| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Unexpected State |
Scope: Integrity |
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. |
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Output Encoding While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
|
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. | 707 | Improper Neutralization |
| ParentOf | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 173 | Improper Handling of Alternate Encoding |
| ParentOf | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 174 | Double Decoding of the Same Data |
| ParentOf | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 175 | Improper Handling of Mixed Encoding |
| ParentOf | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 176 | Improper Handling of Unicode Encoding |
| ParentOf | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 177 | Improper Handling of URL Encoding (Hex Encoding) |
| CanPrecede | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 22 | Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') |
| CanPrecede | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 41 | Improper Resolution of Path Equivalence |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Implementation |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
Forum software improperly URL decodes the highlight parameter when extracting text to highlight, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code by double-encoding the highlight value so that special characters are inserted into the result.
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|
|
XSS protection mechanism attempts to remove "/" that could be used to close tags, but it can be bypassed using double encoded slashes (%252F)
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|
Server allows a remote attacker to obtain source code of ASP files via a URL encoded with Unicode.
|
|
|
Hex-encoded path traversal variants - "%2e%2e", "%2e%2e%2f", "%5c%2e%2e"
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 992 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Input Transformation |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1407 | Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Neutralization |
Rationale
This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriateComments
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fitRelationship
Maintenance
Maintenance
| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLOVER | Encoding Error |
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-120 | Double Encoding |
| CAPEC-267 | Leverage Alternate Encoding |
| CAPEC-3 | Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters |
| CAPEC-52 | Embedding NULL Bytes |
| CAPEC-53 | Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash |
| CAPEC-64 | Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic |
| CAPEC-71 | Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic |
| CAPEC-72 | URL Encoding |
| CAPEC-78 | Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding |
| CAPEC-80 | Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic |
| Submissions | ||
|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
PLOVER | |
| Modifications | ||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
| 2023年10月26日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Observed_Examples | ||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Mapping_Notes | ||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2023年01月31日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description | ||
| 2020年06月25日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | ||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | ||
| 2019年06月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2019年01月03日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | ||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Applicable_Platforms | ||
| 2015年12月07日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2013年02月21日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | ||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | ||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | ||
| 2011年06月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Common_Consequences | ||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Common_Consequences, Description | ||
| 2011年03月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | ||
| 2010年12月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description | ||
| 2009年07月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | ||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings | ||
| 2008年07月01日 | Eric Dalci | Cigital |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction | ||
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