Denise D. Cummins, The Other Side of Psychology: How
Experimental Psychologists Find Out About the Way We Think and Act [Of
course, cognitive science is more than just cognitive psychology, and
experimental psychology is more than just cognitive psychology.]
Sara J. Shettleworth, Cognition, Evolution, and
Behavior
Recommended, close-ups:
Stanislas Dehane, The Number Sense
Daniel Dennett writes, among other
things, extensively about the philosophical implications of cognitive science,
in the process explaining a lot of it, and defending the general approach of
orthodox cognitivists.
Reuven Dukas (ed.), Cognitive Ecology: The Evolutionary
Ecology of Information Processing and Decision Making
K. Anders Ericsson, Ralf Th. Krampe and Clemens Tesch-Romer, "The
Role of Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert
Performance", Psychological Review 100 (1993):
363--406
Marcello Frixione, "Tractable Competence", Minds and
Machines 11 (2001): 379--397 [Cognitive systems do not,
in fact, routinely solve intractable problems, so theories which postulate that
they do are bad. Calling them "competence" theories is no excuse.]
Alison Gopnik, Andrew N. Meltzoff and Patricia K. Kuhl, The Scientist in the Crib: Minds, Brains, and How Children Learn
Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild [Actually, I
have mixed feelings about the book, but I am, if I may say so, very fond of my
review of it: Naval Collective
Intelligence.]
Heinz Pagels, The Dreams of Reason [especially the
chapters "Waiting for the Messiah" and "The Man Who Mistook His Brain for His
Mind."]
Dan Sperber and Deirdre
Wilson, Relevance: Cognition and Communication
Alonso H. Vera and Herbert A. Simon, "Situated Action: A Symbolic
Interpretation," Cognitive Science 17 (1993):
7--48
Rhiannon Weaver, "Parameters, Predictions, and Evidence in
Computational Modeling: A Statistical View Informed by
ACT-R", Cognitive
Science 32 (2008): 1349--1375 [A really great paper
on using modern statistical methods to connect sophisticated cognitive models
to data. I am very proud that Weaver is from the CMU stats. department, though
she's not my student.]
David Danks, "Rational Analyses, Instrumentalism, and
Implementations", in Chater and Oaksford (eds.) The Probabilistic Mind:
Prospects for Rational Models of Cognition
[PDF
preprint]
Jeff Evans, Adults' Mathematical Thinking and Emotions:
A Study of Numerate Practices
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, "In two minds: dual-process accounts of
reasoning", Trends
in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2003): 454--459. Brought
to my notice by reading an interesting comment by Frederick
Toates, TiCS 8 (2004): 57 (link), pointing out
that much of what Evans believes to be uniquely human has parallels in other
animals, suggesting that the dual-systems design has older evolutionary roots.]
Eliza Kosoy, David M. Chan, Adrian Liu, Jasmine Collins, Bryanna Kaufmann, Sandy Han Huang, Jessica B. Hamrick, John Canny, Nan Rosemary Ke, Alison Gopnik, "Towards Understanding How Machines Can Learn Causal Overhypotheses", arxiv:2206.08353
Daniel Povinelli, Folk Physics for Apes: The Chimpanzee's Theory of How the World Works
Rajkumar Vasudeva Raju, J. Swaroop Guntupalli, Guangyao Zhou, Carter Wendelken, Miguel Lázaro-Gredilla, and Dileep George, "Space is a latent sequence: A theory of the hippocampus", Science Advances 10:31 (2024)
Catherine E. Stinson, Cognitive Mechanisms and Computational Models: Explanation in Cognitive Neuroscience [Ph.D. Thesis, Philosophy Dept., University of Pittsburgh, 2013; thanks to Dr. Stinson for a copy]
Peter Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction
Tan Zhi-Xuan, Nishad Gothoskar, Falk Pollok, Dan Gutfreund, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Vikash K. Mansinghka, "Solving the Baby Intuitions Benchmark with a Hierarchically Bayesian Theory of Mind", arxiv:2208.02914
Iris van Rooij, Olivia Guest, Federico G. Adolfi, Ronald de Haan,
Antonina Kolokolova and Patricia Rich, "Reclaiming AI as a theoretical tool for
cognitive
science", psyarxiv/4cbuv
(2023) [Superificial and no doubt unfair comments: This is the latest in a
series of papers from van Rooij and collaborators, applying computational
complexity theory to questions in cognitive science, broadly conceived. This
seems to me a very worth-while undertaking, and I have no particular reason to
think any of their theorems are wrong. But I am uneasy about the general trend
of the papers, because they seem to prove too much, viz., that science in
general is computationally infeasible --- since my superficial impression
is that there isn't really much in their math that would pick
out cognition as harder than, say, geology. One reason for
bookmarking this paper, and planning to read it very carefully, is to come to
grips with these doubts.]