| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Scope: Access Control
A password authentication mechanism error will almost always result in attackers being authorized as valid users.
|
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Architecture and Design |
In order to protect password systems from compromise, the following should be noted:
|
|
Architecture and Design |
Use a zero-knowledge password protocol, such as SRP.
|
|
Architecture and Design |
Ensure that passwords are stored safely and are not reversible.
|
|
Architecture and Design |
Implement password aging functionality that requires passwords be changed after a certain point.
|
|
Architecture and Design |
Use a mechanism for determining the strength of a password and notify the user of weak password use.
|
|
Architecture and Design |
Inform the user of why password protections are in place, how they work to protect data integrity, and why it is important to heed their warnings.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 654 | Reliance on a Single Factor in a Security Decision |
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 1390 | Weak Authentication |
| PeerOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 262 | Not Using Password Aging |
| PeerOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 308 | Use of Single-factor Authentication |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1211 | Authentication Errors |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
In both of these examples, a user is logged in if their given password matches a stored password:
This code relies exclusively on a password mechanism (CWE-309) using only one factor of authentication (CWE-308). If an attacker can steal or guess a user's password, they are given full access to their account. Note this code also uses SHA-1, which is a weak hash (CWE-328). It also does not use a salt (CWE-759).
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 724 | OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 947 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Authentication Bypass |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1396 | Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| CLASP | Using password systems | ||
| OWASP Top Ten 2004 | A3 | CWE More Specific | Broken Authentication and Session Management |
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-16 | Dictionary-based Password Attack |
| CAPEC-49 | Password Brute Forcing |
| CAPEC-509 | Kerberoasting |
| CAPEC-55 | Rainbow Table Password Cracking |
| CAPEC-555 | Remote Services with Stolen Credentials |
| CAPEC-560 | Use of Known Domain Credentials |
| CAPEC-561 | Windows Admin Shares with Stolen Credentials |
| CAPEC-565 | Password Spraying |
| CAPEC-600 | Credential Stuffing |
| CAPEC-652 | Use of Known Kerberos Credentials |
| CAPEC-653 | Use of Known Operating System Credentials |
| CAPEC-70 | Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords |
| Submissions | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
CLASP | ||
| Modifications | |||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | |
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Mapping_Notes | |||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2022年10月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2021年03月15日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | |||
| 2020年08月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated References, Relationships | |||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit | |||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | |||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences | |||
| 2010年12月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences | |||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2008年08月15日 | Veracode | ||
| Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping | |||
| Previous Entry Names | |||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | ||
| 2008年04月11日 | Using Password Systems | ||
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