Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) E. Lear
Request for Comments: 8520 Cisco Systems
Category: Standards Track R. Droms
ISSN: 2070-1721 Google
 D. Romascanu
 March 2019
 Manufacturer Usage Description Specification
Abstract
 This memo specifies a component-based architecture for Manufacturer
 Usage Descriptions (MUDs). The goal of MUD is to provide a means for
 end devices to signal to the network what sort of access and network
 functionality they require to properly function. The initial focus
 is on access control. Later work can delve into other aspects.
 This memo specifies two YANG modules, IPv4 and IPv6 DHCP options, a
 Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) TLV, a URL, an X.509 certificate
 extension, and a means to sign and verify the descriptions.
Status of This Memo
 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8520.
Copyright Notice
 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors. All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document. Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
 1.1. What MUD Doesn't Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
 1.2. A Simple Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
 1.3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
 1.4. Determining Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
 1.5. Finding a Policy: The MUD URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
 1.6. Processing of the MUD URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
 1.7. Types of Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
 1.8. The Manufacturer Usage Description Architecture . . . . . 10
 1.9. Order of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 2. The MUD Model and Semantic Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 2.1. The IETF-MUD YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 3. MUD Model Definitions for the Root "mud" Container . . . . . 15
 3.1. mud-version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
 3.2. MUD URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
 3.3. to-device-policy and from-device-policy Containers . . . 16
 3.4. last-update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
 3.5. cache-validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
 3.6. is-supported . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
 3.7. systeminfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
 3.8. mfg-name, software-rev, model-name, and firmware-rev . . 17
 3.9. extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
 4. Augmentation to the ACL Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
 4.1. manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
 4.2. same-manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
 4.3. documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
 4.4. model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
 4.5. local-networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
 4.6. controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
 4.7. my-controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
 4.8. direction-initiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
 5. Processing of the MUD File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
 6. What Does a MUD URL Look Like? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
 7. The MUD YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
 8. The Domain Name Extension to the ACL Model . . . . . . . . . 26
 8.1. src-dnsname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
 8.2. dst-dnsname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
 8.3. The ietf-acldns Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
 9. MUD File Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
 10. The MUD URL DHCP Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
 10.1. Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
 10.2. Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
 10.3. Relay Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
 11. The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URL X.509 Extension 34
 12. The Manufacturer Usage Description LLDP Extension . . . . . . 36
 13. The Creating and Processing of Signed MUD Files . . . . . . . 38
 13.1. Creating a MUD File Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
 13.2. Verifying a MUD File Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
 14. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
 15. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
 16. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
 17. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
 17.1. YANG Module Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
 17.2. URI Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
 17.3. DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
 17.4. PKIX Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
 17.5. Media Type Registration for MUD Files . . . . . . . . . 44
 17.6. IANA LLDP TLV Subtype Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
 17.7. The MUD Well-Known Universal Resource Name (URNs) . . . 45
 17.8. Extensions Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
 18. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
 18.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
 18.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
 Appendix A. Default MUD Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
 Appendix B. A Sample Extension: DETNET-indicator . . . . . . . . 56
 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1. Introduction
 The Internet has largely been constructed for general purpose
 computers, those devices that may be used for a purpose that is
 specified by those who own the device. In [RFC1984], it was presumed
 that an end device would be most capable of protecting itself. This
 made sense when the typical device was a workstation or a mainframe,
 and it continues to make sense for general purpose computing devices
 today, including laptops, smart phones, and tablets.
 [RFC7452] discusses design patterns for, and poses questions about,
 smart objects. Let us then posit a group of objects that are
 specifically not intended to be used for general purpose computing
 tasks. These devices, which this memo refers to as Things, have a
 specific purpose. By definition, therefore, all other uses are not
 intended. If a small number of communication patterns follows from
 those small number of uses, the combination of these two statements
 can be restated as a Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) that can be
 applied at various points within a network. MUD primarily addresses
 threats to the device rather than the device as a threat. In some
 circumstances, however, MUD may offer some protection in the latter
 case, depending on how the MUD URL is communicated and how devices
 and their communications are authenticated.
 We use the notion of "manufacturer" loosely in this context to refer
 to the entity or organization that will state how a device is
 intended to be used. For example, in the context of a light bulb,
 this might indeed be the light bulb manufacturer. In the context of
 a smarter device that has a built in Linux stack, it might be an
 integrator of that device. The key points are that the device itself
 is assumed to serve a limited purpose, and that there exists an
 organization in the supply chain of that device that will take
 responsibility for informing the network about that purpose.
 The intent of MUD is to provide the following:
 o Substantially reduce the threat surface on a device to those
 communications intended by the manufacturer.
 o Provide a means to scale network policies to the ever-increasing
 number of types of devices in the network.
 o Provide a means to address at least some vulnerabilities in a way
 that is faster than the time it might take to update systems.
 This will be particularly true for systems that are no longer
 supported.
 o Keep the cost of implementation of such a system to the bare
 minimum.
 o Provide a means of extensibility for manufacturers to express
 other device capabilities or requirements.
 MUD consists of three architectural building blocks:
 o A URL that can be used to locate a description;
 o The description itself, including how it is interpreted; and
 o A means for local network management systems to retrieve the
 description.
 MUD is most effective when the network is able to identify in some
 way the remote endpoints that Things will talk to.
 In this specification, we describe each of these building blocks and
 how they are intended to be used together. However, they may also be
 used separately, independent of this specification, by local
 deployments for their own purposes.
1.1. What MUD Doesn't Do
 MUD is not intended to address network authorization of general
 purpose computers, as their manufacturers cannot envision a specific
 communication pattern to describe. In addition, even those devices
 that have a single or small number of uses might have very broad
 communication patterns. MUD on its own is not for them either.
 Although MUD can provide network administrators with some additional
 protection when device vulnerabilities exist, it will never replace
 the need for manufacturers to patch vulnerabilities.
 Finally, no matter what the manufacturer specifies in a MUD file,
 these are not directives, but suggestions. How they are instantiated
 locally will depend on many factors and will be ultimately up to the
 local network administrator, who must decide what is appropriate in a
 given circumstances.
1.2. A Simple Example
 A light bulb is intended to light a room. It may be remotely
 controlled through the network, and it may make use of a rendezvous
 service (which could be accessed by an application on a smart phone).
 What we can say about that light bulb, then, is that all other
 network access is unwanted. It will not contact a news service, nor
 speak to the refrigerator, and it has no need of a printer or other
 devices. It has no social networking friends. Therefore, applying
 an access list to it that states it will only connect to the single
 rendezvous service will not impede performing its function; at the
 same time, this will allow the network to provide the light bulb and
 other devices an additional layer of protection.
1.3. Terminology
 MUD: Manufacturer Usage Description.
 MUD file: a file containing YANG-based JSON that describes a Thing
 and associated suggested specific network behavior.
 MUD file server: a web server that hosts a MUD file.
 MUD manager: the system that requests and receives the MUD file from
 the MUD server. After it has processed a MUD file, it may direct
 changes to relevant network elements.
 MUD controller: a synonym that has been used in the past for MUD
 manager.
 MUD URL: a URL that can be used by the MUD manager to receive the
 MUD file.
 Thing: the device emitting a MUD URL.
 Manufacturer: the entity that configures the Thing to emit the MUD
 URL and the one who asserts a recommendation in a MUD file. The
 manufacturer might not always be the entity that constructs a
 Thing. It could, for instance, be a systems integrator, or even a
 component provider.
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
 BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
 capitals, as shown here.
1.4. Determining Intended Use
 The notion of intended use is in itself not new. Network
 administrators apply access lists every day to allow for only such
 use. This notion of white listing was well described by Chapman and
 Zwicky in [FW95]. Profiling systems that make use of heuristics to
 identify types of systems have existed for years as well.
 A Thing could just as easily tell the network what sort of access it
 requires without going into what sort of system it is. This would,
 in effect, be the converse of [RFC7488]. In seeking a general
 solution, however, we assume that a device will implement
 functionality necessary to fulfill its limited purpose. This is
 basic economic constraint. Unless the network would refuse access to
 such a device, its developers would have no reason to provide the
 network any information. To date, such an assertion has held true.
1.5. Finding a Policy: The MUD URL
 Our work begins with the device emitting a Universal Resource Locator
 (URL) [RFC3986]. This URL serves both to classify the device type
 and to provide a means to locate a policy file.
 MUD URLs MUST use the "https" scheme [RFC7230].
 In this memo, three means are defined to emit the MUD URL, as
 follows:
 o A DHCP option [RFC2131] [RFC8415] that the DHCP client uses to
 inform the DHCP server. The DHCP server may take further actions,
 such as acting as the MUD manager or passing the MUD URL along to
 the MUD manager.
 o An X.509 constraint. The IEEE has developed IEEE 802.1AR
 [IEEE8021AR] to provide a certificate-based approach to
 communicate device characteristics, which itself relies on
 [RFC5280]. The MUD URL extension is non-critical, as required by
 IEEE 802.1AR. Various means may be used to communicate that
 certificate, including the Tunnel Extensible Authentication
 Protocol (TEAP) [RFC7170].
 o Finally, a Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) frame is defined
 [IEEE8021AB].
 It is possible that there may be other means for a MUD URL to be
 learned by a network. For instance, some devices may already be
 fielded or have very limited ability to communicate a MUD URL, and
 yet they can be identified through some means, such as a serial
 number or a public key. In these cases, manufacturers may be able to
 map those identifiers to particular MUD URLs (or even the files
 themselves). Similarly, there may be alternative resolution
 mechanisms available for situations where Internet connectivity is
 limited or does not exist. Such mechanisms are not described in this
 memo, but they are possible. Implementors are encouraged to allow
 for the flexibility of how MUD URLs may be learned.
1.6. Processing of the MUD URL
 MUD managers that are able to do so SHOULD retrieve MUD URLs and
 signature files as per [RFC7230], using the GET method [RFC7231].
 They MUST validate the certificate using the rules in [RFC2818],
 Section 3.1.
 Requests for MUD URLs SHOULD include an "Accept" header field
 ([RFC7231], Section 5.3.2) containing "application/mud+json", an
 "Accept-Language" header field ([RFC7231], Section 5.3.5), and a
 "User-Agent" header field ([RFC7231], Section 5.5.3).
 MUD managers SHOULD automatically process 3xx response status codes.
 If a MUD manager is not able to fetch a MUD URL, other means MAY be
 used to import MUD files and associated signature files. So long as
 the signature of the file can be validated, the file can be used. In
 such environments, controllers SHOULD warn administrators when cache-
 validity expiry is approaching so that they may check for new files.
 It may not be possible for a MUD manager to retrieve a MUD file at
 any given time. Should a MUD manager fail to retrieve a MUD file, it
 SHOULD consider the existing one safe to use, at least for a time.
 After some period, it SHOULD log that it has been unable to retrieve
 the file. There may be very good reasons for such failures,
 including the possibility that the MUD manager is in an offline
 environment, the local Internet connection has failed, or the remote
 Internet connection has failed. It is also possible that an attacker
 is attempting to interfere with the deployment of a device. How to
 handle such circumstances is a local decision.
1.7. Types of Policies
 When the MUD URL is resolved, the MUD manager retrieves a file that
 describes what sort of communications a device is designed to have.
 The manufacturer may specify either specific hosts for cloud-based
 services or certain classes for access within an operational network.
 An example of a class might be "devices of a specified manufacturer
 type", where the manufacturer type itself is indicated simply by the
 authority component (e.g., the domain name) of the MUD URL. Another
 example might be to allow or disallow local access. Just like other
 policies, these may be combined. For example:
 o Allow access to devices of the same manufacturer
 o Allow access to and from controllers via the Constrained
 Application Protocol (COAP) [RFC7252]
 o Allow access to local DNS/NTP
 o Deny all other access
 A printer might have a description that states:
 o Allow access for port IPP or port LPD
 o Allow local access for port HTTP
 o Deny all other access
 In this way, anyone can print to the printer, but local access would
 be required for the management interface.
 The files that are retrieved are intended to be closely aligned to
 existing network architectures so that they are easy to deploy. We
 make use of YANG [RFC7950] because it provides accurate and adequate
 models for use by network devices. JSON [RFC8259] is used as a
 serialization format for compactness and readability, relative to
 XML. Other formats may be chosen with later versions of MUD.
 While the policy examples given here focus on access control, this is
 not intended to be the sole focus. By structuring the model
 described in this document with clear extension points, other
 descriptions could be included. One that often comes to mind is
 quality of service.
 The YANG modules specified here are extensions of [RFC8519]. The
 extensions to this model allow for a manufacturer to express classes
 of systems that a manufacturer would find necessary for the proper
 function of the device. Two modules are specified. The first module
 specifies a means for domain names to be used in Access Control Lists
 (ACLs) so that devices that have their controllers in the cloud may
 be appropriately authorized with domain names, where the mapping of
 those names to addresses may rapidly change.
 The other module abstracts away IP addresses into certain classes
 that are instantiated into actual IP addresses through local
 processing. Through these classes, manufacturers can specify how the
 device is designed to communicate, so that network elements can be
 configured by local systems that have local topological knowledge.
 That is, the deployment populates the classes that the manufacturer
 specifies. The abstractions below map to zero or more hosts, as
 follows:
 Manufacturer: A device made by a particular manufacturer, as
 identified by the authority component of its MUD URL.
 same-manufacturer: Devices that have the same authority component of
 their MUD URL.
 controller: Devices that the local network administrator admits to
 the particular class.
 my-controller: Devices intended to serve as controllers for the MUD
 URL that the Thing emitted.
 local: The class of IP addresses that are scoped within some
 administrative boundary. By default, it is suggested that this be
 the local subnet.
 The "manufacturer" classes can be easily specified by the
 manufacturer, whereas controller classes are initially envisioned to
 be specified by the administrator.
 Because manufacturers do not know who will be using their devices, it
 is important for functionality referenced in usage descriptions to be
 relatively ubiquitous and mature. For these reasons, the YANG-based
 configuration in a MUD file is limited to the modules either
 specified or referenced in this document, or specified in documented
 extensions.
1.8. The Manufacturer Usage Description Architecture
 With these components laid out, we now have the basis for an
 architecture. This leads us to ASCII art.
 .......................................
 . ____________ . _____________
 . | | . | |
 . | MUD |-->get URL-->| MUD |
 . | Manager | .(https) | File Server |
 . End system network |____________|<-MUD file<-<|_____________|
 . . .
 . . .
 . _______ _________ .
 .| | (DHCP et al.) | router | .
 .| Thing |---->MUD URL-->| or | .
 .|_______| | switch | .
 . |_________| .
 .......................................
 Figure 1: MUD Architecture
 In the above diagram, the switch or router collects MUD URLs and
 forwards them to the MUD manager (a network management system) for
 processing. This happens in different ways, depending on how the URL
 is communicated. For instance, in the case of DHCP, the DHCP server
 might receive the URL and then process it. In the case of IEEE
 802.1X [IEEE8021X], the switch would carry the URL via a certificate
 to the authentication server via the Extensible Authentication
 Protocol (EAP) over Radius [RFC3748], which would then process it.
 One method to do this is TEAP, as described in [RFC7170]. The
 certificate extension is described below.
 The information returned by the MUD file server is valid for as long
 as the Thing is connected. There is no expiry. However, if the MUD
 manager has detected that the MUD file for a Thing has changed, it
 SHOULD update the policy expeditiously, taking into account whatever
 approval flow is required in a deployment. In this way, new
 recommendations from the manufacturer can be processed in a timely
 fashion.
 The information returned by the MUD file server (a web server) is
 valid for the duration of the Thing's connection, or as specified in
 the description. Thus, if the Thing is disconnected, any associated
 configuration in the switch can be removed. Similarly, from time to
 time the description may be refreshed, based on new capabilities or
 communication patterns or vulnerabilities.
 The web server is typically run by or on behalf of the manufacturer.
 Its domain name is that of the authority found in the MUD URL. For
 legacy cases where Things cannot emit a URL, if the switch is able to
 determine the appropriate URL, it may proxy it. In a trivial case,
 it may hardcode a MUD URL on a switch port or a map from some
 available identifier such as an L2 address or certificate hash to a
 MUD URL.
 The role of the MUD manager in this environment is to do the
 following:
 o receive MUD URLs,
 o fetch MUD files,
 o translate abstractions in the MUD files to specific network
 element configuration,
 o maintain and update any required mappings of the abstractions, and
 o update network elements with appropriate configuration.
 A MUD manager may be a component of an Authentication, Authorization,
 and Accounting (AAA) system or a network management system.
 Communication within those systems and from those systems to network
 elements is beyond the scope of this memo.
1.9. Order of Operations
 As mentioned above, MUD contains architectural building blocks, so
 the order of operation may vary. However, here is one clear intended
 example:
 1. Thing emits a URL.
 2. That URL is forwarded to a MUD manager by the nearest switch (how
 this happens depends on the way in which the MUD URL is emitted).
 3. The MUD manager retrieves the MUD file and signature from the MUD
 file server, assuming it doesn't already have copies. After
 validating the signature, it may test the URL against a web or
 domain reputation service, and it may test any hosts within the
 file against those reputation services, as it deems fit.
 4. The MUD manager may query the administrator for permission to add
 the Thing and associated policy. If the Thing is known or the
 Thing type is known, it may skip this step.
 5. The MUD manager instantiates local configuration based on the
 abstractions defined in this document.
 6. The MUD manager configures the switch nearest the Thing. Other
 systems may be configured as well.
 7. When the Thing disconnects, policy is removed.
2. The MUD Model and Semantic Meaning
 A MUD file consists of a YANG model instance that has been serialized
 in JSON [RFC7951]. For purposes of MUD, the nodes that can be
 modified are access lists as augmented by this model. The MUD file
 is limited to the serialization of only the following YANG schema:
 o ietf-access-control-list [RFC8519]
 o ietf-mud (RFC 8520)
 o ietf-acldns (RFC 8520)
 Extensions may be used to add additional schema. This is described
 further on.
 To provide the widest possible deployment, publishers of MUD files
 SHOULD make use of the abstractions in this memo and avoid the use of
 IP addresses. A MUD manager SHOULD NOT automatically implement any
 MUD file that contains IP addresses, especially those that might have
 local significance. The addressing of one side of an access list is
 implicit, based on whether it is applied as to-device-policy or
 from-device-policy.
 With the exceptions of the "name" of the ACL, "type", "name" of the
 Access Control Entry (ACE), and TCP and UDP source and destination
 port information, publishers of MUD files SHOULD limit the use of ACL
 model leaf nodes expressed to those found in this specification.
 Absent any extensions, MUD files are assumed to implement only the
 following ACL model features:
 o match-on-ipv4, match-on-ipv6, match-on-tcp, match-on-udp,
 match-on-icmp
 Furthermore, only "accept" or "drop" actions SHOULD be included. A
 MUD manager MAY choose to interpret "reject" as "drop". A MUD
 manager SHOULD ignore all other actions. This is because
 manufacturers do not have sufficient context within a local
 deployment to know whether reject is appropriate. That is a decision
 that should be left to a network administrator.
 Given that MUD does not deal with interfaces, the support of the
 "ietf-interfaces" module [RFC8343] is not required. Specifically,
 the support of interface-related features and branches (e.g.,
 interface-attachment and interface-stats) of the ACL YANG module is
 not required.
 In fact, MUD managers MAY ignore any particular component of a
 description or MAY ignore the description in its entirety, and they
 SHOULD carefully inspect all MUD descriptions. Publishers of MUD
 files MUST NOT include other nodes except as described in
 Section 3.9. See that section for more information.
2.1. The IETF-MUD YANG Module
 This module is structured into three parts:
 o The first component, the "mud" container, holds information that
 is relevant to retrieval and validity of the MUD file itself, as
 well as policy intended to and from the Thing.
 o The second component augments the matching container of the ACL
 model to add several nodes that are relevant to the MUD URL, or
 they are otherwise abstracted for use within a local environment.
 o The third component augments the tcp-acl container of the ACL
 model to add the ability to match on the direction of initiation
 of a TCP connection.
 A valid MUD file will contain two root objects: a "mud" container and
 an "acls" container. Extensions may add additional root objects as
 required. As a reminder, when parsing acls, elements within a
 "match" block are logically ANDed. In general, a single abstraction
 in a match statement should be used. For instance, it makes little
 sense to match both "my-controller" and "controller" with an
 argument, since they are highly unlikely to be the same value.
 A simplified graphical representation of the data models is used in
 this document. The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is
 explained in [RFC8340].
 module: ietf-mud
 +--rw mud!
 +--rw mud-version uint8
 +--rw mud-url inet:uri
 +--rw last-update yang:date-and-time
 +--rw mud-signature? inet:uri
 +--rw cache-validity? uint8
 +--rw is-supported boolean
 +--rw systeminfo? string
 +--rw mfg-name? string
 +--rw model-name? string
 +--rw firmware-rev? string
 +--rw software-rev? string
 +--rw documentation? inet:uri
 +--rw extensions* string
 +--rw from-device-policy
 | +--rw acls
 | +--rw access-list* [name]
 | +--rw name -> /acl:acls/acl/name
 +--rw to-device-policy
 +--rw acls
 +--rw access-list* [name]
 +--rw name -> /acl:acls/acl/name
 augment /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches:
 +--rw mud
 +--rw manufacturer? inet:host
 +--rw same-manufacturer? empty
 +--rw model? inet:uri
 +--rw local-networks? empty
 +--rw controller? inet:uri
 +--rw my-controller? empty
 augment
 /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches
 /acl:l4/acl:tcp/acl:tcp:
 +--rw direction-initiated? direction
3. MUD Model Definitions for the Root "mud" Container
3.1. mud-version
 This node specifies the integer version of the MUD specification.
 This memo specifies version 1.
3.2. MUD URL
 This URL identifies the MUD file. This is useful when the file and
 associated signature are manually uploaded, say, in an offline mode.
3.3. to-device-policy and from-device-policy Containers
 [RFC8519] describes access lists. In the case of MUD, a MUD file
 must be explicit in describing the communication pattern of a Thing,
 and that includes indicating what is to be permitted or denied in
 either direction of communication. Hence, each of these containers
 indicates the appropriate direction of a flow in association with a
 particular Thing. They contain references to specific access lists.
3.4. last-update
 This is a date-and-time value of when the MUD file was generated.
 This is akin to a version number. Its form is taken from [RFC6991].
3.5. cache-validity
 This uint8 is the period of time in hours that a network management
 station MUST wait since its last retrieval before checking for an
 update. It is RECOMMENDED that this value be no less than 24, and it
 MUST NOT be more than 168 for any Thing that is supported. This
 period SHOULD be no shorter than any period determined through HTTP
 caching directives (e.g., "cache-control" or "Expires"). N.B., the
 expiring of this timer does not require the MUD manager to discard
 the MUD file, nor terminate access to a Thing. See Section 16 for
 more information.
3.6. is-supported
 This boolean is an indication from the manufacturer to the network
 administrator as to whether or not the Thing is supported. In this
 context, a Thing is said to not be supported if the manufacturer
 intends never to issue a firmware or software update to the Thing or
 never to update the MUD file. A MUD manager MAY still periodically
 check for updates.
3.7. systeminfo
 This is a textual UTF-8 description of the Thing to be connected.
 The intent is for administrators to be able to see a brief
 displayable description of the Thing. It SHOULD NOT exceed 60
 characters worth of display space.
3.8. mfg-name, software-rev, model-name, and firmware-rev
 These optional fields are filled in as specified by [RFC8348]. Note
 that firmware-rev and software-rev MUST NOT be populated in a MUD
 file if the device can be upgraded but the MUD URL cannot be. This
 would be the case, for instance, with MUD URLs that are contained in
 802.1AR certificates.
3.9. extensions
 This optional leaf-list names MUD extensions that are used in the MUD
 file. Note that MUD extensions MUST NOT be used in a MUD file
 without the extensions being declared. Implementations MUST ignore
 any node in this file that they do not understand.
 Note that extensions can either extend the MUD file as described in
 the previous paragraph or reference other work. An extension example
 can be found in Appendix B.
4. Augmentation to the ACL Model
 Note that in this section, when we use the term "match", we are
 referring to the ACL model "matches" node.
4.1. manufacturer
 This node consists of a hostname that would be matched against the
 authority component of another Thing's MUD URL. In its simplest
 form, "manufacturer" and "same-manufacturer" may be implemented as
 access lists. In more complex forms, additional network capabilities
 may be used. For example, if one saw the line "manufacturer" :
 "flobbidy.example.com", then all Things that registered with a MUD
 URL that contained flobbity.example.com in its authority section
 would match.
4.2. same-manufacturer
 This null-valued node is an equivalent for when the manufacturer
 element is used to indicate that the authority found in another
 Thing's MUD URL matches that of the authority found in this Thing's
 MUD URL. For example, if the Thing's MUD URL were
 "https://b1.example.com/ThingV1", then all devices that had a MUD URL
 with an authority section of b1.example.com would match.
4.3. documentation
 This URI consists of a URL that points to documentation relating to
 the device and the MUD file. This can prove particularly useful when
 the "controller" class is used, so that its use can be explained.
4.4. model
 This string matches the entire MUD URL, thus covering the model that
 is unique within the context of the authority. It may contain not
 only model information, but versioning information as well, and any
 other information that the manufacturer wishes to add. The intended
 use is for devices of this precise class to match, to permit or deny
 communication between one another.
4.5. local-networks
 This null-valued node expands to include local networks. Its default
 expansion is that packets must not traverse toward a default route
 that is received from the router. However, administrators may expand
 the expression as is appropriate in their deployments.
4.6. controller
 This URI specifies a value that a controller will register with the
 MUD manager. The node then is expanded to the set of hosts that are
 so registered. This node may also be a URN. In this case, the URN
 describes a well-known service, such as DNS or NTP, that has been
 standardized. Both of those URNs may be found in Section 17.7.
 When "my-controller" is used, it is possible that the administrator
 will be prompted to populate that class for each and every model.
 Use of "controller" with a named class allows the user to populate
 that class only once for many different models that a manufacturer
 may produce.
 Controller URIs MAY take the form of a URL (e.g., "http[s]://").
 However, MUD managers MUST NOT resolve and retrieve such files, and
 it is RECOMMENDED that there be no such file at this time, as their
 form and function may be defined at a point in the future. For now,
 URLs should serve simply as class names and may be populated by the
 local deployment administrator.
 Great care should be taken by MUD managers when invoking the
 controller class in the form of URLs. For one thing, it requires
 some understanding by the administrator as to when it is appropriate.
 Pre-registration in such classes by controllers with the MUD server
 is encouraged. The mechanism to do that is beyond the scope of this
 work.
4.7. my-controller
 This null-valued node signals to the MUD manager to use whatever
 mapping it has for this MUD URL to a particular group of hosts. This
 may require prompting the administrator for class members. Future
 work should seek to automate membership management.
4.8. direction-initiated
 This MUST only be applied to TCP. This matches the direction in
 which a TCP connection is initiated. When the direction initiated is
 "from-device", packets that are transmitted in the direction of a
 Thing MUST be dropped unless the Thing has first initiated a TCP
 connection. By way of example, this node may be implemented in its
 simplest form by looking at naked SYN bits, but it may also be
 implemented through more stateful mechanisms.
 When applied, this matches packets when the flow was initiated in the
 corresponding direction. [RFC6092] specifies IPv6 guidance best
 practices. While that document is scoped specifically to IPv6, its
 contents are applicable for IPv4 as well.
5. Processing of the MUD File
 To keep things relatively simple in addition to whatever definitions
 exist, we also apply two additional default behaviors:
 o Anything not explicitly permitted is denied.
 o Local DNS and NTP are, by default, permitted to and from the
 Thing.
 An explicit description of the defaults can be found in Appendix A.
 These are applied AFTER all other explicit rules. Thus, a default
 behavior can be changed with a "drop" action.
6. What Does a MUD URL Look Like?
 MUD URLs are required to use the "https" scheme, in order to
 establish the MUD file server's identity and assure integrity of the
 MUD file.
 Any "https://" URL can be a MUD URL. For example:
 https://things.example.org/product_abc123/v5
 https://www.example.net/mudfiles/temperature_sensor/
 https://example.com/lightbulbs/colour/v1
 A manufacturer may construct a MUD URL in any way, so long as it
 makes use of the "https" scheme.
7. The MUD YANG Model
 <CODE BEGINS>file "ietf-mud@2019年01月28日.yang"
 module ietf-mud {
 yang-version 1.1;
 namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud";
 prefix ietf-mud;
 import ietf-access-control-list {
 prefix acl;
 }
 import ietf-yang-types {
 prefix yang;
 }
 import ietf-inet-types {
 prefix inet;
 }
 organization
 "IETF OPSAWG (Operations and Management Area Working Group)";
 contact
 "WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/>
 WG List: opsawg@ietf.org
 Author: Eliot Lear
 lear@cisco.com
 Author: Ralph Droms
 rdroms@gmail.com
 Author: Dan Romascanu
 dromasca@gmail.com
 ";
 description
 "This YANG module defines a component that augments the
 IETF description of an access list. This specific module
 focuses on additional filters that include local, model,
 and same-manufacturer.
 This module is intended to be serialized via JSON and stored
 as a file, as described in RFC 8520.
 The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
 NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
 described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
 they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
 authors of the code. All rights reserved.
 Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
 without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
 to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
 set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
 Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
 This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 8520; see
 the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
 revision 2019年01月28日 {
 description
 "Initial proposed standard.";
 reference
 "RFC 8520: Manufacturer Usage Description
 Specification";
 }
 typedef direction {
 type enumeration {
 enum to-device {
 description
 "packets or flows destined to the target
 Thing.";
 }
 enum from-device {
 description
 "packets or flows destined from
 the target Thing.";
 }
 }
 description
 "Which way are we talking about?";
 }
 container mud {
 presence "Enabled for this particular MUD URL";
 description
 "MUD-related information, as specified
 by RFC 8520.";
 uses mud-grouping;
 }
 grouping mud-grouping {
 description
 "Information about when support ends (or ended)
 and when to refresh.";
 leaf mud-version {
 type uint8;
 mandatory true;
 description
 "This is the version of the MUD
 specification. This memo specifies version 1.";
 }
 leaf mud-url {
 type inet:uri;
 mandatory true;
 description
 "This is the MUD URL associated with the entry found
 in a MUD file.";
 }
 leaf last-update {
 type yang:date-and-time;
 mandatory true;
 description
 "This is intended to be when the current MUD file
 was generated. MUD managers SHOULD NOT check
 for updates between this time plus cache validity.";
 }
 leaf mud-signature {
 type inet:uri;
 description
 "A URI that resolves to a signature as
 described in this specification.";
 }
 leaf cache-validity {
 type uint8 {
 range "1..168";
 }
 units "hours";
 default "48";
 description
 "The information retrieved from the MUD server is
 valid for these many hours, after which it should
 be refreshed. N.B., MUD manager implementations
 need not discard MUD files beyond this period.";
 }
 leaf is-supported {
 type boolean;
 mandatory true;
 description
 "This boolean indicates whether or not the Thing is
 currently supported by the manufacturer.";
 }
 leaf systeminfo {
 type string;
 description
 "A UTF-8 description of this Thing. This
 should be a brief description that may be
 displayed to the user to determine whether
 to allow the Thing on the
 network.";
 }
 leaf mfg-name {
 type string;
 description
 "Manufacturer name, as described in
 the ietf-hardware YANG module.";
 }
 leaf model-name {
 type string;
 description
 "Model name, as described in the
 ietf-hardware YANG module.";
 }
 leaf firmware-rev {
 type string;
 description
 "firmware-rev, as described in the
 ietf-hardware YANG module. Note that this field
 MUST NOT be included when the device can be
 updated but the MUD URL cannot.";
 }
 leaf software-rev {
 type string;
 description
 "software-rev, as described in the
 ietf-hardware YANG module. Note that this field
 MUST NOT be included when the device can be
 updated but the MUD URL cannot.";
 }
 leaf documentation {
 type inet:uri;
 description
 "This URL points to documentation that
 relates to this device and any classes that it uses
 in its MUD file. A caution: MUD managers need
 not resolve this URL on their own but rather simply
 provide it to the administrator. Parsing HTML is
 not an intended function of a MUD manager.";
 }
 leaf-list extensions {
 type string {
 length "1..40";
 }
 description
 "A list of extension names that are used in this MUD
 file. Each name is registered with the IANA and
 described in an RFC.";
 }
 container from-device-policy {
 description
 "The policies that should be enforced on traffic
 coming from the device. These policies are not
 necessarily intended to be enforced at a single
 point but may be rendered by the controller to any
 relevant enforcement points in the network or
 elsewhere.";
 uses access-lists;
 }
 container to-device-policy {
 description
 "The policies that should be enforced on traffic
 going to the device. These policies are not
 necessarily intended to be enforced at a single
 point but may be rendered by the controller to any
 relevant enforcement points in the network or
 elsewhere.";
 uses access-lists;
 }
 }
 grouping access-lists {
 description
 "A grouping for access lists in the context of device
 policy.";
 container access-lists {
 description
 "The access lists that should be applied to traffic
 to or from the device.";
 list access-list {
 key "name";
 description
 "Each entry on this list refers to an ACL that
 should be present in the overall access list
 data model. Each ACL is identified by name and
 type.";
 leaf name {
 type leafref {
 path "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:name";
 }
 description
 "The name of the ACL for this entry.";
 }
 }
 }
 }
 augment "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches" {
 description
 "adding abstractions to avoid the need of IP addresses.";
 container mud {
 description
 "MUD-specific matches.";
 leaf manufacturer {
 type inet:host;
 description
 "A domain that is intended to match the authority
 section of the MUD URL. This node is used to specify
 one or more manufacturers a device should
 be authorized to access.";
 }
 leaf same-manufacturer {
 type empty;
 description
 "This node matches the authority section of the MUD URL
 of a Thing. It is intended to grant access to all
 devices with the same authority section.";
 }
 leaf model {
 type inet:uri;
 description
 "Devices of the specified model type will match if
 they have an identical MUD URL.";
 }
 leaf local-networks {
 type empty;
 description
 "IP addresses will match this node if they are
 considered local addresses. A local address may be
 a list of locally defined prefixes and masks
 that indicate a particular administrative scope.";
 }
 leaf controller {
 type inet:uri;
 description
 "This node names a class that has associated with it
 zero or more IP addresses to match against. These
 may be scoped to a manufacturer or via a standard
 URN.";
 }
 leaf my-controller {
 type empty;
 description
 "This node matches one or more network elements that
 have been configured to be the controller for this
 Thing, based on its MUD URL.";
 }
 }
 }
 augment "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches"
 + "/acl:l4/acl:tcp/acl:tcp" {
 description
 "add direction-initiated";
 leaf direction-initiated {
 type direction;
 description
 "This node matches based on which direction a
 connection was initiated. The means by which that
 is determined is discussed in this document.";
 }
 }
 }
 <CODE ENDS>
8. The Domain Name Extension to the ACL Model
 This module specifies an extension to the IETF-ACL model such that
 domain names may be referenced by augmenting the "matches" node.
 Different implementations may deploy differing methods to maintain
 the mapping between the IP address and domain name, if indeed any are
 needed. However, the intent is that resources that are referred to
 using a name should be authorized (or not) within an access list.
 The structure of the change is as follows:
 module: ietf-acldns
 augment /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/
 acl:matches/acl:l3/acl:ipv4/acl:ipv4:
 +--rw src-dnsname? inet:host
 +--rw dst-dnsname? inet:host
 augment /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/
 acl:matches/acl:l3/acl:ipv6/acl:ipv6:
 +--rw src-dnsname? inet:host
 +--rw dst-dnsname? inet:host
 The choice of these particular points in the access control list
 model is based on the assumption that we are in some way referring to
 IP-related resources, as that is what the DNS returns. A domain name
 in our context is defined in [RFC6991]. The augmentations are
 replicated across IPv4 and IPv6 to allow MUD file authors the ability
 to control the IP version that the Thing may utilize.
 The following nodes are defined.
8.1. src-dnsname
 The argument corresponds to a domain name of a source as specified by
 inet:host. A number of means may be used to resolve hosts. What is
 important is that such resolutions be consistent with ACLs that are
 required by Things to properly operate.
8.2. dst-dnsname
 The argument corresponds to a domain name of a destination as
 specified by inet:host. See the previous section (Section 8.1)
 relating to resolution.
 Note that when using either of these with a MUD file, because access
 is associated with a particular Thing, MUD files MUST NOT contain
 either a src-dnsname in an ACL associated with from-device-policy or
 a dst-dnsname associated with to-device-policy.
8.3. The ietf-acldns Model
 <CODE BEGINS>file "ietf-acldns@2019年01月28日.yang"
 module ietf-acldns {
 yang-version 1.1;
 namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acldns";
 prefix ietf-acldns;
 import ietf-access-control-list {
 prefix acl;
 }
 import ietf-inet-types {
 prefix inet;
 }
 organization
 "IETF OPSAWG (Operations and Management Area Working Group)";
 contact
 "WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/>
 WG List: opsawg@ietf.org
 Author: Eliot Lear
 lear@cisco.com
 Author: Ralph Droms
 rdroms@gmail.com
 Author: Dan Romascanu
 dromasca@gmail.com
 ";
 description
 "This YANG module defines a component that augments the
 IETF description of an access list to allow DNS names
 as matching criteria.
 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
 authors of the code. All rights reserved.
 Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
 without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
 to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
 set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
 Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).";
 revision 2019年01月28日 {
 description
 "Base version of dnsname extension of the ACL model.";
 reference
 "RFC 8520: Manufacturer Usage Description
 Specification";
 }
 grouping dns-matches {
 description
 "Domain names for matching.";
 leaf src-dnsname {
 type inet:host;
 description
 "domain name to be matched against.";
 }
 leaf dst-dnsname {
 type inet:host;
 description
 "domain name to be matched against.";
 }
 }
 augment "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches"
 + "/acl:l3/acl:ipv4/acl:ipv4" {
 description
 "Adding domain names to matching.";
 uses dns-matches;
 }
 augment "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches"
 + "/acl:l3/acl:ipv6/acl:ipv6" {
 description
 "Adding domain names to matching.";
 uses dns-matches;
 }
 }
 <CODE ENDS>
9. MUD File Example
 This example contains two access lists that are intended to provide
 outbound access to a cloud service on TCP port 443.
 {
 "ietf-mud:mud": {
 "mud-version": 1,
 "mud-url": "https://lighting.example.com/lightbulb2000",
 "last-update": "2019-01-28T11:20:51+01:00",
 "cache-validity": 48,
 "is-supported": true,
 "systeminfo": "The BMS Example Light Bulb",
 "from-device-policy": {
 "access-lists": {
 "access-list": [
 {
 "name": "mud-76100-v6fr"
 }
 ]
 }
 },
 "to-device-policy": {
 "access-lists": {
 "access-list": [
 {
 "name": "mud-76100-v6to"
 }
 ]
 }
 }
 },
 "ietf-access-control-list:acls": {
 "acl": [
 {
 "name": "mud-76100-v6to",
 "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
 "aces": {
 "ace": [
 {
 "name": "cl0-todev",
 "matches": {
 "ipv6": {
 "ietf-acldns:src-dnsname": "test.example.com",
 "protocol": 6
 },
 "tcp": {
 "ietf-mud:direction-initiated": "from-device",
 "source-port": {
 "operator": "eq",
 "port": 443
 }
 }
 },
 "actions": {
 "forwarding": "accept"
 }
 }
 ]
 }
 },
 {
 "name": "mud-76100-v6fr",
 "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
 "aces": {
 "ace": [
 {
 "name": "cl0-frdev",
 "matches": {
 "ipv6": {
 "ietf-acldns:dst-dnsname": "test.example.com",
 "protocol": 6
 },
 "tcp": {
 "ietf-mud:direction-initiated": "from-device",
 "destination-port": {
 "operator": "eq",
 "port": 443
 }
 }
 },
 "actions": {
 "forwarding": "accept"
 }
 }
 ]
 }
 }
 ]
 }
 }
 In this example, two policies are declared: one from the Thing and
 the other to the Thing. Each policy names an access list that
 applies to the Thing and one that applies from the Thing. Within
 each access list, access is permitted to packets flowing to or from
 the Thing that can be mapped to the domain name of
 "service.bms.example.com". For each access list, the enforcement
 point should expect that the Thing initiated the connection.
10. The MUD URL DHCP Option
 The IPv4 MUD URL client option has the following format:
 +------+-----+------------------------------
 | code | len | MUDstring
 +------+-----+------------------------------
 Code OPTION_MUD_URL_V4 (161) has been assigned by IANA. len is a
 single octet that indicates the length of the MUD string in octets.
 The MUDstring is defined as follows:
 MUDstring = mudurl [ " " reserved ]
 mudurl = URI; a URL [RFC3986] that uses the "https" scheme [RFC7230]
 reserved = 1*( OCTET ) ; from [RFC5234]
 The entire option MUST NOT exceed 255 octets. If a space follows the
 MUD URL, a reserved string that will be defined in future
 specifications follows. MUD managers that do not understand this
 field MUST ignore it.
 The IPv6 MUD URL client option has the following format:
 0 1 2 3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 | OPTION_MUD_URL_V6 | option-length |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 | MUDstring |
 | |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 OPTION_MUD_URL_V6 (112).
 option-length contains the length of the MUDstring, as defined above,
 in octets.
 The intent of this option is to provide both a new Thing classifier
 to the network as well as some recommended configuration to the
 routers that implement the policy. However, it is entirely the
 purview of the network system as managed by the network administrator
 to decide what to do with this information. The key function of this
 option is simply to identify the type of Thing to the network in a
 structured way such that the policy can be easily found with existing
 toolsets.
10.1. Client Behavior
 A DHCPv4 client MAY emit a DHCPv4 option, and a DHCPv6 client MAY
 emit a DHCPv6 option. These options are singletons, as specified in
 [RFC7227]. Because clients are intended to have at most one MUD URL
 associated with them, they may emit at most one MUD URL option via
 DHCPv4 and one MUD URL option via DHCPv6. In the case where both v4
 and v6 DHCP options are emitted, the same URL MUST be used.
10.2. Server Behavior
 A DHCP server may ignore these options or take action based on
 receipt of these options. When a server consumes this option, it
 will either forward the URL and relevant client information (such as
 the gateway address or giaddr and requested IP address, and lease
 length) to a network management system or retrieve the usage
 description itself by resolving the URL.
 DHCP servers may implement MUD functionality themselves or they may
 pass along appropriate information to a network management system or
 MUD manager. A DHCP server that does process the MUD URL MUST adhere
 to the process specified in [RFC2818] and [RFC5280] to validate the
 TLS certificate of the web server hosting the MUD file. Those
 servers will retrieve the file, process it, and create and install
 the necessary configuration on the relevant network element. Servers
 SHOULD monitor the gateway for state changes on a given interface. A
 DHCP server that does not provide MUD functionality and has forwarded
 a MUD URL to a MUD manager MUST notify the MUD manager of any
 corresponding change to the DHCP state of the client (such as
 expiration or explicit release of a network address lease).
 Should the DHCP server fail, in the case when it implements the MUD
 manager functionality, any backup mechanisms SHOULD include the MUD
 state, and the server SHOULD resolve the status of clients upon its
 restart, similar to what it would do absent MUD manager
 functionality. In the case where the DHCP server forwards
 information to the MUD manager, the MUD manager will either make use
 of redundant DHCP servers for information or clear state based on
 other network information, such as monitoring port status on a switch
 via SNMP, Radius accounting, or similar mechanisms.
10.3. Relay Requirements
 There are no additional requirements for relays.
11. The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URL X.509 Extension
 This section defines an X.509 non-critical certificate extension that
 contains a single URL that points to an online Manufacturer Usage
 Description concerning the certificate subject. The URI must be
 represented as described in Section 7.4 of [RFC5280].
 Any Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) MUST be mapped to
 URIs as specified in Section 3.1 of [RFC3987] before they are placed
 in the certificate extension.
 The semantics of the URL are defined Section 6 of this document.
 The choice of id-pe is based on guidance found in Section 4.2.2 of
 [RFC5280]:
 These extensions may be used to direct applications to on-line
 information about the issuer or the subject.
 The MUD URL is precisely that: online information about the
 particular subject.
 In addition, a separate new extension is defined as id-pe-mudsigner.
 This contains the subject field of the signing certificate of the MUD
 file. Processing of this field is specified in Section 13.2.
 The purpose of this signature is to make a claim that the MUD file
 found on the server is valid for a given device, independent of any
 other factors. There are several security considerations below in
 Section 16.
 A new content-type id-ct-mud is also defined. While signatures are
 detached today, should a MUD file be transmitted as part of a
 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) message, this content-type SHOULD
 be used.
 This module imports from [RFC5912] and [RFC6268]. The new extension
 is identified as follows:
 <CODE BEGINS>
 MUDURLExtnModule-2016 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
 internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
 id-mod(0) id-mod-mudURLExtn2016(88) }
 DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
 -- EXPORTS ALL --
 IMPORTS
 -- RFC 5912
 EXTENSION
 FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
 id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
 -- RFC 5912
 id-ct
 FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
 id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }
 -- RFC 6268
 CONTENT-TYPE
 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010
 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
 pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }
 -- RFC 5912
 id-pe, Name
 FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
 id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } ;
 --
 -- Certificate Extensions
 --
 MUDCertExtensions EXTENSION ::=
 { ext-MUDURL | ext-MUDsigner, ... }
 ext-MUDURL EXTENSION ::=
 { SYNTAX MUDURLSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-mud-url }
 id-pe-mud-url OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 25 }
 MUDURLSyntax ::= IA5String
 ext-MUDsigner EXTENSION ::=
 { SYNTAX MUDsignerSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-mudsigner }
 id-pe-mudsigner OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 30 }
 MUDsignerSyntax ::= Name
 --
 -- CMS Content Types
 --
 MUDContentTypes CONTENT-TYPE ::=
 { ct-mud, ... }
 ct-mud CONTENT-TYPE ::=
 { -- directly include the content
 IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-mudtype }
 -- The binary data that is in the form
 -- "application/mud+json" is directly encoded as the
 -- signed data. No additional ASN.1 encoding is added.
 id-ct-mudtype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 41 }
 END
 <CODE ENDS>
 While this extension can appear in either an 802.AR manufacturer
 certificate (IDevID) or a deployment certificate (LDevID), of course
 it is not guaranteed in either, nor is it guaranteed to be carried
 over. It is RECOMMENDED that MUD manager implementations maintain a
 table that maps a Thing to its MUD URL based on IDevIDs.
12. The Manufacturer Usage Description LLDP Extension
 The IEEE802.1AB Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) is a one-hop,
 vendor-neutral link-layer protocol used by end host network Things
 for advertising their identity, capabilities, and neighbors on an
 IEEE 802 local area network. Its Type-Length-Value (TLV) design
 allows for "vendor-specific" extensions to be defined. IANA has a
 registered IEEE 802 organizationally unique identifier (OUI) defined
 as documented in [RFC7042]. The MUD LLDP extension uses a subtype
 defined in this document to carry the MUD URL.
 The LLDP vendor-specific frame has the following format:
 +--------+--------+----------+---------+--------------
 |TLV Type| len | OUI |subtype | MUDString
 | =127 | |= 00 00 5E| = 1 |
 |(7 bits)|(9 bits)|(3 octets)|(1 octet)|(1-255 octets)
 +--------+--------+----------+---------+--------------
 where:
 o TLV Type = 127 indicates a vendor-specific TLV
 o len = indicates the TLV string length
 o OUI = 00 00 5E is the organizationally unique identifier of IANA
 o subtype = 1 (as assigned by IANA for the MUDstring)
 o MUDstring = the length MUST NOT exceed 255 octets
 The intent of this extension is to provide both a new Thing
 classifier to the network as well as some recommended configuration
 to the routers that implement the policy. However, it is entirely
 the purview of the network system as managed by the network
 administrator to decide what to do with this information. The key
 function of this extension is simply to identify the type of Thing to
 the network in a structured way such that the policy can be easily
 found with existing toolsets.
 Hosts, routers, or other network elements that implement this option
 are intended to have at most one MUD URL associated with them, so
 they may transmit at most one MUD URL value.
 Hosts, routers, or other network elements that implement this option
 may ignore these options or take action based on receipt of these
 options. For example, they may fill in information in the respective
 extensions of the LLDP Management Information Base (MIB). LLDP
 operates in a one-way direction. Link Layer Discovery Protocol Data
 Units (LLDPDUs) are not exchanged as information requests by one
 Thing and responses sent by another Thing. The other Things do not
 acknowledge LLDP information received from a Thing. No specific
 network behavior is guaranteed. When a Thing consumes this
 extension, it may either forward the URL and relevant remote Thing
 information to a MUD manager or retrieve the usage description by
 resolving the URL in accordance with normal HTTP semantics.
13. The Creating and Processing of Signed MUD Files
 Because MUD files contain information that may be used to configure
 network access lists, they are sensitive. To ensure that they have
 not been tampered with, it is important that they be signed. We make
 use of DER-encoded Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] for
 this purpose.
13.1. Creating a MUD File Signature
 A MUD file MUST be signed using CMS as an opaque binary object. In
 order to make successful verification more likely, intermediate
 certificates SHOULD be included. The signature is stored at the
 location specified in the MUD file. Signatures are transferred using
 content-type "application/pkcs7-signature".
 For example:
 % openssl cms -sign -signer mancertfile -inkey mankey \
 -in mudfile -binary -outform DER -binary \
 -certfile intermediatecert -out mudfile.p7s
 Note: A MUD file may need to be re-signed if the signature expires.
13.2. Verifying a MUD File Signature
 Prior to processing the rest of a MUD file, the MUD manager MUST
 retrieve the MUD signature file by retrieving the value of "mud-
 signature" and validating the signature across the MUD file. The Key
 Usage Extension in the signing certificate MUST be present and have
 the bit digitalSignature(0) set. When the id-pe-mudsigner extension
 is present in a device's X.509 certificate, the MUD signature file
 MUST have been generated by a certificate whose subject matches the
 contents of that id-pe-mudsigner extension. If these conditions are
 not met, or if it cannot validate the chain of trust to a known trust
 anchor, the MUD manager MUST cease processing the MUD file until an
 administrator has given approval.
 The purpose of the signature on the file is to assign accountability
 to an entity, whose reputation can be used to guide administrators on
 whether or not to accept a given MUD file. It is already common
 place to check web reputation on the location of a server on which a
 file resides. While it is likely that the manufacturer will be the
 signer of the file, this is not strictly necessary, and it may not be
 desirable. For one thing, in some environments, integrators may
 install their own certificates. For another, what is more important
 is the accountability of the recommendation, and not just the
 relationship between the Thing and the file.
 An example:
 % openssl cms -verify -in mudfile.p7s -inform DER -content mudfile
 Note the additional step of verifying the common trust root.
14. Extensibility
 One of our design goals is to see that MUD files are able to be
 understood by as broad a cross-section of systems as is possible.
 Coupled with the fact that we have also chosen to leverage existing
 mechanisms, we are left with no ability to negotiate extensions and a
 limited desire for those extensions in any event. As such, a two-
 tier extensibility framework is employed, as follows:
 1. At a coarse grain, a protocol version is included in a MUD URL.
 This memo specifies MUD version 1. Any and all changes are
 entertained when this version is bumped. Transition approaches
 between versions would be a matter for discussion in future
 versions.
 2. At a finer grain, only extensions that would not incur additional
 risk to the Thing are permitted. Specifically, adding nodes to
 the mud container is permitted with the understanding that such
 additions will be ignored by unaware implementations. Any such
 extensions SHALL be standardized through the IETF process and
 MUST be named in the "extensions" list. MUD managers MUST ignore
 YANG nodes they do not understand and SHOULD create an exception
 to be resolved by an administrator, so as to avoid any policy
 inconsistencies.
15. Deployment Considerations
 Because MUD consists of a number of architectural building blocks, it
 is possible to assemble different deployment scenarios. One key
 aspect is where to place policy enforcement. In order to protect the
 Thing from other Things within a local deployment, policy can be
 enforced on the nearest switch or access point. In order to limit
 unwanted traffic within a network, it may also be advisable to
 enforce policy as close to the Internet as possible. In some
 circumstances, policy enforcement may not be available at the closest
 hop. At that point, the risk of lateral infection (infection of
 devices that reside near one another) is increased to the number of
 Things that are able to communicate without protection.
 A caution about some of the classes: admission of a Thing into the
 "manufacturer" and "same-manufacturer" class may have impact on the
 access of other Things. Put another way, the admission may grow the
 access list on switches connected to other Things, depending on how
 access is managed. Some care should be given on managing that access
 list growth. Alternative methods such as additional network
 segmentation can be used to keep that growth within reason.
 Because as of this writing MUD is a new concept, one can expect a
 great many devices to not have implemented it. It remains a local
 deployment decision as to whether a device that is first connected
 should be allowed broad or limited access. Furthermore, as mentioned
 in the introduction, a deployment may choose to ignore a MUD policy
 in its entirety and simply take into account the MUD URL as a
 classifier to be used as part of a local policy decision.
 Finally, please see directly below information regarding device
 lifetimes and use of domain names.
16. Security Considerations
 Based on how a MUD URL is emitted, a Thing may be able to lie about
 what it is, thus gaining additional network access. This can happen
 in a number of ways when a device emits a MUD URL using DHCP or LLDP,
 such as being inappropriately admitted to a class such as
 "same-manufacturer", being given access to a device such as
 "my-controller", or being permitted access to an Internet resource,
 where such access would otherwise be disallowed. Whether that is the
 case will depend on the deployment. Implementations SHOULD be
 configurable to disallow additive access for devices using MUD URLs
 that are not emitted in a secure fashion such as in a certificate.
 Similarly, implementations SHOULD NOT grant elevated permissions
 (beyond those of devices presenting no MUD policy) to devices that do
 not strongly bind their identity to their L2/L3 transmissions. When
 insecure methods are used by the MUD manager, the classes SHOULD NOT
 contain devices that use both insecure and secure methods, in order
 to prevent privilege escalation attacks, and MUST NOT contain devices
 with the same MUD URL that are derived from both strong and weak
 authentication methods.
 Devices may forge source (L2/L3) information. Deployments should
 apply appropriate protections to bind communications to the
 authentication that has taken place. For 802.1X authentication, IEEE
 802.1AE (MACsec) [IEEE8021AE] is one means by which this may happen.
 A similar approach can be used with 802.11i (Wi-Fi Protected Access 2
 (WPA2)) [IEEE80211i]. Other means are available with other lower-
 layer technologies. Implementations using session-oriented access
 that is not cryptographically bound should take care to remove state
 when any form of break in the session is detected.
 A rogue certification authority (CA) may sign a certificate that
 contains the same subject name as is listed in the MUDsigner field in
 the manufacturer certificate, thus seemingly permitting a substitute
 MUD file for a device. There are two mitigations available: First,
 if the signer changes, this may be flagged as an exception by the MUD
 manager. Second, if the MUD file also changes, the MUD manager
 SHOULD seek administrator approval (it should do this in any case).
 In all circumstances, the MUD manager MUST maintain a cache of
 trusted CAs for this purpose. When such a rogue is discovered, it
 SHOULD be removed.
 Additional mitigations are described below.
 When certificates are not present, Things claiming to be of a certain
 manufacturer SHOULD NOT be included in that manufacturer grouping
 without additional validation of some form. This will be relevant
 when the MUD manager makes use of primitives such as "manufacturer"
 for the purpose of accessing Things of a particular type. Similarly,
 network management systems may be able to fingerprint the Thing. In
 such cases, the MUD URL can act as a classifier that can be proven or
 disproven. Fingerprinting may have other advantages as well: when
 802.1AR certificates are used, because they themselves cannot change,
 fingerprinting offers the opportunity to add artifacts to the MUD
 string in the form of the reserved field discussed in Section 10.
 The meaning of such artifacts is left as future work.
 MUD managers SHOULD NOT accept a usage description for a Thing with
 the same Media Access Control (MAC) address that has indicated a
 change of the URL authority without some additional validation (such
 as review by a network administrator). New Things that present some
 form of unauthenticated MUD URL SHOULD be validated by some external
 means when they would be given increased network access.
 It may be possible for a rogue manufacturer to inappropriately
 exercise the MUD file parser, in order to exploit a vulnerability.
 There are two recommended approaches to address this threat. The
 first is to validate that the signer of the MUD file is known to and
 trusted by the MUD manager. The second is to have a system do a
 primary scan of the file to ensure that it is both parseable and
 believable at some level. MUD files will likely be relatively small,
 to start with. The number of ACEs used by any given Thing should be
 relatively small as well. It may also be useful to limit retrieval
 of MUD URLs to only those sites that are known to have decent web or
 domain reputations.
 Use of a URL necessitates the use of domain names. If a domain name
 changes ownership, the new owner of that domain may be able to
 provide MUD files that MUD managers would consider valid. MUD
 managers SHOULD cache certificates used by the MUD file server. When
 a new certificate is retrieved for whatever reason, the MUD manager
 should check to see if ownership of the domain has changed. A fair
 programmatic approximation of this is when the name servers for the
 domain have changed. If the actual MUD file has changed, the MUD
 manager MAY check the WHOIS database to see if registration ownership
 of a domain has changed. If a change has occurred, or if for some
 reason it is not possible to determine whether ownership has changed,
 further review may be warranted. Note, this remediation does not
 take into account the case of a Thing that was produced long ago and
 only recently fielded, or the case where a new MUD manager has been
 installed.
 The release of a MUD URL by a Thing reveals what the Thing is and
 provides an attacker with guidance on what vulnerabilities may be
 present.
 While the MUD URL itself is not intended to be unique to a specific
 Thing, the release of the URL may aid an observer in identifying
 individuals when combined with other information. This is a privacy
 consideration.
 In addressing both of these concerns, implementors should take into
 account what other information they are advertising through
 mechanisms such as Multicast DNS (mDNS) [RFC6872]; how a Thing might
 otherwise be identified, perhaps through how it behaves when it is
 connected to the network; and whether a Thing is intended to be used
 by individuals or carry personal identifying information, and then
 apply appropriate data minimization techniques. One approach is to
 make use of TEAP [RFC7170] as the means to share information with
 authorized components in the network. Network elements may also
 assist in limiting access to the MUD URL through the use of
 mechanisms such as DHCPv6-Shield [RFC7610].
 There is the risk of the MUD manager itself being spied on to
 determine what things are connected to the network. To address this
 risk, MUD managers may choose to make use of TLS proxies that they
 trust that would aggregate other information.
 Please note that the security considerations mentioned in Section 3.7
 of [RFC8407] are not applicable in this case because the YANG
 serialization is not intended to be accessed via NETCONF. However,
 for those who try to instantiate this model in a network element via
 the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF), all objects in each
 model in this document exhibit similar security characteristics as
 [RFC8519]. The basic purpose of MUD is to configure access, so by
 its very nature, it can be disruptive if used by unauthorized
 parties.
17. IANA Considerations
17.1. YANG Module Registrations
 The following YANG modules have been registered in the "YANG Module
 Names" registry:
 Name: ietf-mud
 URN: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud
 Prefix: ietf-mud
 Registrant contact: The IESG
 Reference: RFC 8520
 Name: ietf-acldns
 URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acldns
 Prefix: ietf-acldns
 Registrant contact: The IESG
 Reference: RFC 8520
17.2. URI Registrations
 IANA has added the following entries to the "IETF XML registry":
 URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acldns
 Registrant Contact: The IESG.
 XML: N/A. The requested URI is an XML namespace.
 URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud
 Registrant Contact: The IESG.
 XML: N/A. The requested URI is an XML namespace.
17.3. DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options
 The IANA has allocated OPTION_MUD_URL_V4 (161) in the "Dynamic Host
 Configuration Protocol (DHCP) and Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP)
 Parameters" registry, and OPTION_MUD_URL_V6 (112) in the "Dynamic
 Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)" registry, as described
 in Section 10.
17.4. PKIX Extensions
 IANA has made the following assignments for:
 o The MUDURLExtnModule-2016 ASN.1 module (88) in the "SMI Security
 for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0).
 o id-pe-mud-url object identifier (25) from the "SMI Security for
 PKIX Certificate Extension" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1).
 o id-pe-mudsigner object identifier (30) from the "SMI Security for
 PKIX Certificate Extension" registry.
 o id-ct-mudtype object identifier (41) from the "SMI Security for
 S/MIME CMS Content Type" registry.
 o The use of these values is specified in Section 11.
17.5. Media Type Registration for MUD Files
 The following media type is defined for the transfer of MUD files:
 o Type name: application
 o Subtype name: mud+json
 o Required parameters: N/A
 o Optional parameters: N/A
 o Encoding considerations: 8bit; "application/mud+json" values are
 represented as JSON objects; UTF-8 encoding MUST be employed
 [RFC3629].
 o Security considerations: See Security Considerations of RFC 8520
 and Section 12 of [RFC8259].
 o Interoperability considerations: N/A
 o Published specification: RFC 8520
 o Applications that use this media type: MUD managers as specified
 by RFC 8520.
 o Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
 o Additional information:
 Magic number(s): N/A
 File extension(s): N/A
 Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
 o Person & email address to contact for further information:
 Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>, Ralph Droms <rdroms@gmail.com>,
 Dan Romascanu <dromasca@gmail.com>
 o Intended usage: COMMON
 o Restrictions on usage: none
 o Author:
 Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
 Ralph Droms <rdroms@gmail.com>
 Dan Romascanu <dromasca@gmail.com>
 o Change controller: IESG
 o Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No.
17.6. IANA LLDP TLV Subtype Registry
 IANA has created a new registry titled "IANA Link Layer Discovery
 Protocol (LLDP) TLV Subtypes" under "IEEE 802 Numbers". The policy
 for this registry is Expert Review [RFC8126]. The maximum number of
 entries in the registry is 256.
 IANA has populated the initial registry as follows:
 LLDP subtype value: 1 (All the other 255 values are initially marked
 as "Unassigned".)
 Description: the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) Uniform
 Resource Locator (URL)
 Reference: RFC 8520
17.7. The MUD Well-Known Universal Resource Name (URNs)
 The following parameter registry has been added in accordance with
 [RFC3553].
 Registry name: MUD Well-Known Universal Resource Name (URN)
 Specification: RFC 8520
 Repository: https://www.iana.org/assignments/mud
 Index value: Encoded identically to a TCP/UDP port service
 name, as specified in Section 5.1 of [RFC6335]
 The following entries have been added to the "MUD Well-Known
 Universal Resource Name (URN)" registry:
 "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns" refers to the service specified by
 [RFC1123]. "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp" refers to the service specified
 by [RFC5905].
17.8. Extensions Registry
 The IANA has established a registry of extensions as follows:
 Registry name: MUD Extensions
 Registry policy: Standards Action
 Reference: RFC 8520
 Extension name: UTF-8-encoded string, not to exceed 40 characters.
 Each extension MUST follow the rules specified in this specification.
 As is usual, the IANA issues early allocations in accordance with
 [RFC7120].
18. References
18.1. Normative References
 [IEEE8021AB]
 IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
 Networks-- Station and Media Access Control Connectivity
 Discovery", IEEE 802.1AB.
 [RFC1123] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
 Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123,
 DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123>.
 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 [RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
 RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>.
 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
 DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
 [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
 [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
 Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
 (EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.
 [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
 RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
 [RFC3987] Duerst, M. and M. Suignard, "Internationalized Resource
 Identifiers (IRIs)", RFC 3987, DOI 10.17487/RFC3987,
 January 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3987>.
 [RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
 Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
 DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
 [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
 RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
 [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
 "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
 Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
 [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
 Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
 DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
 [RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
 for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
 Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268,
 DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>.
 [RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
 Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
 Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
 Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
 RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.
 [RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
 RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
 [RFC7120] Cotton, M., "Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code
 Points", BCP 100, RFC 7120, DOI 10.17487/RFC7120, January
 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7120>.
 [RFC7227] Hankins, D., Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Jiang, S., and
 S. Krishnan, "Guidelines for Creating New DHCPv6 Options",
 BCP 187, RFC 7227, DOI 10.17487/RFC7227, May 2014,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7227>.
 [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
 RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
 [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
 DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
 [RFC7610] Gont, F., Liu, W., and G. Van de Velde, "DHCPv6-Shield:
 Protecting against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers", BCP 199,
 RFC 7610, DOI 10.17487/RFC7610, August 2015,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7610>.
 [RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
 RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
 [RFC7951] Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",
 RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7951>.
 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
 May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
 [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
 Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
 DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
 [RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
 BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
 [RFC8348] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Dong, J., and D. Romascanu, "A
 YANG Data Model for Hardware Management", RFC 8348,
 DOI 10.17487/RFC8348, March 2018,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8348>.
 [RFC8415] Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
 Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
 "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
 RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.
 [RFC8519] Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Huang, L., and D. Blair,
 "YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)",
 RFC 8519, DOI 10.17487/RFC8519, March 2019,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8519>.
18.2. Informative References
 [FW95] Chapman, D. and E. Zwicky, "Building Internet Firewalls",
 First Edition, November 1995.
 [IEEE80211i]
 IEEE, "IEEE Standard for information technology-
 Telecommunications and information exchange between
 systems-Local and metropolitan area networks-Specific
 requirements-Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control
 (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications: Amendment
 6: Medium Access Control (MAC) Security Enhancements",
 IEEE 802.11i.
 [IEEE8021AE]
 IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
 networks-Media Access Control (MAC) Security",
 IEEE 802.1AE.
 [IEEE8021AR]
 IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
 networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR.
 [IEEE8021X]
 IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
 networks--Port-Based Network Access Control", IEEE 802.1X.
 [RFC1984] IAB and IESG, "IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic
 Technology and the Internet", BCP 200, RFC 1984,
 DOI 10.17487/RFC1984, August 1996,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1984>.
 [RFC3553] Mealling, M., Masinter, L., Hardie, T., and G. Klyne, "An
 IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol
 Parameters", BCP 73, RFC 3553, DOI 10.17487/RFC3553, June
 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3553>.
 [RFC6092] Woodyatt, J., Ed., "Recommended Simple Security
 Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for
 Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service", RFC 6092,
 DOI 10.17487/RFC6092, January 2011,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6092>.
 [RFC6872] Gurbani, V., Ed., Burger, E., Ed., Anjali, T., Abdelnur,
 H., and O. Festor, "The Common Log Format (CLF) for the
 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP): Framework and
 Information Model", RFC 6872, DOI 10.17487/RFC6872,
 February 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6872>.
 [RFC7042] Eastlake 3rd, D. and J. Abley, "IANA Considerations and
 IETF Protocol and Documentation Usage for IEEE 802
 Parameters", BCP 141, RFC 7042, DOI 10.17487/RFC7042,
 October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7042>.
 [RFC7170] Zhou, H., Cam-Winget, N., Salowey, J., and S. Hanna,
 "Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version
 1", RFC 7170, DOI 10.17487/RFC7170, May 2014,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7170>.
 [RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
 Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
 DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
 [RFC7452] Tschofenig, H., Arkko, J., Thaler, D., and D. McPherson,
 "Architectural Considerations in Smart Object Networking",
 RFC 7452, DOI 10.17487/RFC7452, March 2015,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7452>.
 [RFC7488] Boucadair, M., Penno, R., Wing, D., Patil, P., and T.
 Reddy, "Port Control Protocol (PCP) Server Selection",
 RFC 7488, DOI 10.17487/RFC7488, March 2015,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7488>.
 [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
 Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
 RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
 [RFC8343] Bjorklund, M., "A YANG Data Model for Interface
 Management", RFC 8343, DOI 10.17487/RFC8343, March 2018,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8343>.
 [RFC8407] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of
 Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407,
 DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018,
 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.
Appendix A. Default MUD Nodes
 What follows is the portion of a MUD file that permits DNS traffic to
 a controller that is registered with the URN
 "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns" and traffic NTP to a controller that is
 registered with "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp". This is considered the
 default behavior, and the ACEs are in effect appended to whatever
 other "ace" entries that a MUD file contains. To block DNS or NTP,
 one repeats the matching statement but replaces the "forwarding"
 action "accept" with "drop". Because ACEs are processed in the order
 they are received, the defaults would not be reached. A MUD manager
 might further decide to optimize to simply not include the defaults
 when they are overridden.
 Four "acl" list entries that implement default MUD nodes are listed
 below. Two are for IPv4 and two are for IPv6 (one in each direction
 for both versions of IP). Note that neither the access list name nor
 the ace name need be retained or used in any way by local
 implementations; they are simply there for the sake of completeness.
 "ietf-access-control-list:acls": {
 "acl": [
 {
 "name": "mud-59776-v4to",
 "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
 "aces": {
 "ace": [
 {
 "name": "ent0-todev",
 "matches": {
 "ietf-mud:mud": {
 "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns"
 },
 "ipv4": {
 "protocol": 17
 },
 "udp": {
 "source-port": {
 "operator": "eq",
 "port": 53
 }
 }
 },
 "actions": {
 "forwarding": "accept"
 }
 },
 {
 "name": "ent1-todev",
 "matches": {
 "ietf-mud:mud": {
 "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp"
 },
 "ipv4": {
 "protocol": 17
 },
 "udp": {
 "source-port": {
 "operator": "eq",
 "port": 123
 }
 }
 },
 "actions": {
 "forwarding": "accept"
 }
 }
 ]
 }
 },
 {
 "name": "mud-59776-v4fr",
 "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
 "aces": {
 "ace": [
 {
 "name": "ent0-frdev",
 "matches": {
 "ietf-mud:mud": {
 "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns"
 },
 "ipv4": {
 "protocol": 17
 },
 "udp": {
 "destination-port": {
 "operator": "eq",
 "port": 53
 }
 }
 },
 "actions": {
 "forwarding": "accept"
 }
 },
 {
 "name": "ent1-frdev",
 "matches": {
 "ietf-mud:mud": {
 "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp"
 },
 "ipv4": {
 "protocol": 17
 },
 "udp": {
 "destination-port": {
 "operator": "eq",
 "port": 123
 }
 }
 },
 "actions": {
 "forwarding": "accept"
 }
 }
 ]
 }
 },
 {
 "name": "mud-59776-v6to",
 "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
 "aces": {
 "ace": [
 {
 "name": "ent0-todev",
 "matches": {
 "ietf-mud:mud": {
 "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns"
 },
 "ipv6": {
 "protocol": 17
 },
 "udp": {
 "source-port": {
 "operator": "eq",
 "port": 53
 }
 }
 },
 "actions": {
 "forwarding": "accept"
 }
 },
 {
 "name": "ent1-todev",
 "matches": {
 "ietf-mud:mud": {
 "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp"
 },
 "ipv6": {
 "protocol": 17
 },
 "udp": {
 "source-port": {
 "operator": "eq",
 "port": 123
 }
 }
 },
 "actions": {
 "forwarding": "accept"
 }
 }
 ]
 }
 },
 {
 "name": "mud-59776-v6fr",
 "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
 "aces": {
 "ace": [
 {
 "name": "ent0-frdev",
 "matches": {
 "ietf-mud:mud": {
 "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns"
 },
 "ipv6": {
 "protocol": 17
 },
 "udp": {
 "destination-port": {
 "operator": "eq",
 "port": 53
 }
 }
 },
 "actions": {
 "forwarding": "accept"
 }
 },
 {
 "name": "ent1-frdev",
 "matches": {
 "ietf-mud:mud": {
 "controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp"
 },
 "ipv6": {
 "protocol": 17
 },
 "udp": {
 "destination-port": {
 "operator": "eq",
 "port": 123
 }
 }
 },
 "actions": {
 "forwarding": "accept"
 }
 }
 ]
 }
 }
 ]
 }
Appendix B. A Sample Extension: DETNET-indicator
 In this sample extension, we augment the core MUD model to indicate
 whether the device implements DETNET. If a device claims not to use
 DETNET, but then later attempts to do so, a notification or exception
 might be generated. Note that this example is intended only for
 illustrative purposes.
 Extension Name: "Example-Extension" (to be used in the extensions list)
 Standard: RFC 8520 (but do not register the example)
 This extension augments the MUD model to include a single node, using
 the following sample module that has the following tree structure:
 module: ietf-mud-detext-example
 augment /ietf-mud:mud:
 +--rw is-detnet-required? boolean
 The model is defined as follows:
 <CODE BEGINS>file "ietf-mud-detext-example@2019年01月28日.yang"
 module ietf-mud-detext-example {
 yang-version 1.1;
 namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud-detext-example";
 prefix ietf-mud-detext-example;
 import ietf-mud {
 prefix ietf-mud;
 }
 organization
 "IETF OPSAWG (Operations and Management Area Working Group)";
 contact
 "WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/>
 WG List: opsawg@ietf.org
 Author: Eliot Lear
 lear@cisco.com
 Author: Ralph Droms
 rdroms@gmail.com
 Author: Dan Romascanu
 dromasca@gmail.com
 ";
 description
 "Sample extension to a MUD module to indicate a need
 for DETNET support.";
 revision 2019年01月28日 {
 description
 "Initial revision.";
 reference
 "RFC 8520: Manufacturer Usage Description
 Specification";
 }
 augment "/ietf-mud:mud" {
 description
 "This adds a simple extension for a manufacturer
 to indicate whether DETNET is required by a
 device.";
 leaf is-detnet-required {
 type boolean;
 description
 "This value will equal 'true' if a device requires
 DETNET to properly function.";
 }
 }
 }
 <CODE ENDS>
 Using the previous example, we now show how the extension would be
 expressed:
 {
 "ietf-mud:mud": {
 "mud-version": 1,
 "mud-url": "https://lighting.example.com/lightbulb2000",
 "last-update": "2019-01-28T11:20:51+01:00",
 "cache-validity": 48,
 "extensions": [
 "ietf-mud-detext-example"
 ],
 "ietf-mud-detext-example:is-detnet-required": "false",
 "is-supported": true,
 "systeminfo": "The BMS Example Light Bulb",
 "from-device-policy": {
 "access-lists": {
 "access-list": [
 {
 "name": "mud-76100-v6fr"
 }
 ]
 }
 },
 "to-device-policy": {
 "access-lists": {
 "access-list": [
 {
 "name": "mud-76100-v6to"
 }
 ]
 }
 }
 },
 "ietf-access-control-list:acls": {
 "acl": [
 {
 "name": "mud-76100-v6to",
 "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
 "aces": {
 "ace": [
 {
 "name": "cl0-todev",
 "matches": {
 "ipv6": {
 "ietf-acldns:src-dnsname": "test.example.com",
 "protocol": 6
 },
 "tcp": {
 "ietf-mud:direction-initiated": "from-device",
 "source-port": {
 "operator": "eq",
 "port": 443
 }
 }
 },
 "actions": {
 "forwarding": "accept"
 }
 }
 ]
 }
 },
 {
 "name": "mud-76100-v6fr",
 "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
 "aces": {
 "ace": [
 {
 "name": "cl0-frdev",
 "matches": {
 "ipv6": {
 "ietf-acldns:dst-dnsname": "test.example.com",
 "protocol": 6
 },
 "tcp": {
 "ietf-mud:direction-initiated": "from-device",
 "destination-port": {
 "operator": "eq",
 "port": 443
 }
 }
 },
 "actions": {
 "forwarding": "accept"
 }
 }
 ]
 }
 }
 ]
 }
 }
Acknowledgments
 The authors would like to thank Einar Nilsen-Nygaard, who
 singlehandedly updated the model to match the updated ACL model,
 Bernie Volz, Tom Gindin, Brian Weis, Sandeep Kumar, Thorsten Dahm,
 John Bashinski, Steve Rich, Jim Bieda, Dan Wing, Joe Clarke, Henk
 Birkholz, Adam Montville, Jim Schaad, and Robert Sparks for their
 valuable advice and reviews. Russ Housley entirely rewrote
 Section 11 to be a complete module. Adrian Farrel provided the basis
 for the privacy considerations text. Kent Watsen provided a thorough
 review of the architecture and the YANG model. The remaining errors
 in this work are entirely the responsibility of the authors.
Authors' Addresses
 Eliot Lear
 Cisco Systems
 Richtistrasse 7
 Wallisellen CH-8304
 Switzerland
 Phone: +41 44 878 9200
 Email: lear@cisco.com
 Ralph Droms
 Google
 355 Main St., 5th Floor
 Cambridge, MA 02142
 United States of America
 Phone: +1 978 376 3731
 Email: rdroms@gmail.com
 Dan Romascanu
 Phone: +972 54 5555347
 Email: dromasca@gmail.com