TUCoPS :: Unix :: General :: ciacj045.txt

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 __________________________________________________________
 The U.S. Department of Energy
 Computer Incident Advisory Capability
 ___ __ __ _ ___
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 __________________________________________________________
 INFORMATION BULLETIN
 Vulnerability in statd exposes vulnerability in automountd
June 10, 1999 21:00 GMT Number J-045
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: Two vulnerabilities are address in this advisory:
 1) rpc.statd, a program used to communicate state changes among
 NFS clients and servers.
 2) automountd, a program used to automatically mount certain
 types of file systems.
 By exploiting these two vulnerabilities simultaneously, a
 Remote intruder is able to "bounce" rpc calls from the
 rpc.statd service to the automountd service on the same
 targeted machine.
PLATFORM: SGI IRIX 5.3 is vulnerable to rpc.statd but no longer
 supported. Unpatched IRIX 6.2 and above are vulnerable
 to automountd.
 SunOS 5.6, 5.6_x86, 5.5.1, 5.5.1_x86, 5.5, 5.5_x86,
 5.4, 5.4_x86, and 5.3.
DAMAGE: This combination of vulnerabilities allows a remote
 intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the administrative
 privileges of the automountd service, typically root.
SOLUTION: Apply the vendor-supplied patch.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Risk is high due to these vulnerabilities having been widely
ASSESSMENT: discussed on public forums such as BugTraq.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ Start CERT Advisory ]
CERT Advisory CA-99-05 Vulnerability in statd exposes vulnerability in
 automountd
 Original issue date: June 9, 1999
 Source: CERT/CC
Systems Affected
 Systems running older versions of rpc.statd and automountd
I. Description
 This advisory describes two vulnerabilities that are being used
 together by intruders to gain access to vulnerable systems. The first
 vulnerability is in rpc.statd, a program used to communicate state
 changes among NFS clients and servers. The second vulnerability is in
 automountd, a program used to automatically mount certain types of
 file systems. Both of these vulnerabilities have been widely discussed
 on public forums, such as BugTraq, and some vendors have issued
 security advisories related to the problems discussed here. Because of
 the number of incident reports we have received, however, we are
 releasing this advisory to call attention to these problems so that
 system and network administrators who have not addressed these
 problems do so immediately.
 The vulnerability in rpc.statd allows an intruder to call arbitrary
 rpc services with the privileges of the rpc.statd process. The called
 rpc service may be a local service on the same machine or it may be a
 network service on another machine. Although the form of the call is
 constrained by rpc.statd, if the call is acceptable to another rpc
 service, the other rpc service will act on the call as if it were an
 authentic call from the rpc.statd process.
 The vulnerability in automountd allows a local intruder to execute
 arbitrary commands with the privileges of the automountd process. This
 vulnerability has been widely known for a significant period of time,
 and patches have been available from vendors, but many systems remain
 vulnerable because their administrators have not yet applied the
 appropriate patches.
 By exploiting these two vulnerabilities simultaneously, a remote
 intruder is able to "bounce" rpc calls from the rpc.statd service to
 the automountd service on the same targeted machine. Although on many
 systems the automountd service does not normally accept traffic from
 the network, this combination of vulnerabilities allows a remote
 intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the administrative
 privileges of the automountd service, typically root.
 Note that the rpc.statd vulnerability described in this advisory is
 distinct from the vulnerabilities described in CERT Advisories
 CA-96.09 and CA-97.26.
II. Impact
 The vulnerability in rpc.statd may allow a remote intruder to call
 arbitrary rpc services with the privileges of the rpc.statd process,
 typically root. The vulnerability in automountd may allow a local
 intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the
 automountd service.
 By combining attacks exploiting these two vulnerabilities, a remote
 intruder is able to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of
 the automountd service.
Note
 It may still be possible to cause rpc.statd to call other rpc services
 even after applying patches which reduce the privileges of rpc.statd.
 If there are additional vulnerabilities in other rpc services
 (including services you have written), an intruder may be able to
 exploit those vulnerabilities through rpc.statd. At the present time,
 we are unaware of any such vulnerabilitity that may be exploited
 through this mechanism.
III. Solutions
 Install a patch from your vendor
 Appendix A contains input from vendors who have provided information
 for this advisory. We will update the appendix as we receive more
 information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not
 hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor directly.
Appendix A: Vendor Information
 Caldera
 Caldera's currently not shipping statd.
 Compaq Computer Corporation
 (c) Copyright 1998, 1999 Compaq Computer Corporation. All rights
 reserved.
 SOURCE: Compaq Computer Corporation
 Compaq Services
 Software Security Response Team USA
 This reported problem has not been found to affect the as
 shipped, Compaq's Tru64/UNIX Operating Systems Software.
 - Compaq Computer Corporation
 Data General
 We are investigating. We will provide an update when our
 investigation is complete.
 Hewlett-Packard Company
 HP is not vulnerable.
 The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc.
 No SCO products are vulnerable.
 Silicon Graphics, Inc.
 % IRIX
 % rpc.statd
 IRIX 6.2 and above ARE NOT vulnerable.
 IRIX 5.3 is vulnerable, but no longer supported.
 % automountd
 With patches from SGI Security Advisory
 19981005-01-PX installed,
 IRIX 6.2 and above ARE NOT vulnerable.
 % Unicos
 Currently, SGI is investigating and no further information
 is
 available for public release at this time.
 As further information becomes available, additional
 advisories
 will be issued via the normal SGI security information
 distribution
 method including the wiretap mailing list.
 SGI Security Headquarters
 http://www.sgi.com/Support/security
 Sun Microsystems Inc.
 The following patches are available:
 rpc.statd:
 Patch OS Version
 _____ __________
 106592-02 SunOS 5.6
 106593-02 SunOS 5.6_x86
 104166-04 SunOS 5.5.1
 104167-04 SunOS 5.5.1_x86
 103468-04 SunOS 5.5
 103469-05 SunOS 5.5_x86
 102769-07 SunOS 5.4
 102770-07 SunOS 5.4_x86
 102932-05 SunOS 5.3
 The fix for this vulnerability was integrated in SunOS
 5.7 (Solaris 7) before it was released.
 automountd:
 104654-05 SunOS 5.5.1
 104655-05 SunOS 5.5.1_x86
 103187-43 SunOS 5.5
 103188-43 SunOS 5.5_x86
 101945-61 SunOS 5.4
 101946-54 SunOS 5.4_x86
 101318-92 SunOS 5.3
 SunOS 5.6 (Solaris 2.6) and SunOS 5.7 (Solaris 7) are not
 vulnerable.
 Sun security patches are available at:
 http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/show.pl?target=patches/patch-li
 cense&nav=pub-patches
 _______________________________________________________________
 Our thanks to Olaf Kirch of Caldera for his assistance in
 helping us understand the problem and Chok Poh of Sun
 Microsystems for his assistance in helping us construct this
 advisory.
 _______________________________________________________________
 This document is available from:
 http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-05-statd-automountd.html.
 _______________________________________________________________
[ End CERT Advisory ]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge CERT for the information contained in this
bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
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