| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Read Application Data; Modify Application Data; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Access Control
An attacker could pose as one of the entities and read or possibly modify the communication.
|
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Implementation |
Always fully authenticate both ends of any communications channel.
|
|
Architecture and Design |
Adhere to the principle of complete mediation.
|
|
Implementation |
A certificate binds an identity to a cryptographic key to authenticate a communicating party. Often, the certificate takes the encrypted form of the hash of the identity of the subject, the public key, and information such as time of issue or expiration using the issuer's private key. The certificate can be validated by deciphering the certificate with the issuer's public key. See also X.509 certificate signature chains and the PGP certification structure.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 923 | Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints |
| PeerOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 602 | Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security |
| PeerOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 603 | Use of Client-Side Authentication |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1011 | Authorize Actors |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic. |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
In the Java snippet below, data is sent over an unencrypted channel to a remote server.
By eavesdropping on the communication channel or posing as the endpoint, an attacker would be able to read all of the transmitted data.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
chain: incorrect "goto" in Apple SSL product bypasses certificate validation, allowing Adversry-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack (Apple "goto fail" bug). CWE-705 (Incorrect Control Flow Scoping) -> CWE-561 (Dead Code) -> CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) -> CWE-393 (Return of Wrong Status Code) -> CWE-300 (Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint).
|
| Method | Details |
|---|---|
|
Automated Dynamic Analysis |
Some tools can act as proxy servers that allow the tester to intercept packets or messages, inspect them, and modify them before sending them to the destination in order to see if the modified packets are still accepted by the receiving component.
|
|
Automated Dynamic Analysis |
Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) tools can be used to detect network traffic without encryption and/or verification. The affected protocol may be subject to Adversary-in-the-Middle attacks. Some tools act as proxy servers that allow the tester to inspect and modify packets/messages to see if they are still accepted by the receiving component.
|
|
Automated Static Analysis |
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.) The analysis could identify use of protocols that are subject to Adversary-in-the-Middle attacks.
Effectiveness: Moderate Note:Encryption and other protection mechanisms may be provided in the environment (e.g., by a load balancer or firewall that is positioned in front of a server), but this cannot be detected by SAST tools. |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 859 | The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 16 - Platform Security (SEC) |
| MemberOf | ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). | 884 | CWE Cross-section |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 956 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Channel Attack |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1353 | OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1396 | Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control |
Rationale
CWE-300 is commonly misused for vulnerabilities in which the prerequisites for exploitation require the adversary to be in a privileged "in-the-middle" position.Comments
Consider root-cause weaknesses that allow adversary-in-the-middle attacks to happen, such as CWEs involving poor integrity protection.Maintenance
| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLOVER | Man-in-the-middle (MITM) | ||
| WASC | 32 | Routing Detour | |
| The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) | SEC06-J | Do not rely on the default automatic signature verification provided by URLClassLoader and java.util.jar |
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-466 | Leveraging Active Adversary in the Middle Attacks to Bypass Same Origin Policy |
| CAPEC-57 | Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data |
| CAPEC-589 | DNS Blocking |
| CAPEC-590 | IP Address Blocking |
| CAPEC-612 | WiFi MAC Address Tracking |
| CAPEC-613 | WiFi SSID Tracking |
| CAPEC-615 | Evil Twin Wi-Fi Attack |
| CAPEC-662 | Adversary in the Browser (AiTB) |
| CAPEC-94 | Adversary in the Middle (AiTM) |
| Submissions | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
PLOVER | ||
| Contributions | |||
| Contribution Date | Contributor | Organization | |
|
2024年09月02日
(CWE 4.18, 2025年09月09日) |
Renaud Sauvain | West Pharmaceutical Services | |
| Modifications | |||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | |
|
2025年09月09日
(CWE 4.18, 2025年09月09日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Alternate_Terms, Detection_Factors | |||
|
2024年07月16日
(CWE 4.15, 2024年07月16日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Alternate_Terms | |||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Mapping_Notes | |||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Detection_Factors, Relationships | |||
| 2023年01月31日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2021年10月28日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2021年07月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples | |||
| 2021年03月15日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Alternate_Terms, Related_Attack_Patterns | |||
| 2020年12月10日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Alternate_Terms, Name, Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | |||
| 2019年06月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |||
| 2019年01月03日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships | |||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships | |||
| 2014年06月23日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples | |||
| 2014年02月18日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2010年12月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description | |||
| 2010年02月16日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2009年05月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Name | |||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2008年07月01日 | Eric Dalci | Cigital | |
| updated Time_of_Introduction | |||
| 2008年07月01日 | Sean Eidemiller | Cigital | |
| added/updated demonstrative examples | |||
| Previous Entry Names | |||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | ||
| 2008年04月11日 | Man-in-the-middle (MITM) | ||
| 2009年05月27日 | Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint (aka 'Man-in-the-Middle') | ||
| 2020年02月24日 | Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint ('Man-in-the-Middle') | ||
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