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Abstract

This chapter provides qualitative and quantitative evidence of floor voting in the Argentine Senate, paying attention to the sequential nature of the legislative process. Analyzing the case of Resolution 125 and a novel dataset on roll-call votes, it reveals that high-profile senators (e.g., former presidents and governors) and their fellows are very active on the floor. Their positon-taking strategies led to a historical tie-breaking vote cast by Vice-President Julio Cobos. However, the analysis on roll-call votes also showed that they just vote against a limited number of targeted presidential bills if they are affiliated with the president’s party. By contrast, longstanding governors tend to ask their senators to support presidential initiatives on the floor, because they have already screened out unwanted ones in committees.

The original version of this chapter was revised: For detailed information please see Erratum. The erratum to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_7

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In this sense, it is considered that the Parliamentary Labor Plenary may exercise a pocket veto power.

  2. 2.

    It was between May 1 and September 30, before the constitutional reform in 1994.

  3. 3.

    There were two vice-presidents until 1992.

  4. 4.

    Therefore, it was a surprise when Gerardo Zamora (UCR-Frente Cívico por Santiago, Santiago del Estero), former governor of Santiago del Estero, was elected as the provisional president in 2014, even if he was close to President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (PJ-FPV). Another exceptional example was the assignment of Ramón Puerta (PJ, Misiones) during the 2001 political crisis .

  5. 5.

    As I showed in the previous chapter, it is also true that presidential bills are more likely to be unreported or amended at the committee stage if the president’s party does not have majority status.

  6. 6.

    This is not necessarily true for the period between 2008 and 2011. Because the relationship between President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (PJ-FPV) and Vice-President Julio Cobos (UCR-Radicales K) was complicated after the case of Resolution 125 in 2008, Cobos sometimes called for meetings of the Parliamentary Labor Plenary to attack President Fernández de Kirchner. For example, in 2010, he called for a meeting so that the Senate floor questioned the presidential decree on the removal of President of the Central Bank of Argentina Martín Redrado.

  7. 7.

    This number does not include bills on (a) authorization of the president to travel abroad, (b) confirmation of the presidential appointees, and (c) ratification of international treaties on good neighborliness.

  8. 8.

    According to the Senate rules , proposals of a parliamentary action plan should be analyzed or voted on the Senate floor if the Parliamentary Labor Plenary cannot publish an agreed parliamentary action plan. However, this rarely occurs in practice. Floor meetings are usually not held until all the legislative party blocs agree on a parliamentary action plan .

  9. 9.

    If the leader of a unipersonal legislative bloc is absent from a Parliamentary Labor Plenary meeting, the parliamentary action plan is published without his or her signature.

  10. 10.

    Author’s interview, July 8, 2009.

  11. 11.

    If the number of senators on the floor does not reach a quorum, the session is closed as a sesión en minoría.

  12. 12.

    Most of the sobre tablas and preferential motions for presidential bills are scheduled by agreement made at the Parliamentary Labor Plenary .

  13. 13.

    In the case of preferential motions for bills with committee reports , the support of an absolute majority is required.

  14. 14.

    There should also be another rapporteur if a bill also has a minority report.

  15. 15.

    See Alemán (2003) for the floor amending process in the Chamber of Deputies .

  16. 16.

    The author of the bill also has a chance to speak at this point.

  17. 17.

    This bill number indicates that it was the 442nd bill submitted by the president to the Senate in the 2005 legislative year.

  18. 18.

    It was required to use roll-call voting when senators vote on impeachment or election of their authorities (provisional president and vice-presidents). However, they rarely cast roll-call votes on the election except for the cases in which there were multiple candidates for the authority positions.

  19. 19.

    If a bill has a unanimous committee report or no senator is expected to oppose a bill before the en general vote, this requirement can be waived with the support of the absolute majority of the senators present. However, senators rarely ask for a waiver. By contrast, resolutions, declarations, and communications are often approved by signal voting.

  20. 20.

    "Export withholding taxes " (retenciones) was a keyword in the conflict with the countryside because these export duties were withholding taxes.

  21. 21.

    Clarín, "Son piquetes de la abundancia" (They are pickets of abundance), March 26, 2008.

  22. 22.

    He was one of the governors who opposed Resolution 125.

  23. 23.

    La Nación, "Renunció el presidente de la comisión de Presupuesto y Hacienda en el Senado" (The chair of the Budget Committee in the Senate resigned), June 25, 2008.

  24. 24.

    Gustavo Ybarra, "Urgente regreso de Calcagno a su banca" (Calcagno’s early return to his seat), La Nación, July 6, 2008.

  25. 25.

    Parlamentario.com, "Tratan de convencer a Quintela" (They tried to convince Quintela), July 14, 2008, http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-15950.htm.

  26. 26.

    Author’s interview, August 19, 2009 (translation by the author).

  27. 27.

    Parlamentario.com, "Das Neves confirmó que los senadores del PJ chubutense ratificarán las retenciones" (Das Neves confirmed that senators of the PJ Chubut will ratify the export withholding taxes), July 8, 2008, http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-15802.html (translation by the author).

  28. 28.

    Author’s interview, August 14, 2009 (translation by the author).

  29. 29.

    La Nación, "Convocan temprano al debate de las retenciones" (They call early to the debate on the export withholding taxes), July 15, 2008.

  30. 30.

    La Voz del Interior, "Conflicto agrario: Schiaretti reiteró que las retenciones tienen que bajar" (Agricultural conflict: Schiaretti reaffirmed that the export withholding taxes have to be lower), May 16, 2008.

  31. 31.

    Cámara de Senadores (Senate), Versión Taquigráfica/Plenario de las Comisiones de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca y de Presupuesto y Hacienda (Record of Committee Meetings of the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee and the Budget Committee), July 10, 2008. We should bear in mind that Alberto Rodríguez Saá was not a supporter of the 1994 constitutional reform s under the Menem administration.

  32. 32.

    Cámara de Senadores (Senate), Versión Taquigráfica/Plenario de las Comisiones de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca y de Presupuesto y Hacienda (Record of Committee Meetings of the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee and the Budget Committee), July 10, 2008.

  33. 33.

    La Capital, "Gobernadores del PJ le dieron un fuerte espaldarazo a la convocatoria" (The PJ governors gave a strong support to the call), July 16, 2008.

  34. 34.

    Author’s interview, August 19, 2009 (translation by the author). By contrast, Vice-Governor Andrés Zottos (Renovador de Salta) opposed Resolution 125 .

  35. 35.

    La Capital, "Gobernadores del PJ le dieron un fuerte espaldarazo a la convocatoria" (The PJ governors gave a strong support to the call), July 16, 2008.

  36. 36.

    Parlamentario.com, "Se aprobaron las retenciones móviles en Diputados" (The mobile export withholding taxes were approved at the Chamber of Deputies), July 5, 2008, http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-15879.html.

  37. 37.

    La Nación, "Se esperan ausencias notorias en la Plaza" (Absenses of the well-known politicians from the Plaza de Mayo are expected), June 18, 2008.

  38. 38.

    Laura Capriata, "Radicales K, lejos de la Casa Rosada en 2009" (The Radicales K faction distances themselves from Casa Rosada), La Nación, July 13, 2008.

  39. 39.

    La Nación, "Binner reclamó un mejor reparto de las retenciones" (Binner claimed a better distribution of the export withholding taxes), April 7, 2008.

  40. 40.

    La Nación, "Macri dice que el kirchnerismo aisló al país" (Macri says that the Kirchner government made the country isolated), July 11, 2008.

  41. 41.

    La Mañana Neuquén, "Sapag dio libertad de acción a Lores" (Sapag gave Lores freedom of action), July 10, 2008.

  42. 42.

    There was also one PJ-FPV deputy who abstained from the en general vote.

  43. 43.

    Cámara de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies), Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación (Record of floor sessions of the Chamber of Deputies), July 5, 2008.

  44. 44.

    Regardless of holding joint plenary meetings, committees must publish majority (and minority) reports together.

  45. 45.

    Senator Nicolás Fernández (PJ-FPV, Santa Cruz) was affiliated with both of the committees.

  46. 46.

    The bill required a sobre tablas motion because bills should have been sent to the Parliamentary Labor Plenary seven days after the publication of majority reports on them according to the normal procedure. Senator Rubén Giustiniani (PS, Santa Fe), the leader of his unipersonal bloc, was absent from this meeting.

  47. 47.

    Parlamentario.com, "El debate será el miércoles 16" (The debate will be held on Wednesday, 16), July 7, 2008, http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-15775.html.

  48. 48.

    It was not an official legislative bloc but a group led by Senator Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis).

  49. 49.

    Cámara de Senadores (Senate), Versión Taquigráfica/Plenario de las Comisiones de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca y de Presupuesto y Hacienda (Record of Committee Meetings of the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee and the Budget Committee), July 11, 2008, 8.

  50. 50.

    This bill number denotes that the bill was the 2293rd bill submitted by senators in the legislative year 2008.

  51. 51.

    Author’s interview with Director of the Office of Senator Juan Pérez Alsina (Renovador de Salta, Salta) Guillermo Fernández Pego, August 5, 2009. This bill was submitted to the Senate on March 26, 2008.

  52. 52.

    Cámara de Senadores (Senate), Versión Taquigráfica/Plenario de las Comisiones de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca y de Presupuesto y Hacienda (Record of Committee Meetings of the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee and the Budget Committee), July 11, 2008.

  53. 53.

    Parlamentario.com, "El dictamen del oficialismo sobre retenciones se impuso en las comisiones del Senado" (Committee report of the governing party was launched in the Sanate committees), July 12, 2008, http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-16057.html.

  54. 54.

    Senators Juan Carlos Romero (PJ-FPV, Salta ) and José Martínez (ARI, Tierra del Fuego) did not sign any committee report.

  55. 55.

    Senator Nicolás Fernández (PJ-FPV, Santa Cruz) was affiliated with both of the committees.

  56. 56.

    This minority report was different from the one that was signed by most of the UCR senators. He signed it with Senator María Sánchez (UCR-Concertación Plural, Corrientes).

  57. 57.

    Ámbito Financiero, "Hay unos 200 cortes de ruta por transportistas" (There are about 200 blockades by truck drivers), June 11, 2008.

  58. 58.

    La Capital, "Gobernadores del PJ le dieron un fuerte espaldarazo a la convocatoria" (The PJ governors gave a strong support to the call), July 16, 2008.

  59. 59.

    La Nación, "Contundente acto del agro en Palermo" (Convincing event of the agricultural sector at Palermo), July 16, 2008.

  60. 60.

    Parlamentario.com, "Cobos definió en contra del Gobierno y las retenciones no son ley" (Cobos voted against the government, and the export withholding taxes were not enacted into law), July 17, 2008, http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-16026.html.

  61. 61.

    Parlamentario.com, "Cobos definió en contra del Gobierno y las retenciones no son ley" (Cobos voted against the government, and the export withholding taxes were not enacted into law), July 17, 2008, http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-16026.html.

  62. 62.

    Including this occasion, Cobos went off the floor seven times during the session. Provisional President of the Senate José Pampuro (PJ-FPV, Buenos Aires), Vice-President of the Senate Juan Carlos Romero (PJ-FPV, Salta), and First Vice-President of the Senate Juan Carlos Marino (UCR, La Pampa) chaired the session when Cobos was not on the floor. See Cámara de Senadores (Senate), Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores de la Nación (Record of Floor Sessions of the Senate), July 16, 2008.

  63. 63.

    He was a Senate boss who governed the province of Catamarca between 1983 and 1987 as well as between 1988 and 1991.

  64. 64.

    Parlamentario.com, "Cobos definió en contra del Gobierno y las retenciones no son ley" (Cobos voted against the government, and the export withholding taxes were not enacted into law), July 17, 2008, http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-16026.html.

  65. 65.

    Cámara de Senadores (Senate), Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores de la Nación (Record of Floor Sessions of the Senate), July 16, 2008.

  66. 66.

    No committee member changed his or her position.

  67. 67.

    Author’s interview, August 19, 2009 (translation by the author).

  68. 68.

    Author’s interview, August 24, 2009.

  69. 69.

    Senator Horacio Lores ’ (Movimiento Popular Neuquino, Neuquén) Nay vote is not regarded as a case of defection because his boss Governor Jorge Sapag (Movimiento Popular Neuquino, Neuquén) granted him a freedom of action. See La Mañana Neuquén, "Sapag dio libertad de acción a Lores" (Sapag gave Lores freedom of action), July 10, 2008.

  70. 70.

    Parlamentario.com, "Empate técnico" (technical tie), July 11, 2008, http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-16035.html.

  71. 71.

    This classification of the senators is based on the information from Baron (2008) and Hoy en la Noticia, "Cómo votará cada uno de los senadores" (How each senator will vote), July 10, 2008.

  72. 72.

    Governor José Alperovich (PJ-FPV, Tucumán) succeeded in introducing constitutional amendment for his reelection before the defeat of Rovira in 2006.

  73. 73.

    He replaced Cristina Fernández de Kirchner when she assumed the presidency in 2007.

  74. 74.

    Parlamentario.com, "El Partido Nuevo reclama a su senadora votar en contra" (The Partido Nuevo asked their senator to vote against the bill), July 13, 2008, http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-15922.html.

  75. 75.

    Parlamentario.com, "Cobos apoya proyecto alternativo de retenciones" (Cobos supports an alternative bill of the export withholding taxes), July 3, 2008, http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-15654.html.

  76. 76.

    Cámara de Senadores (Senate), Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores de la Nación (Record of Floor Sessions of the Senate), July 16, 2008.

  77. 77.

    I did not exclude presidential bills with successful bypassing ( sobre tablas or preferencia ) motions because the leaders of legislative party blocs discuss most of them at the Parliamentary Labor Plenary in order to avoid their defeat.

  78. 78.

    I would like to thank Ernesto Calvo for generously sharing his datasets.

  79. 79.

    They considered that presidential bills that change the tax system should be subnational-depriving legislation.

  80. 80.

    Another possible causal story would be that the president kills amended bills using his or her agenda-setting power over the Parliamentary Labor Plenary . However, it is unlikely in Argentina because the president possesses line- item veto that allows him or her to deactivate amended parts of presidential bills.

  81. 81.

    Heckman’s (1976) two-step procedure cannot be used for my analysis because the dependent variable of the outcome equation is not continuous. See Bushway et al. (2007).

  82. 82.

    Abstention and absence are recorded differently in the Argentine Senate . A senator’s behavior is regarded as abstention if (a) he or she speaks up for declaring his or her abstention from voting or (b) he or she pushes the button of "abstention " at his or her desk on the floor. If a senator is not physically present at the moment of voting, it is recorded as absence . The definition of an "abstention votes" differs under the new Senate rules after 2002 and the old rules. Article 212 of the new Senate rules prescribes that "abstention votes" do not count toward a quorum, but they were conventionally regarded as Nay votes under the old rules. See also Chapter 3.

  83. 83.

    I coded as 0 cases in which (a) a senator cast a Nay vote or (b) a senator declared his or her abstention under the old Senate rules .

  84. 84.

    The baseline category is local subordinate.

  85. 85.

    This number does not include Ramón Saadi (PJ, Catamarca), who was also a longstanding governor between 1988 and 1991. There was no roll call on the en general vote during that period.

  86. 86.

    There were 267 senators between 1983 and 2007, but some of them were not included in this analysis because they did not have an opportunity to cast roll-call vote or they were from provinces without elected governors.

  87. 87.

    I appreciate Germán Lodola for sharing his dataset with me.

  88. 88.

    A negative rho means that the "true" impacts of covariates on senators’ voting choice are underestimated. It is generated because only limited data are available for the floor voting before 2004, but its insignificance indicates that the results for Model 5.2 are not biased.

  89. 89.

    An exception was the case of two PJ senators from La Pampa on Resolution 125 in 2008, which was analyzed in this chapter. However, as I described, Senators Rubén Marín (PJ-FPV) and Siliva Gallego (PJ-FPV) strategically decided to vote differently on the presidential bill.

  90. 90.

    In this case, the value of UCR-PJ dimension is set at 0.

  91. 91.

    It was the mean of the share of provincial tax revenues variable for the province of La Pampa between 1983 and 2007.

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  1. Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, Chiba, Japan

    Hirokazu Kikuchi

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  1. Hirokazu Kikuchi

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Correspondence to Hirokazu Kikuchi .

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Kikuchi, H. (2018). Bosses at the Frontline. In: Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process. IDE-JETRO Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_5

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