Latest comment: 1 month ago79 comments4 people in discussion
hi @Cent58! happy to see you dropping those awesome edits on those second sino japanese war pages. i gotta ask, where are you finding these articles? i'm super interested. thanks!:) Wahreit (talk) 05:14, 8 January 2025 (UTC)Reply
I mostly follow some accounts in Zhihu that specialize in comparing Chinese, Taiwanese, and Japanese historical materials instead of relying on just one side's source. The official Japanese newspaper that many of the articles use can be found in the NDL digital collections website. The "戰地其他死亡者" section of the Official Gazette "官报" list the names and units of the deceased soldiers along with their location and time of death. Though it does require a deep knowledge of the Imperial Japanese Army military structure to understand it and it stops mostly at the end of 1939. Another website you can use for Japanese historical records is the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records which has an English version. For Chinese historical materials from the perspective of the Nationalists, you can use the ahonline dot drnh dot gov dot tw and aa dot archives dot gov dot tw websites. Cent58 (talk) 08:04, 8 January 2025 (UTC)Reply
thanks @Cent58. if its not too much trouble, would you be able to take a look at japanese casualties in the snlf (naval marines) and the 3rd army division between october 27 and november 1 in the shanghai area? im interested in editing the sihang warehouse page, but the current japanese figure looks a bit suspicious to me. it would be much appreciated, thanks! Wahreit (talk) 18:17, 8 January 2025 (UTC)Reply
From 27 October until 1 November 1937, the SNLF suffered many wounded fighting in Zhabei, including 3 who would die of their wounds. Among them, one, warrant officer Tanaka Shiroku, incurred his injury near Sihang Warehouse. The 3rd division did not participate in the battle. Instead, the division suffered 60 combat deaths at the north bank of Suzhou River from 27 until 30 October and 288 combat deaths from 31 October until 1 November trying to cross the river. So it is true that there was only one combat death in the SNLF (the IJA did not participate) from the battle. Cent58 (talk) 03:47, 9 January 2025 (UTC)Reply
gotcha, appreciate the help. if you're free, would you also be able to find the casualty number for these units and dates? i'd like to update some of the pages with the info:
- ija + ijn forces between november 11 to december 14 (the nanjing campaign); i dont really trust benjamin lai's figure for the entire campaign overall
- 3rd division between September 4 and 6 (Baoshan)
The Imperial Japanese Army had a total of 21,898 combat deaths (excluding deaths from illness and accidents) in East China in 1937. Subtracting the losses of the IJA from 23 August until the fall of Shanghai on 12 November, there were a total of 3,906 combat deaths and over 600 non-combat deaths from 13 November until the end of December 1937 (nearly all should be before December 14).
The 3rd division suffered 75 combat deaths from 4 until 5 September 1937. However, the IJA 3rd division was facing the main force of the NRA 6th division and Independent 37th brigade outside Baoshan during that time period. It was only on the 6th of September that the 3rd division surrounded Baoshan after the 6th division and independent 37th brigade had to retreat due to excessive casualties. On the 6th, the 3rd division suffered 49 combat deaths, but the division was not only fighting the Baoshan defenders. A section of the division launched a sneak attack at the Qiujiang Wharf, fighting against the 366th regiment of the 61st division, the 342nd regiment of the 57th division, and a portion of the independent 20th brigade, and suffered 20-30 killed in action. So the amount of losses the 3rd division suffered to take the city of Baoshan itself was around two dozen killed, which is not surprising as they stormed the city with tanks and heavy artillery. Still, Yao Ziqing's 500-man battalion was recorded by the Japanese army as having fought bravely, with Colonel Nishihara praising their spirits in fighting against tanks with grenades.
The SNLF had a total of 276 combat deaths from 13 August until 23 August 1937. The SNLF definitely perform well against the elite of the NRA in the 10-day defensive operation. During the first offensive at Baji Bridge on August 14, the 88th division suffered more than a thousand casualties, including the death of brigade commander Huang Meixing, while the SNLF facing them had only 8 fatalities. On 21 August during the first Chinese tank assault in history, the 36th division failed to coordinate with the two tank companies attached to the division and suffered heavy casualties, with as many as 1,200 casualties, while the SNLF only suffered several dozen casualties (including 6 killed). The only battle where the NRA performed well in these ten days seems to be the attack on the Guangzhong Road on 16 August by the 88th division, where the SNLF suffered more than 200 casualties (including 83 killed) and at least 3 tanks were destroyed or damaged. Aside from that, the Chinese army could not break through the positions of the SNLF, even with stormtrooper tactics, and failed in their initial objective of driving the SNLF to sea. Cent58 (talk) 08:17, 9 January 2025 (UTC)Reply
Also forgot to add to the first point, the IJN from 13 November until 11 December 1937 had 44 combat deaths (4 SNLFs, 6 naval crew, and 34 from the IJNAF) along with 2 missing (presumed captured) from the IJNAF. One sailor was also killed in action on 16 December 1937 (according to Chinese source, there were three Chinese soldiers who tried to break out from Nanjing on that day in a raft but when they see the anchored Umikaze destroyer they decided to fire upon the destroyer, killing one of the crew with all three being killed soon after by returning fire). 4 SNLFs and 1 sailor also died in 1938 from wounds sustained during the battle of Shanghai. Cent58 (talk) 10:04, 9 January 2025 (UTC)Reply
appreciate the help. would you be interested in putting those numbers into the battle of nanjing page? i can't access zhihu myself so it would be a really nice addition to the page. Wahreit (talk) 20:30, 9 January 2025 (UTC)Reply
>During the first offensive at Baji Bridge on August 14, the 88th division suffered more than a thousand casualties, including the death of brigade commander Huang Meixing, while the SNLF facing them had only 8 fatalities
didn't huang meixings unit destroy dozens of japanese fortifications during his attack on bazi bridge?
didn't a few hundred snlf marine troops go into the british concession to surrender during the 36th divisions attack on huishan wharf? Vantage153 (talk) 09:00, 11 March 2025 (UTC)Reply
Huang Meixing's offensive at Guangzhong Road only resulted in the capture of a few strongholds. The 264th brigade might actually have been close to capturing one of the six main SNLF positions in that direction as the position was defended only by a platoon and in the initial assault more than 10 were already killed or wounded. However, Huang Meixing had placed the headquarters of the brigade at the front-line to obtain better information and boost the morale of his troops, and before they could make a breakthrough a mortar shell hit the headquarters, killing Huang Meixin and the chief of staff of the brigade. Thus, the offensive was called off. The attack on Bazi Bridge was also a failure, as the SNLF quickly sent in armored vehicles to stabilize the front.
The 400 casualties and SNLFs fleeing to the British concession were both claims made by the 36th division. The SNLF did not lose much troops or positions in the attack.
Theres also websites that say in the first day of Bazi Bridge assault the SNLF losses were 106 killed and 337 wounded. on the SNLF's 1st and 3rd brigade. Krips15 (talk) 14:38, 15 July 2025 (UTC)Reply
in the entire battle of shanghai, japanese sources claim the chinese soldiers killed in action as 67,000 in their source of 250,000 killed and wounded. you think this is accurate?
do you also think that IJA total combat casualties in shanghai was 90,000 or 100,000. since 3rd, 11th, 9th, 101st divisions alone suffered over 90% casualties. Krips15 (talk) 14:42, 15 July 2025 (UTC)Reply
on the chinese wikipedia says IJA casualties in the first year was 51,000 killed and 200,000 wounded, other than shanghai and nanjing, what other fronts would cause their casualties? Krips15 (talk) 14:44, 15 July 2025 (UTC)Reply
also was a problem the NRA had in the battle of shanghai that their troops had to cross long distances to reach the frontline so their frontline strength was usually at 350,000 - 400,000 against roughly 200,000 IJA 3rd, 11th, 9th, 101st, 13th, TMB etc? Krips15 (talk) 15:04, 15 July 2025 (UTC)Reply
1. The SNLF lost 106 men on August 15 and August 16 which many attributed to the battle on August 14. Lieutenant Takashi for example was killed on August 16, not on the 14th as some Chinese sources claimed.
2. According to incomplete statistics, the Chinese Army suffered 229,382 casualties in the battle of Shanghai. There are two figures for the specification of casualties. According to the National Congress of the Kuomintang, there were 9,073 officers and 105,500 soldiers killed in action and 9,225 officers and 105,584 soldiers wounded in action. According to the Military Commission of the Kuomintang, there were 3,823 officers and 72,637 soldiers killed in action and 7,646 officers and 145,276 soldiers wounded in action. For both figures it is unknown if the number of missing is included in the number of killed or just not included as many individual units’ battle report included the number of missing.
The second figure is suspect as the number of wounded officers is just the number of killed officers multiplied by two and the number of wounded soldiers is the number of killed soldiers multiplied by two then with the addition of two. This problem is similar in the other War Zones, as the First War Zone in the same source was reported to have suffered 2,303 officers and 43,755 soldiers killed and 4,605 officers and 87,508 soldiers wounded. The Second War Zone was reported to have suffered 1,326 officers and 25,194 soldiers killed and 2,652 officers and 50,389 soldiers wounded. Thus the first figure should be more accurate with a nearly 1:1 killed: wounded ratio, which is a common ratio for the Nationalist Chinese Army in many other major battles.
3. Japanese combat casualties in the battle of Shanghai is estimated to be at 80,000 with several tens of thousands more fallen ill.
4. The ‘51,220 killed and 204,880 wounded’ figure is the Chinese Army’s claim, not based on Japanese report. The IJA and IJN lost more than 25,000 men in Eastern China and nearly 10,000 in North China. Most of the casualties in North China were from the battle of Beiping-Tianjin, Operation Chahar, Beiping-Hankou and Tianjin-Pukou Railway Operations, and the battle of Taiyuan.
5. The frontline strength was actually much smaller. The Chinese Army did not deploy of their troops to the battlefield at once. Whenever one division had been exhausted after days of fighting, another division would take its place while it rested and reorganized. When that division was in a similar state another division would take its place, and so on. The Chinese Army would cycle between units throughout the battle so the total number of troops at the frontline did not exceed 200,000. Cent58 (talk) 03:22, 16 July 2025 (UTC)Reply
following up to ask for your help with a few , as i'd like to improve the battle of nanjing page again. would you be able to find the figures for these engagements?
battle casualties for the Japanese 10th Army (6th, 18th, 114th Divisions), and the opposing Sichuanese Divisions (23rd Group Army) between November 25 - November 30 near Guangde/Lake Tai.
losses for the Japanese 9th Division and the Chinese 74th Corps (51st Division) near the Chunhua defense line between December 4 - December 8
losses and remaining strengths for the 66th and 83th Corps of the Guangdong Army, the 36th Division and the overall Nanjing garrison after escaping Nanjing.
also a quick clarification for Baoshan, since the Japanese 3rd Division attacked on the 6th, which units attacked the city on september 4 and 5 (according to Harmsen's book).
The strength and losses of the Nanjing Garrison will be a long one so I'll tackle this first. Since the Chinese military was very disorganized in 1937, there is unfortunately no unified statistics for the army in Eastern China, so there is a lot of conflicting information regarding the units involved in Nanjing:
1. 2nd Army Corps (41st and 48th division): crossed the Yangtze river on the 12th of December, and thus is the unit most intact. The 41st and 48th divisions and the headquarters each had their own battles reports, totalling 3,966 killed and 1,112 wounded, with 11,851 survivors.
3. 71st Corps (87th division): only 300 or 500 troops managed to breakout from Nanjing as division commander Wang Jingjiu chose to flee the city alongside Tang Shengzhi on 12 December 1937 without informing his men of the retreat order. Thus, the division continued fighting on the 13th when most of the other units were in the process of breaking out or had already crossed the Yangtze River.
4. 72nd Corps (88th division): there's many different statistics for the number of escapees:
a. Yu Jishi reported on 21 December 1937 that he had taken in 1,573 officers and soldiers from the 88th division.
b. According to the memoir of staff officer Lu Weisan, brigade commanders Liao Lingqi and Wu Qiujian each led nearly a thousand troops (most of whom are wounded) to cross the river in 300 sailboats from the division's supply battalion.
c. According to division commander Sun Yuanliang himself, he gathered more than 600 scattered troops from his headquarters and arrived at Wuhan in late March 1938.
5. 74th Corps (51st and 58th division): Before the fall of the city, corps commander Yu Jishi had asked his cousin Yu Feipeng, the Minister of Transportation, for two steamboats, which he would use to evacuate his men from Nanjing. According to his own report on 21 December 1937, the 51st division had 1,627 officers, soldiers, and labourers while the 58th division had 1,142 officers, soldiers, and labourers. Including stragglers that would break out of the city in 1938, the army accommodated a total of 5,000 troops. The 51st division had its own battle report, with 4,070 killed and 3,785 wounded.
6. 78th Corps (36th division): the 78th Corps actually had a detailed battle report in 1937. According to the report on 30th December 1937, the 78th corps suffered 228 killed, 285 wounded, and 6,673 missing in Nanjing (most of the killed or wounded is from the 2nd supplementary regiment under the 78th corps in the battle of Dahu Mountain), with 4,937 survivors. Interestingly, in the statistical table of the 78th army for the Shanghai-Nanjing Campaign, the corps had 5,964 missing in 1937, so presumably many soldiers managed to break out from Nanjing in 1938.
7. Guangdong Army (66th and 83rd corps): was the only unit (excluding the 156th division of the 83rd corps which were reassigned to assist the 88th division in the Guanghua Gate and chose to try to cross the river alongside most of the Central Army) to follow Tang Shengzhi's original retreat plan and tried to break out through the Taiping Gate (joined by the 3rd brigade of the Training Corps). Unfortunately, they were dispersed after making contact with Japanese troops and a large portion were lost, with the Japanese army claiming 7,200 prisoners while only suffering 60 combat deaths. By the 31st of December, the two corps had a total of about 3,000 troops (including more than 1,300 from the 66th corps).
8. Training Corps: When the retreat order was given, only a portion of the 1st and 2nd brigades received the order, with the rest continuing to fight until the 13th of December. Those who received the order tried to cross the Yangtze river through the Yijiang Gate along with most of the Central Army, but was fired upon by machine guns from a battalion of the 36th division which had not known about the retreat order and still followed orders to shoot anyone trying to escape. During the chaos, the commander of the 2nd regiment Xie Chengrui was trampled to death. When they tried to cross the river, the Eleventh Fleet of the IJN arrived and fired upon the men in the water. At the same time, two regiments of the 16th division also fired upon the retreating soldiers, resulting in lots of losses (the IJA and IJN claimed to have killed a total of 18,000 soldiers trying to cross the river). The deputy commander of the Training Corps mentioned in his memoir that there were more than 4,000 survivors from the Training Corps, while other sources put the number of survivors at only 1,000 (the 1st brigade suffered the most losses as the main force did not know about the retreat order).
9. 103rd division of the Guizhou Army and the 112th division of the Northeast Army: the 103rd division had only 500 soldiers who managed to cross the river while the 112th division had only 60 (the division with the highest casualty rate).
10. Gendarmerie Military Police: had a total of 5,452 troops, of whom 794 were killed, 56 were wounded, 2,184 went missing, and 2,418 escaped.
11. Regular Police: had 6,000 troops, of which 840 escaped and the rest presumed dead.
12. Tank Corps: all tanks destroyed or captured, most of the personnel killed or went missing.
13. Yangtze River Fortress (including crew members of the Hai Qi cruiser): two-thirds of the troops missing, with only 50 rifles recovered. Cent58 (talk) 14:20, 3 February 2025 (UTC)Reply
The battle for the Baoshan city itself is just on the 6th of September. From the 4th until the 5th of September, the 68th infantry regiment of the IJA 3rd division was fighting against the NRA 6th division and Independent 37th brigade at villages outside Baoshan (assisted by the Amaya detachment of the 11th division on the 5th of September). Yao Ziqing's battalion inside Baoshan did suffer losses in these two days, but those were from artillery and air strikes in preparation for the assault once the flanks were secured. It was only on the 6th of September after forcing all NRA forces at the peripherals of the city to retreat that the 68th infantry regiment stormed the city using the 1st battalion supported by artillery while tanks blocked the city gates. Yao Ziqing's battalion did not engage with Japanese infantry on the 4th and 5th of September. Cent58 (talk) 13:07, 6 February 2025 (UTC)Reply
appreciate the help and edits @Cent58. a final question, what is (in your opinion) the most authoritative death toll of the second sino-japanese war overall (military and civilian)? i'm inclined to believe 12,000,000 Chinese civilians and 3,000,000 soldiers died, while 500,000 Japanese soldiers and 80,000 civilians (Manchuria) died, but i'd love your perspective. Wahreit (talk) 14:36, 10 February 2025 (UTC)Reply
The Japanese Demobilization Bureau on 1977 reported 465.700 deaths in China. This is an increase from the 1964 report which put deaths at 455.700. The reason for the increase is partly because the 1977 report include Japanese civilians in China, while the 1964 one only included deaths in the Japanese armed forces (including from the Navy). Additionally, there were 245,400 deaths of Japanese soldiers and civilians in Northeast China (including Manchuria) which were considered as separate from the rest of China. This number includes deaths in the battle of Khalkhin Gol and most of the deaths were after the war. So total deaths of Japanese soldiers and civilians in China is at around 700,000.
By my own estimate, there is around 2 million combat deaths and presumed dead after being reported missing for the National Revolutionary Army and other units aligned with the Nationalists (including military police units, air defense personnel, security forces, guerilla columns, and civilian volunteers such as local militias and self-defense units). There were also non-combat deaths, which is harder to estimate. Using two methods (one from finding the ratio of desertions, dismissals, and deaths from illnesses to estimate how many among the 10,322,934 non-combat losses were deaths from illnesses and another from using some units’ monthly report of deaths from illnesses to estimate it for the total army), I estimate non-combat deaths to range between 1 million and 3 million, with 2 million being the number I’m most comfortable with.
Additionally, there are people who died in the conscription system in the forced marches before they could be recruited into the army. There is no complete statistics, but the Chinese Red Cross estimated there were 14 million deaths. This number seems to be too high and is also the same number of people conscripted into the army during the war, but even more conservative estimates put the total deaths at over 1 million.
The Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, and South China guerillas aligned with the CPC suffered 160,603 killed, 290,467 wounded, 45,989 captured, and 87,208 missing from July 1937 until August 1945 according to postwar announcement, which should be relatively accurate since their armies do not have a problem of disorganization as the Nationalists. The Qiongya Column also had 681 killed, 676 wounded, and 9 captured fighting against the Japanese armed forces though no records on casualties fighting the puppet army. The Northeast Anti-Japanese Allied Forces had less than 9,000 KIAs from 1932 until 1941 fighting against Japanese and puppet troops. I believe that the above number of losses for the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army only included the losses of the regular soldiers of the army, and do not include militias and counties’ self-defense teams under the two armies.
The statistics of deaths from the Nationalist and Communist armies only include losses fighting the Japanese armed forces and puppet soldiers, and do not include the losses fighting each other or against local bandits. The New Fourth Army alone claimed to have fought against ‘stubborn’ troops 3,212 times from March 1940 until June 1945 (excluding November and December 1940 and also not including the New Fourth Army incident in January 1941) and suffered 30,544 casualties while claiming to have 'annihilated' 143,320 Nationalist soldiers. The Eighth Route Army and the South China guerillas also had a lot of fighting against 'stubborn' troops and while the Qiongya Column and the Wang Huan’s Nationalist guerilla unit in Hainan initially had good cooperation, by 1940 the relationship had deteriorated to the point of fighting each other until the Nationalist unit had to evacuate from Hainan. The Qiongya Column recorded fighting against 'stubborn' troops 724 times (compared to 2,089 times against the Japanese armed forces and 140 times against puppet troops) and claimed to have killed 2,047 'stubborn' troops, wounded 1,953, and captured 607 while suffering 686 killed, 1,016 wounded, and 1 captured. So total casualties in these frictions should be in the hundreds of thousands.
The losses of the puppet army are unknown. Neither the Japanese nor the puppet government keep a detailed report of losses of the army. The only source we can use is the Nationalist and Communist claims, which are not reliable.
During the Chinese Civil War both the Nationalists and Communists investigated the number of civilian casualties from areas under their control. The Nationalists put their civilian losses at 4,397,504 killed, 4,737,065 wounded, and 2,441,885 missing. The Communists put their civilian losses at 3,176,123 killed, 2,963,582 wounded, and 2,760,227 captured. The total losses combining both reports is 7,573,627 killed, 7,700,647 wounded, and 5,202,112 missing or captured. Since this not a unified statistics it is not one hundred percent reliable, there might be some overlap but there might also be some unreported casualties as many areas were captured or lost in the civil war while they were still counting the losses.
There is also the estimate of casualties by historian Bian Xiuyue for the total losses of China. From his study (subtracting his estimate of casualties of the Nationalist Army, Communist Army, various ministries under the Nationalist government, puppet soldiers, Taiwanese soldiers, and conscripts), there were a total of 14,485,541 direct civilian deaths (including 253,000 overseas Chinese), 3 million indirect civilian deaths (Henan famine), and 18,882 missing (not including those who are confirmed to have been captured). He himself noted that his estimate came from various different sources so the number might not add up. Cent58 (talk) 13:04, 11 March 2025 (UTC)Reply
I think by the end of 1938 alone Japanese combat casualties exceeded 400,000 and approached 500,000. They suffered near 200,000 combat casualties by the end of 1937 alone (100,000 in shanghai alone)
and in 1938: probably 70,000 in xuzhou and 140,000 in wuhan.
and chinese combat casualties could amount to 1 million by 1938.
At the end of the day, Japans superior medical support helped recover their wounded from dying. But weren't most japanese civilians safe from any sort of violence during the war in china. the 700,000 japanese soldiers killed in action seems more believable. Vantage153 (talk) 07:48, 13 March 2025 (UTC)Reply
on the chinese wikipedia for the war of resistance also has this paragraph: 另根据日本战后研究,在华日军作战阵亡或因重伤残废无法再度返回战场:1937年至少5.1万人,1938年至少8.9万人,1939年至少8.2万人,1940年至少4.2万人,1941年至少4.1万。
added them together the KIA would be 306,000 in the first 4 years, according to postwar japanese research. but of course, the second sino japanese war is a very vague topic in general. i just hope that more and more information can get revealed. Vantage153 (talk) 08:37, 13 March 2025 (UTC)Reply
According to the Official Gazette, there were 34,131 deaths (including 31,364 combat deaths) in the IJA and Kwantung Army in China and Manchuria and more than 800 combat deaths in the IJN in 1937. In 1938, there were 45,754 deaths (including 34,127 combat deaths) for the IJA and Kwantung Army. In 1939, there were 30,717 deaths (including 20,365 combat deaths) from the IJA and Kwantung Army (excluding from the battle of Khalkhin Gol). There might be some missing data (especially in 1939) but it is a very reliable statistics for Japanese army losses in these three years.
The North China Front Army and Central China Expeditionary Force had nearly 7,000 combat deaths from 26 January until 6 June 1938, so total combat casualties should be closer to 30,000. 140,000 casualties in the battle of Wuhan might be true if it includes non-combat casualties. The 11th army and 2nd army of the IJA had about 16,000 deaths during the battle of Wuhan, of which about 75% are combat deaths. Total combat casualties should be at around 40,000-50,000.
According to the Nationalist post-war investigation of their army's losses, the NRA suffered 881,349 casualties in 1937 and 517,121 casualties in 1938. While the former included losses from the invasion of Manchuria, 1932 battle of Shanghai, and defense of the Great Wall, the two statistics do not include losses in guerilla fighting, which by my estimate could reach 100,000 or more. Including the losses of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army, the total casualties of the Chinese armed forces might be as high as 1.5 million by the end of 1938.
A large portion of the 245,400 Japanese who died in Northeast China are civilians. After the invasion of Manchuria by the Red Army, many Japanese civilians were also sent to Siberia with Kwantung Army POWs. Only about 60,000 of the deaths in Northeast China were soldiers, most of the rest were civilians who died in Soviet camps after the war. If we're strictly speaking combat deaths (excluding deaths from illnesses, accidents, and other non-battlefield related causes and excluding deaths after the war), about 250,000-300,000 Japanese soldiers were killed in action in China.
That text states that those were soldiers who were killed in action, crippled, or severely wounded enough that they could not return to the battlefield. Those are not just combat deaths. Cent58 (talk) 11:01, 13 March 2025 (UTC)Reply
The figures 51k in 1937, 89k in 1938, 82k in 1939, 42k in 1940 and 41k in 1941 are still accurate for KIA, crippled, and severely wounded added together right? Krips15 (talk) 16:24, 20 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
The author of the cited book claim to have sourced his information from Japanese historical materials though I could not verify the authenticity of these specific figures. Cent58 (talk) 03:14, 21 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
Also During the Battle of Wuhan 6th Division's casualties reported from August to October was 9585 not counting earlier from June to July?
And what about 9th Division's casualties, was the reported 3997 casualties also like the 6th divisions? only reported from eg August to October and not covering their casualties reported in the entire duration of the campaign?
9,585 is the casualties of the 6th Division in 1937 and 1938. No Japanese division were reported to have suffered that many combat casualties in the battle of Wuhan, not even the 106th Division. The reported casualties of the 9th Division covered the whole battle of Wuhan. The division participated in the battle of Wuhan in August so it's casualties in June and July (primarily against the Third War Zone) were not included. The 27th Division suffered 708 killed and 2,034 wounded and the Hada Task Force suffered 733 killed and 2,322 wounded in the battle of Wuhan. Cent58 (talk) 03:44, 21 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
40,417 killed came from a later investigation in 1951,
while the investigation that gave the conclusion to ~20k KIA and 10k died of disease came in 1946, so the 40k killed figure produced by the 1951 investigation seems to make alot more sense and corrects 1946. Krips15 (talk) 02:06, 12 May 2026 (UTC)Reply
adachi says sometimes the khalkin gol battle is sometimes counted as a battle outside Manchuria according to Japanese statistics. Krips15 (talk) 02:08, 12 May 2026 (UTC)Reply
Yes, there were many omissions in the Official Gazette for 1939. The 1951 investigation from Japanese Demobilization Bureau is the more accurate one. Cent58 (talk) 12:51, 19 May 2026 (UTC)Reply
the part where i do find suspicious in the 1951 investigation is their figure for 1937-38. They gave only some 14,778 crippled in combat figure for their 63k KIA figure, i find this suspicious because the other years had a more higher number of crippled from combat figure,
shouldn't the crippled from combat figure be much higher, relative to the significantly higher number of KIA for 1937-38? Krips15 (talk) 03:23, 28 May 2026 (UTC)Reply
some people are saying the 1951 investigation still has alot of statistical errors despite being much more accurate than earlier figures aswell, like Emperorpenguin20160923 who wrote this phrase:
rough translation (it is also considered that the statistics from the First Demobilization Bureau may contain statistical errors, resulting in a large number of omissions.)
so i'd like to hear his reasoning to why he considers the 1951 investigation in general contains significant statistical errors Krips15 (talk) 03:48, 28 May 2026 (UTC)Reply
the 1937-1938 statistics from the Japanese Demobilization Bureau in 1951 had more than 10,000 omissions though more from non-combat deaths than combat deaths. The 1940-1941 statistics also had several thousands omissions mostly from non-combat deaths. Cent58 (talk) 10:24, 28 May 2026 (UTC)Reply
what about their 1937-38 figure for crippled soldiers, since like i said it only stated some 14,778 soldiers were crippled from combat (戦闘に起因する能力喪失者). which seems low compared to the other years (1939, 1940, 1941) relative to the much higher number of KIA for 37-38.
I'm not sure how the Japanese Army classified "crippled from combat wounds". Are they considered separate than wounded in action? The 1941 figure had nearly as many soldiers crippled from combat wounds as wounded in action which seems unlikely. So I am not really sure if I can answer your question there. Cent58 (talk) 05:37, 29 May 2026 (UTC)Reply
Regarding the number of former Japanese Army soldiers and civilian employees killed in action (including deaths resulting from combat) and wounded during the Sino-Japanese War (from July 7, 1937 to December 7, 1941) June 2, 1951 Demobilization Bureau The above matter is reported as follows:
Killed in action due to direct combat: 132,584
Deaths from illness resulting from combat: 48,394
Total: 180,978
Wounded in action due to direct combat: 323,733
Persons rendered incapacitated due to combat: 103,867
Total: 427,600
Grand total: 608,578
The yearly breakdown of these figures is as shown in the attached table. "Notes" (1) These figures are based on reports made by local units to the Army Ministry Medical Bureau during the Sino-Japanese War. (2) These figures include losses in the Manchurian region during the same period.
That's interesting, but I still find it hard to believe that nearly half of the wounded in 1941 was crippled as a result. The Chinese Army's firepower had not improved by this time and most of the wounds caused should not be crippling. Cent58 (talk) 02:00, 31 May 2026 (UTC)Reply
That's total deaths including approximately half who died from illness. Nearly 59,000 IJA troops died in 1940 and 1941 (pre-Pearl Harbor) in China, Manchuria, French Indochina, and Japan including nearly half who died from illness or accidents. Cent58 (talk) 03:13, 25 April 2026 (UTC)Reply
"A large portion of the 245,400 Japanese who died in Northeast China are civilians. After the invasion of Manchuria by the Red Army, many Japanese civilians were also sent to Siberia with Kwantung Army POWs. Only about 60,000 of the deaths in Northeast China were soldiers, most of the rest were civilians who died in Soviet camps after the war. If we're strictly speaking combat deaths (excluding deaths from illnesses, accidents, and other non-battlefield related causes and excluding deaths after the war), about 250,000-300,000 Japanese soldiers were killed in action in China.
That text states that those were soldiers who were killed in action, crippled, or severely wounded enough that they could not return to the battlefield. Those are not just combat deaths. Cent58 (talk) 11:01, 13 March 2025 (UTC)"
Just to be clear, when you said this, you meant 250 thousand to 300 thousand killed in action combat deaths fighting the nationalists inside the great wall right? Krips15 (talk) 06:18, 27 June 2026 (UTC)Reply
Approximately 250,000 killed against Nationalist and Nationalist-aligned forces in China, probably 10,000 or more killed against Nationalist Chinese troops in Burma, and several tens of thousands killed against Communist and Communist-aligned forces in China. Cent58 (talk) 08:49, 27 June 2026 (UTC)Reply
so with this: would you say they suffered a higher end of 300 thousand directly killed in action fighting chinese forces from 1937-45? Krips15 (talk) 09:04, 27 June 2026 (UTC)Reply
@Vantage153 based on my readings of western sources, the Japanese suffered over 100,000 combat casualties in 1937 (Paine) with 60,000-70,000 lost in shanghai, of which over 18,000 were KIA. the Japanese lost some 20,000 KIA in the Xuzhou Campaign including 8,000 dead at Taierzhuang, and anywhere between 35,000 (Richard Frank, who cites one of the Japanese scholars in Battle of China) and 100,000 (Williamson & Levine) combat casualties in the Wuhan Campaign.
the Chinese Army suffered 367,000 combat casualties in 1937 (Fenby) mainly in the Shanghai-Nanjing and Taiyuan campaigns, and another 735,000 in 1938 (also Fenby), mainly in the Xuzhou and Wuhan campaigns. it is probable that chinese combat casualties exceeded 1 million by the end of 1938, of which the vast majority were Nationalists.
for total Japanese deaths, the most common figures in Western literature are 450,000-480,000 Japanese KIA, and twice that number wounded at around 920,000. another figure I've seen is 388,000 Japanese KIA of which 185,000 were killed before Pearl Harbor, and I've also seen that 700,000 number thrown around.
for Chinese casualties, i see the number 3,000,000 thrown around a lot, but many sources differ if this represents total casualties or just deaths. what seems the most reliable is 1.3M-1.5M Nationalist KIA, 1.M Nationalist wounded, and another 1M-2M Nationalist soldiers dead from disease, forced conscription, and wounds. Communist casualties do not exceed 500,000 in any numbers I see, of which the death toll was 144,000 KIA by 1944.
@Cent58 any of your thoughts are appreciated. also, would you mind dropping these figures if you're interested?
1. the most reliable size of the Nanjing Capital Garrison as of the 1937 Battle. Sun Zhawei's estimate of 150,000 seems way to high, and im more inclined to lean for askew's estimate of 75,000-80,000, although Hata's figure of 100,000 is also plausible. ill update the nanjing battle page asap.
2. battle casualties for the X Corps against the 23rd Group Army in late November around Lake Tai.
3. battle casualties of the SEF against the Jiangyin River Garrison in late November, and the 74th Corps at Chunhua in early December.
4. i know this one is contentious, but in your opinion what is the most verifiable death toll of the Nanjing Massacre? i personally find wakabayashi's book to be the most fair (50,000 in the city walls in December, 100,000+ for the city and surrounding countryside for four months), but i'd like your thoughts.
Let's breakdown each unit in the battle of Nanjing, starting from the Central Army. Before the battle of Nanjing, the Ministry of Military and Political Affairs planned to transfer 44 supplementary battalions, 4 supplementary regiments, and 1 Jiangxi security regiment totaling 40,200 men to bring the Central Army units up to strength.
According to the supplementary plan, the 36th division was expected to receive 5,200 troops. According to its own detailed battle report, the 78th Corps (36th division) had 5,071 troops after reaching Nanjing by November 20. The Corps received 1,400 troops right after arriving at the city and then received an additional 5,130 troops (and perhaps some more unreported additions), bringing the Corps up to 11,987 troops.
According to the supplementary plan, the 88th division was expected to receive 6,300 troops. However, according to Gu Zhutong's telegram on 2 February 1938, division commander Sun Yuanliang reported that his division had 12,000 troops participating in the battle, of which 8,000 were new recruits.
The 87th division was also supposed to receive the same amount of new recruits as the 88th division, which would put its strength at over 10,000 troops. The division should however have similar strength as the 36th and 88th divisions of 12,000 troops.
The Training Corps and 74th Corps were supposed to receive 22,400 troops. The 74th Corps had nearly 20,000 troops at the start of the war and according to various battle reports by my count suffered as many as 10,000 casualties. The corps received recruits from a security regiment plus another 1,000 troops from the 140th division during the battle. The Training Corps had 13,517 troops in 3 infantry regiments before the war. The 2nd infantry regiment fought in Shanghai at the start of the war followed by the 1st and 3rd infantry regiments in early November. During the battle the Training Corps suffered 5,000 casualties (including more than 3,000 casualties from the two newly-arrived regiments during the battle along the Suzhou River). Before the battle of Nanjing, the Training Corps was upgraded from 3 infantry regiments to 9 infantry regiments (2 of the regiments were sent to receive recruits in Hunan and Jiangxi so only 7 infantry regiments participated in the battle of Nanjing), 1 cavalry regiment, 1 artillery regiment, 1 engineer regiment, 1 baggage regiment, and 1 special forces battalion. The total strength of the two units after receiving the new recruits should at around 39,000 troops.
The Central Army should have been supplemented to full strength before the start of the battle, so total strength for the 5 divisions and Training Corps is at around 75,000. For the rest of the units:
66th Corps: the 159th and 160th divisions had more than 9,000 troops each. During the 66th Corps' participation in the battles for Liujiahang and Gujiazhai from 17 September until 1 October 1937, the 159th division suffered 5,164 casualties, the 160th division suffered 1,954 casualties, the training brigade of the Corps suffered 3,003 casualties, and the artillery and engineer battalions of the Corps suffered 29 casualties. The training brigade suffered too many casualties and the survivors were integrated into the 160th division. In October, the 159th and 160th divisions took part in the battle for Guangfu and suffered heavy casualties. On October 29, the corps received 3,234 troops from six supplementary battalions which should be to cover the losses in the battle for Guangfu. In November, the two divisions retreat from the Shanghai battlefield. At the night of November 11, the 13th regiment of the IJA 6th division block the retreat path of the 160th division. Due to poor visibility, the division marched right into the firing line of the Japanese unit and suffered heavy casualties. The 159th division also suffered hundreds of casualties during the retreat. Overall, total casualties of the 159th division is estimated at more than 6,000, and the 160th division should have suffered similar number of casualties. The total strength of the 66th corps in the battle for Nanjing is estimated to be at approximately 13,000.
The 154th division participated at the end of the battle of Shanghai, and the 156th division only participated in the retreat phase. There is not much information regarding the total strength of the 83rd Corps before the battle of Shanghai and what the losses were before Nanjing. Theoretically, the divisions of the 83rd corps should have similar strength with the divisions of the 66th corps which would put total strength of the 83rd corps at approximately 20,000. Yu Hanmou reported on 12th March 1938 that the two corps had a shortfall of more than 30,000 troops from their establishment strength. By this point the 66th corps had nearly 8,000 troops and the 83rd corps had at least 3,000 troops, so the 20,000 troops from the 83rd corps should be reliable. The casualties of the 83rd corps during the retreat should not be that great. I would put the strength of the 83rd corps in the battle of Nanjing at approximately 15,000 troops.
The 103rd and 112th divisions took part in the battle of Jiangyin. The 103rd division lost more than half of its men during the battle. By the time the division reached Nanjing, there were only 1,000 troops left. According to its own detailed battle report, the 112th division suffered more than 700 casualties. According to the political department of the division, the unit had more 5,000 troops before the battle. According to brigade commander Wan Yi, there were still more than 4,000 troops after reaching Nanjing. The total number for the two divisions is more than 5,000.
The 2nd army corps (41st and 48th divisions) was the only army unit that had not taken part in any fighting and was still at its full strength of 18,000 at the start of the battle.
The Nanjing Gendarmerie had 5,452 men and there were also more than 6,000 regular police who participated in the battle.
The Zhenjiang and Jiangning Fortresses had a total of more than 2,000 troops (including a portion of the 3rd and 4th security regiments of Jiangsu Province, a garrison battalion, a battalion of the 8th artillery regiment, a battalion of the 10th artillery regiment, an anti-air team, a communications battalion, and a special forces platoon).
The 3rd (tank) company of the Armored Corps had nearly 100 troops.
There was also a guard battalion from the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum which might have taken part in the fighting.
From 27 until 30 November, about 70 soldiers of the X Corps were killed in action fighting the 23rd Army Group in the battle of Lake Tai. The 18th divisions suffered an additional 100 casualties (including 30 killed) fighting the 23rd Army Group from 4 until 6 December.
During the battle of Jiangyin from 26 November until 3 December, 129 soldiers of the 13th division was killed in action (including 32 who were killed by bombs from friendly aircraft on December 2 as the bombers did not know the fort had been captured by then).
The 36th infantry regiment of the 9th division was the unit which fought against the 51st division in Chunhua Town. According to its battle history, the regiment suffered 257 killed and 546 wounded in the battle of Nanjing, during which the regiment fought at Chunhua Town and Guanghua Gate. Based on the battle descriptions, the unit might have suffered more casualties at Guanghua Gate. Moreover, in the battle of Guanghua Gate a battalion commander was killed while in Chunhua Town a company commander was killed.
I estimate massacre victims among POWs to be at around 30,000-50,000 based on Chinese and Japanese materials (the lower figure is assuming many of the Chinese soldiers killed in Japanese reports are civilians). Unfortunately, civilian losses are harder to estimate as the IJA and IJN mostly don't record them, and the Chinese claims have a lot of issues, so I'll have to defer to Wakabayashi's study for that. Cent58 (talk) 08:28, 14 March 2025 (UTC)Reply
The 367,362 casualties reported by the Ministry of Military and Political Affairs is a very dubious figure considered how intense 1937 was. Some generals in their memoirs claim that this number is only until the end of the battle of Shanghai and does not included losses in Nanjing. In North China, there was the the battle of Beiping-Tianjin, with about 15,000 casualties, Operation Chahar, with 50,269 casualties, battle of Taiyuan, with 129,737 casualties, and the Beiping-Hankou and the Tianjin-Pukou Railway Operations, both totaling more than 75,000 casualties. Including the battles in Central China, the total casualties might be as many as twice as the original report. Additionally, more than 10,000 security and army personnel surrendered to the Japanese Army in Beiping and Tianjin that were not included in the 15,000 casualties.
The other years with doubtful casualties are the 673,368 casualties (much more than expected) in 1940, and 210,734 (too few) in 1944.
The 446,740 casualties in the 'Other Communist estimates' section in the Second Sino-Japanese War page is the casualties from July 1937 until March 1945 (excluding losses of the South China guerillas before 1943). Moreover, as the statistical table of Rummel's book noted, this is only the number of killed or wounded. Including the number of missing and captured until August 1945, the total casualties is 584,267 like in the 'Official Communist data'. If the casualties in September and October 1945 fighting the Japanese army is included, the total casualties is 610,588. Cent58 (talk) 09:30, 14 March 2025 (UTC)Reply
in Xuzhou NRA casualties was 219,678 killed, wounded, or missing, you guys have the source for the figures of how many were killed, and how many were wounded? etc Krips15 (talk) 06:54, 21 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
85,324 killed, 106,387 wounded, and 27,968 missing. This statistic of casualties however does not necessarily represent the actual losses of each participating units. Some problem I've seen for example are:
Adding up the casualties of each unit in the statistical table, it seems that as 10,000 of the reported missing were put as wounded in the final figure.
Most of the units did not leave behind detailed battle reports and a lot of the units' strength and casualties were approximate figures. For example, the 132nd and 140th Divisions each suffered 2,030 killed, 2,070 wounded, and 2,040 missing out of 9,007 troops. The 139th Division suffered 4,060 killed, 4,140 wounded, and 4,080 missing out of 9,007 troops, etc
Some of the units' casualties were based on only a portion of the unit. For example, the 20th Corps consisted of four divisions, of which only the 89th Division had a known detailed battle report at that time. The casualties of the corps were put as four times the casualties of the 89th Division. Similarly, only the detailed battle report of the 199th Division among the three divisions of the 26th Group Army was available. The casualties of the group army included is the casualties of the 199th Division times three.
Included in the statistics were the casualties of the 3rd Group Army in the Yellow River crossing operation in late December 1937 and the casualties of the 27th Group Army in the battle at Chao County and Huaining in June 1938.
The casualties of the 40th Army in the battle of Pei County in May 1938 were not included even though the statistic of its casualties was known.
The casualties of various peace preservation and guerilla units were not included.
20,000 is not based on any Japanese source. The number of Japanese troops of the Second Army and the Central China Expeditionary Force killed in action or died from combat wounds in the battle of Xuzhou in a broad sense (from the battle of the Huai River on January 26 to the end of the pursuit from Xuzhou on June 5) is approximately one-third that figure. The number of wounded is estimated at three times the number of killed, so an estimated total of 25,000 casualties. Cent58 (talk) 09:01, 21 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
I checked over the Chinese Wikipedia for the battle of Xuzhou,
it said that the North China Area Army took some 35,086 casualties from February to May, most of them of course were from the battle of Xuzhou.
and the Central China Expeditionary Force which was replenished its casualties from Shanghai and Nanjing in January:
have reported in May 31st that
3rd Division was understaffed by 4081 personnel,
6th Division understaffed by 1495 personnel,
9th Division understaffed by 3621 personnel,
101st Division understaffed by 1314 personnel and
13th division understaffed by 1923 personnel.
don't know if this means that the understaffed would mean those personnel were KIA or severely wounded.
It ends by saying Japanese casualties were likely well over tens of thousands.
(rough translation)
日军在徐州会战中没有达到歼灭国军主力进而迫使国民政府投降的目的,自身亦受到较大伤亡,日军华北方面军在1938年2月至5月伤亡达35,086人,绝大部分是在徐州会战中伤亡的;日军华中派遣军伤亡根据日军在5月31日制作的统计图表,日军华中派遣军下辖之第3师团定员不足额4,081人、第6师团定员不足额1,495人、第9师团定员不足额3,621人、第101师团定员不足额1,314人、第13师团定员不足额1,923人,考量到华中派遣军下辖单位在1月中旬发起攻击前就已经接收大量补充人员补满先前在淞沪战役期间阵亡与伤重后送造成的缺额(轻伤现地住院者应不计算在内),这很显然是在徐州会战期间战死与重伤后送回国所造成的大量缺额(轻伤现地住院者应不计算在内),若再考量日军在徐州会战期间所接受的人员补充,华中派遣军于徐州会战所承受的伤亡必然十分惨重。将日军华北方面军与华中派遣军伤亡合计起来,整个徐州会战中日军死伤人数肯定是数以万计。 Krips15 (talk) 09:49, 21 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
You're forgetting about the Henan battlefield in which the 14th division alone suffered 6,400 casualties. The Shanxi battlefield was also very active during this period, with 700 troops of the North China Area Army killed or died from combat wounds in February alone. From March to June the 20th Division suffered 3,615 combat casualties and the 109th Division also suffered considerable casualties during this period. Cent58 (talk) 11:06, 21 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
Yes, thats why I said *most of them likely from xuzhou, I know that there was fighting elsewhere in North China, not just in Xuzhou Krips15 (talk) 11:24, 21 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
Most of the above-mentioned Japanese divisions had suffered heavy casualties in 1937 and were not guaranteed to have been fully replenished. Even the 5th and 10th Divisions which were front-line combat units in the battle of Xuzhou were replenished to 90% of their authorized strength. The 3rd, 6th, and 101st Divisions were not the main participating troops of the Central China Expeditionary Force for the battle of Xuzhou and each lost than 100 troops killed in action. Cent58 (talk) 11:32, 21 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
Frank Dorn was an American military officer stationed in China at the time. His source for Japanese losses were not based on Japanese data but likely came from Chinese claims. In fact the 20,000 Japanese troops killed that he claimed were only for the Japanese campaign towards Xuzhou starting from mid-April. He also claimed that there were 16,000 bodies abandoned by the Japanese Army in Taierzhuang, so his figure for Japanese losses is not trustworthy. Cent58 (talk) 09:13, 22 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
is the record of captured Japanese equipment by the CNRA after the victory of Taierzhuang also accurate, like ~10,000 rifles, and the captured machine guns, artillery and tanks accurate? Krips15 (talk) 11:26, 22 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
No, that's a propaganda claim used to boost the 'Great Victory of Taierzhuang'. According to 'History of the Anti-Japanese War', the 20th Corps reported the capture of 378 rifles and machine guns and 5 grenade dischargers and the 2nd Group Army only reported the capture of 'a large of number of weapons, equipment, and materials'. Cent58 (talk) 12:28, 22 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
From the start of the battle of Huai River to the Xuzhou offensive, the 9th and 13th Divisions lost a total of approximately 1,300 troops killed in action or died from combat wounds. Cent58 (talk) 09:27, 22 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
Also during the year 1940, what was the reasoning for it being the "NRA's bloodiest year" with over 300,000 being reported as KIA?
would the 6044 additional soldiers the 3rd Division recieved in July 1940 after Zaoyi give an rough estimate to the exact Killed in Action the 3rd Division took in that battle? would that mean majority of those supplementary troops it received be for KIA casualties? Krips15 (talk) 11:18, 7 February 2026 (UTC)Reply
No Japanese division lost that much troops in a single battle for the entire Second Sino-Japanese War. The 3rd Division suffered approximately 500 killed in action or died from combat wounds in the battle of Zaoyang-Yichang from May 1 to July 10, 1940. Cent58 (talk) 13:43, 7 February 2026 (UTC)Reply
Considering that the statistics of casualties were compiled year by year, I assume that the casualties of the whole 1939 Winter Offensive were included in the 1940 year. 1940 was a bloody year for the Chinese Army, but its casualties should not exceeded casualties in 1937, 1938, or 1939. Cent58 (talk) 13:39, 7 February 2026 (UTC)Reply
Also if you're comparing the number of troops killed in action, the missing should also be included at least partly. While some might have deserted, many more were probably killed or captured. The 27th Group Army for example believed that three-fourth of its missing troops were killed in action, which were not factored in in the final calculus. Cent58 (talk) 09:04, 21 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
Latest comment: 7 months ago30 comments5 people in discussion
Hello, I appreciate the new information you've added to many articles. However as a user outside of China I'm unable to access Zhihu. If it's not too much work, could you please change the links to redirect to archived versions of the pages that users outsider of China can easily access? I'm particularly interested in reading the articles on the Shanghai losses.
Sorry! I'll work on it though the archiving will take a while. I'll start on the Zhihu articles for the battle of Shanghai first. Cent58 (talk) 03:49, 9 January 2025 (UTC)Reply
@Adachi1939 I tried using the Wayback Machine to archive the Zhihu articles but it seems like the archived versions still have the same issue as if you are an unregistered user in Zhihu. While there are a few articles I've found in other websites that I believe are accessible without logging in, for the most part you'll have to register a Zhihu account with your phone number to access the full articles unfortunately. Cent58 (talk) 05:46, 9 January 2025 (UTC)Reply
Alright, no worries, I appreciate you trying. I pestered one of my Chinese friends to screenshot one of the articles on Shanghai for me. Lots of interesting stuff! It's impressive to see how much further ahead research on the Second Sino-Japanese is outside of the anglo-sphere. Adachi1939 (talk) 05:54, 9 January 2025 (UTC)Reply
I see you edited alot about the second sino japanese war, could we discuss battles of northern and eastern henan and south guangxi.
On the wikipedia page of Battle of South Guangxi, Japanese casualties say they suffered 8100 casualties, i think that number only includes the casualties they suffered in kunlun pass. The battle of binyang that happened after kunlun pass was brief, its unrealistic that the casualties were:
576 officers and 23,582 soldiers killed
932 officers and 29,630 soldiers wounded
203 officers and 9,366 soldiers missing
For Northern and Eastern Henan you listed Chinese casualties at
Chinese claim:
979 officers and 24,275 soldiers killed
1,453 officers and 24,284 soldiers wounded
451 officers and 10,785 soldiers missing
when i think the only major battle that happened was at lanfeng, Zhihu says Japan suffered 6400 casualties but i think multiple regiments of the 14th division faced annihilation so it should be close to 10,000.
How reliable is zhihu really, they mainly use japanese sources.
The Chinese casualties in both battles are from the History of the Anti-Japanese War, one of the most authoritative source for losses of the National Revolutionary Army in specific battles.
The battle of South Guangxi can be split into three phases. The first phase was the 5th division's landing at Qinzhou Bay on November 15 until the fall of Kunlun Pass on December 4. The 5th division was able to quickly rout the new 19th division of the 46th Corps in Qinzhou Bay, the 135th division of the 31st Corps and 170th division of the 46th Corps in Nanning, and the 200th division of the newly-arrived Fifth Corps at Ertang with light losses while inflicting heavy losses on the defenders. The 31st Corps alone suffered more than 6,600 casualties in 5 days. After the fall of Nanning on November 24, the IJA 5th division captured Gaofengai on December 1, defeated a counterattack by the 188th and 200th divisions on December 2, and captured Kunlun Pass on December 4. The 200th division had already suffered about 2,000 casualties up to this point.
The second phase of the battle is the counterattack to retake Kunlun Pass. The Chinese High Command successively sent in the 36th, 66th, and 99th Corps and the rest of the Fifth Corps. The Fifth Corps itself was tasked in taking back Kunlun Pass while the 66th and 99th Corps would block reinforcements to the IJA 21st brigade in Kunlun Pass. The 31st and 46th Corps would also fight against the 9th brigade of the 5th division at Gaofengai to contain the brigade, during which the 31st Corps suffered nearly 2,000 casualties. Starting from 17 December, the Fifth Corps attacked the position of the brigade until the full retreat of the Japanese unit from the pass on 31 December. During the fighting the brigade commander Masao Nakamura was killed in action. On December 2 the 5th and 66th Corps attacked Jiutang and Batang but could not break-through after a week of fighting, resulting in a stalemate. On 10 January 1940 the 5th Corps was replaced by the 36th Corps and withdrawn for rest, having reported 17,691 casualties.
The last phase of the battle is the Binyang operation. In early and mid January 1940 both sides sent in more units to Southern Guangxi. The IJA 18th division and Taiwan Mixed Brigade landed at Qinzhou Bay to support the battle. The Chinese also sent in the 2nd, 6th, and 64th corps and the new 33rd division to the Southern Guangxi frontline. On 28 January, the 9th brigade, 18th division, and Taiwan Mixed Brigade started the operation, attacking Kunlun Pass defended by the 36th and 99th Corps under supporting artillery fire and aircraft. The Guilin headquarters urgently sent the 46th, 64th, and 66th Corps to counterattack the Japanese army, but they were quickly defeated and the five corps retreated in panic. The Japanese army successively took Binyang, Shanglin, Gantang, Wuming, and Kunlun Pass. By February 8, the Japanese army withdrew to Nanning, having completed their objective of consolidating their position in Nanning. While this was a short offensive, according to History of the Anti-Japanese War, the Chinese army suffered more than 25,000 casualties in the battle of Binyang.
The 64,289 casualties reported by the Fourth Military Front is actually an incomplete statistics, as some units had not reported their casualties in certain battles. Additionally, the 5th Corps suffered 6,416 casualties during the battle of South Guangxi excluding the battle of Kunlun Pass, and this number was also not included in the statistics. Cent58 (talk) 12:20, 13 March 2025 (UTC)Reply
For the battle of Northern and Eastern Henan, there are many other large-scale battles aside from the battle of Lanfeng.
Starting from the 11th of February 1938, the Japanese army launched a massive offensive against the 1st army group and new 6th division in Tangyin County. In the first two days, the Chinese army suffered more than 5,000 casualties. The 14th division pursued the retreating Chinese army for the next two weeks, inflicting further casualties. By 24 February, the 14th division had taken Sishui, Fengqiu, Jiyuan and Boai and forced the 1st army group and new 6th division to retreat to Shanxi. Due to the quick advance of the Japanese army, hundreds of Chinese soldiers drowned trying to cross to Xinhe River. After reaching Shanxi, the Chinese troops can only hastily build a defense line. From 25 February until 1 March, the 14th division occupied the Tianjing Pass, Zhoucun, Qinhe, and Yuanqu, successively defeating the 37th division, 91st division, and 53rd Corps. By the start of March, the 37th division and the 179th division of the 1st army group reported having a total of only 1,800 troops left.
In April 1938, the 166th division of the 91st Corps was ordered to retake Jiyuan. While they did recover the city after several offensives, they suffered more than 1,500 casualties. During the same period, the 132nd division of the 77th Corps also recovered Pinglu at a cost of more than 1,500 casualties.
In May 1938, the IJA 14th division crossed the Yellow River and marched to eastern Henan to block the First Military Front from assisting the Fifth Military Front in Xuzhou. The division attacked Heze on May 14 and took it in just 3 days. The 23rd division lost more than half of its troops and division commander Li Bifan died. The new 35th division also suffered casualties exceeding 50%. The 141st division of the 32nd Corps also tasked with defending the city suffered more than 2,000 casualties.
Xiao County was also attacked by the IJA 9th division on May 16. The 139th division defended the county for three days, before breaking out on May 18. The 21st division took in the remaining 1,000 soldiers of the division (According to history of the Anti-Japanese War, the 139th division suffered 850 killed, 609 wounded, and 925 missing in the defense of Xiao County). The 21st division suffered 1,461 casualties and the 180th division suffered hundreds of casualties in supporting operations for the defense.
After the battle of Lanfeng, the 14th division attacked Kaifeng on June 3. The 141st division and Tax Police Brigade blocked the Japanese division for two days and nights, but even had to withdraw due to casualties. The two defending units suffered more than 2,050 casualties in the battle.
Adding up to the various smaller battles from January until early June and the battle of Lanfeng, the casualties of the First Military Front already reached more than 60,000, so the casualty figure from the history of the Anti-Japanese War is not unrealistic Cent58 (talk) 13:17, 13 March 2025 (UTC)Reply
The total number of combat deaths in the battle of Southern Guangxi should be at no more than 1,500 (the majority being from the IJA 5th division). The 6,400 casualty figure reported by headquarters of the 14th division as the casualties in the battle of Lanfeng should actually be the total casualties in the battle of Northern and Eastern Henan, as according to Official Gazette, there were a total of 903 combat deaths (including 112 who died of their wounds) during the battles of Lanfeng and Kafeng, which is much less than the more than 1,200 killed in the 6,400 casualty figure. The casualties of other IJA units in the campaign are unknown but should be far less than the 14th division. Cent58 (talk) 13:32, 13 March 2025 (UTC)Reply
so in the first stage of Northern and Eastern Henan, was Song Zheyuan's army against the 14th division
and another battle was before lanfeng with Li Bifan's division defending Heze right?
and as well as Huang Jie's defence of Shangqiu against the 16th division and a 13th Kwantung mixed brigade. you know the casualties for both sides here? Krips15 (talk) 16:24, 15 July 2025 (UTC)Reply
in general, could you give me a rundown of the entire first 2 years of the war in 1937-38 if you have the time.
Like list all the battles fought during the campaigns from Beiping-Tianjin, Chahar, Beiping-Hankou Raiway operation, Tianjin-Pukou Railway Operation, Taiyuan Campaign, Shanghai-Nanjing campaign in 1937, and the Xuzhou Campaign, Northern and Eastern Henan Campaign, Southern Shanxi Campaign, and Wuhan Campaign. and the casualties each side suffered. Krips15 (talk) 16:40, 15 July 2025 (UTC)Reply
was a reason for Song Zheyuan's 1st army group collapsing during the battle in Northern Henan 1938 because of the high casualties they took in 1937? during their offensive operation on Daming? Krips15 (talk) 17:18, 15 July 2025 (UTC)Reply
you think its also believable that the japanese casualty report in the battle of wuhan is unreliable since 30,000 japanese got annihilated at wanjialing alone, while they reported combat casualties to be much lower. Krips15 (talk) 01:57, 16 July 2025 (UTC)Reply
1. The 14th division suffered nearly 1,000 casualties fighting along the Yellow River in February and March 1938. 45 troops of the division were killed in action in the battle of Heze.
2. The 16th division and 3rd independent mixed brigade suffered nearly 2,500 casualties in the final stage of the battle of Xuzhou, most of which were from fighting the 55th corps at Jinxiang and Yutai and fighting Huang Jie’s 8th corps at Dangshan and Shangqiu (in the battle of Weilou alone, the 3rd independent mixed brigade suffered 503 casualties fighting the 304th regiment of the 102nd division of the 8th corps which suffered more than 900 casualties).
3. The defeat of the 1st army group is not disastrous compared to other battles at that time. During the same period in Shanxi, the Japanese 20th and 108th divisions defeated 7 divisions of the Central Army (including Wei Lihuang’s own 14th corps), 4 divisions of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Army, and 2 divisions of the Sichuan Army, inflicting nearly 30,000 casualties on the Nationalist Chinese Army while suffering only 500 combat deaths. In Shandong, the Japanese 10th division repelled the counterattack from 5 divisions of the Shandong Army and 1 division of the Sichuan Army, inflicting nearly 11,000 casualties while suffering approximately 800 casualties. Most Chinese units which fought in 1937 had a sharp drop in combat effectiveness afterwards.
4. The ‘History of the Anti-Japanese War’ only claimed that five thousand Japanese soldiers were killed in Wanjialing. The Ninth War Zone reported to have killed or wounded more than twenty thousand Japanese soldiers in the whole Nanxun campaign from mid-September until mid-October 1938, which is less than the ’30,000 Japanese soldiers annihilated’ claim for just the battle of Wanjialing. Cent58 (talk) 07:20, 16 July 2025 (UTC)Reply
for 3; I thought Wei Lihuang's army stopped the Japanese advance in Lingshi Pass until japan chose a flanking route to ultimately capture linfen-shanxi.
1. In the battle of Lingshi, the 78th infantry regiment of the Japanese 20th division quickly broke through the defence lines of the 15th corps. The Chinese Army successively sent the 54th, 83rd, and 85th divisions to assist the 15th corps. However, their positions were soon breached one by one, with the advancing units of the 83rd division quickly losing more than half of their troops after entering the battlefield. A single Japanese regiment was able to break through the defense lines of five Chinese Central Army divisions in three days. At the same time, the 80th infantry regiment attacked the positions of the 10th and 47th divisions and, despite suffering considerable casualties in the Chinese counterattack, was quickly approaching from the east as the 78th infantry regiment close in from the west. With a threat of encirclement from both sides, Wei Lihuang ordered his troops to retreat and Lingshi was occupied by the 20th division.
2. There are controversies regarding Han Fuju’s decision but essentially yes. The target of the Shandong Army offensive was Jining city which fell in January 1938. Army group commander Sun Tongxuan reported on 6th March 1938 the losses of his troops in the offensive as 5,905 killed, 3,345 wounded, and 95 missing. According to the ‘History of the Anti-Japanese War’, the Shandong Army suffered 9,620 killed, wounded, or missing in the offensive.
3. There’s no complete statistics for the losses of the 1st army group in February 1938. Song Zheyuan reported on 4th March 1938 the losses of his army group from February 11 until February 20 as more than 7,000 killed, wounded, or missing. After that, the 37th division suffered more than 1,200 casualties at Fengmenkou and the 116th division of the 53rd corps suffered very heavy casualties at Qinhe. Cent58 (talk) 13:38, 16 July 2025 (UTC)Reply
in your opinion what do you think could be the result for these bad performances in southern shanxi besides the firepower disparity. was the battle also characterized by IJA using mobility to concentrate superior numbers locally? Krips15 (talk) 15:39, 16 July 2025 (UTC)Reply
The key factor is that the Japanese troops had advanced far quicker than the Chinese Army had anticipated and reached the battlefield while the various Chinese units were still in exchanging or handing over positions in accordance to their battle orders. They were unprepared for the sudden Japanese attacks and did not have enough time to build up strong defense lines. Additionally, the Chinese Army did not know the strength of the Japanese troops in front of them and did not want to counterattack the much smaller foe. The Chinese Army also invested its troops one after another where they were immediately engaged after entering the battlefield. The Chinese units failed to coordinate between each other, allowing the 78th infantry regiment to break through each defensive position and defeat the Chinese divisions one by one.
For the February offensives, the Chinese Army invested 9 divisions, 3 brigades, the Hebei People’s Army, and various guerilla units in Northern Henan, 14 divisions and the Fenyang security team in Southern Shanxi, and 6 divisions in Western Shandong. The Japanese army opposing them had the 14th division in Northern Henan, the 20th division and parts of the 108th and 109th divisions in Southern Shanxi, and the 10th division in Western Shandong.
The losses of the Chinese Army in the Pinghan Railway operation recorded in the ‘History of the Anti-Japanese War’ is very incomplete with less than half of the units actually reporting the number of troops invested and the number of casualties. Many Chinese units which suffered heavy casualties in the operation were not included in the statistics such as most of Song Zheyuan’s 1st army group, Wei Lihuang’s 14th army group, most of Sun Lianzhong’s 26th route army, Feng Qinzai’s 27th route army, Wu Keren’s 67th corps, Liu Ruming’s 68th corps, Tan Zixin’s 4th cavalry corps, and Bao Gang’s 46th independent brigade. The total casualties of the Chinese Army in the Pinghan and Jinpu railway operations should exceed 100,000. The Japanese Army lost nearly 4,000 troops in the two operations so total casualties should be closer to 15,000. Cent58 (talk) 06:39, 2 August 2025 (UTC)Reply
Japanese casualties at Pinghan and Jinpu railway added together is 15,000 in 1937?
Also, in the Jining-Wenshang campaign, regarding the performance of the 81st division of Sun Tongxuan's corps, was there a battle where they caused 700-800 casualties in exchange for 2000 casualties?
and in the second battle of changsha, regarding battle of Chunhua Mountain, how many casualties did Japan take? 74th corps took some 14,000 in that battle and it was recorded that the 18th regiment lost 8 company commanders? is there an accurate count for the casualties the IJA 3rd, 6th and 4th divisions took in Chunhua mountain?
for the other NRA corps that participated in the second battle of Changsha (10th corps, 37th corps, 4th corps)you listed the casualties they took, is there also one for how many casualties they caused on the japanese in those battles?
You know could we countinue this conversation in a chatroom/messaging app? do you have a preferred messaging app to link up with? Krips15 (talk) 18:44, 1 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
most of Song Zheyuan's casualties were in the later period of the Jinpu railway battle right? since Han Fuju refused to allow his units to cross over into Shandong. Krips15 (talk) 18:52, 1 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
and also regarding the battle of Baoding along the Pinghan railway, it was fought by the 52nd corps right? did it cause around/over 5000 IJA casualties in that battle? the 52nd corps faced a situation where it was surrounded by 3 IJA divisions (6th, 14th, 20th) right? Krips15 (talk) 18:58, 1 January 2026 (UTC)Reply
To be fair it took a week or more for each of the two edits. Most of the additions also came from two primary sources which detailed the whole battle from the perspective of both combatants. Cent58 (talk) 13:33, 28 April 2025 (UTC)Reply
From the start of the battle of Wuhan until the fall of Jiujiang, a total of 23,537 civilians died in the Jiujiang area. However, a large portion of them died in bombings. The number of massacre victims are unknown. In total, 98,461 civilians in Jiujiang (including the various counties and cities under its jurisdiction) died in the war, many from sickness and epidemics. Cent58 (talk) 12:24, 14 May 2025 (UTC)Reply
Latest comment: 1 year ago2 comments1 person in discussion
Please see WP:RSPRIMARY for notes on the use of primary sources. For safety, consider using explicit attribution ("According to so-and-so, this happened") for details taken from primary sources; there's a reason secondary sources are preferred because they act to filter out inaccuracies in primary sources or provide necessary context.
Also, when adding references, do include author and publication date. And since you're using many non-English language sources, include translations of author names, titles and publishers (eg. Template:Cite book includes fields for translations); this makes it easier to get a general idea of the credibility and value of the source, as well as making it clearer when primary sources are being used. - RovingPersonalityConstruct (talk, contribs) 05:03, 1 May 2025 (UTC)Reply
Also make full use of Wikipedia:Citation templates and fill out as many of the template fields as possible. In particular, make sure to include unique identifiers for the document (for example, books may have ISBNs or something else, stuff from archives have some sort of ID too.) Take for example (from Special:Diff/1268730388):
{{cite book |title= 對黃山整軍會議審查修正各案之訓示 |last=Jieshi| first=Jiang |page= 472}}
I can't find any reference to a "Battle of South Shanxi" outside of the main 1941 Battle of South Shanxi (which is very notable). Therefore, this is either original research or inaccurate. thanks.
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@Aszx5000: The 1940 battle of South Shanxi has no reference in any English sources, but there are many Chinese sources about the battle or parts of the battle. Both the official military history of the Chinese Nationalist Revolutionary Army and Imperial Japan ('History of the Anti-Japanese War' and 'Senshi Sōsho' respectively) also contained information about the battle. The 'History of the Anti-Japanese War: Battle of South Shanxi' about the more notable 1941 battle of South Shanxi had a minor reference to the battle in its prelude. The 'History of the Anti-Japanese War: Shanxi-Suiyuan Guerilla Warfare (Part 2)' expanded more for the battle, spanning from page 151 to page 167. Volume 18 of 'Senshi Sōsho' also talk about the three phases of the battle from page 297 to page 301. I've updated the page with relevant information from the 'Senshi Sōsho' and 'History of the Anti-Japanese War' ~~~~Cent58 (talk) 04:54, 1 October 2025 (UTC)Reply
Latest comment: 8 months ago1 comment1 person in discussion
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Latest comment: 14 days ago33 comments2 people in discussion
I noticed new revisions you made on a few of my edits, battle of North Burma and West Yunnan and the Conscription section of the NRA article.
For the Northern Burma and Western Yunnan article, you claim that the Japanese cannibalizing 200 of their own is just "unreliable speculation" by allied forces, at the same time you claim that Senshi Sosho which selectively translated the American account of Northern Burma and Western Yunnan and leaving out anything they didn't like (including the cannibalism part) is reliable.
Also you say theres no consensus on the unreliability of Rummel's study. yet Rummel does not read Chinese and never specialised in China and was caught lying about death tolls in the Xinhai revolution by Edward Rhoads, aswell as lying about the Jewish Death toll during the Spanish Inquisition. Krips15 (talk) 22:11, 10 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
If there were any cannibalism, then it would be from the few possibly cannibalized bodies found by the Americans and Chinese among the 75 total corpses found, not the more than 200 completely missing ones (that is if there were actually 300 Japanese soldiers as claimed). They would have likely been evacuated, buried, burned, or destroyed by artillery or air power.
You need to find a consensus in the talk page before deleting a long-standing source from a historian whether you agree with them or not. The horrible conscription system of the NRA is well-known in the Chinese circle and there are many books corroborating Rummel's claims. Cent58 (talk) 03:10, 11 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
your avoiding the main question here:
Why are you ignoring that Senshi Sosho had no data for Zhaigongfang and only selectively translated American accounts of the battle? they translated their accounts word for word except for the cannibalism part, doesn't this seem even the slight bit suspicious and ingenuine?
you're also engaging in original research speculation, you can't comment on or analyze the source when editing
accusing the source of engaging in speculation (engaging in speculation yourself).
Rummel also isn't a historian, hes a political scientist who is a known liar, with absolutely no qualifications to write about China or WW2 history. If you have Chinese sources other than Rummel then why dont you just use those sources on the NRA article instead of Rummel? Krips15 (talk) 17:19, 11 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
That is because the editors of Senshi Sosho did not feel that the need to mention what your source itself said is "circumstantial evidences" of acts of cannibalism when the reason they put the Allied source was to the showcase the battle process from the perspective of the enemy. Chinese military histories also cut off passages they deemed unnecessary when quoting official Japanese battle accounts, often only focusing on the battle process.
The "Famine, Sword, And Fire: The Liberation of Southwest China in World War II" book you sourced did not mention that the reason for the more than 200 missing Japanese soldiers were because of cannibalism. It said that the Chinese found seventy-five bodies when it was believed to have been garrisoned by at 300 troops and then quoted the account of the American liaison officer of the 54th Army who mentioned finding twelve Japanese bodies in a kitchen with most of their flesh cut off which was believed to be signs of cannibalisms. But the book did not say that was the reason why they could not find more bodies of the defenders.
In fact, I checked the source that was used for this passage which was page 345 of the United States official history book "Stilwell's Command Problems". It mentioned the finding of seventy-five bodies out of at least 300 defenders and the kitchen that showed that the Japanese soldiers had resorted to cannibalism, but it also mentioned right after that, as quoted:
"With their food stocks exhausted, the defenders had been ordered by Colonel Kurashige to escape at night and to fall back into the valley of the Shweli. Annihilation was inevitable if the Japanese garrison clung longer to its defenses , and Kurashige wanted its survivors to live and fight another day.
With Chai - kung - tang firmly in Chinese hands , with clearing skies permit- ting the C - 47's to return again with their cargoes of food and bullets , the 54th Army , victors of Ma - mien pass , began moving on into the Shweli valley"
So your claim that "there were originally 300 Japanese at the outpost but now only 75 corpses after the Chinese retook it since the Japanese had eaten the rest of their own comrades" is not only your speculation but is directly contradicted by your source's own source. There were not 300 corpses at Mamien Pass, not because they were all eaten (if that were the case, there would more corpses in the state like the dozen reported by First Lieutenant Richard Shoemaker), but because the surviving defenders had retreated.
I've added Dr Bian Xiuyue's research on Chinese losses, specifically his study of the losses of conscripts which can corroborate Rummel's claim of horrible treatment. His estimate of losses matched up with the official CPC claim of Chinese losses and often used when talking about casualties. Cent58 (talk) 10:44, 12 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
Even Bian Xiuyue said only 10% died en route to training camps unlike Rummel giving his ridiculous 50% died en route to training camps, his source does not corroborate with or backs up Rummel's claims at all here.
provide an actual historian backing up Rummel's numbers of 50% of conscripts dying en route to training camps or remove it. Krips15 (talk) 18:45, 12 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
I've added more Chinese informations for the conscription atrocity including the brutal condition of the camps as described by Rummel and multiple cases where the number of conscripts reaching the training camps alive were as low as 10%. Also Bian Xiuyue did not claim that 10% of all conscripts died en route to the camps, you read it wrong. Similarly, Rummel mentioned that in some cases less than 50% made it to the camps, not that less than 50% conscripts survived in total, which as I mentioned above is true in at least several instances. Cent58 (talk) 13:53, 13 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
Bian Xiuyue literally said this: "More than 1.91 million conscripts did not make it to their assigned war zones, with most likely deserting and 10% or 190.000 men estimated by Bian Xiuyue to have died en route."
You're trying to imply that the 1.91 million who didn't make it to the Training camps all died in these examples you edited:
"Of the 300 conscripts sent from Shaoguan, only 27 made it to their destination. Of the 1,800 coming from Jiangxi, only more than 150 remained, of whom only 20% were healthy enough to join the army. Of the 1000 sent from Longtan, only more than 100 were left. These statistics were confirmed by high-ranking officials, medical personnel, and instructors. In the years following the start of the war, based on the experience of doctors from the Red Cross, of every four conscripted men, one deserted, one fell ill, and one died. Only one out of four or 25% were fit for military service. According to Jiang Menglin, interviewed senior military commanders all agreed that this statistic was generally accurate. However, seeing the current situation of the conscripts, Jiang believed that the proportion of healthy conscripts had fallen to no more than 10%." Krips15 (talk) 16:53, 13 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
I'm not sure how you came to that conclusion. My edits made it clear that these two were separate individual sources not correlating to one another, one from a modern estimate by Dr. Bian Xiuyue and one from a contemporary investigation by Chinese Red Cross leader Jiang Menglin in 1941. I've read through the text several times and I did not see any implication from my wording that the contemporary one is superior to the modern study or that it makes Bian Xiuyue's research untrue. So I'm not sure what your issue is with my edit considering you are the one who asked for more Chinese sources which can corroborate Rummel's claims, which Jiang Menglin's report did contain.
I assume that based on your defense of Bian Xiuyue's work that you don't have problem with his estimate of overall non-combat deaths that is nearly three times the number of combat deaths, which made Rummel's estimate of Chinese military deaths not an exaggeration but an underestimation.
Also, I see that not only did you continue not fully addressing your mistaken claim that more than 200 Japanese corpses were cannibalized at Zhaigongfang, but you still implied that this large-scale incident happened (even if you change the wording a little) with your recent massive one with the Imperial Japanese Army page even though I already pointed you (and you did not argue back) that you were contradicted by the source you used yourself. I find it increasingly difficult to interpret your edits in Wikipedia as being in good faith. Cent58 (talk) 04:31, 14 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
I find it hard for your edits being in good faith when you openly admit Senshi Sosho wants to depict "heroic acts" of Japanese troops and still use it as a source.
You are also not addressing that Senshi Sosho lied about Defence of the Salween river and said Chinese retreated far beyond the river (to the east) in 1942 while American pilots said Chinese on the east bank attacked, raided and stopped the Japanese west of the river forcing the Japanese to retreat when they tried to cross. Senshi Sosho even falsely implied that statement was translated from the American War history on Stillwell. Senshi Sosho doesn't even acknowledge the attempted Japanese crossing of the river accompanied by bombing of Baoshan and makes a false statement that Chinese retreated far beyond the river. This is not just a case of Senshi Sosho omitting a battle, but lying about what happened. Krips15 (talk) 16:37, 14 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
That is every military histories. You would be extremely naive if you think an nation's own written army military history would not highlight their military victories and heroic acts while downplaying crushing losses. The Chinese equivalent certainly had many such cases, such as the "Five Heroes of Langya Mountain", the "Liulaozhuang Company", the "Eight Hundred Heroes Jumping Into the Yellow River*, and others which were not as "heroic" when recorded in Japanese sources. The "Liulaozhuang Company" even had a successor in the modern PLA. For the "Five Heroes of Langya Mountain", Eighth Route Army sources claimed that in the battle the Japanese had suffered more than 50 killed or wounded from landmines and the "five heroes" had by themselves also killed or wounded more than 50 Japanese troops before running out of ammunition and voluntarily jumping off a cliff, resulting in three dying and the other two being injured and rescued. The Japanese 9th Company of the 110th Infantry Regiment which was responsible for engaging with the Japanese troops on the cliff did not suffered any deaths that day on September 25, 1941. They did not suffer any losses from landmines and only one soldier was wounded in the firefight. They also recorded that the Chinese troops fell off the cliff. For the "Liulaozhuang Company", the New Fourth Army claimed that 82 Chinese troops of a company were surrounded by Japanese troops at Liulaozhuang on March 18, 1943 and fought until the end, with all of them dying but also killing 170 Japanese troops and wounding more than 200. The 1st Battalion of the 54th Infantry Regiment of the 17th Division responsible for the attack of Liulaozhuang recorded 118 abandoned corpses while losing 2 men killed in action. For the "Eight Hundred Heroes Jumping Into the Yellow River", according to Chinese source, during the "June 6" Battle of Zhongtiao Mountains in 1939, 800 Shaanxi sixteen- and seventeen-year-old troops of the 4th Group Army refused to be captured after running out of ammunition and jumped into the Yellow River, dying heroically. According to Japanese source, they had cornered a large group of Chinese soldiers to the Yellow River and annihilated most of them by the riverbank with machine guns. It was said that the Japanese troops could not drink from the river were so many corpses. The "800" number is likely the number of corpses retrieved by the 4th group army after. The "History of the Anti-Japanese War" also did not mention the surrender of a regimental commander during the battle that was recorded by the Japanese 20th Division. There was so a similar case during the First Battle of the Taihang Mountains in June 1942 where Japanese troops had cornered 500 troops of the Temporary 3rd Division Sun Dianying’s New Fifth Army at Lin County. The Japanese reported that 200 including the divisional commander were captured while the remaining 300 "fell off the cliff". This was interpreted by some Chinese accounts as voluntarily jumping off the cliff to avoid capture.
Whenever I use a Japanese military source in my edits, I generally used one or more equivalent Chinese source to corroborate or compare the opposing side’s perspectives. If there are sources which used both then I will also use them. I am not the one who rely on only one side’s source and also, either deliberately or mistakenly, made a claim in Wikipedia that is proven false by one's own cited source (which you hadn't addressed among other issues you had been hounding me on. Most of the sources I used for Wikipedia articles had been Chinese or Taiwanese, so it’s not only disingenuous but baffling that you’re trying to imply that I only used Senshi Sōsho as a standalone for my source. It’s a fairer criticism if you said I did not use enough Japanese sources for my edits. I am planning to check up more on Senshi Sōsho in my free time since I have only read a few volumes.
Now for your issues, the Chinese 36th Division did repel an advance unit of the Japanese 56th Division at Huitong Bridge. However, Chiang Kai-Shek then ordered General Song Xilian to lead the 36th, 88th, and 2nd Reserve Divisions of the 71st Army to retake Tengchong which had fallen on May 10. But despite repeated attacks they were unable to break though the Japanese defenses and suffered heavy losses. Chiang Kai-Shek himself sent several telegraphs to General Song Xilian threatening punishments for him and the three divisional commanders if they did not retake Longling and Tengchong within three days. On May 28, the 264th Brigade of the 88th Division claimed to have killed a battalion commander (according to the detailed battle report of the 11th Group Army, the officer killed was Kaneyasu Iribe, commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 113th Infantry Regiment. However, Kaneyasu Iribe did not die in the battle, nor did he die in that year. So there were lies in Chinese battle reports) and seized documents which suggested the enemy facing them numbered 15,000 to 20,000 instead of them 2,000 to 3,000 they expected. After Song Xilian sent the documents to the Military High Command, Chiang Kai-shek ordered an end to the offensive and for the main force of the 71st Army to withdraw from the Salween River, leaving behind a portion for guerilla warfare. Senshi Sosho also recorded this attack from the three divisions of the 71st Army in late May. The main force of the 56th Division, which were conducting a mopping-up operation along the Longchuan River, immediately headed towards Longling and claimed to have driven the Chinese from the Salween River by early June.
So, in summary, the 36th Division did repel a small portion of the 56th Division’s attack across the Salween River but the whole 71st Army them attempted to counterattack the 56th Division at Longling and Tengchong but were defeated with heavy casualties. Using the claim that the Japanese forces numbered much more than expected as an excuse, most of the 71st Army retreated to the other side of the Salween River, leaving a small portion to go behind enemy lines. Thus, the Japanese claim of driving the Chinese from the Salween River is not false like your claim it is. The reason you might not know this is and think that Japanese sources are lying is because these Chinese information were held in (formerly) classified telegraphs and battle reports. Chinese public announcements and American newspapers did not report on this because it ended with a Chinese defeat and retreat. In fact, the Tengchong battlefield did not end there. The guerilla units of the 71st Army continued harassing the 56th Division in their defense zones, especially the 2nd Reserve Division which were the very active in that year. The 56th Division itself recorded several mopping-up operations conducted against units of the 71st Army in June. However, your edits for the Defense of Salween River implied that after the 56th Division took Longling and Tengchong, the 71st Army not only did nothing, but the 2nd Reserve Division even refused to attack Tengchong over a claim that it had no defenses and was garrisoned by only a few Japanese troops. In fact, the 56th Division stationed the 148th Infantry Regiment there. The suggestion that there was no active attempts by the Chinese to counterattack until 1944 is a disservice to the many Chinese soldiers who shed their blood in the Tengchong battlefield in May and June of 1942.
Now, the reason why most non-contemporary Chinese sources did not mention the guerilla activities around Tengchong for the rest of 1942 and 1943 and instead skipped to the 1944 Chinese counterattack is because the 56th Division eventually defeated all the Chinese guerilla units. In the "September 18" mopping-up operation of 1942, the Japanese division inflicted heavy damage on the guerilla forces of the 71st Army, especially the 2nd Reserve Division which by October 18 had lost 3,720 officers and soldiers according to the divisional commander’s report. The Japanese also conducted several smaller mopping-up operations which drove Zhang Wende’s Tengchong militia troops of their positions by December. In February 1943, the 56th Division conducted a mopping-up operation at the north of Tengchong, wiping out one company of the 88th Division wiped out and inflicting heavy casualties on the 5th Regiment of the 2nd Reserve Division. In March, they conducted a mopping-up operation against local Yunnan militias south of Tengchong, capturing Zhanxi on March 10. The next day, hundreds of troops under the chieftain of Ganya not only defected but fought alongside the Japanese. By March 15 the other militias in the area had suffered heavy losses and were forced to retreat, abandoning several positions to the Japanese. In May, the 56th Division received information that the Chinese 36th Division was preparing to relieve the exhausted 2nd Reserve Division and decided to strike just as they arrived. In the mopping-up operation at the north of Tengchong from May 11 to May 20, 1943, the 36th Division suffered 296 killed, 40 wounded, and 32 missing while the 148th Infantry Regiment of the 56th Division suffered 12 killed and 28 wounded.
In September 1943, the 148th Infantry Regiment of the 56th Division launched a final large-scale mopping-up operation targeting the 36th Division. From late September to early October, they drove Zhang Wende’s Tengchong militia out of several positions. On October 8, they broke through that positions of the New 28th Division. In mid-October, they captured multiple important towns. In Beizhai, only the magistrate, his secretary, and a few policemen managed to escape. On October 19, the 148th Infantry Regiment intercepted 650 troops of the 108th Regiment of the 36th Division, claiming more than 100 abandoned enemy corpses. Chinese sources actually gave a higher loss figure with battalion commander Yang Yunhong and his entire 2nd Battalion of the 108th Regiment martyred while covering for the regimental headquarters after they were surrounded that day. On October 23, the 148th Infantry Regiment intercepted scattered troops of the 106th Regiment, claiming to have wiped them out one by one. By the end of November, the 148th Infantry Regiment claimed to have inflicted a significant blow to the 36th Division, claiming 1,200 abandoned enemy corpses while suffering 12 killed and 39 wounded. A military doctor of the 36th Division recalled that the 106th and 108th Regiments were mostly destroyed during the break-out with the 71st Army’s headquarters managing to take in a few surviving troops. A radio operator who was captured in the operation recalled that there were more than 300 POWs in the POW camp he was sent to. General Song Xilian sent a confidential telegraph to Chiang Kai-shek on November 1, reporting that the 36th Division suffered very heavy casualties in ten days of bitter fighting since October 15. The divisional headquarters and the 107th regiment was able to cross the Salween River safely with only more than 200 casualties. However, the 106th and 108th Regiments were scattered into several groups. On October 25, regimental commander Gu Bin telegraphed to Song Xilian that he was going to break out of the enemy encirclement with the two battalions of the 106th Regiment and approximately half of the 108th Regiment. However, since October 26 contact with Gu and his troops had been lost and it was believed that they were all martyred. Additionally, Yang Yunhong led his troops to the mountainous area with no information about them afterwards. Considering post-war sources mentioned that Yan Yunhong and his entire unit were killed, that meant at least more than four battalions were completely wiped out, not counting the more than 200 casualties from the other units and the undoubtedly heavy casualties suffered from the two infantry companies of the 108th Regiment led by the regimental commander and the one battalion of the 106th Regiment led by the deputy divisional commander which managed to break out, the Japanese claim for Chinese casualties might not be an exaggeration. After that there were no more units of the 71st Army around the Tengchong area until the counterattack from the Second Chinese Expeditionary Army in 1944.
Most of the above were from the book "1944: Siege of Tengchong" which I do recommend as it detailed the Tengchong battlefield since its fall in 1942 until its recapture in 1944 using both Chinese and Japanese sources to reconstruct the battle process. There were also two other books from the same author "1944: Notes on the Battle of Songshan" and "1944: Battle of Longling" which I have not gotten into but if it’s as good of a quality as the Tengchong one then they’re something that you can check up if you actually want to get the real battlefield situation instead of getting it from one side's biased accounts.
Going back to your last statement, the Japanese claim that the Chinese retreated from the Salween river was not false from contemporary Chinese sources that I had mentioned above. For the attempted river crossing, it is not surprising that it was mentioned in Senshi Sosho as it was not a notable action. I don’t know why you expected Senshi Sōsho to record every single small engagements and losses when you know that the other nation’s equivalent did not considering it is a world war involving millions of troops. Did you think that the Chinese equivalent the "History of the Anti-Japanese War" wrote down all the tens of thousands of recorded battles in the Second Sino-Japanese War? In fact, the History of the Anti-Japanese War did not record even every major battles. The Japanese invasion of East Zhejiang and Fuzhou in April 1941 was recorded in Senshi Sosho but was not recorded in the History of the Anti-Japanese War despite the Third War Zone losing more than 40,000 troops and several dozen counties until the Japanese voluntary withdrawal. Some other notable cases of battles recorded in Senshi Sosho but not in the History of the Anti-Japanese War are the Northern Jiangsu Operation in February 1941 where both Nationalists and Communists lost their main guerilla bases in Northern Jiangsu, the Dabie Mountains Operation from December 1942 to January 1943 where the 21st Group Army of the Guangxi Army lost their guerilla base in the Dabie Mountains and had their guerilla activities drastically reduced (some Chinese sources even claimed that the 21st Group Army had a secret agreement with the Japanese Army to stop fighting against each other after the operation), the Jiangbei Operation by the 11th Army in May 1941, the Second Southern Hebei Operation in May 1942, and many others. There was also the Jiangbei Annihilation Operation which resulted in the complete destruction of the independent 128th Division (estimated to be between 10,000 to 30,000 troops) in February 1943 that was only mentioned briefly in the History of the Anti-Japanese War. The several friendly fire incidents which resulted in significant casualties due to Chinese units getting lost in the battle of Myitkyina were recorded by both American and Japanese sources, but not in officially published Chinese Army military history including the History of the Anti-Japanese War, which made it seemed like there was progress that day. Incidents where hundreds of American-trained Chinese troops fled in panic after being ambushed by several dozen Japanese defenders were also not recorded in the series. In other parts of Burma there was also a case where an American-trained Chinese battalion was in a stalemate with the remnants of the Japanese platoon for a month since they believed they were facing a Japanese battalion. This was also not recorded in official Chinese sources. The war histories of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army also have similar issues where crushing battles recorded in Japanese official sources were not recorded by the Communist Armies. You disparaged Senshi Sōsho a lot but the Chinese equivalents had a lot more problems that you seemed to ignore and believed their official sources to be the truth. Cent58 (talk) 14:31, 15 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
"Incidents where hundreds of American-trained Chinese troops fled in panic after being ambushed by several dozen Japanese defenders were also not recorded in the series. In other parts of Burma there was also a case where an American-trained Chinese battalion was in a stalemate with the remnants of the Japanese platoon for a month since they believed they were facing a Japanese battalion. This was also not recorded in official Chinese sources."
At the start of the battle of Myitkyina on May 17, 1944, the 150th Regiment of the 50th Division initially managed to make good progress in its advance towards Myitkyina but then got lost and stumbled into the area of Sinkap, north of Myitkyina. They were fired upon by the medical team and epidemic prevention and water supply unit of the 18th Division defending the area and was immediately thrown into chaos with Chinese soldiers firing at each other (this friendly fire incident was also recorded by the Americans). The History of the 18th Division even mentioned that if the Chinese had been an elite combat-experienced unit, then they would have been able to break through a corner of Myitkyina, but because this was their first battle, they began firing at each other after being attacked by the Japanese garrison and then retreated. This assessment was very humiliating for the 150th Regiment, as the 50th Division was not a newly-formed unit. It had gone through the battlefields of Xuzhou, Wuhan, and Northern Guangdong before being airlifted to India to be trained by US instructors, but due to the poor performance of the 150th Regiment in the battle of Myitkyina, the Japanese believed that this was their first combat. Despite being recorded by American and Japanese sources, the "History of the Anti-Japanese War" omitted the battle process for the whole of May 17, probably because the military history compiler of the Republic of China felt it was too embarrassing. It only mentioned that the 150th Regiment attacking Xinkapo on May 18, which made no sense without the battle process of May 17 because Xinkapo was at the north of Myitkyina, and the actual reason the Chinese were there was because they got lost.
On May 19 and the early morning of May 20, the Chinese regiment made good progress capturing the Myitkyina train station and stormed into the city, but these were against Japanese military police and Burmese collaborators, not the actual Japanese Army, and the regiment still suffered heavy casualties including one battalion commander killed. The advance of the regiment terrified the Myitkyina garrison and they hastily cobbled up a force of no more than 80 troops to launch a counterattack. To their surprise however, the train station was barely defended with the Japanese claiming that most of the Chinese soldiers were looting the area and even civilian houses nearby. Seeing the opportunity, the small Japanese unit launched its counterattack, breaking into the center of the Chinese ranks and firing in all directions, plunging the 150th Regiment fell into chaos yet again. The Japanese even claimed that the Chinese troops in the rear poured rifle fire and mortar shells at the troops at the front, mistaking them for Japanese troops. The 150th Regiment soon fleeing from a counterattack by a small number of Japanese troops. It did not end there, as follow-up troops of the 150th Regiment were unaware that the train station had fallen back into Japanese hands and marched into an ambush by several Japanese troops commander by a sergeant with a light machine gun near the station who fired at close range into the densely-packed formation. Again for the third time, the troops of the 150th Regiment fell into chaos. The Japanese claimed that the Chinese troops at the back fired at the Chinese troops fleeing from the front, and that this infighting expanded from the company level to the battalion level. By the morning of May 21, the 150th Regiment had suffered 671 casualties and was forced to retreat, requiring several days of rest.
The "History of the Anti-Japanese War" revised a lot of details when describing that day’s action. It mentioned the attack from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 150th Regiment towards Myitkyina and the capture of the train station, but then mentioned the enemy firing artillery shells at the two battalions in the station, causing heavy casualties. The enemy then counterattacked and the station was lost. However, the hastily-formed Japanese unit of no more than 80 men did not have mortars or artillery pieces with them, and in fact recorded that it was the Chinese which mortar shells at each other, so the "History of the Anti-Japanese War" embellished the friendly fire incident. Then it mentioned the follow-up ambush until the Chinese regiment’s retreat in the morning of May 21. During this engagement, it mentioned the Chinese trapped near the train station fighting all night in hand-to-hand combat against the enemy. In reality they were ambushed by only several Japanese troops with a light machine gun and the Japanese did not mention engaging in hand-to-hand, so the only "opponent" the Chinese were engaging in hand-to-hand combat were themselves. Aside from the casualties, the 150th Regiment lost a large number of American-supplied weapons and ammunitions in the retreat, which the Japanese garrison used to their advantage. In fact, the history of the 18th Division attributed this as an important factor in enabling the garrison to hold onto Myitkyina for eighty days. No wonder the commander of the 150th Regiment was dismissed as a result of this fiasco.
The other part was during the Hukawng Valley Campaign. On October 31, 1943, the 2nd Battalion of the 112th Regiment of the Chinese New 38th Division (which had been General Sun Liren’s own division before he was promoted) began its assault against the positions of the 7th Company of the 56th Infantry Regiment of the Japanese 18th Division with its 4th and 6th Companies attacking Xialaojia and the 5th Company attacking Yubang. While the 5th Company was advancing towards Yubang they were ambushed by a portion of the 7th Company of the 56th Infantry Regiment and suffered extremely heavy casualties. More than 30 were killed including the company commander and many more were wounded. In the end, the 5th Company was reduced to ten troops. The attack on the 1st Platoon of the 7th Company at Xialaojia also ended in failure with many Chinese soldiers killed. Overall, the Americans recorded that the 2nd Battalion suffered 116 casualties on October 31, but this was not recorded in the battle history of the New 38th Division. The Japanese 1st Platoon defending Xialaojia lost two men killed and three wounded that day.
On November 1 and November 2, the 2nd Battalion launched multiple fierce assaults at Xialaojia but were repelled after fierce grenade battles and hand-to-hand combat. The 2nd Battalion suffered considerable losses in these assaults including two platoon commanders killed and the deputy battalion commander and one company commander wounded. Despite the setback, the Japanese platoon was very impressed with the 2nd Battalion’s fearless assaults, which believed them to be superior to the Chinese Army in the mainland. On November 3, the 2nd Battalion received support from the US air force and more artillery firepower, and thus launched more fierce assaults on the 1st Platoon, engaging in brutal close combat with the 1st Platoon with the Japanese suffering increasing number of casualties and being forced to shrink down their defense lines. On November 9, the main force of the 7th Company attempted to relieve it’s 1st Platoon but was repelled by the 2nd Battalion with the Japanese suffering more than 30 casualties. On November 11, the 2nd Battalion managed to make more progress and killed the commander of the 1st Platoon, but was then locked in a stalemate with the remnants of the 1st Platoon. On November 17, they make significant progress in surrounding the 1st Platoon, but then stopped attacking for the rest of the month and most of December. On December 22, the 2nd Battalion was ordered to hand over the task of capturing Xialaojia to the 3rd Battalion of the 113th Regiment. In the end, the 2nd Battalion failed in their objective of capturing Xialaojia. At almost the same time, the 1st Platoon of the 7th Company was ordered to hand over the defense of Xialaojia to reinforcements from the 56th Regiment. After nearly two months of fighting, there were only 3 men left in the platoon.
There were a few details I had misremembered when I first mentioned about this and I apologize for that, but it was still very humiliating for the 2nd Battalion. While they made some progress at the start and even repelled a relief attempt and inflicted heavy casualties, in the end two Chinese companies were locked in a stalemate with three Japanese soldiers for more than a month, and ended up not even taking their objective. It would have been a very shameful battle for the Chinese if not for the 1st Battalion’s performance during the battle, especially its 1st Company which not only withstood the attacks of two Japanese battalions at Linbin for a week with the help from the US Air Force, but even managed to repel them and inflicted heavy casualties. The 3rd Battalion did not perform as well though they were still not as bad the 2nd Battalion. Cent58 (talk) 10:33, 16 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
There are tons more examples of a small Japanese force defeating or at least holding their on against a much larger Chinese force if that's what you're asking. Like in the Chinese counterattack towards Yichang in September 1941 where some of the Japanese battalions were able to hold their own against an entire Chinese Corps. For actions against the Communists there was the battle of Guanjianao where, despite losing its commander, the Okazaki detachment of 500 troops managed to hold out for two days against 10,000 to 20,000 Eighth Route Army troops until reinforcements arrived. There were also many smaller actions where the Chinese might lose dozens, sometimes even hundreds of times more troops than the Japanese according to each sides' own reported casualties. But the two above from Burma were the ones I had off the top of my head when making the initial comment. Cent58 (talk) 14:42, 16 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
your original words: "Incidents where hundreds of American-trained Chinese troops fled in panic after being ambushed by several dozen Japanese defenders were also not recorded in the series. In other parts of Burma there was also a case where an American-trained Chinese battalion was in a stalemate with the remnants of the Japanese platoon for a month since they believed they were facing a Japanese battalion. This was also not recorded in official Chinese sources."
Your question was not very clear to me so sorry about that. I’m also going to answer all your replies here.
The Yichang Counteroffensive during the Second Battle of Changsha was a failure the Chinese not sure how you took it as a Japanese defeat. Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to use the opportunity to retake Yichang when most of the front-line troops of the 11th Army were still invested in the Changsha Battlefield, which the Sixth War Zone failed to do. The Japanese 13th Division was also not getting 'nearly annihilated' or 'slaughtered' by the Sixth War Zone’s counterattack. From the start of the offensive on September 28, the 13th Division suffered nearly 600 combat deaths including men who died of their wounds until November 15 according to the decoration archives by the Japanese Decoration Bureau and Army Ministry. Not even the Sixth War Zone claimed that the 13th Division was near annihilation as they claimed 6,422 Japanese troops killed or wounded and 23 captured from the 13th and 39th Divisions in the Yichang Offensive. The Chinese retreat as recorded by the "History of the Anti-Japanese War" and Chiang Kai-shek’s diary was because of the Japanese use of poison gas on the Chinese troops who broke into the city and the reports that Japanese reinforcements from Changsha would be arriving soon which worried General Chen Cheng a lot. The poison gas usage was actually a boon for the generals of the Sixth War Zone, as Chen Cheng was able to use it as an excuse to cease the offensive as Chiang Kai-shek felt the propaganda of the enemy's use of poison gas was the best the Chinese Army could hope for to mitigate the Chinese defeat at Changsha. If the Sixth War Zone had stayed a while longer in an effort to destroy the still-intact 13th Division, then they would have been slaughtered by Japanese ground reinforcements and air power. In fact, the 233rd Infantry Regiment of the 39th Division had caught up and engaged with a portion of the Chinese 39th Corps while the Chinese Army was retreating, and the 4th Division (the same unit that had shattered the 74th Corps’ headquarters at the Laodao River), 39th Division, and 18th Independent Mixed Brigade also swept (though without much results) portions of the 8th Corps and 73rd Corps at Linghekou. The Japanese 3rd air group also dropped a large number of bombs at the retreating Chinese Army which would have been more devastating if the Chinese had continued the siege. Even the "History of the Anti-Japanese War", which had been shown to downplay or even erase defeats, admitted that the Chinese Army failed in the Yichang Offensive despite outnumbering the enemy ten to one due to a lack of heavy firepower. Stop taking propaganda or non-professional assertions at face value. If you are not going to bother reading Japanese sources then at least read contemporary Chinese military ones. The claim that the Chinese Army only halted the attempted recapture of an important city was because of "political reasons" is insulting to the more than 20,000 Chinese soldiers who shed their blood in the offensive.
Yes, it is a notable problem that Senshi Sosho did not mentioned the use of poison gas even in combat situations (though I do wonder if you had checked every volume to make sure since you decided to cite the entire series). What I have an issue is that you’re to use cases such as this to either claim that these meant that Senshi Sosho was also deliberately concealing losses or that the entire series is untrustworthy because of it. I have also shown that the equivalent Chinese war history had its own issues with concealing or embellishing crushing defeats, so why is only Senshi Sosho under such scrutiny from you? The "History of the Anti-Japanese War" itself does not record any instances of violation of international law from either side. During the January 28 Incident, the Japanese Army reported the capture of hundreds of plainclothes troops from the Chinese Army which were not mentioned in any official Chinese military sources. Are these troops not included in the Chinese casualty statistics? That is why I said that you should corroborate both Chinese and Japanese sources to get a clearer picture of the battlefield situation since every country’s sources have bias. I don’t use only one side’s source and then ignore certain parts to fit my narrative. So yes, Senshi Sosho had some serious issues, I had even put a few in the article for it, but that is also true for Chinese sources which constantly recorded a lower casualty statistics than actually suffered and claimed as many as a dozen times more Japanese casualties than reality in major battles and dozens more times in smaller actions. American and Soviet contemporary and even modern sources often just echoed what the Chinese Armies and Government were reporting.
The battlefield was between to the southern side of Guanjianao and the opposite hill of Liushunao (the latter of which was defended by one Japanese company). Obviously the Eighth Route Army did not use their entire force surrounding the Okazaki battalion to launch a simultaneous assault, but they also did not company-sized units to attack one at a time. The Eighth Route Army would not even dream of attacking an entrenched Japanese battalion for two days without knowing they would be able to greatly outnumber the enemy in each action (especially when the Eighth Route Army knew the terrain well). On October 30, the main force of the 38th Regiment of the 1st Death-Defying Column occupied Liushunao after fierce fighting, but was then driven back by a unexpected counterattack from the Japanese company. General Peng Dehuai immediately ordered General Chen Geng to counterattack with three whole battalions, but they were unable to recapture Liushunao from the lone Japanese company. The main assault at Guanjianao also failed with heavy Chinese casualties. General Peng Dehuai was furious at the lack of progress and, despite protests from Generals Chen Geng and Liu Bocheng that the terrain was too difficult, ordered his troops to take Guanjianao at all costs, threatening the disbandment of the 129th Division (one of the three divisions of the Eighth Route Army) if they failed to retake Guanjianao. The Eighth Route Army launched multiple simultaneous assaults but despite achieving some gains, they were unable to dislodge the Japanese battalion from the two main positions. On October 31, the Eighth Route Army launched eighteen consecutive assaults with whatever strength they have left (the 25th and 38th Regiments of the 1st Death-Defying Column had suffered heavy casualties on the previous day and could only muster one battalion each for the assaults). However, despite the loss of their commander that day, the Japanese troops held on and resisted annihilation. With the threat of Japanese reinforcements soon to be arriving, General Peng Dehuai ordered his troops to abandon the siege and withdraw.
The official history of the Eighth Route Army reported suffering more than 600 casualties in this battle. However, the 25th and 38th Regiments of the 1st Death-Defying Column reported suffering 589 killed and 1,570 wounded in this battle alone and had only several hundred troops left after. The 769th Regiment of the 385th Brigade, the 772nd Regiment of the 386th Brigade, and the Special Forces Regiment all reported suffering considerable thought without any actual figure with the Special Forces Regiment reduced from thirteen infantry companies and one machine gun to nine companies after. The casualties of the two regiments of the New 10th Brigade and the 16th Regiment of the 386th Brigade were unclear, but the 16th Regiment commander was killed and the New 10th Brigade commander was wounded during this battle. Actual casualties were estimated to be three to four thousands out of more than 10,000 troops, and it is unknown why the official history of the Eighth Route Army gave a much reduced figure for its casualties. Nevertheless the casualty rate would not be so severe in just two days if the Eighth Route Army had dispatched company-sized units one at a time, especially from the 1st Death-Defying Column which was nearly destroyed. The Japanese actually gave a much smaller casualty claim for the Chinese with 126 abandoned corpses while the Okazaki battalion suffered 50 killed and 99 wounded. The reason for this might be because the Japanese troops of the detachment could not accurately count the enemy casualties while fighting for survival and the Eighth Route Army might have evacuated the bodies of the deadapplying your logic for the Japanese, concealing their own casualties) before Japanese reinforcements arrived. Cent58 (talk) 12:26, 17 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
Chinese diaries by officers and politicians are far more likely to be biased against their own side while Japanese official accounts are aimed at glorifying their own side. China had factional disputes between warlords and political factions like New Guangxi clique and leadership often used disguised "self criticism" to blame other factions and generals or undermine them. During Ichigo, Chiang could have mentioned the Ili rebellion as an excuse to western officers as to why his troops were tied up. He did not and American reports were that he and the New Guangxi clique and various warlords were engaged in a power struggle that prevented any offensives after Hengyang. According to the American war history on Stillwell's problems, Shunroku Hata even suspected that a dispute between Chiang and the New Guangxi clique was why Guilin was left lightly defended and that someone was conserving their forces to undermine the other instead of fighting. Chennault mentioned Soviet involvement in the Ili rebellion in his correspondence with Washington as an explanation for Ichigo. Chiang and other Chinese officers mention none of these and just engaged in "self criticism" which were in fact politicak attacks on other officers to undermine them or not reinforcing them.
Meanwhile Japan used bioweapons and chemical weapons at Taierzhuang, Wanjialing, Guangzhou in Henan, south Shanxi, Hankou, battle of Wuhan, West Suiyuan, Baoshan during the defence of the Salween river in May 1942, Zhejiang-Jiangxi campaign, Changde, Hengyang, Changsha.
American journalists and military heard reports of mustard gas in Wuhan and Yichang and American military officers personally saw chemical weapons and bioweapons usage in western Yunnan during Saleeen river battles and Tengchong and in northern Burma. Krips15 (talk) 17:27, 17 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
The "History of the Anti-Japanese War" was not using Chinese Generals' "self-criticism" for the overall battle process so I'm not sure why any of what you said has any relevance. Contemporary Chinese and Japanese sources both put it as a Chinese failure, and believing otherwise is just cope.
The 13th Division was in a bitter struggle and was in a threat of annihilation, but was not "nearly annihilated". Lieutenant General Uchiyama Eitaro was preparing for a possibility that no help was coming, and the 13th Division reported his intention to pressure the IJA command to relieve them. And it worked, as when Lieutenant General Anami heard that the 13th Division's entire staff were planning to commit seppuku, he ordered available forces to counterattack the Chinese besieging Yichang. Even before reinforcements had arrived, the Chinese offensive on October 10 had bogged down due to muddy terrain as a result of heavy rain. There's no claim in the "History of the Anti-Japanese War" or contemporary sources that the 13th Division was near destruction. The 13th Division lost twice as many troops in the 1939 Winter Offensive and Battle of Zaoyang-Yichang and four times as many in the Battle of Shanghai, but in none of these cases were they "nearly annihilated". Soviet advisors were also not free of their biases or knew the actual battlefield situations of the Chinese and Japanese forces. The Sixth War Zone was already struggling against one Japanese division, do you think they would be able to fight against more than three?
It is not to me. You quote my two examples and then asked if there are any more, but you did not specify what examples you were thinking of, whether it is specifically in Burma or just in general where small Japanese unit defeated a much larger Chinese force.
Also all of these had gone too far off topic from the original issues. You still haven't acknowledged and explained your false interpretation of your own source that spread a narrative and your issues with my edits for the NRA conscription that you demanded from me. Until then I won't be answering any more of your reply here. Cent58 (talk) 02:49, 18 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
"It is not to me. You quote my two examples and then asked if there are any more, but you did not specify what examples you were thinking of, whether it is specifically in Burma or just in general where small Japanese unit defeated a much larger Chinese force."
it kind of seems to me that you just took what I asked out of context on purpose to use as an opportunity to boast to me. Krips15 (talk) 22:02, 18 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
"The Japanese 13th Division was also not getting 'nearly annihilated' or 'slaughtered' by the Sixth War Zone’s counterattack. From the start of the offensive on September 28, the 13th Division suffered nearly 600 combat deaths including men who died of their wounds until November 15 according to the decoration archives by the Japanese Decoration Bureau and Army Ministry"
the Japanese commander of the 13th Division: Uchiyama was preparing to kill himself and burning all documents, and the soviet advisors who took part in the battle all give accounts which paints another picture Krips15 (talk) 18:53, 17 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
"Your question was not very clear to me so sorry about that. I’m also going to answer all your replies here."
I think it was pretty clear what I was implying when i asked you to provide more examples of american trained units doing poorly like you said? Krips15 (talk) 19:09, 17 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
at Yichang, the Japanese were getting slaughtered from their well fortified positions and had to withdraw the troops attacking Changsha as well as dropping mustard gas, the 13th Division was nearly annihilated
The Chinese force only withdrew voluntarily from Yichang because of political reasons
Why does Senshi Sosho not mention a single instance of Japanese using chemical weapons and biological weapons when its well documented that they did and how does that make it reliable? Did Americans drop mustard gas and cholera on Japanese in Mount Song and Tengchong, did they use the full extent of their "superior technology"? What are the Japanese casualty statistics for Yichang in 1941, and how are they reliable when Senshi Sosho wouldn't even mention the mass gas attack? Japan committed a mass gas attack with mustard gas at Yichang but described the battle in Senshi Sosho without mentioning it so how can anything they say be reliable? Japanese were getting slaughtered in their well fortified positions at Yichang until they desperstely pulled back all their troops attacking Changsha to Yichang, dropped tons of mustard gas bombs and attacking Chinese troops had no gas masks. The Chinese offensive was only stopped for political reasons. Russian advisors assessed that the Japanese would have been crushed despite them using gas. https://books.google.ca/books?id=YwitEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA296https://books.google.ca/books?id=GZN3EQAAQBAJ&pg=PT162 Japan dropped tons of cholera and bubonic plague bombs on Baoshan in May 1942, why the Japanese army failed to seize it and cross the Salween. America had mustard gas and bioweapons and did not use them, while Japan used the full extent of its WMDs and did not mention them in any Senshi Sosho report. Japan's cholera and bubonic plague bombs should have wiped out the Chinese army in Baoshan east of the Salween in May 1942 and enable Japanese to cross without resistance. Why did they fail to do that, while Japan bombing their own soldiers with cholera and bubonic plague in Zhejiang forced the Japanese army to retreat. There's nothing comparable in any Chinese records of using weapons of mass destruction, losing despite it and not mentioning it. When did Chinese use mustard gas bombs and cholera filled bombs against Tengchong and Mount Song like Japan did in Yichang, Hengyang, Baoshan and countless other battles? Krips15 (talk) 15:42, 16 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
also i think the battle of Guanjianao is similar to the Battle of Mount Song
in both battles, the Chinese attackers only sent a few hundred or so soldiers to attack the japanese positions at any given moment, meaning japanese troops defending these positions only had to face these small chinese attacking forces.
Japanese occupied a mountainous position which restricted the Chinese attackers from sending more than a company or so of soldiers to attack is likely what happened at Guanjianao Krips15 (talk) 19:08, 16 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
Regarding the Salween river crossing attempt, I've found the statistics for all actions of the 56th Division during the Japanese Invasion of Burma which I had put in the Defence of the Salween River page. The 56th Division recorded not a single casualty suffered by the Sakaguchi task force at the Salween River front from May 5 to May 9, 1942 (the same period recorded by the Chinese Army for the 36th Division's defenses of the east bank) while claiming 500 abandoned enemy corpses. This is probably why it is not recorded in Senshi Sosho because it was a small action with no losses suffered. Even the battle summary of the 56th Division for this fourth phase of the Burma campaign only mentioned it briefly before the Sakaguchi task force went on to occupy Tengchong. I've also found the statistics of the 56th Division for the Chinese counteroffensive and the Chinese 71st Army performed admirably during the engagement, suffering approximately 2,000 killed, wounded, or missing while the 56th Division suffered approximately 250 killed or wounded. Among the three Chinese divisions the 2nd Reserve Division seemed to have performed the best. Cent58 (talk) 14:52, 20 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
Are American AVG pilots who saw columns of Japanese defeated/massacred by NRA troops as well as columns of Japanese tanks and trucks burning liars? Krips15 (talk) 21:47, 20 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
The Japanese statistics sourced were made right at the end of an campaign or operation so there could be some not-yet-reported casualties, and I also could not find the statistics for actions of the 56th Division from May 15 to May 20, 1942. Actual losses of the 56th Division by June 10 were 227 killed and 19 died of wounds. Among the statistics I could find, the 56th Division lost 111 killed in the Burma Campaign until May 14, 70 killed in the 71st Army’s counterattack from May 21 to May 31, and 11 killed in mopping-up operations from June 1 to June 9, which leave 35 KIAs. Not all can be assumed to have been killed from May 14 to May 20 as there might be some casualties in the Burma Campaign that were originally not recorded due to time constraint. Of the 19 who died of wounds, at least more than half were from the Burma Campaign as the number of wounded there was twice the number of wounded in the Chinese counterattack. So even at a maximum there might be several dozen more Japanese troops killed in the Salween river campaign. However, there’s no such possibility for the attempted river crossing as the statistics made it clear the Sakaguchi task force fought along the Salween river from May 5 to May 9 (same period as recorded by the Chinese Army) with no casualties while claiming enemy casualties. Cent58 (talk) 08:04, 21 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
There were columns of destroyed trucks and tanks all the way from the Salween to Longling to Wanding. Senshi Sosho also lied and falsely stated that Chinese fled far beyond the Salween river implying the wast bank was totally unguarded and that Japan voluntarily chose not to cross, not stating that Chinese just guarded the east bank of the river.
The Japanese defences there were designed for 300 men which is where the number came from
you didn't explain why Senshi Sosho left that out Senshi Sosho implies only 75 Japanese were fighting there
The American military history said the Japanese defences were designed to accommodate 300 and you don't explain why Senshi Sosho left that out and said only 75 bodies were found, no matter what happened to the missing soldiers
Senshi Sōsho explicitly mentioned that that Higuma’s 2nd Battalion of the 148th Infantry Regiment to be defending Qiaotoujie on page 84 with an illustration on page 85 showing that the battalion was responsible for the Lengshuigou Front (including Zhaigongfang, Mamien Pass, and Qiaotoujie). Pages 87 to 88 and pages 90 to 92 described the bitter battles the battalion fought against at more than 2,000 troops of the 198th division and 2nd reserve division of the 54th army at the Lengshuigou Front from the middle until the end of May with the battalion suffering heavy casualties and running out of supplies. Page 100 then detailed the rescue of the Higuma battalion by two battalions, which engaged the 198th division and 2nd reserve division near Qiaotoujie and Mamien Pass before relieving the struggling battalion on June 13 and then retreating together, abandoning the positions to the victorious Chinese. So no, Senshi Sōsho did not imply that there were only 75 troops in the area that were all killed, but a battalion, which, while suffering heavy casualties, managed to break out intact. The translation was used in Senshi Sōsho merely to show the numerically-superior Chinese Army facing great hardships against the heroic acts of the Japanese troops.
Even the Chinese wikipedia for the battle of Tengchong mentioned the Higuma battalion’s defenses of Lengshuigou, Zhaigongfang, Mamien Pass, and Qiaotoujie, and the rescue of the battalion by two other Japanese battalion on June 13, with the Chinese occupying Zhaigongfang soon after. These are present in the Senshi Sōsho which you claimed weren’t there. If you are going to source a passage from a book, at least read the rest of the chapter that contained the passage. Like I saw that you also posted the claim of the cannibalism of more than 200 Japanese corpses in the Senshi Sōsho page even though I already told you that that speculation was debunked by your own source. Cent58 (talk) 13:48, 13 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
Also, page 290 stated that Higuma's 2nd Battalion of the 148th Infantry Regiment still had 650 troops even after its losses in the earlier fighting at Lengshuigou, so the strength recorded in Senshi Sōsho is larger than what was claimed by the Americans. The battalion was actually the most intact among all units that would defend Tengchong by that time, accounting for nearly a third of the total strength. Cent58 (talk) 14:14, 13 July 2026 (UTC)Reply
