In many processor architectures an exception, mis-speculation, or microcode assist results in a flush operation to clear results that are no longer required. This action prevents these results from influencing architectural state that is intended to be visible from software. However, traces of this transient execution may remain in microarchitectural buffers, resulting in a change in microarchitectural state that can expose sensitive information to an attacker using side-channel analysis. For example, Load Value Injection (LVI) [REF-1202] can exploit direct injection of erroneous values into intermediate load and store buffers.
Several conditions may need to be fulfilled for a successful attack:
| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Modify Memory; Read Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands |
Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity Likelihood: Medium |
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Architecture and Design; Requirements |
Hardware ensures that no illegal data flows from faulting micro-ops exists at the microarchitectural level.
Effectiveness: High Note:
Being implemented in silicon it is expected to fully address the known weaknesses with limited performance impact.
|
|
Build and Compilation |
Include instructions that explicitly remove traces of unneeded computations from software interactions with microarchitectural elements e.g. lfence, sfence, mfence, clflush.
Effectiveness: High Note:
This effectively forces the processor to complete each memory access before moving on to the next operation. This may have a large performance impact.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 226 | Sensitive Information in Resource Not Removed Before Reuse |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1201 | Core and Compute Issues |
| ChildOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 226 | Sensitive Information in Resource Not Removed Before Reuse |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | |
| Requirements |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: Workstation (Undetermined Prevalence)
x86 (Undetermined Prevalence)
ARM (Undetermined Prevalence)
Other (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: System on Chip (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
Faulting loads in a victim domain may trigger incorrect transient forwarding, which leaves secret-dependent traces in the microarchitectural state. Consider this example from [REF-1203].
Consider the code gadget:
A processor with this weakness will store the value of untrusted_arg (which may be provided by an attacker) to the stack, which is trusted memory. Additionally, this store operation will save this value in some microarchitectural buffer, e.g. the store queue.
In this code gadget, trusted_ptr is dereferenced while the attacker forces a page fault. The faulting load causes the processor to mis-speculate by forwarding untrusted_arg as the (speculative) load result. The processor then uses untrusted_arg for the pointer dereference. After the fault has been handled and the load has been re-issued with the correct argument, secret-dependent information stored at the address of trusted_ptr remains in microarchitectural state and can be extracted by an attacker using a code gadget.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
Load value injection in some processors utilizing speculative execution may allow an authenticated user to enable information disclosure via a side-channel with local access.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1416 | Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.Relationship
Maintenance
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-696 | Load Value Injection |
| Submissions | ||
|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
|
2021年09月22日
(CWE 4.6, 2021年10月28日) |
Anders Nordstrom, Alric Althoff | Cycuity (originally submitted as Tortuga Logic) |
| Modifications | ||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
|
2024年02月29日
(CWE 4.14, 2024年02月29日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description | ||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Mapping_Notes | ||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2022年10月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns | ||
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