| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
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Unexpected State |
Scope: Integrity |
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
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Developers should anticipate that null characters or null bytes will be injected/removed/manipulated in the input vectors of their product. Use an appropriate combination of denylists and allowlists to ensure only valid, expected and appropriate input is processed by the system.
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Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. |
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
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| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 138 | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Implementation |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
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NUL byte in theme name causes directory traversal impact to be worse
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Source code disclosure using trailing null.
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Source code disclosure using trailing null.
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Trailing null allows file include.
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Null character in MIME header allows detection bypass.
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Web server allows remote attackers to view the source code for CGI programs via a null character (%00) at the end of a URL.
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Web server earlier allows allows remote attackers to bypass access restrictions, list directory contents, and read source code by inserting a null character (%00) in the URL.
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Logging system allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (hang) by causing null bytes to be placed in log messages.
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Web server allows source code for executable programs to be read via a null character (%00) at the end of a request.
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Protection mechanism for limiting file access can be bypassed using a null character (%00) at the end of the directory name.
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Application server allows remote attackers to read JSP source code via an encoded null byte in an HTTP GET request, which causes the server to send the .JSP file unparsed.
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XSS protection mechanism only checks for sequences with an alphabetical character following a (<), so a non-alphabetical or null character (%00) following a < may be processed.
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Decoding function in proxy allows regular expression bypass in ACLs via URLs with null characters.
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Null byte bypasses PHP regexp check (interaction error).
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Null byte bypasses PHP regexp check (interaction error).
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| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 990 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Command |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1407 | Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Neutralization |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.Relationship
| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLOVER | Null Character / Null Byte | ||
| WASC | 28 | Null Byte Injection | |
| Software Fault Patterns | SFP24 | Tainted input to command |
| Submissions | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
PLOVER | ||
| Modifications | |||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | |
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Mapping_Notes | |||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2023年01月31日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2020年06月25日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | |||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Applicable_Platforms | |||
| 2017年05月03日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples, References, Relationships | |||
| 2011年06月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences | |||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences | |||
| 2011年03月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2010年04月05日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Name | |||
| 2010年02月16日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2009年07月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2008年11月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples | |||
| 2008年10月14日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description | |||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2008年07月01日 | Eric Dalci | Cigital | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| Previous Entry Names | |||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | ||
| 2008年01月30日 | Null Character / Null Byte | ||
| 2008年04月11日 | Failure to Remove Null Character / Null Byte | ||
| 2010年04月05日 | Failure to Sanitize Null Byte or NUL Character | ||
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