction.  Those reasons are fundamental to

> ontology.  Mereology

>

> is useful.  But the hope that it might provide

> "objective" criteria

>

> for ontology is a fantasy -- an extremely

> *misleading* fantasy.

>

>

>

> John

>

>

>

> Agreed; it is the observer who decides what

> distinctions to apply, and that makes the

> observer's subjective ontology the appropriate one

> to use, not some so-called "objective" ontology.

>

>

>

> Even worse, no two people use exactly the same

> ontology, which is one of those things that make

> interpersonal communications so very faulty.

>

>

>

> -Rich

>

>

>

> Sincerely,

>

> Rich Cooper

>

> EnglishLogicKernel.com

>

> Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com

>

> 9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2

>

>

>

> -----Original Message-----

> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On

> Behalf Of John F Sowa

> Sent: Wednesday, September 26, 2012 7:29 AM

> To: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Universal Basic

> Semantic Structures

>

>

>

> On 9/26/2012 9:16 AM, Obrst, Leo J. wrote:

>

>> Then you agree with the author of the second

> paper?

>

>>

>

>> Robinson, Edward Heath. 2012. Reexamining fiat,

> bona fide

>

>> and force dynamic boundaries for geopolitical

> entities and

>

>> their placement in DOLCE. Applied Ontology 7

> (2012),

>

>> pp. 93-108, DOI 10.3233/AO-2012-0103, IOS Press.

>

>

>

> I haven't had a chance to read that paper.  But I

> objected to the

>

> distinction of fiat vs. natural boundaries as soon

> as it was published.

>

>

>

> In physics, everything is continuous.   Some

> gradients are sharper

>

> than others, but nothing in nature has a clearly

> defined or definable

>

> 0-thickness boundary.

>

>

>

> Just consider the human body. The boundary changes

> every time somebody

>

> gets a hair cut, clips fingernails, takes a bath,

> puts on make-up,

>

> removes contact lenses, or sheds a few skin cells.

> For legal purposes,

>

> even clothing is considered within the body's

> boundary.

>

>

>

> If you admit clothing, you have to ask about the

> difference between

>

> a wallet in somebody's pocket vs. a purse carried

> outside the boundary

>

> of the clothing.  What about a necklace that might

> be partly under

>

> the clothing and partly outside?   What about a

> backpack?  If you admit

>

> a backpack, what about a suitcase that somebody is

> carrying.  If you

>

> admit that, what about a cane? Crutches?  A

> walker?  A wheelchair?

>

> A seeing-eye dog?

>

>

>

> The fundamental principle is that there is a

> reason for every

>

> distinction.  Those reasons are fundamental to

> ontology.  Mereology

>

> is useful.  But the hope that it might provide

> "objective" criteria

>

> for ontology is a fantasy -- an extremely

> *misleading* fantasy.

>

>

>

> John

>

>

>

>

>

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--

Avril Styrman

+358 40 7000 589

 

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