| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Unexpected State |
Scope: Integrity |
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Developers should anticipate that special elements will be injected/removed/manipulated in the input vectors of their software system. Use an appropriate combination of denylists and allowlists to ensure only valid, expected and appropriate input is processed by the system.
|
|
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. |
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Output Encoding While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
|
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 138 | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements |
| ParentOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 166 | Improper Handling of Missing Special Element |
| ParentOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 167 | Improper Handling of Additional Special Element |
| ParentOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 168 | Improper Handling of Inconsistent Special Elements |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Implementation |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
Crash via message type without separator character
|
|
|
Extra "<" in front of SCRIPT tag bypasses XSS prevention.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 990 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Command |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1407 | Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Neutralization |
Rationale
This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriateComments
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fitTerminology
Research Gap
Maintenance
| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLOVER | Common Special Element Manipulations | ||
| Software Fault Patterns | SFP24 | Tainted input to command |
| Submissions | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
PLOVER | ||
| Modifications | |||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | |
| 2023年10月26日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples | |||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Mapping_Notes | |||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2021年03月15日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Maintenance_Notes | |||
| 2020年06月25日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | |||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships | |||
| 2017年05月03日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2014年06月23日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Other_Notes | |||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2011年06月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences | |||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences | |||
| 2011年03月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2009年10月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Maintenance_Notes, Other_Notes, Terminology_Notes | |||
| 2009年07月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2008年07月01日 | Eric Dalci | Cigital | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction | |||
| Previous Entry Names | |||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | ||
| 2008年04月11日 | Common Special Element Manipulations | ||
| 2020年02月24日 | Failure to Sanitize Special Element | ||
Use of the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE™) and the associated references from this website are subject to the Terms of Use. CWE is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and managed by the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HSSEDI) which is operated by The MITRE Corporation (MITRE). Copyright © 2006–2025, The MITRE Corporation. CWE, CWSS, CWRAF, and the CWE logo are trademarks of The MITRE Corporation.