Draft:Conditional electoral system

In political science and voting theory, conditional electoral systems ^{[1] [2] [3]} are in which whether one formula is used or not depends on the outcome of the other subsystem^[1] . In a broad sense of the term, many single-winner systems may also be conditional, such as the typical two-round system, where the second round is only held if not candidate has received more than 50% of the vote.

Among mixed electoral systems ^[1] , the conditional type of system is rare dependent combination of two systems^[4] . An example would be a rule that if a party has received 50% of the vote, it is entitled to all seats, otherwise proportional representation is used. Today, pure conditional systems are not typically used, but supermixed systems such as majority jackpot or minority jackpot have a conditional element. The conditional system is distinguished from the compensation (correction) model of dependent combination, where another formula always (unconditionally) applies but how it applies depends on the other subsystem.^[1]

A 1923 Italian law established that two-thirds of the seats were to be allocated to a party, provided that this party gets at least 25% of the vote. Remaining seats were distributed among the other parties. by PR. The majority jackpot (itself a fusion-correction-system) is therefore dependent on the vote share of the largest party.

In the 1953 Italian electoral law, 380/589 allocated as a majority jackpot if it received a majority of the vote, otherwise simple list-PR was used.

In the 1926 Romanian electoral law provided a plurality jackpot of 50% on the condition the largest party received 40% of the vote. The plurality jackpot rule would not apply if the largest party received less than 40%.

In French systems from 1919 and 1951, the conditional system applied on a district level: If a party got the majority of the vote, they got all seats in the district, but otherwise PR was used.^[1]

A conditional majority jackpot was once again introduced in Italy, in 2015 - but never used due to it being deemed unconstitutional^[5] . It would have guaranteed an absolute majority (340 seats) to a list, provided the list gains at least 40% of the votes in the first round. If no list achieves 40%, the jackpot would have been assigned to the winner of a second round.^[6]