| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Scope: Access Control
If the single factor is compromised (e.g. by theft or spoofing), then the integrity of the entire security mechanism can be violated with respect to the user that is identified by that factor.
|
|
Hide Activities |
Scope: Non-Repudiation
It can become difficult or impossible for the product to be able to distinguish between legitimate activities by the entity who provided the factor, versus illegitimate activities by an attacker.
|
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Architecture and Design |
Use multiple simultaneous checks before granting access to critical operations or granting critical privileges. A weaker but helpful mitigation is to use several successive checks (multiple layers of security).
|
|
Architecture and Design |
Use redundant access rules on different choke points (e.g., firewalls).
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 657 | Violation of Secure Design Principles |
| ChildOf | Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. | 693 | Protection Mechanism Failure |
| ParentOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 308 | Use of Single-factor Authentication |
| ParentOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 309 | Use of Password System for Primary Authentication |
| PeerOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 1293 | Missing Source Correlation of Multiple Independent Data |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1006 | Bad Coding Practices |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | |
| Implementation | |
| Operation |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
Password-only authentication is perhaps the most well-known example of use of a single factor. Anybody who knows a user's password can impersonate that user.
Example 2
When authenticating, use multiple factors, such as "something you know" (such as a password) and "something you have" (such as a hardware-based one-time password generator, or a biometric device).
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
Chat application skips validation when Central Authentication Service
(CAS) is enabled, effectively removing the second factor from
two-factor authentication
|
| Ordinality | Description |
|---|---|
|
Primary
|
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 975 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Architecture |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1418 | Comprehensive Categorization: Violation of Secure Design Principles |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.Maintenance
| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ISA/IEC 62443 | Part 4-1 | Req SD-3 | |
| ISA/IEC 62443 | Part 4-1 | Req SD-4 | |
| ISA/IEC 62443 | Part 4-1 | Req SI-1 |
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-16 | Dictionary-based Password Attack |
| CAPEC-274 | HTTP Verb Tampering |
| CAPEC-49 | Password Brute Forcing |
| CAPEC-55 | Rainbow Table Password Cracking |
| CAPEC-560 | Use of Known Domain Credentials |
| CAPEC-565 | Password Spraying |
| CAPEC-600 | Credential Stuffing |
| CAPEC-652 | Use of Known Kerberos Credentials |
| CAPEC-653 | Use of Known Operating System Credentials |
| CAPEC-70 | Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords |
| Submissions | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | |
|
2008年01月18日
(CWE Draft 8, 2008年01月30日) |
Pascal Meunier | Purdue University | |
| Contributions | |||
| Contribution Date | Contributor | Organization | |
| 2023年04月25日 | "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group | CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG | |
| Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443. | |||
| Modifications | |||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | |
| 2023年10月26日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples | |||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Mapping_Notes | |||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2022年10月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated References | |||
| 2021年03月15日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Alternate_Terms, Maintenance_Notes | |||
| 2020年12月10日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2020年08月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature | |||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2013年02月21日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences, Maintenance_Notes, Other_Notes | |||
| 2010年04月05日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |||
| 2009年05月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2009年01月12日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Name | |||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities | |||
| 2008年07月01日 | Eric Dalci | Cigital | |
| updated Time_of_Introduction | |||
| Previous Entry Names | |||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | ||
| 2009年01月12日 | Design Principle Violation: Reliance on a Single Factor in a Security Decision | ||
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