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Home > CWE List > CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow (4.18)
ID
CWE Glossary Definition

CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow

Weakness ID: 122
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
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Description
A heap overflow condition is a buffer overflow, where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning that the buffer was allocated using a routine such as malloc().
Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)

Scope: Availability

Buffer overflows generally lead to crashes. Other attacks leading to lack of availability are possible, including putting the program into an infinite loop.

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Modify Memory

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control

Buffer overflows often can be used to execute arbitrary code, which is usually outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy. Besides important user data, heap-based overflows can be used to overwrite function pointers that may be living in memory, pointing it to the attacker's code. Even in applications that do not explicitly use function pointers, the run-time will usually leave many in memory. For example, object methods in C++ are generally implemented using function pointers. Even in C programs, there is often a global offset table used by the underlying runtime.

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Other

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control, Other

When the consequence is arbitrary code execution, this can often be used to subvert any other security service.
Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation
Pre-design: Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.

Architecture and Design
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note:

This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.

Operation; Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]

Implementation
Implement and perform bounds checking on input.

Implementation

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Do not use dangerous functions such as gets. Look for their safe equivalent, which checks for the boundary.

Operation
Use OS-level preventative functionality. This is not a complete solution, but it provides some defense in depth.
Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 787 Out-of-bounds Write
ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 788 Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer
Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Implementation
Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

C (Often Prevalent)

C++ (Often Prevalent)

Likelihood Of Exploit
High
Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


While buffer overflow examples can be rather complex, it is possible to have very simple, yet still exploitable, heap-based buffer overflows:

(bad code)
Example Language: C
#define BUFSIZE 256
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
char *buf;
buf = (char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*BUFSIZE);
strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
}

The buffer is allocated heap memory with a fixed size, but there is no guarantee the string in argv[1] will not exceed this size and cause an overflow.



Example 2


This example applies an encoding procedure to an input string and stores it into a buffer.

(bad code)
Example Language: C
char * copy_input(char *user_supplied_string){
int i, dst_index;
char *dst_buf = (char*)malloc(4*sizeof(char) * MAX_SIZE);
if ( MAX_SIZE <= strlen(user_supplied_string) ){
die("user string too long, die evil hacker!");
}
dst_index = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < strlen(user_supplied_string); i++ ){
if( '&' == user_supplied_string[i] ){
dst_buf[dst_index++] = '&';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'a';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'm';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'p';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = ';';
}
else if ('<' == user_supplied_string[i] ){

/* encode to &lt; */
}
else dst_buf[dst_index++] = user_supplied_string[i];
}
return dst_buf;
}

The programmer attempts to encode the ampersand character in the user-controlled string, however the length of the string is validated before the encoding procedure is applied. Furthermore, the programmer assumes encoding expansion will only expand a given character by a factor of 4, while the encoding of the ampersand expands by 5. As a result, when the encoding procedure expands the string it is possible to overflow the destination buffer if the attacker provides a string of many ampersands.



Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
Chain: in a web browser, an unsigned 64-bit integer is forcibly cast to a 32-bit integer (CWE-681) and potentially leading to an integer overflow (CWE-190). If an integer overflow occurs, this can cause heap memory corruption (CWE-122)
Chain: integer signedness error (CWE-195) passes signed comparison, leading to heap overflow (CWE-122)
Chain: product does not handle when an input string is not NULL terminated (CWE-170), leading to buffer over-read (CWE-125) or heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122).
Chain: machine-learning product can have a heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122) when some integer-oriented bounds are calculated by using ceiling() and floor() on floating point values (CWE-1339)
Chain: integer overflow (CWE-190) causes a negative signed value, which later bypasses a maximum-only check (CWE-839), leading to heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122).
Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
Detection Methods
Method Details

Fuzzing
Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.

Effectiveness: High
Functional Areas
  • Memory Management
Affected Resources
  • Memory
Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 970 SFP Secondary Cluster: Faulty Buffer Access
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1161 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 07. Characters and Strings (STR)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1399 Comprehensive Categorization: Memory Safety
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Notes

Relationship

Heap-based buffer overflows are usually just as dangerous as stack-based buffer overflows.
Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Heap overflow
Software Fault Patterns SFP8 Faulty Buffer Access
CERT C Secure Coding STR31-C CWE More Specific Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space for character data and the null terminator
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 3.5
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 3.5
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SI-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SI-2
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-1
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SVV-3
References
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 5, "Heap Overruns" Page 138. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002年12月04日.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 5: Buffer Overruns." Page 89. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 3, "Nonexecutable Stack", Page 76. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 5, "Protection Mechanisms", Page 189. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-58] Michael Howard. "Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista".
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/michael_howard/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista>. (URL validated: 2023年04月07日)
[REF-60] "PaX".
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_space_protection#PaX>. (URL validated: 2023年04月07日)
[REF-64] Grant Murphy. "Position Independent Executables (PIE)". Red Hat. 2012年11月28日.
<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/position-independent-executables-pie>. (URL validated: 2023年04月07日)
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024年11月17日)
[REF-1337] Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd. "Bypassing Browser Memory Protections: Setting back browser security by 10 years". Memory information leaks. 2008.
<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Sotirov_Dowd/bh08-sotirov-dowd.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023年04月26日)
[REF-1332] John Richard Moser. "Prelink and address space randomization". 2006年07月05日.
<https://lwn.net/Articles/190139/>. (URL validated: 2023年04月26日)
[REF-1333] Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR". 2016.
<http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~nael/pubs/micro16.pdf>. (URL validated: 2023年04月26日)
[REF-1334] D3FEND. "Stack Frame Canary Validation (D3-SFCV)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StackFrameCanaryValidation/>. (URL validated: 2023年04月26日)
[REF-1335] D3FEND. "Segment Address Offset Randomization (D3-SAOR)". 2023.
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SegmentAddressOffsetRandomization/>. (URL validated: 2023年04月26日)
[REF-1477] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. "Secure by Design Alert: Eliminating Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities". 2025年02月12日.
<https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/secure-design-alert-eliminating-buffer-overflow-vulnerabilities>. (URL validated: 2025年07月18日)
Content History
Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) 		CLASP
Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023年11月14日
(CWE 4.14, 2024年02月29日) 		participants in the CWE ICS/OT SIG 62443 Mapping Fall Workshop
Contributed or reviewed taxonomy mappings for ISA/IEC 62443
Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025年09月09日
(CWE 4.18, 2025年09月09日) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas, References
2025年04月03日
(CWE 4.17, 2025年04月03日) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms
2024年02月29日
(CWE 4.14, 2024年02月29日) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Taxonomy_Mappings
2023年10月26日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023年06月29日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023年04月27日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2021年07月20日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2021年03月15日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2020年02月24日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2019年01月03日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2018年03月27日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2017年11月08日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, White_Box_Definitions
2014年07月30日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014年06月23日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2013年02月21日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2012年10月30日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2012年05月11日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
2011年06月01日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences
2010年02月16日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2009年10月29日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009年01月12日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
2008年11月24日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes
2008年09月08日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008年08月01日 KDM Analytics
added/updated white box definitions
2008年07月01日 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
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Page Last Updated: September 09, 2025

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