draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-site-local-02

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INTERNET DRAFT C. Huitema
<draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-site-local-02.txt> Microsoft
November 18, 2003 B. Carpenter
Expires June 18, 2004 IBM
 Deprecating Site Local Addresses
Status of this memo
 This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
 all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
 This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
 documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
 and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
 working documents as Internet-Drafts.
 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
 months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
 at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
 reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Abstract
 This document describes the issues surrounding the use of IPv6 site-
 local unicast addresses in their original form, and formally
 deprecates them. This deprecation does not prevent their continued
 use until a replacement has been standardized and implemented.
1 Introduction
 For some time, the IPv6 working group has been debating a set of
 issues surrounding the use of "site local" addresses. In its meeting
 in March 2003, the group reached a measure of agreement that these
 issues were serious enough to warrant a replacement of site local
 addresses in their original form. Although the consensus was far
 from unanimous, the working group confirmed in its meeting in July
 2003 the need to document these issues and the consequent decision
 to deprecate IPv6 site-local unicast addresses.
 Site-local addresses are defined in the IPv6 addressing architecture
 [RFC3513], especially in section 2.5.6.
 The remainder of this document describes the adverse effects of
 site-local addresses according to the above definition, and formally
 deprecates them.
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 Companion documents will describe the goals of a replacement
 solution and specify a replacement solution. However, the formal
 deprecation allows existing usage of site-local addresses to
 continue until the replacement is standardized and implemented.
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2 Adverse effects of site local addresses
 Discussions in the IPv6 working group outlined several defects of
 the current site local addressing scope. These defects fall in two
 broad categories: ambiguity of addresses, and fuzzy definition of
 sites.
 As currently defined, site local addresses are ambiguous: an address
 such as FEC0::1 can be present in multiple sites, and the address
 itself does not contain any indication of the site to which it
 belongs. This creates pain for developers of applications, for the
 designers of routers and for the network managers. This pain is
 compounded by the fuzzy nature of the site concept. We will develop
 the specific nature of this pain in the following section.
2.1 Developer pain, scope identifiers
 Early feedback from developers indicates that site local addresses
 are hard to use correctly in an application. This is particularly
 true for multi-homed hosts, which can be simultaneously connected to
 multiple sites, and for mobile hosts, which can be successively
 connected to multiple sites.
 Applications would learn or remember that the address of some
 correspondent was "FEC0::1234:5678:9ABC", they would try to feed the
 address in a socket address structure and issue a connect, and the
 call will fail because they did not fill up the "site identifier"
 variable, as in "FEC0::1234:5678:9ABC&1". The problem is compounded
 by the fact that the site identifier varies with the host
 instantiation, e.g. sometimes &1 and sometimes &2, and thus that the
 host identifier cannot be remembered in memory, or learned from a
 name server.
 In short, the developer pain is caused by the ambiguity of site
 local addresses. Since site-local addresses are ambiguous,
 application developers have to manage the "site identifiers" that
 qualify the addresses of the hosts. This management of identifiers
 has proven hard to understand by developers, and also hard to
 execute by those developers who understand the concept.
2.2 Developer pain, local addresses
 Simple client/server applications that do share IP addresses at the
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 application layer are made more complex by IPv6 site-local
 addressing. These applications need to make intelligent decisions
 about the addresses that should and shouldn't be passed across site
 boundaries. These decisions, in practice, require that the
 applications acquire some knowledge of the network topology. Site
 local addresses may be used when client and server are in the same
 site, but trying to use them when client and server are in different
 sites may result in unexpected errors (i.e. connection reset by
 peer) or the establishment of connections with the wrong node. The
 robustness and security implications of sending packets to an
 unexpected end-point will differ from application to application.
 Multi-party applications that pass IP addresses at the application
 layer present a particular challenge. Even if a node can correctly
 determine whether a single remote node belongs or not to the local
 site, it will have no way of knowing where those addresses may
 eventually be sent. The best course of action for these
 applications might be to use only global addresses. However, this
 would prevent the use of these applications on isolated or
 intermittently connected networks that only have site-local
 addresses available, and might be incompatible with the use of site-
 local addresses for access control in some cases.
 In summary, the ambiguity of site local addresses leads to
 unexpected application behavior when application payloads carry
 these addresses outside the local site.
2.3 Manager pain, leaks
 The management of IPv6 site local addresses is in many ways similar
 to the management of RFC 1918 [RFC1918] addresses in some IPv4
 networks. In theory, the private addresses defined in RFC 1918
 should only be used locally, and should never appear in the
 Internet. In practice, these addresses "leak". The conjunction of
 leaks and ambiguity ends up causing management problems.
 Names and literal addresses of "private" hosts leak in mail
 messages, web pages, or files. Private addresses end up being used
 as source or destination of TCP requests or UDP messages, for
 example in DNS or trace-route requests, causing the request to fail,
 or the response to arrive at unsuspecting hosts.
 The experience with RFC1918 addresses also shows some non trivial
 leaks, besides pacing these addresses in IP headers. Private
 addresses also end up being used as targets of reverse DNS queries
 for RFC1918, uselessly overloading the DNS infrastructure. In
 general, many applications that use IP addresses directly end up
 passing RFC1918 addresses in application payloads, creating
 confusion and failures.
 The leakage issue is largely unavoidable. While some applications
 are intrinsically scoped (eg. Router Advertisement, Neighbor
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 Discovery), most applications have no concept of scope, and no way
 of expressing scope. As a result, "stuff leaks across the borders".
 Since the addresses are ambiguous, the network managers cannot
 easily find out "who did it". Leaks are thus hard to fix, resulting
 in a lot of frustration.
2.4 Router pain, routing tables
 The ambiguity of site local addresses also creates problems for the
 routers. In theory, site local addresses are only used within a
 contiguous site, and all routers in that site can treat them as if
 they were not ambiguous. In practice, problem occurs when sites are
 disjoint, or when routers have to handle several sites.
 In theory, sites should never be disjoint. In practice, if site
 local addressing is used throughout a large network, some elements
 of the site will not be directly connected. This will create a
 demand to route the site-local packets across some intermediate
 network. In practice, this leads to an extensive use of tunneling
 techniques, or the use of multi-sited routers, or both.
 Ambiguous addresses have fairly obvious consequences on multi-sited
 routers. In classic router architecture, the exit interface is a
 direct function of the destination address, as specified by a single
 routing table. However, if a router is connected to multiple sites,
 the routing of site local packets depends on the interface on which
 the packet arrived. Interfaces have to be associated to sites, and
 the routing entries for the site local addresses are site-dependent.
 The route management software and the routing protocols have to
 account for the site boundaries. This can be particularly hard to do
 when sites are adjacent or overlap.
 In multi-homed routers, such as for example site border routers, the
 routing process should be complemented by a filtering process, to
 guarantee that packets sourced with a site local address never leave
 the site. This filtering process will in turn interact with the
 routing of packets, as it may cause the drop of packets sent to a
 global address, even if that global address happen to belong to the
 target site.
 In summary, the ambiguity of site local addresses makes them hard to
 manage in multi-sited routers, while the requirement to support
 disjoint sites creates a demand for such routers.
2.5 Site is an ill-defined concept
 The current definition of scopes follows an idealized "concentric
 scopes" model. Hosts are supposed to be attached to a link, which
 belongs to a site, which belongs to the Internet. Packets could be
 sent to the same link, the same site, or outside that site. However,
 experts have been arguing about the definition of sites for years
 and have reached no sort of consensus. That suggests that there is
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 in fact no consensus to be reached.
 Apart from link-local, scope boundaries are ill-defined. What is a
 site? Is the whole of a corporate network a site, or are sites
 limited to single geographic locations? Many networks today are
 split between an internal area and an outside facing "DMZ",
 separated by a firewall. Servers in the DMZ are supposedly
 accessible by both the internal hosts and external hosts on the
 Internet. Does the DMZ belong to the same site as the internal host?
 Depending on whom we ask, the definition of the site scope varies.
 It may map security boundaries, reachability boundaries, routing
 boundaries, QOS boundaries, administrative boundaries, funding
 boundaries, some other kinds of boundaries, or a combination of
 these. It is very unclear that a single scope could satisfy all
 these requirements.
 There are some well known and important scope-breaking phenomena,
 such as intermittently connected networks, mobile nodes, mobile
 networks, inter-domain VPNs, hosted networks, network merges and
 splits, etc. Specifically, this means that scope *cannot* be mapped
 into concentric circles such as a naive link/local/global model.
 Scopes overlap and extend into one another. The scope relationship
 between two hosts may even be different for different protocols.
 In summary, the current concept of site is naive, and does not map
 operational requirements.
3 Development of a better alternative
 The previous section reviewed the arguments against site-local
 addresses. Obviously, site locals also have some benefits, without
 which they would have been removed from the specification long ago.
 The perceived benefits of site local are that they are simple,
 stable, and private. However, it appears that these benefits can be
 also obtained with an alternative architecture, for example
 [Hinden/Haberman], in which addresses are not ambiguous and do not
 have a simple explicit scope.
 Having non-ambiguous address solves a large part of the developers'
 pain, as it removes the need to manage site identifiers. The
 application can use the addresses as if they were regular global
 addresses, and the stack will be able to use standard techniques to
 discover which interface should be used. Some level of pain will
 remain, as these addresses will not always be reachable; however,
 applications can deal with the un-reachability issues by trying
 connections at a different time, or with a different address.
 Speculatively, a more sophisticated scope mechanism might be
 introduced at a later date.
 Having non ambiguous addresses will not eliminate the leaks that
 cause management pain. However, since the addresses are not
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 ambiguous, debugging these leaks will be much simpler.
 Having non ambiguous addresses will solve a large part of the router
 issues: since addresses are not ambiguous, routers will be able to
 use standard routing techniques, and will not need different routing
 tables for each interface. Some of the pain will remain at border
 routers, which will need to filter packets from some ranges of
 source addresses; this is however a fairly common function.
 Avoiding the explicit declaration of scope will remove the issues
 linked to the ambiguity of the site concept. Non-reachability can be
 obtained by using "firewalls" where appropriate. The firewall rules
 can explicitly accommodate various network configurations, by
 accepting of refusing traffic to and from ranges of the new non-
 ambiguous addresses.
 One question remains, anycast addressing. Anycast addresses are
 ambiguous by construction, since they refer by definition to any
 host that has been assigned a given anycast address. Link-local or
 global anycast addresses can be "baked in the code". Further study
 is required on the need for anycast addresses with scope between
 link-local and global.
4 Deprecation
 This document formally deprecates the IPv6 site-local unicast prefix
 defined in [RFC3513], i.e. 1111111011 binary or FEC0::/10. The
 special behavior of this prefix MUST no longer be supported in new
 implementations. The prefix MUST NOT be reassigned for other use
 except by a future IETF standards action. Future versions of the
 addressing architecture [RFC3513] will include this information.
 However, router implementations SHOULD be configured to prevent
 routing of this prefix by default.
 The references to site local addresses should be removed as soon as
 practical from the revision of the Default Address Selection for
 Internet Protocol version 6 [RFC3484], the revision of the Basic
 Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6 [RFC3493], and from the
 revision of the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing
 Architecture [RFC3513]. Incidental references to site local
 addresses should be removed from other IETF documents if and when
 they are updated. These documents include [RFC2772, RFC2894,
 RFC3082, RFC3111, RFC3142, RFC3177, RFC3316].
 Existing implementations and deployments MAY continue to use this
 prefix.
5 Security Considerations
 The site-local unicast prefix allows for some blocking action in
 firewall rules and address selection rules, which are commonly
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 viewed as a security feature since they prevent packets crossing
 administrative boundaries. Such blocking rules can be configured for
 any prefix, including the expected future replacement for the site-
 local prefix. If these blocking rules are actually enforced, the
 deprecation of the site-local prefix does not endanger security.
6 IANA Considerations
 IANA is specifically requested not to reassign the 1111111011 binary
 or FEC0::/10 prefix unless requested to do so by a future IETF
 standards action.
7 Copyright
 The following copyright notice is copied from RFC 2026 [Bradner,
 1996], Section 10.4, and describes the applicable copyright for this
 document.
 Copyright (C) The Internet Society November 14, 2003. All Rights
 Reserved.
 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph
 are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
 English.
 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees.
 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
8 Intellectual Property
 The following notice is copied from RFC 2026 [Bradner, 1996],
 Section 10.4, and describes the position of the IETF concerning
 intellectual property claims made against this document.
 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
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 intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
 pertain to the implementation or use other technology described in
 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
 might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
 has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
 IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
 standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
 claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances
 of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made
 to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
 proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification
 can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
 The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
 copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
 rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
 this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
 Director.
9 Acknowledgements
 The authors would like to thank Fred Templin, Peter Bieringer,
 Chirayu Patel, Pekka Savola, and Alain Baudot for their review of
 the initial draft. The text of section 2.2 includes 2 paragraphs
 taken from a draft by Margaret Wasserman describing the impact of
 site local addressing. Alain Durand pointed out the need to revise
 existing RFC that make reference to site local addresses.
10 References
 Normative References
 [RFC3513] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
 Architecture", RFC 3513, April 2003
 [RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
 Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
 Informative references
 [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.
 J. and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", RFC
 1918, February 1996
 [Hinden/Haberman] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6
 Unicast Addresses", work in progress.
 [RFC2772] Rockell, R. and R. Fink. "6Bone Backbone Routing
 Guidelines." RFC 2772, February 2000.
 [RFC2894] M. Crawford. "Router Renumbering for IPv6." RFC 2894,
 August 2000.
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INTERNET DRAFT Deprecating Site Local Addresses November 18, 2003
 [RFC3082] Kempf, J. and J. Goldschmidt. "Notification and
 Subscription for SLP." RFC 3082, March 2001.
 [RFC3111] E. Guttman. "Service Location Protocol Modifications for
 IPv6." RFC 3111, May 2001.
 [RFC3142] Hagino, J. and K. Yamamoto. "An IPv6-to-IPv4 Transport
 Relay Translator." RFC 3142, June 2001.
 [RFC3177] IAB, IESG. "IAB/IESG Recommendations on IPv6 Address." RFC
 3177, September 2001.
 [RFC3316] Arkko, J., Kuijpers, G., Soliman, H., Loughney, J. and J.
 Wiljakka. "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) for Some Second and
 Third Generation Cellular Hosts." RFC 3316, April 2003.
 [RFC3484] R. Draves. "Default Address Selection for Internet
 Protocol version 6 (IPv6)." RFC 3484, February 2003.
 [RFC3493] Gilligan, R., Thomson, S., Bound, J., McCann, J. and W.
 Stevens. "Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6." RFC 3493,
 February 2003.
 [RFC3513] Hinden, R. and S. Deering. "Internet Protocol Version 6
 (IPv6) Addressing Architecture." RFC 3513, April 2003.
11 Authors' Addresses
 Christian Huitema
 Microsoft Corporation
 One Microsoft Way
 Redmond, WA 98052-6399
 USA
 Email: huitema@microsoft.com
 Brian Carpenter
 IBM Corporation
 Sauemerstrasse 4
 8803 Rueschlikon
 Switzerland
 Email: brc@zurich.ibm.com
12 History of changes
12.1 Changes from draft-00 to draft-01 
 Changed the text in the introduction to say that the decision was
 "confirmed" in July 2003.
 Add some explanatory text in section 2.2, address leak, and section
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 2.3, routing pain.
 In section 4, and 5 change the erroneous "link local" to "site
 local".
 Add a reference to RFC 2119 describing the use of keywords.
 In section 5, qualify that the replacement of site local is only as
 secure if blocking rules are actually implemented at site
 boundaries.
12.2 Changes from draft-01 to draft-02 
 Inserted a new section "2.2 Developer pain, local addresses" to
 capture the pain caused by ambiguous addresses carried in
 application payloads.
 Added a paragraph in section 4 recommending the removal of
 references to site local addresses from several RFC. Added these RFC
 to the Reference section.
 Removed the reference to the draft "Addressing Requirements for
 Local Communications within Sites", in order to avoid references to
 drafts that may slow down document publication.
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INTERNET DRAFT Deprecating Site Local Addresses November 18, 2003
Table of Contents:
1 Introduction .................................................... 1
2 Adverse effects of site local addresses ......................... 2
2.1 Developer pain, scope identifiers ............................. 2
2.2 Developer pain, local addresses ............................... 2
2.3 Manager pain, leaks ........................................... 3
2.4 Router pain, routing tables ................................... 4
2.5 Site is an ill-defined concept ................................ 4
3 Development of a better alternative ............................. 5
4 Deprecation ..................................................... 6
5 Security Considerations ......................................... 6
6 IANA Considerations ............................................. 7
7 Copyright ....................................................... 7
8 Intellectual Property ........................................... 7
9 Acknowledgements ................................................ 8
10 References ..................................................... 8
11 Authors' Addresses ............................................. 9
12 History of changes ............................................. 9
12.1 Changes from draft-00 to draft-01 ............................ 9
12.2 Changes from draft-01 to draft-02 ............................ 10
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