Sanctions against Russia: ways to break the deadlock

Max Planck experts outline legal avenues to overcome Hungary’s veto on EU sanctions

European Council meeting with officials seated around a circular table.

European Council meeting with officials seated around a circular table.

To the point

• Sanctions against Russia: The European Council will decide at the end of October on the EU’s 19th sanctions package against Russia, which aims to use frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine.
• Overcoming the blockade: Hungary and Slovakia are threatening to veto a renewal of the sanctions, thereby complicating the process. Legal scholars at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law are exploring legal avenues to overcome such vetoes.
• Principle of solidarity: Armin von Bogdandy emphasises that obstructing necessary EU responses constitutes a breach of the principle of solidarity, particularly within the context of a hybrid war with Russia.
• Withdrawal of voting rights: Dimitri Spieker proposes suspending Hungary’s voting rights in EU foreign policy to safeguard solidarity. However, this measure would require the unanimous consent of the other member states.

At the end of October, the European Council will decide on the EU’s 19th package of sanctions against Russia. This package aims not only to tighten economic restrictions, but also to utilise frozen Russian assets as collateral for loans to support Ukraine. As such decisions require unanimity among the EU member states, the threat of vetoes from Hungary and Slovakia could stall progress. Two legal scholars at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law are therefore examining legal pathways to overcome such blockades.

How can the EU extend sanctions against Russia despite resistance from Hungary or Slovakia?At the centre of the debate is the EU’s 19th sanctions package, which would mobilise roughly 140ドル billion in frozen Russian assets as loan collateral for Ukraine. Both Hungary and Slovakia have threatened to block the decision. The current legal debate focuses on whether it is possible to adopt such EU measures in foreign and security policy without the consent of Hungary or Slovakia. Moreover, should these states also block an extension of the sanctions currently in place, up to 200ドル billion of Russian central bank assets, currently frozen in Belgian clearing facilities, could be released.

Legal experts Armin von Bogdandy and Dimitri Spieker at the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg have been developing legal options since early 2025 to overcome such standoffs. They contend that in instances of serious and systematic breaches of the EU’s principle of solidarity, as enshrined in the EU treaties, a member state’s veto could be qualified as legally irrelevant. They further argue that the unanimity requirement does not apply when the EU’s peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples are under threat, thereby permitting decisions by qualified majority vote.

Violation of the principle of solidarity

Von Bogdandy explains: "Russia is engaging in hybrid warfare against the European Union. When a member state blocks essential EU responses in a manner that benefits an authoritarian aggressor –^­ thereby endangering peace and security across Europe – it constitutes a violation of the principle of solidarity."

Spieker outlines an alternative argument: "Hungary’s voting rights in the EU’s common foreign and security policy could be suspended on the grounds of having breached European solidarity. However, this would necessitate a unanimous decision by the other member states under Article 7 of the EU Treaty. We have developed a concrete proposal for such a mechanism in collaboration with the German Bar Association and the Jacques Delors Centre."

Is a qualified majority vote sufficient?

The European Commission has taken up these ideas. According to reports by Table.Media, the Commission refers to a recent European Council decision stipulating that Russian assets will remain frozen until Russia compensates Ukraine. The Commission argues that because this decision established a fundamental strategic goal of the EU, subsequent measures to enforce it may now be adopted by qualified majority vote – thus preventing individual states from blocking them.

The proposals have incited a controversial debate. The Commission’s majority-vote model is perceived as being faster and more flexible, yet it raises new constitutional questions. The Max Planck experts’ approach offers an alternative legal rationale for bypassing vetoes. Spieker’s Article 7 proposal, grounded in the principle of solidarity is to be incorporated into a European Parliament resolution against Hungary.

A final decision on how to proceed will be taken at the European Council meeting at the end of October – a decision that could shape both future of the EU’s sanctions policy and its continued support for Ukraine.