| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Unexpected State |
Scope: Integrity |
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Developers should anticipate that terminators will be injected/removed/manipulated in the input vectors of their product. Use an appropriate combination of denylists and allowlists to ensure only valid, expected and appropriate input is processed by the system.
|
|
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. |
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Output Encoding While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
|
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 138 | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements |
| ParentOf | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 626 | Null Byte Interaction Error (Poison Null Byte) |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Implementation |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
MFV. mail server does not properly identify terminator string to signify end of message, causing corruption, possibly in conjunction with off-by-one error.
|
|
|
MFV. mail server does not properly identify terminator string to signify end of message, causing corruption, possibly in conjunction with off-by-one error.
|
|
|
Mail server does not quote end-of-input terminator if it appears in the middle of a message.
|
|
|
Improperly terminated comment or phrase allows commands.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 990 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Command |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1407 | Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Neutralization |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLOVER | Input Terminator | ||
| Software Fault Patterns | SFP24 | Tainted input to command |
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-460 | HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) |
| Submissions | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
PLOVER | ||
| Modifications | |||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | |
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Mapping_Notes | |||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2023年01月31日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2020年06月25日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | |||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | |||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Applicable_Platforms | |||
| 2017年05月03日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | |||
| 2011年06月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences | |||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences | |||
| 2011年03月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2010年04月05日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Name | |||
| 2009年07月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2009年03月10日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Name | |||
| 2008年10月14日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description | |||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2008年07月01日 | Eric Dalci | Cigital | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction | |||
| Previous Entry Names | |||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | ||
| 2008年01月30日 | Input Terminator | ||
| 2008年04月11日 | Failure to Remove Input Terminator | ||
| 2009年03月10日 | Failure to Sanitize Input Terminators | ||
| 2010年04月05日 | Improper Sanitization of Input Terminators | ||
Use of the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE™) and the associated references from this website are subject to the Terms of Use. CWE is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and managed by the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HSSEDI) which is operated by The MITRE Corporation (MITRE). Copyright © 2006–2025, The MITRE Corporation. CWE, CWSS, CWRAF, and the CWE logo are trademarks of The MITRE Corporation.