| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Unexpected State |
Scope: Integrity |
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Architecture and Design |
Strategy: Input Validation Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if those resources can have alternate names.
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|
Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. |
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
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| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 172 | Encoding Error |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Implementation |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
Windows provides the MultiByteToWideChar(), WideCharToMultiByte(), UnicodeToBytes(), and BytesToUnicode() functions to convert between arbitrary multibyte (usually ANSI) character strings and Unicode (wide character) strings. The size arguments to these functions are specified in different units, (one in bytes, the other in characters) making their use prone to error.
In a multibyte character string, each character occupies a varying number of bytes, and therefore the size of such strings is most easily specified as a total number of bytes. In Unicode, however, characters are always a fixed size, and string lengths are typically given by the number of characters they contain. Mistakenly specifying the wrong units in a size argument can lead to a buffer overflow.
The following function takes a username specified as a multibyte string and a pointer to a structure for user information and populates the structure with information about the specified user. Since Windows authentication uses Unicode for usernames, the username argument is first converted from a multibyte string to a Unicode string.
This function incorrectly passes the size of unicodeUser in bytes instead of characters. The call to MultiByteToWideChar() can therefore write up to (UNLEN+1)*sizeof(WCHAR) wide characters, or (UNLEN+1)*sizeof(WCHAR)*sizeof(WCHAR) bytes, to the unicodeUser array, which has only (UNLEN+1)*sizeof(WCHAR) bytes allocated.
If the username string contains more than UNLEN characters, the call to MultiByteToWideChar() will overflow the buffer unicodeUser.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
Server allows remote attackers to read documents outside of the web root, and possibly execute arbitrary commands, via malformed URLs that contain Unicode encoded characters.
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|
Server allows a remote attacker to obtain source code of ASP files via a URL encoded with Unicode.
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Overlaps interaction error.
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| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 747 | CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 14 - Miscellaneous (MSC) |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 883 | CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC) |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 992 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Input Transformation |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1407 | Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Neutralization |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLOVER | Unicode Encoding | ||
| CERT C Secure Coding | MSC10-C | Character Encoding - UTF8 Related Issues |
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-71 | Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic |
| Submissions | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
PLOVER | ||
| Modifications | |||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | |
|
2024年02月29日
(CWE 4.14, 2024年02月29日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | |||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Mapping_Notes | |||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2023年01月31日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description | |||
| 2020年06月25日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | |||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples, References, Relationships | |||
| 2011年09月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2011年06月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences | |||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences | |||
| 2011年03月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2010年12月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Name | |||
| 2009年07月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2009年05月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | |||
| 2009年03月10日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | |||
| 2008年11月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2008年07月01日 | Eric Dalci | Cigital | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction | |||
| Previous Entry Names | |||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | ||
| 2008年04月11日 | Unicode Encoding | ||
| 2010年12月13日 | Failure to Handle Unicode Encoding | ||
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