CAPEC - CAPEC-92: Forced Integer Overflow (Version 3.9)


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CAPEC-92: Forced Integer Overflow

Attack Pattern ID: 92

Abstraction: Detailed

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Description

This attack forces an integer variable to go out of range. The integer variable is often used as an offset such as size of memory allocation or similarly. The attacker would typically control the value of such variable and try to get it out of range. For instance the integer in question is incremented past the maximum possible value, it may wrap to become a very small, or negative number, therefore providing a very incorrect value which can lead to unexpected behavior. At worst the attacker can execute arbitrary code.

Likelihood Of Attack

High

Typical Severity

High

Relationships

Section HelpThis table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These relationships are defined as ChildOf and ParentOf, and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Standard Attack PatternStandard Attack Pattern - A standard level attack pattern in CAPEC is focused on a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. It is often seen as a singular piece of a fully executed attack. A standard attack pattern is meant to provide sufficient details to understand the specific technique and how it attempts to accomplish a desired goal. A standard level attack pattern is a specific type of a more abstract meta level attack pattern.	128	Integer Attacks

Section HelpThis table shows the views that this attack pattern belongs to and top level categories within that view.

View Name	Top Level Categories
Domains of Attack	Software
Mechanisms of Attack	Manipulate Data Structures

Execution Flow

Explore

The first step is exploratory meaning the attacker looks for an integer variable that they can control.

Experiment

The attacker finds an integer variable that they can write into or manipulate and try to get the value of the integer out of the possible range.

Exploit

The integer variable is forced to have a value out of range which set its final value to an unexpected value.
The target host acts on the data and unexpected behavior may happen.

Prerequisites

The attacker can manipulate the value of an integer variable utilized by the target host.

The target host does not do proper range checking on the variable before utilizing it.

When the integer variable is incremented or decremented to an out of range value, it gets a very different value (e.g. very small or negative number)

Skills Required

[Level: Low]

An attacker can simply overflow an integer by inserting an out of range value.

[Level: High]

Exploiting a buffer overflow by injecting malicious code into the stack of a software system or even the heap can require a higher skill level.

Consequences

Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.

Scope	Impact	Likelihood
Integrity	Modify Data
Confidentiality Access Control Authorization	Gain Privileges
Confidentiality Integrity Availability	Execute Unauthorized Commands
Confidentiality	Read Data
Availability	Unreliable Execution

Mitigations

Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.

Carefully review the service's implementation before making it available to user. For instance you can use manual or automated code review to uncover vulnerabilities such as integer overflow.

Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.

Always do bound checking before consuming user input data.

Example Instances

Integer overflow in the ProcAuWriteElement function in server/dia/audispatch.c in Network Audio System (NAS) before 1.8a SVN 237 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a large max_samples value. See also: CVE-2007-1544

The following code illustrates an integer overflow. The declaration of total integer as "unsigned short int" assumes that the length of the first and second arguments fits in such an integer [REF-547], [REF-548].

include <stdlib.h>
include <string.h>
include <stdio.h>

int main (int argc, char *const *argv)
{

if (argc !=3){

printf("Usage: prog_name <string1> <string2>\n");
exit(-1);

}
unsigned short int total;
total = strlen(argv[1])+strlen(argv[2])+1;
char * buff = (char *)malloc(total);
strcpy(buff, argv[1]);
strcpy(buff, argv[2]);

}

Related Weaknesses

Section HelpA Related Weakness relationship associates a weakness with this attack pattern. Each association implies a weakness that must exist for a given attack to be successful. If multiple weaknesses are associated with the attack pattern, then any of the weaknesses (but not necessarily all) may be present for the attack to be successful. Each related weakness is identified by a CWE identifier.

CWE-ID	Weakness Name
190	Integer Overflow or Wraparound
128	Wrap-around Error
120	Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
122	Heap-based Buffer Overflow
196	Unsigned to Signed Conversion Error
680	Integer Overflow to Buffer Overflow
697	Incorrect Comparison

Taxonomy Mappings

Relevant to the WASC taxonomy mapping

Entry ID	Entry Name
03	Integer Overflows

References

[REF-131] J. Viega and G. McGraw. "Building Secure Software". Addison-Wesley. 2002.

[REF-547] Robert C. Seacord. "SAMATE - Software Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation". Test Case ID 1511. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 2006年05月22日. <http://samate.nist.gov/SRD/view_testcase.php?tID=1511>.

[REF-548] Robert C. Seacord. "Secure Coding in C and C++". Page 152, Figure 5-1.

Content History

Submissions
Submission Date	Submitter	Organization
2014年06月23日 (Version 2.6)	CAPEC Content Team	The MITRE Corporation
2014年06月23日 (Version 2.6)
Modifications
Modification Date	Modifier	Organization
2018年07月31日 (Version 2.12)	CAPEC Content Team	The MITRE Corporation
2018年07月31日 (Version 2.12)	Updated References
2020年07月30日 (Version 3.3)	CAPEC Content Team	The MITRE Corporation
2020年07月30日 (Version 3.3)	Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow
2020年12月17日 (Version 3.4)	CAPEC Content Team	The MITRE Corporation
2020年12月17日 (Version 3.4)	Updated Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
2022年09月29日 (Version 3.8)	CAPEC Content Team	The MITRE Corporation
2022年09月29日 (Version 3.8)	Updated Example_Instances

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Page Last Updated or Reviewed: July 31, 2018


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Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification

CAPEC-92: Forced Integer Overflow