Table 2 \(CCE_{IAC_\infty }^{k-P} (k, m)\)
From: Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes
\(k\) | \(m\) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | |
1 | 0.8815 | 0.7426 | 0.6143 | 0.5207 |
2 | 0.6296 | 0.5427 | 0.4476 | 0.3638 |
3 | – | 0.5516 | 0.4199 | 0.3380 |
4 | – | – | 0.5100 | 0.3322 |
5 | – | – | – | 0.4701 |