| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands |
Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability
The attacker may be able to create or overwrite critical files that are used to execute code, such as programs or libraries.
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Modify Files or Directories |
Scope: Integrity
The attacker may be able to overwrite or create critical files, such as programs, libraries, or important data. If the targeted file is used for a security mechanism, then the attacker may be able to bypass that mechanism. For example, appending a new account at the end of a password file may allow an attacker to bypass authentication.
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Read Files or Directories |
Scope: Confidentiality
The attacker may be able read the contents of unexpected files and expose sensitive data. If the targeted file is used for a security mechanism, then the attacker may be able to bypass that mechanism. For example, by reading a password file, the attacker could conduct brute force password guessing attacks in order to break into an account on the system.
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DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart |
Scope: Availability
The attacker may be able to overwrite, delete, or corrupt unexpected critical files such as programs, libraries, or important data. This may prevent the product from working at all and in the case of a protection mechanisms such as authentication, it has the potential to lockout every user of the product.
|
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string. Effectiveness: High |
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
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Operation |
Strategy: Firewall Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Effectiveness: Moderate Note:
An application firewall might not cover all possible input vectors. In addition, attack techniques might be available to bypass the protection mechanism, such as using malformed inputs that can still be processed by the component that receives those inputs. Depending on functionality, an application firewall might inadvertently reject or modify legitimate requests. Finally, some manual effort may be required for customization.
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| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 22 | Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') |
| ParentOf | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 37 | Path Traversal: '/absolute/pathname/here' |
| ParentOf | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 38 | Path Traversal: '\absolute\pathname\here' |
| ParentOf | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 39 | Path Traversal: 'C:dirname' |
| ParentOf | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 40 | Path Traversal: '\\UNC\share\name\' (Windows UNC Share) |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 22 | Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 22 | Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Implementation |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
AI/ML (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
In the example below, the path to a dictionary file is read from a system property and used to initialize a File object.
However, the path is not validated or modified to prevent it from containing relative or absolute path sequences before creating the File object. This allows anyone who can control the system property to determine what file is used. Ideally, the path should be resolved relative to some kind of application or user home directory.
Example 2
This script intends to read a user-supplied file from the current directory. The user inputs the relative path to the file and the script uses Python's os.path.join() function to combine the path to the current working directory with the provided path to the specified file. This results in an absolute path to the desired file. If the file does not exist when the script attempts to read it, an error is printed to the user.
However, if the user supplies an absolute path, the os.path.join() function will discard the path to the current working directory and use only the absolute path provided. For example, if the current working directory is /home/user/documents, but the user inputs /etc/passwd, os.path.join() will use only /etc/passwd, as it is considered an absolute path. In the above scenario, this would cause the script to access and read the /etc/passwd file.
The constructed path string uses os.sep to add the appropriate separation character for the given operating system (e.g. '\' or '/') and the call to os.path.normpath() removes any additional slashes that may have been entered - this may occur particularly when using a Windows path. The path is checked against an expected directory (/home/cwe/documents); otherwise, an attacker could provide relative path sequences like ".." to cause normpath() to generate paths that are outside the intended directory (CWE-23). By putting the pieces of the path string together in this fashion, the script avoids a call to os.path.join() and any potential issues that might arise if an absolute path is entered. With this version of the script, if the current working directory is /home/cwe/documents, and the user inputs /etc/passwd, the resulting path will be /home/cwe/documents/etc/passwd. The user is therefore contained within the current working directory as intended.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
Python package constructs filenames using an unsafe os.path.join call on untrusted input, allowing absolute path traversal because os.path.join resets the pathname to an absolute path that is specified as part of the input.
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Multiple FTP clients write arbitrary files via absolute paths in server responses
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ZIP file extractor allows full path
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Path traversal using absolute pathname
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Path traversal using absolute pathname
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Path traversal using absolute pathname
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Arbitrary files may be overwritten via compressed attachments that specify absolute path names for the decompressed output.
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Mail client allows remote attackers to overwrite arbitrary files via an e-mail message containing a uuencoded attachment that specifies the full pathname for the file to be modified.
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Remote attackers can read arbitrary files via a full pathname to the target file in config parameter.
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Remote attackers can read arbitrary files via an absolute pathname.
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Remote attackers can read arbitrary files by specifying the drive letter in the requested URL.
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FTP server allows remote attackers to list arbitrary directories by using the "ls" command and including the drive letter name (e.g. C:) in the requested pathname.
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FTP server allows remote attackers to list the contents of arbitrary drives via a ls command that includes the drive letter as an argument.
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Server allows remote attackers to browse arbitrary directories via a full pathname in the arguments to certain dynamic pages.
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Remote attackers can read arbitrary files via an HTTP request whose argument is a filename of the form "C:" (Drive letter), "//absolute/path", or ".." .
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FTP server read/access arbitrary files using "C:\" filenames
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FTP server allows a remote attacker to retrieve privileged web server system information by specifying arbitrary paths in the UNC format (\\computername\sharename).
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| Method | Details |
|---|---|
|
Automated Static Analysis |
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Effectiveness: High |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). | 884 | CWE Cross-section |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 981 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Path Traversal |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1404 | Comprehensive Categorization: File Handling |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLOVER | Absolute Path Traversal | ||
| Software Fault Patterns | SFP16 | Path Traversal |
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-597 | Absolute Path Traversal |
| Submissions | ||
|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
PLOVER | |
| Modifications | ||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
|
2025年09月09日
(CWE 4.18, 2025年09月09日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Affected_Resources, Applicable_Platforms, Functional_Areas, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References | ||
|
2024年11月19日
(CWE 4.16, 2024年11月19日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | ||
|
2024年07月16日
(CWE 4.15, 2024年07月16日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated References | ||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Mapping_Notes | ||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction | ||
| 2023年01月31日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Common_Consequences, Description | ||
| 2022年10月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Observed_Examples | ||
| 2021年03月15日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | ||
| 2020年12月10日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2020年08月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Applicable_Platforms | ||
| 2017年01月19日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | ||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | ||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | ||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships | ||
| 2011年09月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | ||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | ||
| 2010年06月21日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description | ||
| 2010年02月16日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | ||
| 2008年10月14日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description | ||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | ||
| 2008年07月01日 | Eric Dalci | Cigital |
| updated Time_of_Introduction | ||
| 2008年07月01日 | Sean Eidemiller | Cigital |
| added/updated demonstrative examples | ||
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