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Abstract

This chapter concludes the discussion about the subnational electoral connection and senatorial behavior. Conducting a simulation based on the statistical models introduced in the previous chapters, it shows that the tenure stability of governors seriously hurts the president’s legislative success in the Senate. Referring to the cases of Brazil and Mexico, this chapter also claims that the theoretical framework of this book holds beyond the Argentine context.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This simulation assumes a seven-member Senate rather than a seventy-two-member Senate in order to avoid a heavy burden of calculation. Of course, however, the results of the simulation reflect the reality of Argentine politics, since they are based on the statistical models in Chapters 4 and 5.

  2. 2.

    The likelihoods of a longstanding governor’s subordinate, a freshman governor’s subordinate, a Senate boss, a Senate boss’s subordinate, and a local subordinate supporting the bill without amendments are respectively .801, .801, .803, .819, and .800, if they are from the PJ . These probabilities drop to .564, .564, .566, .589, and .562 if they are from the UCR . When senators face the bill with amendments , the probabilities of PJ senators increase to .821, .821, .822, .837, and .820, and those of UCR senators also goes up to .592, .592, .594, .617, and .591.

  3. 3.

    These 64 cases include one case in which all the seven senators sign a majority report, seven cases in which six out of seven senators sign it, 21 cases in which five out of seven senators sign it, and 35 cases in which four out of seven senators sign it.

  4. 4.

    These probabilities are lower than actual general bill’s probabilities of being supported by a majority report, since Model 4.2 regarded singing a majority report with partial disagreements as a position-taking activity.

  5. 5.

    Predicted probabilities of a PJ longstanding governor’s subordinate, a PJ freshman governor’s subordinate, a PJ Senate boss, a PJ Senate boss’s subordinate, and a PJ local subordinate casting an affirmative vote on a general bill without amendments are .997, .985, .972, .973, and .987 when they face the bill without amendments, and .997, .985, .973, .974, and .988 when they vote on an amended general bill. If they are from the UCR , these probabilities change to .820, .633, .536, .541, and .656 when senators deal with a general bill without amendments, and .826, .642, .546, .550, and .665 when they discuss an amended bill.

  6. 6.

    Therefore, recent trend of tightening gubernatorial term limits should favor the president, and President Néstor Kirchner ’s (PJ-FPV) pressure on the PJ governors about the prohibition of relaxing their term limits in 2007 made sense for the legislative success of his successor President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (PJ-FPV).

  7. 7.

    No immediate reelection was allowed before 1998. However, former governors could run for the governorship after four years out of office.

  8. 8.

    The president is entitled to introduce his or her bills (including constitutional amendments), and he or she may set an early deadline for the Congress to consider presidential statutory bills. In addition, the president has a package and line- item veto as well as a right to issue presidential decrees in many areas. See Hiroi (2005) for more detailed information.

  9. 9.

    Even though they hold joint sessions, senators’ votes and deputies’ votes are counted separately (Llanos and Nolte 2003).

  10. 10.

    Brazil was democratized in 1985, and the members of the constituent assembly for the 1988 constitution were elected in 1986.

  11. 11.

    Figueiredo et al. (2009) data include presidential decrees, since the constitution requires presidential decrees to be approved by Congress as ordinary laws.

  12. 12.

    This information was obtained through personal communication with Taeko Hiroi.

  13. 13.

    These senators include two former governors who were appointed by the military government.

  14. 14.

    This description does not mean that senators never work for governors. As I argue later in this section, senators also engage in the public credit-claiming for governors and voters.

  15. 15.

    Hiroi’s (2005) study on bicameral lawmaking in Brazil implies that legislators shelve presidential bills not for killing them but for amending them or receiving some compensation.

  16. 16.

    I collected this information through personal communication with Taeko Hiroi.

  17. 17.

    Using the data between 1998 and 2009, Neiva (2011) also found the same tendency.

  18. 18.

    Llanos and Nolte (2003) considered that Mexican bicameralism is less incongruent than Argentine and Brazilian ones, since senators in Mexico face no partial renewal of the upper chamber.

  19. 19.

    This system is due to the 1996 electoral reform. Before 1986, 64 senators (each state had two senators) were directly elected using a plurality rule with binomial formula , under which the winning party in each state took all the two senatorial seats. The 1986 reform introduced a staggered election cycle, and 64 senators were elected through a plurality formula between 1986 and 1993. The 1993 reform abolished the staggered election cycle and doubled the size of the upper chamber. Between 1993 and 1996, all the 128 senators (each state had four senators) were elected using the incomplete list , but this system distributed three senators to the first party and one senator to the second party.

  20. 20.

    Before the 2014 constitutional reform, former senators and deputies were enabled to return to the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies seats after six years (senators) or three years (deputies) out of office.

  21. 21.

    Annual appropriation bills are exclusively discussed in the Chamber of Deputies , while the Senate ratifies international treaties and confirms presidential appointments such as cabinet ministers and justices of the Supreme Court.

  22. 22.

    The Mexican president may partially object to a bill, but cannot enact other parts of the bill into a law.

  23. 23.

    Rather, the Senate is one of the springboard positions for winning the governorship (Langston 2008).

  24. 24.

    Senators elected in 2018 should not face a drastically changed situation, since governors who nominate them will be out of office when the senators run for other positions in 2024 or 2030.

  25. 25.

    In the case of deputies , who are elected for a three-year term, Rosas and Langston (2011) find that a governor’s ability to discipline deputies from his or her party and state depends on his remaining tenure as a governor.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, Chiba, Japan

    Hirokazu Kikuchi

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  1. Hirokazu Kikuchi

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Correspondence to Hirokazu Kikuchi .

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Kikuchi, H. (2018). Conclusion. In: Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process. IDE-JETRO Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_6

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