| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Scope: Access Control
If privileges are not dropped, neither are access rights of the user. Often these rights can be prevented from being dropped.
|
|
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Hide Activities |
Scope: Access Control, Non-Repudiation
If privileges are not dropped, in some cases the system may record actions as the user which is being impersonated rather than the impersonator.
|
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Architecture and Design |
Strategy: Separation of Privilege Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges. |
|
Architecture and Design; Operation |
Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
|
|
Architecture and Design |
Strategy: Separation of Privilege Consider following the principle of separation of privilege. Require multiple conditions to be met before permitting access to a system resource.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 269 | Improper Privilege Management |
| ParentOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 272 | Least Privilege Violation |
| ParentOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 273 | Improper Check for Dropped Privileges |
| PeerOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 274 | Improper Handling of Insufficient Privileges |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1011 | Authorize Actors |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | |
| Implementation | REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic. |
| Operation |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
The following code calls chroot() to restrict the application to a subset of the filesystem below APP_HOME in order to prevent an attacker from using the program to gain unauthorized access to files located elsewhere. The code then opens a file specified by the user and processes the contents of the file.
Constraining the process inside the application's home directory before opening any files is a valuable security measure. However, the absence of a call to setuid() with some non-zero value means the application is continuing to operate with unnecessary root privileges. Any successful exploit carried out by an attacker against the application can now result in a privilege escalation attack because any malicious operations will be performed with the privileges of the superuser. If the application drops to the privilege level of a non-root user, the potential for damage is substantially reduced.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
Program does not drop privileges after acquiring the raw socket.
|
|
|
Setuid program does not drop privileges after a parsing error occurs, then calls another program to handle the error.
|
|
|
Does not drop privileges in related groups when lowering privileges.
|
|
|
Does not drop privileges in related groups when lowering privileges.
|
|
|
Does not drop privileges before determining access to certain files.
|
|
|
Finger daemon does not drop privileges when executing programs on behalf of the user being fingered.
|
|
|
FTP server does not drop privileges if a connection is aborted during file transfer.
|
|
|
Program only uses seteuid to drop privileges.
|
|
|
Windows program running as SYSTEM does not drop privileges before executing other programs (many others like this, especially involving the Help facility).
|
|
|
Utility Manager launches winhlp32.exe while running with raised privileges, which allows local users to gain system privileges.
|
|
|
Setuid program does not drop privileges before executing program specified in an environment variable.
|
|
|
Setuid program does not drop privileges before processing file specified on command line.
|
|
|
Service on Windows does not drop privileges before using "view file" option, allowing code execution.
|
| Ordinality | Description |
|---|---|
|
Primary
|
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). | 884 | CWE Cross-section |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 901 | SFP Primary Cluster: Privilege |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1396 | Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control |
Rationale
This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriateComments
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLOVER | Privilege Dropping / Lowering Errors |
| Submissions | ||
|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
PLOVER | |
| Modifications | ||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Mapping_Notes | ||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2023年01月31日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description | ||
| 2020年12月10日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | ||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships | ||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | ||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships | ||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Common_Consequences | ||
| 2011年03月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2010年06月21日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | ||
| 2009年12月28日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | ||
| 2008年10月14日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description, Maintenance_Notes | ||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities | ||
| 2008年07月01日 | Eric Dalci | Cigital |
| updated Time_of_Introduction | ||
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