Talk:Problem of universals

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universals are nature exsplained by humans. Time for instants, we took something that we can feel and know called the past, thanks to memeroy muscles, and put a symbol on certail similar lengths to make things easier, and you know how the easy ways in life make the real things darker or simplafied, or even forgotten. Well we took qulitys in events that are similar and put a name or (symbol)on them called personalities. personalities are just the spirit shown threw the body. Person-ality, or ,human-spirituallity, or, duelality. a easy human way to look at universals is to thinks about it like this. there are a million different traits and we all exsperience them, but what make us our own independent soul is how long we choose to recide in certain ones. becoming a higher being means to relize the ones that cause ulitment good and that serve youself, others, and your desions.

Yikes! As a Nominalist, I take offense to the way the Nominalism section was written - it actually attacks it, saying that Nominalism "just seems insane"! Perhaps I'll tone it down a bit, switching some of those oddly first-person sentences to more unbiased thirds. - Flammicidia

As a nominalist, how can you even talk about "a bit" :P AnarchyElmo 05:43, 6 July 2007 (UTC) [reply ]

Any objective analysis of Nominalism can only expose its incoherency :O) - MWAK--217.122.44.226 09:30, 7 Jul 2004 (UTC)

Wikipedia is not a forum. Talk pages exist for the purpose of discussing how to improve articles. Talk pages are not mere general discussion pages about the subject of the article...

Surely the section on Nominalism in this article diverges greatly from the NPOV? Turns of phrase like "This sound right to me." should also probably not be included in an encylopedia, to say nothing of "spooky never never lands". As a (Platonic) realist I find it all mildly jarring, although somewhat amusing. - J.M.

Indeed. This section is POV both in terms of unique (individual) point of view and the universalist vs. nominalist dichotomy. As a mere dabbler in formal philosophy, I am not in a position to fix this error myself. Who wants a crack at it? -- Erik Carson 05:22, 2004 May 16 (UTC)

I fixed the Nominalism section. Almost all of it more belongs on either the nominalism page or an a 'talk' page on nominalism not in the problem of universals page. Well, actually it's not fixed, just pruned and NPOV is attempted to be restored. The last sentence I put in about reliance on base assumptions for any philosophical answer to the problem of universals, is what should be expanded upon for this article. Examples of different beliefs one may assume to get around this problem belong on separate pages.

A one-line summary of nominalism and a clearer explaination of Berkeley's position would be very helpful anyway.

The text is indicative of uncertainty, e.g.

"Three facts about universals, or constraints ... (if these constraints have been correctly stated) ... In other words, we can (if they are correctly stated) take these three facts as background assumptions. Definitely, we have to have some background assumptions, or else we would not have any tools to evaluate any theory of universals.

Are these three facts, or constraints, generally accepted as the criteria for evaluating how well a theory resolves the Problem of Universals?

- Universals can be multiply instantiated

- Universals are abstract

- Universals are referents of general terms - rparker@patmedia.net

In philosophy, there is no consensus on anything. However you have to start from something (no, there's no consensus on that either) and as far as these things go, these criteria are pretty useful and indeed often used. I use them myself :o) - MWAK--217.122.44.226 09:30, 7 Jul 2004 (UTC)

Universals are at least the first---i.e. multiply instantiated. There is then room to have different views about whether they are always abstract or the referents of general terms. One can still hold that some universals are concrete (e.g. Aristotle). And it's not a primarily semantic issue, so it shouldn't be formulated in terms of the referents of terms. - Jaymay (talk) 22:50, 26 June 2008 (UTC) [reply ]

And there is consensus in philosophy about many things. Philosophy is not as different from other disciplines in that respect. I understand many people think otherwise, but it's a misconception. Not all scientists agree about everything in their field. Maybe there is more consensus in the empirical sciences than in philosophy, but that's compatible with there being some consensus on some things in philosophy. - Jaymay (talk) 21:22, 29 June 2008 (UTC) [reply ]

Heraclitus' ideas were predated by Gautama Buddha - for which there are many examples in which, over the period of 40 years, Buddha set the groundwork for the exposition of nominalism far more extensive and profound than that of Heraclitus. As most Greek nominalists postdate Buddha, it is quite possible that they were substantially influenced by the ideas arising from his lectures. Certainly, by the Ashokan cultural dispersion around 250 BCE, Buddhist philosophy spread as far as Rome and the Levant. The Buddhist views centre on anatman - non-essentialism, but extend to 'subtle impermanence' - the basis of Heraclitus' famous assertion. In general, for Buddhism, there is no problem of universals - universals are samvrti - existing only within those conventions that accept them. (20040302 11:24, 1 Dec 2004 (UTC))

Feel free to edit, amend, overturn, and scramble the article appropriately to include the material you wish included. This is wikipedia, after all. --Christofurio 13:16, Dec 1, 2004 (UTC)

I would like to add that the Buddha section is 'Asiocentric', 'Eastcentric' or 'Buddhacentric' (please use a more appropriate definition if possible), and is very speculative. It assumes that Buddha is the beginning of nominalism, and I think it is not useful to try and state such terms. Philosophy should be at the very least useful, and not to promote the foundations of a thing (for surely this means that some form of nominalism came before Buddha, and in any case it becomes an uneconomical discussion), rather than to portray the similarities between two things to avoid such prejudice and bias. This sections needs to pay serious attention to this matter or should just quite simple be removed until its neutrality can be attended to

I'm surprised at the lack of mention of the Australian philosopher David Armstrongs extensive thought on universals, his Immanent Realism about universals is particularly satisfying in dissolving concerns about uninstantiated universals and in removing the need for an abstract realm of them. Craig Wood - boneyboy@gmail.com

I think this page needs better introductory material that sums up what the general problem of universals IS before going into the details of its philosophical history.

Agreed - I went here expecting a good summary of the problem to get me started on a philosophy assignment, but it jumped from saying it is a problem (not what the problem is) in several areas to discussing Buddha's lectures on nominalism. 141.218.136.102 16:53, 12 July 2007 (UTC) [reply ]

I tried to improve the intro along these lines. Hopefully it's better. - Jaymay (talk) 22:53, 26 June 2008 (UTC) [reply ]

Much of the information on this page is incorrect and displays a gross bias in its philosophical position. antirealist and pragmatist answers to the problem of universals are not mentioned, nor are russell's linguistic analysis or wittgenstein's "family resemblence" solution. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by JFQ (talk • contribs) 23:27, 23 March 2006 (UTC1)

I agree. Even to the details like "As the middle ages waned and the Renaissance approached..." assumes a POV. I was under the impression that the Renaissance was a culmination of processes begun in the middle ages and far from 'waning', exploded like a firework in various directions. - Anon

Added expert tag as a consequence of the above requests. Lucidish 22:20, 17 April 2006 (UTC) [reply ]

I wrote the bulk of this article as it now stands, including that phrase about the waning of the middle ages. It is a traditional metaphor. http://www.age-of-the-sage.org/history/historian/Johan_Huizinga.html

You could still say that, traditional or not, it implies a POV. Possible, but then doesn't the "explosion like a firework" image? Would the latter be more encyclopedia than the former? --Christofurio 04:28, 19 November 2006 (UTC) [reply ]

There's an entire separate page floating around somewhere linked from Abelard which tackles the Mediaeval situation much better than here (thinks: could be in French Wiki). This is a page full of waffle, imho: get specific, folks, please. The restructuring should be from the ontological into subjective viewpoints, which are by definition POV. Another problem is that there are as many classifications as there are philosophers, and then some, eg Paris 1180 has Realists vs Nominalist with Conceptualism in between, now we appear to have Scientific String Theoreticians headed towards Philosophic Existentialists somewhere on territory defined by Godel and Oppenheimer, under the original inspiration of Einstein - and there are links between them (see Godel). Can someone contact me to draft a better section?Jel 13:57, 4 September 2007 (UTC) [reply ]

I agree, this is one of the poorest articles I have read on Wikipedia and actually would significantly impede anyone's understanding of the subject of nominalism —Preceding unsigned comment added by Kantsghost (talk • contribs) 14:42, 1 February 2008 (UTC) [reply ]

Agreed. This article needs major changes. I've tried to make some. It needs less history and more explanation of the main positions on the problem and arguments for and against each position. - Jaymay (talk) 22:52, 26 June 2008 (UTC) [reply ]

Ayn Rand, the philosopher and creator of Objectivist philosophy has solved this problem.

Basic summary is here: http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?pagename=objectivism_pobs2

Has there been any updates on this? Shall I being writing a summary for this wikipage? -- Oleksandr 22:50, 6 March 2007 (UTC) [reply ]

I'm afraid I don't see anything new or different in this summary that hasn't been covered by earlier philosophers. Therefore, I would not be in favor of including Ayn Rand in this page. - Aldrichio 22:08, 7 March 2007 (UTC) [reply ]

Nt. - 1Z 20:15, 11 March 2007 (UTC) [reply ]

Does this topic have anything to do with the concept of qualia? There seems to be at least some similarity between it, quality (philosophy), and qualia, but IANAP, so don't quote me. Mmortal03 12:09, 25 September 2007 (UTC) [reply ]

I read the other article, and yes, I also think there are similarities. However, I believe these these similarities to be coincidental: Take any object, and the vast majority of other objects will share some relationship with it. 68.144.80.168 (talk) 13:07, 24 June 2008 (UTC) [reply ]

No, there is no need to mention qualia in this article. - Jaymay (talk) 22:51, 26 June 2008 (UTC) [reply ]

In the article, Conceptualism is grouped in as a type of nominalism. However, I think this is incorrect. Conceptionalism is better seen as a middle ground between nominalism and realism and, therefore, should probably have its own distinct heading/section.

Also, the way that Berkeley's nominalism is described is a bit misleading. Berkeley did not deny the existence of general ideas. Instead, he denied that general ideas can be developed in the way that Lockean abstraction develops them. This could probably be made more clear in the section (not that Berkeley was exactly clear about it himself). I can probably go ahead and make these changes myself, but I was curious about others opinions on this and/or if this has already been suggested in the past.Diehl1am (talk) 00:54, 25 February 2009 (UTC) [reply ]

Nominalism is the doctrine that universal properties do not exist in things, or more generally that they do not exist in the world. Realism, in this context, is the doctrine that particulars do have universals in them (e.g., 'blackness' inheres in some fashion in particular black marbles, which is what makes the marbles identifiable as being alike black). These two options exhaust all possibilities: either (at least some) universals are real (realism), or they are not real (nominalism). Conceptualism agrees with nominalism on this one relevant issue (and therefore is a form of nominalism): there is no 'blackness' of any sort in black objects. (Indeed, there isn't even a 'blackness' out there in the world like a Form. It simply does not exist in external reality, in any sense.) The only thing distinguishing conceptualism from other nominalist philosophies is that it tries to provide a certain sort of psychological explanation for the epistemological fact that we do identify different instances of blackness as 'the same blackness'—by saying that 'universals' are in fact mental. But clearly nominalism does not entail 'there are no mental entities which account for our recognizing similarities in objects', which is the only way conceptualism could be extracted from nominalism. -Silence (talk) 18:11, 27 September 2009 (UTC) [reply ]

Realise this is a reply to something from 2009, but I would like to reignite this question. There is some conceptual (ironically) confusion between nominalism and conceptualism. Their difference isn't adequately explained in the article, and what's more is that some individuals are frequently included under both headings (eg. Hume and Abelard). Some clarity I think would be helpful. Yr Enw (talk) 11:30, 23 August 2023 (UTC) [reply ]

At the beginning section of realism, the claim that Bertrand Russell as a Realist has an original research flag. This should be changed to a citation to (Russell, Bertrand (1912). "The World of Universals," in The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press.) which is in fact listed in the further reading, and contained within (Loux 2001) which has been cited. Sorry I can't fix this myself(Lucas(CA) (talk) 19:30, 22 July 2010 (UTC))[reply ]

Okay, this article is still a mess. I've made a few changes, but I reckon it might be easier to rewrite it completely.

I think the primary problem is that it is organised historically rather than synoptically. May I suggest something like this instead:

• Lede
• Realism
  • Platonic realism
  • Aristotelian realism
  • Contemporary realisms
    • Armstrong
  • Arguments
    • Third-man
    • (etc.)
• Nominalism
  • Medieval nominalists
  • Contemporary nominalists
  • Arguments
• Other views
  • Trope theory
  • Conceptualism
  • Pragmatism
  • Idealism (maybe?)

This may not be such a good layout if you simply want to understand the historical origin of the problem of universals. It's a synoptic/philosophical layout rather than a chronological one. But I think it would provide a better overview for someone trying to understand the dialectical back-and-forth between the two views and most importantly the philosophical reasons for why people have adopted certain views. Shall I just be bold and rewrite it? 'Cos it really is a bit rubbish at the moment. Heh. —Tom Morris 14:52, 3 January 2011 (UTC) [reply ]

You have my support, you may proceed. la gaie (talk) 03:35, 5 April 2011 (UTC) [reply ]

This page has an abundance of views from medieval philosophers (which is understandable, considering it was one of the most widely discussed problems in philosophy at the time), but Berkeley is the only modern philosopher on this page. I'd like to see Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, and Kant listed on here. --75.154.246.100 (talk) 14:32, 3 January 2012 (UTC) [reply ]

• Add moderate realism
• Add conceptualism (two varieties?)
• Grealy reduce Kant (I sure got what I asked for)
• Add exemplar theory
• Add trope theory
• Expand Penrose
• Add Katz

1Z (talk) 15:23, 5 December 2012 (UTC) [reply ]

I didn't reduce Kant but did move Kant. Wrote a new "Idealism" lead, too. The Kant stuff still needs to be re-written though. (Also, and most importantly, I re-wrote that junky, wonky opening paragraph.) Check it out! CircularReason (talk) 12:19, 7 December 2012 (UTC) [reply ]

Despite its length, and the interesting quality of the contributions, this article seems like an intellectual trompe l'oeil to me. The first line of the introduction states:
"In metaphysics, the problem of universals refers to the question of whether properties exist".
While defining the concept: "properties", even though in my opinion somewhat vaguely, it does not define the concept: "existance". How can there be a debate about a question whose terms are undefined? The question: "Does a thought exist?" can only be answered if one is clear about the terms. If a thought is considered to be a chemical message in a human brain then the answer would be probably be yes, assuming we consider chimical and brains and the like exist, which in normal parlance we do. Other definitions of thought though would require greater precision than normal about the term "existance", as clearly being hit by a thought is not the same as being hit by a brain (or a 2x4)!
Perhaps it is possible to deduce the debate from the commentaries in the article, but imo it would be helpful to set the issue out more plainly, proceeding from definitions and predicates to theory / evidence. At present the article seems to be strenuously nailing fog to the wall.
LookingGlass (talk) 17:05, 25 January 2013 (UTC) [reply ]

You may want to fix the typographical errors which cast a shadow on your contribution. __Ancheta Wis (talk | contribs) 20:26, 16 February 2013 (UTC) [reply ]

The opening statement misstates the issue; it would be better stated "In metaphysics, the problem of universals refers to the issue of how concepts or terms in language can be universal, while everything to which they purport to refer are individuals." (my phraseology).
As Gyula Klima put it, "Indeed, one may safely assert that as long as there is interest in the questions of how a human language obviously abounding in universal terms can be meaningfully mapped onto a world of singulars, there is a problem of universals, regardless of the details of the particular conceptual framework in which the relevant questions are articulated. Clearly, in this sense, the problem of universals is itself a universal, the universal problem of accounting for the relationships between mind, language, and reality."^[1] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.174.113.20 (talk) 00:42, 24 December 2014 (UTC) [reply ]

Gentelmen,

I'm used to compare the same lemmas in different languages (really necessary in many cases). Usually the english versions are great and have more detail and erudition. In this case however the german lemma on the subject seems to be much more detailed and firmly grounded in current research. Since I'm not from the the philosophy field, please allow me to leave just this remark here and not to act on it, since in this case event trying to translate seems to be futile for a non-expert.

CommonsRooke (talk) 07:03, 30 March 2013 (UTC) [reply ]

In metaphysics, the problem of universals is the problem of explaining how individuals which differ in number (such as Socrates and Plato) can have properties in common, such as being a man or being white. Peter Damian (talk) 18:15, 20 April 2015 (UTC) [reply ]

See [1]. Peter Damian (talk) 18:16, 20 April 2015 (UTC) [reply ]

@Peter Damian:That paper is unavailable Mr Damien and if I have grasped the concept, your statement refers only to an individual aspect. Would you please respond to my query below which I posted oblivious to this post. There is almost certainly an obvious error going on with the section unless I am totally off base, and the article proper is so meandering and referring and not really descriptive at all. I'm sure there is a simple leading explanation to be had here... ~ R.T.G 21:58, 12 August 2019 (UTC) [reply ]

Within the introduction I added a bit more depth to the explanation of the "problem of universals" and also included, what I believe to be a clearer example of the problem referenced from the sources added to the bibliography. These sources include: ^{[1] [2] [3]} I would appreciate any feedback on not only my edit, but on my references as well.Preciousg11 (talk) 04:56, 20 February 2019 (UTC) [reply ]

There seems to be an obvious error in the lead section here in that it describes a property as a universal, by claiming that a property is a property which is shared, obvious error. However, rewriting it is not straightforward in the sense of ensuring a description in practical laymans terms. Would I be correct thusly:-

• The problem of universals arises when attempting to describe a universal property as separate from the entities which share it.

Also I am finding the example of cup holders to be problematic:-

This concept seems to relate to nature in the sense of asking the question, does the shape of a flower form uniquely in each circumstance, or do the flowers parts attempt to exemplify a separately existing flower shape.

Whereas the idea of a cup holder referencing or being tied to a metaphysical circle, does not strike in me with same mode of enquiry...

I haven't studied deeply into it. I am not prepared to rewrite the section. But it needs a rewrite. Can anyone be a little more succinct before I attempt to discern it for myself? ~ R.T.G 21:50, 12 August 2019 (UTC) [reply ]

All I can say is that the article is a bit of a mess, and always has been. Peter Damian (talk) 06:25, 14 August 2019 (UTC) [reply ]

Wisdom flows from your words. A reduction so simple as my proposal will never be accepted, but perhaps if I read the whole article over the weekend, and try to describe that thereafter, that it then falls between the guides too... And whoever is watchful of the thing might be encouraged to water it a bit... ~ R.T.G 13:49, 14 August 2019 (UTC) [reply ]

Okay so, the concept does indeed seem to fairly close to what I tried to describe, so that much is fairly simple.

I like my example of the flower, however, better would be a discussion on published and historical resources to decide which are depended upon to explain the concept in the wider world. (Personally, all the way down this article I await to find something which ties the concept in with DNA, as DNA is, a sort of form through reference, but nevermind that...)

The significant content of the article seems to be the resultant paths of nominalism, conceptualism, and realism.

If my comments here are agreeable or undisputed, and I'm not overlooking something significant (there are many facets going on here), I'm prepared to rewrite the heading as suggested, simplify the examples, and swap out the cup example for the flower example (or a really significant commonly posed more stimulating example (breathe) than a cup holder, from literature would be better...) ~ R.T.G 20:31, 18 August 2019 (UTC) [reply ]

@Peter Damian: I've tried an edit, Peter. Apologies for the delay. I can see issues with it already, but I believe it is on the right track now. Previously it was not strictly following the sources. What do you think? ~ R.T.G 02:17, 20 May 2020 (UTC) [reply ]

Hello, I saw that this page was on the Philosophy project template and so I thought I would have a go at adding some meat to the various bones here. I have added a little on Duns Scotus (though I simultaneously wonder if he can be subsumed under the medieval realism section?) I have added to Boethius's entry, as he is an important figure in this field. I read a few articles on the matter and have mainly taken a lead from the Stanford Encyclopaedia page. My explanation is probably utterly dreadful, so any thoughts are welcome. Knucmo2 (talk) 21:23, 5 March 2020 (UTC) [reply ]

I think it would be good to split the medieval section properly into: 1) Boethius 2) Realists (following either Plato or Aristotle, broadly speaking) 3) Nominalists and 4) All of the rest. --Knucmo2 (talk) 00:53, 8 March 2020 (UTC) [reply ]

I am working away at the medievalists, but it is going to take a lot of reading to get their thoughts in encyclopaedic form. Please feel free to fine-tune what I have written. Knucmo2 (talk) 16:04, 22 March 2020 (UTC) [reply ]

I am not sure if you are the originator of the following, or if another has added it, but I feel like it has several issues (questionable relevance, mainly, although I think it may also need a bit of rephrasing):

Boethius maintained that the structure of language corresponds to the structure of reality, and that language creates what he regarded as philosophical babble of confused and contradictory accounts of the nature of things.^[1] To illustrate his view, suppose that although the mind cannot think of 2 or 4 as an odd number, as this would be a false representation, it can think of an even number that is neither 2 nor 4.^{[clarification needed ][original research? ]}

I've commented it out for now, but if other editors disagree, I'm happy to hand the decision over!

Himaldrmann (talk) 22:08, 17 October 2025 (UTC) [reply ]

In the introduction, as example with traits of daughters is mentioned, but is not included in the listed source, atleast according to Archive.org's in-book search mechanism. Could someone with the physical textbook confirm or deny its presence? I can do stuff! (talk) 02:03, 15 August 2025 (UTC) [reply ]

It is not anywhere within the listed source (that is, Sweeney's; it doesn't seem to be in Loux [1998/2017] or Loux [2001], either).

---

(Unrelated to your comment, but about the same example: the IP editor who denied that "male" or "female" are universals is confused about what a universal is, or is supposed to be; it is not required, or not necessarily required, that an entity be unalterable in order to possess universals: one can believe that universals exist, in the Platonic sense or the Aristotelian, yet nevertheless believe that individuals may participate in or instantiate different universals at different times; and so, too, can one deny universals without taking any particular stance upon change. Hence, fish that change sex have no bearing upon the question of universals, or upon what is or is not a universal—or not that I can see, anyway.

(I just figured I'd leave this here in case the example stays up—although it is indeed looking like an original contribution, so I don't know how long it will last, heh; I'm not removing it myself only because it seems basically correct, for all that.)

Cheers,

Himaldrmann (talk) 04:07, 23 October 2025 (UTC) [reply ]

I very much like the way the article looks at the problem in world philosophy, but I think it could do a better job introducing the problem of universals in a way that makes it more general and more relevant for today.

I realize that few philosophers deal with this topic directly anymore, but certainly not because anyone has found a tenable solution; no proposed solution enjoys anything close to universal consensus. Instead, it strikes me that most philosophers are trying to solve it whack‐a‐mole style, chasing its expressions as they pop up in other domains. The reader should understand this -- grasp the importance of the universal-particular distinction in their everyday life, as well as how the problems related to this distinction have not gone away at all but have just morphed.

In an email to friends in a philosophical discussion group, I sent the following. I'm not suggesting we use it as is, but I think it might be a good starting point.

The Problem of Universals

No one, to my knowledge, disputes that the world we perceive around us seems to follow rules, for example, the physical regularities of matter or the biological regularities of plant and animal life. Such rules are examples of universals — things that are the same (or appear to be the same or to which we assign sameness) from one particular occurrence to another.

Human artifacts are also good examples. Take a book, say Reality's Fugue. This book is on a shelf by my desk, but of course if you wanted to read it, you wouldn't have to borrow this one. Other copies are available. Indeed, when most people refer to a certain book or journal article, they're not referring to a particular printed or downloaded copy currently on one person's shelf or screen. They're referring to the "universal" book or article that anyone could read or download.

For another example, consider a word such as red. Notice how it can be printed in a variety of different ways: red, RED, Red, RED. Regardless of how different each particular example is, all are recognizably the same word. Something about each printed instance of the word is universal; it remains the same and permits recognition.

So we have a distinction between "universals" and the "particulars" that instance them. It is an essential distinction for all of us. To look at things and recognize them is to see particulars as instances of universals. You and I couldn’t distinguish prey from predator, friend from foe, or even food from the plate it sat on were we not able to place things into categories — in other words, to see them as instances of universals.

It is hard to think of anything in human life that doesn’t involve this distinction. All the properties shared by the things making up our world are universals, as are all numbers, words, rules of logic and math, and laws of physics. The individual occurrences of properties, numbers, words, and the rest, on the other hand, are particulars.

Similarly, the genetic code and structure of DNA are universals instanced in all DNA molecules. The zoological classes into which we classify creatures are universals instanced in the individual creatures falling into these classes. Every word we speak is a particular instance of a universal term, given meaning by its present context.

While the existence and importance of this distinction in our day-to-day lives may be obvious, the nature of universals and their relation to particulars are not and have been highly controversial for a very long time not only in Western philosophy but also in Indian and Chinese traditions.

In Western philosophy, the disagreement between Heraclitus (c. 535– 480 B.C.E.) and Parmenides (sixth or fifth century B.C.E.) over whether existence was ever-changing or eternal foreshadowed the tension between changeable particulars and enduring universals. For Heraclitus, every experience was fundamentally new and different (he reputedly said that "it is not possible to step into the same river twice"), which points to nature as a process of change. Such an account of nature finds its support in particulars in the sense that particulars differ from one time and place to the next. Parmenides, on the other hand, insisted that all existing things had their existence (their "is"-ness) in common and that existence or being was of one kind, unchanging, and eternal. In other words, he emphasized universals, or what stays the same from one time and place to the next.

Plato and Aristotle disagreed over the nature of universals themselves, specifically where they resided. Plato claimed that universals were separate from particulars and resided in a special realm of their own, while Aristotle argued that they were in the particulars themselves. Aristotle’s view is more consistent with our everyday experience of objects as themselves having properties and is, I expect, much more common today, although the abstract, universal nature of math and logic remains a compelling argument for Plato’s view.

The problem morphed again in the late middle ages. Our word "real" traces back to a debate beginning in the late eleventh century over whether universals are independent of the human mind, a debate that continues today in various forms. A modern analogue is the "instrumentalist" versus "realist" debate over whether or not theories of physics refer to mind independent universals.

The problem of universals also played a role in the demise of logical positivism as a 20th‐century philosophical movement. The positivists sought to show how experimental data (for example, what one sees through a telescope) could verify scientific theories (such as the laws governing celestial objects). They attempted to formulate logical "protocol statements" that would bridge the gap between the private sense data of direct experience and the public language of empirical science. After decades of effort, however, no satisfactory way to bridge this gap was ever found.

Today, the problem has morphed into a lot of areas. Here are a few listed by my AI (I'm assuming a rough but not-publishable-as-is accuracy here):

Science & Physics

Quantum Mechanics (Measurement Problem): The collapse of the wavefunction raises questions about whether the universal (the probabilistic superposition) or the particular (the observed outcome) is ontologically primary, and about how the universal description relates to the particular outcomes we observe.

Biological Species Problem: Are species real universals (natural kinds) or just convenient groupings of individuals? The debate between essentialist and population-based views of species echoes medieval disputes about universals.

Laws of Nature: Do laws describe real universals (like "all electrons have charge -1") or are they just regularities we project onto particulars?

Philosophy of Mind & Cognitive Science

Concept Formation: How does the mind grasp "redness" or "chairness"? Is there a universal concept instantiated in particulars, or just a family resemblance among cases?

AI & Machine Learning: Neural networks generalize from data — but what is the ontological status of the "features" they learn? Are they universals, or just statistical patterns with no metaphysical grounding?

Language & Semiotics

Meaning & Reference: When we use a word like "justice" or "tree," are we pointing to a universal essence, or just a convention tied to particular uses?

Translation & Cross-Cultural Semantics: The struggle to map concepts across languages often reveals the tension between assumed universals of meaning and culturally specific particulars.

Ethics & Political Philosophy

Human Rights: Are rights universal properties of persons, or culturally contingent constructs?

Justice & Equality: The universal principle ("all are equal") versus its messy instantiation in particular societies.

Identity Politics: The tension between universal categories (race, gender, class) and the irreducible particularity of lived experience.

Aesthetics & Art

Beauty: Is beauty a universal quality, or entirely subjective and particular?

Genres & Styles: When we classify art as "Romantic" or "Impressionist," are we naming real universals or just convenient groupings?

Metaphysics & Ontology

Mathematical Objects: Do numbers and sets exist as universals, or are they abstractions from particular instances?

Properties & Tropes: Is "redness" a universal shared by all red things, or just a collection of particular tropes (this redness, that redness)?

Contemporary Analogs

Data Science & Categories: Clustering algorithms face the same issue: are categories "out there" in the data, or imposed by us?

Social Sciences: Concepts like "culture," "class," or "religion" — are they universals with real explanatory power, or heuristic groupings of particulars? Fsbrainard (talk) 18:51, 15 November 2025 (UTC) [reply ]

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