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Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) as Transport for Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)
RFC 7350

Document Type RFC - Proposed Standard (August 2014)
Updates RFC 5928, RFC 5389
Authors M. Petit-Huguenin , G. Salgueiro
Last updated 2026年05月20日
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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IESG Responsible AD Spencer Dawkins
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RFC 7350
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Petit-Huguenin
Request for Comments: 7350 Jive Communications
Updates: 5389, 5928 G. Salgueiro
Category: Standards Track Cisco Systems
ISSN: 2070-1721 August 2014
 Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) as Transport
 for Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)
Abstract
 This document specifies the usage of Datagram Transport Layer
 Security (DTLS) as a transport protocol for Session Traversal
 Utilities for NAT (STUN). It provides guidance on when and how to
 use DTLS with the currently standardized STUN usages. It also
 specifies modifications to the STUN and Traversal Using Relay NAT
 (TURN) URIs and to the TURN resolution mechanism to facilitate the
 resolution of STUN and TURN URIs into the IP address and port of STUN
 and TURN servers supporting DTLS as a transport protocol. This
 document updates RFCs 5389 and 5928.
Status of This Memo
 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7350.
Petit-Huguenin & Salgueiro Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
Copyright Notice
 Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors. All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document. Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
 3. DTLS as Transport for STUN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
 4. STUN Usages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
 4.1. NAT Discovery Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
 4.1.1. DTLS Support in STUN URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
 4.2. Connectivity Check Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
 4.3. Media Keep-Alive Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
 4.4. SIP Keep-Alive Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
 4.5. NAT Behavior Discovery Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
 4.6. TURN Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
 4.6.1. DTLS Support in TURN URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
 4.6.2. Resolution Mechanism for TURN over DTLS . . . . . . . 7
 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
 6.1. S-NAPTR Application Protocol Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
 6.2. Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number . . . . . 9
 6.2.1. The "stuns" Service Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
 6.2.2. The "turns" Service Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
 Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
1. Introduction
 STUN [RFC5389] defines Transport Layer Security (TLS) over TCP
 (simply referred to as TLS [RFC5246]) as the transport for STUN due
 to additional security advantages it offers over plain UDP or TCP
 transport. But, TCP (and thus TLS-over-TCP) is not an optimal
 transport when STUN is used for its originally intended purpose,
 which is to support multimedia sessions. This is a well documented
 and understood transport limitation for real-time communications.
 DTLS-over-UDP (referred to in this document as simply DTLS [RFC6347])
 offers the same security advantages as TLS-over-TCP, but without the
 undesirable concerns.
2. Terminology
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL"
 in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] when
 they appear in ALL CAPS. When these words are not in ALL CAPS (such
 as "must" or "Must"), they have their usual English meanings, and are
 not to be interpreted as RFC 2119 key words.
3. DTLS as Transport for STUN
 STUN [RFC5389] defines three transports: UDP, TCP, and TLS. This
 document adds DTLS as a valid transport for STUN.
 STUN over DTLS MUST use the same retransmission rules as STUN over
 UDP (as described in Section 7.2.1 of [RFC5389]). It MUST also use
 the same rules that are described in Section 7.2.2 of [RFC5389] to
 verify the server identity. Instead of TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
 which is the default cipher suite for STUN over TLS, implementations
 of STUN over DTLS, and deployed clients and servers, MUST support
 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, and MAY support other cipher
 suites. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) cipher suites MUST be
 preferred over non-PFS cipher suites. Cipher suites with known
 weaknesses, such as those based on (single) DES and RC4, MUST NOT be
 used. Implementations MUST disable TLS-level compression. The same
 rules established in Section 7.2.2 of [RFC5389] for keeping open and
 closing TCP/TLS connections MUST be used as well for DTLS
 associations.
 In addition to the path MTU rules described in Section 7.1 of
 [RFC5389], if the path MTU is unknown, the actual STUN message needs
 to be adjusted to take into account the size of the (13-byte) DTLS
 Record header, the MAC size, and the padding size.
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RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
 By default, STUN over DTLS MUST use port 5349, the same port number
 as STUN over TLS. However, the Service Record (SRV) procedures can
 be implemented to use a different port (as described in Section 9 of
 [RFC5389]). When using SRV records, the service name MUST be set to
 "stuns" and the protocol name to "udp".
 Classic STUN [RFC3489] (which was obsoleted by [RFC5389]) defines
 only UDP as a transport, and DTLS MUST NOT be used. Any STUN request
 or indication without the magic cookie (see Section 6 of [RFC5389])
 over DTLS MUST always result in an error.
4. STUN Usages
 Section 7.2 of [RFC5389] states that STUN usages must specify which
 transport protocol is used. The following sections discuss if and
 how the existing STUN usages are used with DTLS as the transport.
 Future STUN usages MUST take into account DTLS as a transport and
 discuss its applicability. In all cases, new STUN usages MUST
 explicitly state if implementing the denial-of-service countermeasure
 described in Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6347] is mandatory.
4.1. NAT Discovery Usage
 As stated by Section 13 of [RFC5389], "...TLS provides minimal
 security benefits..." for this particular STUN usage. DTLS will also
 similarly offer only limited benefit. This is because the only
 mandatory attribute that is TLS/DTLS protected is the
 XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS, which is already known by an on-path attacker,
 since it is the same as the source address and port of the STUN
 request. On the other hand, using TLS/DTLS will prevent an active
 attacker to inject XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS in responses. The TLS/DTLS
 transport will also protect the SOFTWARE attribute, which can be used
 to find vulnerabilities in STUN implementations.
 Regardless, this usage is rarely used by itself, since using TURN
 [RFC5766] with Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) [RFC5245]
 is generally indispensable, and TURN provides the same NAT Discovery
 feature as part of an allocation creation. In fact, with ICE, the
 NAT Discovery usage is only used when there is no longer any resource
 available for new allocations in the TURN server.
 A STUN server implementing the NAT Discovery usage and using DTLS
 MUST implement the denial-of-service countermeasure described in
 Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6347].
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RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
4.1.1. DTLS Support in STUN URIs
 This document does not make any changes to the syntax of a STUN URI
 [RFC7064]. As indicated in Section 3.2 of [RFC7064], secure
 transports like STUN over TLS, and now STUN over DTLS, MUST use the
 "stuns" URI scheme.
 The <host> value MUST be used when using the rules in Section 7.2.2
 of [RFC5389] to verify the server identity. A STUN URI containing an
 IP address MUST be rejected, unless the domain name is provided by
 the same mechanism that provided the STUN URI, and that domain name
 can be passed to the verification code.
4.2. Connectivity Check Usage
 Using DTLS would hide the USERNAME, PRIORITY, USE-CANDIDATE,
 ICE-CONTROLLED, and ICE-CONTROLLING attributes. But, because
 MESSAGE-INTEGRITY protects the entire STUN response using a password
 that is known only by looking at the Session Description Protocol
 (SDP) exchanged, it is not possible for an attacker that does not
 have access to this SDP to inject an incorrect XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS,
 which would subsequently be used as a peer reflexive candidate.
 Adding DTLS on top of the connectivity check would delay, and
 consequently impair, the ICE process. Adding additional round trips
 to ICE is undesirable, so much that there is a proposal ([ICE-DTLS])
 to use the DTLS handshake used by the WebRTC Secure Real-time
 Transport Protocol (SRTP) streams as a replacement for the
 connectivity checks.
 STUN URIs are not used with this usage.
4.3. Media Keep-Alive Usage
 When STUN Binding Indications are being used for media keep-alive
 (described in Section 10 of [RFC5245]), it runs alongside an RTP or
 RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) session. It is possible to send these
 media keep-alive packets inside a separately negotiated non-SRTP DTLS
 session if DTLS-SRTP [RFC5764] is used, but that would add overhead,
 with minimal security benefit.
 STUN URIs are not used with this usage.
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RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
4.4. SIP Keep-Alive Usage
 The SIP keep-alive (described in [RFC5626]) runs inside a SIP flow.
 This flow would be protected if a SIP over DTLS transport mechanism
 is implemented (such as described in [SIP-DTLS]).
 STUN URIs are not used with this usage.
4.5. NAT Behavior Discovery Usage
 The NAT Behavior Discovery usage is Experimental and to date has
 never been effectively deployed. Despite this, using DTLS would add
 the same security properties as for the NAT Discovery usage
 (Section 4.1).
 The STUN URI can be used to access the NAT Discovery feature of a NAT
 Behavior Discovery server, but accessing the full features would
 require definition of a "stun-behaviors:" URI, which is out of scope
 for this document.
 A STUN server implementing the NAT Behavior Discovery usage and using
 DTLS MUST implement the denial-of-service countermeasure described in
 Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6347].
4.6. TURN Usage
 TURN [RFC5766] defines three combinations of transports/allocations:
 UDP/UDP, TCP/UDP, and TLS/UDP. This document adds DTLS/UDP as a
 valid combination. A TURN server using DTLS MUST implement the
 denial-of-service countermeasure described in Section 4.2.1 of
 [RFC6347].
 [RFC6062] states that TCP allocations cannot be obtained using a UDP
 association between client and server. The fact that DTLS uses UDP
 implies that TCP allocations MUST NOT be obtained using a DTLS
 association between client and server.
 By default, TURN over DTLS uses port 5349, the same port number as
 TURN over TLS. However, the SRV procedures can be implemented to use
 a different port (as described in Section 6 of [RFC5766]). When
 using SRV records, the service name MUST be set to "turns" and the
 protocol name to "udp".
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RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
4.6.1. DTLS Support in TURN URIs
 This document does not make any changes to the syntax of a TURN URI
 [RFC7065]. As indicated in Section 3 of [RFC7065], secure transports
 like TURN over TLS, and now TURN over DTLS, MUST use the "turns" URI
 scheme. When using the "turns" URI scheme to designate TURN over
 DTLS, the transport value of the TURN URI, if set, MUST be "udp".
 The <host> value MUST be used when using the rules in Section 7.2.2
 of [RFC5389] to verify the server identity. A TURN URI containing an
 IP address MUST be rejected, unless the domain is provided by the
 same mechanism that provided the TURN URI, and that domain name can
 be passed to the verification code.
4.6.2. Resolution Mechanism for TURN over DTLS
 This document defines a new Straightforward-Naming Authority Pointer
 (S-NAPTR) application protocol tag: "turn.dtls".
 The <transport> component, as provisioned or resulting from the
 parsing of a TURN URI, is passed without modification to the TURN
 resolution mechanism defined in Section 3 of [RFC5928], but with the
 following alterations to that algorithm:
 o The acceptable values for the transport name are extended with the
 addition of "dtls".
 o The acceptable values in the ordered list of supported TURN
 transports is extended with the addition of "Datagram Transport
 Layer Security (DTLS)".
 o The resolution algorithm check rules list is extended with the
 addition of the following step:
 If <secure> is true and <transport> is defined as "udp" but the
 list of TURN transports supported by the application does not
 contain DTLS, then the resolution MUST stop with an error.
 o The 5th rule of the resolution algorithm check rules list is
 modified to read like this:
 If <secure> is true and <transport> is not defined but the list
 of TURN transports supported by the application does not
 contain TLS or DTLS, then the resolution MUST stop with an
 error.
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RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
 o Table 1 is modified to add the following line:
 +----------+-------------+----------------+
 | <secure> | <transport> | TURN Transport |
 +----------+-------------+----------------+
 | true | "udp" | DTLS |
 +----------+-------------+----------------+
 o In step 1 of the resolution algorithm, the default port for DTLS
 is 5349.
 o In step 4 of the resolution algorithm, the following is added to
 the list of conversions between the filtered list of TURN
 transports supported by the application and application protocol
 tags:
 "turn.dtls" is used if the TURN transport is DTLS.
 Note that using the resolution mechanism in [RFC5928] does not imply
 that additional round trips to the DNS server will be needed (e.g.,
 the TURN client will start immediately if the TURN URI contains an IP
 address).
5. Security Considerations
 STUN over DTLS as a STUN transport does not introduce any specific
 security considerations beyond those for STUN over TLS detailed in
 [RFC5389].
 The usage of "udp" as a transport parameter with the "stuns" URI
 scheme does not introduce any specific security issues beyond those
 discussed in [RFC7064].
 TURN over DTLS as a TURN transport does not introduce any specific
 security considerations beyond those for TURN over TLS detailed in
 [RFC5766].
 The usage of "udp" as a transport parameter with the "turns" URI
 scheme does not introduce any specific security issues beyond those
 discussed in [RFC7065].
 The new S-NAPTR application protocol tag defined in this document as
 well as the modifications this document makes to the TURN resolution
 mechanism described in [RFC5928] do not introduce any additional
 security considerations beyond those outlined in [RFC5928].
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RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
6. IANA Considerations
6.1. S-NAPTR Application Protocol Tag
 This specification contains the registration information for one
 S-NAPTR application protocol tag in the "Straightforward-NAPTR
 (S-NAPTR) Parameters" registry under "S-NAPTR Application Protocol
 Tags" (in accordance with [RFC3958]).
 Application Protocol Tag: turn.dtls
 Intended Usage: See Section 4.6.2
 Interoperability considerations: N/A
 Security considerations: See Section 5
 Relevant publications: This document
 Contact information: Marc Petit-Huguenin <petithug@acm.org>
 Author/Change controller: The IESG
6.2. Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number
 This specification contains the registration information for two
 Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Numbers in the "Service
 Names and Transport Protocol Port Numbers/Service Name and Transport
 Protocol Port Number" registry (in accordance with [RFC6335]).
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RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
6.2.1. The "stuns" Service Name
 IANA has modified the following entry in the registry "Service Names
 and Transport Protocol Port Numbers/Service Name and Transport
 Protocol Port Number":
 Service Name: stuns
 PortNumber: 5349
 Transport Protocol: udp
 Description: Reserved for a future enhancement of STUN
 Assignee:
 Contact:
 Reference: RFC 5389
 So that it contains the following:
 Service Name: stuns
 Port Number: 5349
 Transport Protocol: udp
 Description: STUN over DTLS
 Assignee: IESG
 Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
 Reference: RFC 7350
 Assignment Notes: This service name was initially created by
 RFC 5389.
Petit-Huguenin & Salgueiro Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
6.2.2. The "turns" Service Name
 IANA has modified the following entry in the registry "Service Names
 and Transport Protocol Port Numbers/Service Name and Transport
 Protocol Port Number":
 Service Name: turns
 Port Number: 5349
 Transport Protocol: udp
 Description: Reserved for a future enhancement of TURN
 Assignee:
 Contact:
 Reference: RFC 5766
 So that it contains the following:
 Service Name: turns
 Port Number: 5349
 Transport Protocol: udp
 Description: TURN over DTLS
 Assignee: IESG
 Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
 Reference: RFC 7350
 Assignment Notes: This service name was initially created by
 RFC 5766.
7. Acknowledgements
 Thanks to Alan Johnston, Oleg Moskalenko, Simon Perreault, Thomas
 Stach, Simon Josefsson, Roni Even, Kathleen Moriarty, Benoit Claise,
 Martin Stiemerling, Jari Arkko, and Stephen Farrell for the comments,
 suggestions, and questions that helped improve this document.
Petit-Huguenin & Salgueiro Standards Track [Page 11]
RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
8. References
8.1. Normative References
 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [RFC3489] Rosenberg, J., Weinberger, J., Huitema, C., and R. Mahy,
 "STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
 Through Network Address Translators (NATs)", RFC 3489,
 March 2003.
 [RFC3958] Daigle, L. and A. Newton, "Domain-Based Application
 Service Location Using SRV RRs and the Dynamic Delegation
 Discovery Service (DDDS)", RFC 3958, January 2005.
 [RFC5245] Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment
 (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT)
 Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245, April
 2010.
 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
 [RFC5389] Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D. Wing,
 "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5389,
 October 2008.
 [RFC5626] Jennings, C., Mahy, R., and F. Audet, "Managing Client-
 Initiated Connections in the Session Initiation Protocol
 (SIP)", RFC 5626, October 2009.
 [RFC5764] McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer
 Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure
 Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 5764, May 2010.
 [RFC5766] Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using
 Relays around NAT (TURN): Relay Extensions to Session
 Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5766, April 2010.
 [RFC5928] Petit-Huguenin, M., "Traversal Using Relays around NAT
 (TURN) Resolution Mechanism", RFC 5928, August 2010.
 [RFC6062] Perreault, S. and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using Relays
 around NAT (TURN) Extensions for TCP Allocations", RFC
 6062, November 2010.
Petit-Huguenin & Salgueiro Standards Track [Page 12]
RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
 [RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
 Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
 Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
 Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165, RFC
 6335, August 2011.
 [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
 Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.
 [RFC7064] Nandakumar, S., Salgueiro, G., Jones, P., and M. Petit-
 Huguenin, "URI Scheme for the Session Traversal Utilities
 for NAT (STUN) Protocol", RFC 7064, November 2013.
 [RFC7065] Petit-Huguenin, M., Nandakumar, S., Salgueiro, G., and P.
 Jones, "Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN) Uniform
 Resource Identifiers", RFC 7065, November 2013.
8.2. Informative References
 [ICE-DTLS] Thomson, M., "Using Datagram Transport Layer Security
 (DTLS) For Interactivity Connectivity Establishment (ICE)
 Connectivity Checking: ICE-DTLS", Work in Progress, March
 2012.
 [SIP-DTLS] Jennings, C. and N. Modadugu, "Session Initiation Protocol
 (SIP) over Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", Work
 in Progress, October 2007.
Petit-Huguenin & Salgueiro Standards Track [Page 13]
RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
Appendix A. Examples
 Table 1 shows how the <secure>, <port>, and <transport> components
 are populated for a TURN URI that uses DTLS as its transport. For
 all these examples, the <host> component is populated with
 "example.net".
 +---------------------------------+----------+--------+-------------+
 | URI | <secure> | <port> | <transport> |
 +---------------------------------+----------+--------+-------------+
 | turns:example.net?transport=udp | true | | DTLS |
 +---------------------------------+----------+--------+-------------+
 Table 1
 With the DNS Resource Records (RRs) in Figure 1 and an ordered TURN
 transport list of {DTLS, TLS, TCP, UDP}, the resolution algorithm
 will convert the TURN URI "turns:example.net" to the ordered list of
 IP address, port, and protocol tuples in Table 2.
 example.net.
 IN NAPTR 100 10 "" RELAY:turn.udp:turn.dtls "" datagram.example.net.
 IN NAPTR 200 10 "" RELAY:turn.tcp:turn.tls "" stream.example.net.
 datagram.example.net.
 IN NAPTR 100 10 S RELAY:turn.udp "" _turn._udp.example.net.
 IN NAPTR 200 10 S RELAY:turn.dtls "" _turns._udp.example.net.
 stream.example.net.
 IN NAPTR 100 10 S RELAY:turn.tcp "" _turn._tcp.example.net.
 IN NAPTR 200 10 A RELAY:turn.tls "" a.example.net.
 _turn._udp.example.net.
 IN SRV 0 0 3478 a.example.net.
 _turn._tcp.example.net.
 IN SRV 0 0 5000 a.example.net.
 _turns._udp.example.net.
 IN SRV 0 0 5349 a.example.net.
 a.example.net.
 IN A 192.0.2.1
 Figure 1
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RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
 +-------+----------+------------+------+
 | Order | Protocol | IP address | Port |
 +-------+----------+------------+------+
 | 1 | DTLS | 192.0.2.1 | 5349 |
 | 2 | TLS | 192.0.2.1 | 5349 |
 +-------+----------+------------+------+
 Table 2
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RFC 7350 STUN over DTLS August 2014
Authors' Addresses
 Marc Petit-Huguenin
 Jive Communications
 1275 West 1600 North, Suite 100
 Orem, UT 84057
 USA
 EMail: marcph@getjive.com
 Gonzalo Salgueiro
 Cisco Systems
 7200-12 Kit Creek Road
 Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
 USA
 EMail: gsalguei@cisco.com
Petit-Huguenin & Salgueiro Standards Track [Page 16]

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