| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Hide Activities; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Scope: Access Control, Non-Repudiation
Malicious users can fake authentication information, impersonating any IP address.
|
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Architecture and Design |
Use other means of identity verification that cannot be simply spoofed. Possibilities include a username/password or certificate.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 290 | Authentication Bypass by Spoofing |
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 923 | Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1010 | Authenticate Actors |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic. |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
Both of these examples check if a request is from a trusted address before responding to the request.
The code only verifies the address as stored in the request packet. An attacker can spoof this address, thus impersonating a trusted client.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
S-bus functionality in a home automation product performs access control using an IP allowlist, which can be bypassed by a forged IP address.
|
| Ordinality | Description |
|---|---|
|
Resultant
|
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1396 | Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| CLASP | Trusting self-reported IP address |
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-4 | Using Alternative IP Address Encodings |
| Submissions | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
CLASP | ||
| Modifications | |||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | |
|
2025年04月03日
(CWE 4.17, 2025年04月03日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2023年10月26日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples, References | |||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Mapping_Notes | |||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2023年01月31日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description | |||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated References, Relationships | |||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships | |||
| 2014年02月18日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2013年07月17日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Name, Relationships, Type | |||
| 2013年06月23日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| Changed type from composite to weakness. | |||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships | |||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples | |||
| 2010年02月16日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Other_Notes | |||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities | |||
| Previous Entry Names | |||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | ||
| 2013年07月17日 | Trusting Self-reported IP Address | ||
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