| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Scope: Access Control
This weakness can allow an attacker to access resources which are not otherwise accessible without proper authentication.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 1390 | Weak Authentication |
| ParentOf | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 291 | Reliance on IP Address for Authentication |
| ParentOf | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 293 | Using Referer Field for Authentication |
| ParentOf | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 350 | Reliance on Reverse DNS Resolution for a Security-Critical Action |
| PeerOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 602 | Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1211 | Authentication Errors |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 287 | Improper Authentication |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1010 | Authenticate Actors |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Implementation |
Example 1
The following code authenticates users.
The authentication mechanism implemented relies on an IP address for source validation. If an attacker is able to spoof the IP, they may be able to bypass the authentication mechanism.
Example 2
Both of these examples check if a request is from a trusted address before responding to the request.
The code only verifies the address as stored in the request packet. An attacker can spoof this address, thus impersonating a trusted client.
Example 3
The following code samples use a DNS lookup in order to decide whether or not an inbound request is from a trusted host. If an attacker can poison the DNS cache, they can gain trusted status.
IP addresses are more reliable than DNS names, but they can also be spoofed. Attackers can easily forge the source IP address of the packets they send, but response packets will return to the forged IP address. To see the response packets, the attacker has to sniff the traffic between the victim machine and the forged IP address. In order to accomplish the required sniffing, attackers typically attempt to locate themselves on the same subnet as the victim machine. Attackers may be able to circumvent this requirement by using source routing, but source routing is disabled across much of the Internet today. In summary, IP address verification can be a useful part of an authentication scheme, but it should not be the single factor required for authentication.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
S-bus functionality in a home automation product performs access control using an IP allowlist, which can be bypassed by a forged IP address.
|
|
|
VOIP product allows authentication bypass using 127.0.0.1 in the Host header.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). | 884 | CWE Cross-section |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 956 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Channel Attack |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1353 | OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1366 | ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1396 | Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.Relationship
| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLOVER | Authentication bypass by spoofing |
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-21 | Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers |
| CAPEC-22 | Exploiting Trust in Client |
| CAPEC-459 | Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate |
| CAPEC-461 | Web Services API Signature Forgery Leveraging Hash Function Extension Weakness |
| CAPEC-473 | Signature Spoof |
| CAPEC-476 | Signature Spoofing by Misrepresentation |
| CAPEC-59 | Session Credential Falsification through Prediction |
| CAPEC-60 | Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay) |
| CAPEC-667 | Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (BIAS) |
| CAPEC-94 | Adversary in the Middle (AiTM) |
| Submissions | ||
|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
PLOVER | |
| Modifications | ||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
| 2023年10月26日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Observed_Examples | ||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Mapping_Notes | ||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction | ||
| 2023年01月31日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description | ||
| 2022年10月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2021年10月28日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2021年07月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | ||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2019年06月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | ||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships | ||
| 2017年05月03日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships | ||
| 2014年02月18日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | ||
| 2013年07月17日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | ||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Common_Consequences | ||
| 2009年07月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationship_Notes | ||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description, Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings | ||
| 2008年07月01日 | Eric Dalci | Cigital |
| updated Time_of_Introduction | ||
| 2008年07月01日 | Sean Eidemiller | Cigital |
| added/updated demonstrative examples | ||
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