It is impossible to estimate accurately the total number of families which were forced to leave their homes since August 1969, when the first in the latest series of flights took place. During that period, however, four time spans have been the subjects of research enquiries.
It is important to make a number of points about these figures. In the first place, they only refer to families which contacted either official or unofficial agencies; so they exclude many of those who squatted without informing any agency, many of those which emigrated or which moved to Britain or the Republic of Ireland, private houseowners who sold their houses and families who sought refuge with their relations.
Furthermore the four periods detailed above amount to no more
than a total of approximately 10 months out of three and a half
years. It is difficult to secure reliable figures for the gaps
between these four investigations. One agency which kept reliable
and dated data on its cases was the Belfast Housing Aid Society
(BHAS), which only came into contact with a fraction of the total
number of cases. Nevertheless, these are certified cases which
can be added to the table.
Thus, firm evidence exists of a total of 8180 families who were forced to evacuate their homes between August 1969 and February 1973.
This figure is a considerable underestimate, partly for the reasons mentioned above, and partly because the Belfast Housing Aid Society, by nature of its limited functions and resources, only deals with a fraction of the total number of families which fled from their homes. As the BHAS has records of its total number of cases during one of the periods which was more fully researched, it is possible to calculate the ratio of BHAS cases to total cases during that period. Between May 1 and August 1 1972, the period examined in Chapter 6, 508 families left their homes and BHAS dealt with 89 of them. Thus the ratio of BHAS cases to total family movement was 1 : 5.6.
If this ratio were projected to all the BHAS figures in table 2, the figures produced are likely to give a fair indication of the maximum total number of families which were forced to leave their homes during those periods. This would produce a figure of 7991 families (ie, the Table 2 total multiplied by 5.6) to be added to the total reached in Table 1, making a grand total of 14,744 families.
It is possible to cross-check this projected figure (which is
based on the cases of the Belfast Housing Aid Society) by reference
to the 13-week sample period which was examined in detail in Chapter
7 of this report. This was a period which was not characterised
by an extra-ordinary evacuation such as occurred in August 1969,
Summer 1970 or August 1971. Although it is appreciated that the
extent of housing movement probably generally increased between
August 1969 and February 1972, it can be suggested that the 13-week
period is not untypical of the non-crisis periods since 1969,
which have not been documented. Consequently, if the rate of intimidation
is projected to these non-crisis periods (ie, those periods since
1969 not covered in Table 1) the following figures are reached:
To this should be added the 6753 families detected by researchers, producing a projected total of 12,895 families.
Our estimate of the total enforced movements in the Belfast area
between August 1969 and February 1973 is between 8,000 families
(minimum) and approximately 15,000 families (maximum). Based on
an average family size of four the figure suggested by our investigation,
this indicates a total of between 30,000 and 60,000 people who
were forced to evacuate their homes - roughly between 6.6% and
11.8% of the population of the Belfast Urban area.
FOOTNOTES
AIMS AND METHODS
Two researchers conducted this investigation between July 1972
and February 1973, with help from a research assistant for part
of that period. Because of this time pressure, it was decided
to confine the study to intimidation in Housing (ie, not in employment),
and to concentrate on the Greater Belfast area.
These were the main aims:-
Although investigations included a total of 153 formal recorded interviews (included in this total are 29 follow-up interviews), 52 of these could be described as face-to-face interviews with families (8 of which were follow-up interviews); and the remaining 101 were Agency interviews. Of the Agency interviews 78 concerned Official agencies.
In addition to these interviews we were supplied with data about
intimidated families from 31 sources.
HOW INTIMIDATED FAMILIES ARE AFFECTED
No statistics can adequately reflect the degree of human misery
and panic which results from intimidation. As part of our investigation
we followed through the case of 44 families which had been forced
to leave their homes.
Main Findings
No agency employs social case workers whose function it is to deal with all the problems of intimidated families on an integrated basis. The result is that these people, who are often in a state of distress, must try to find out which agencies or organisations can help them, and then call at the headquarters of these bodies. This can involve up to a dozen visits - to local groups, churches, hospitals, the Housing Executive, Belfast Housing Aid Society, the Public Protection Agency, RUC, Army. Considerable hardship often results, with no guarantee that the families will secure all their entitlements.This particularly applies to large families. Between May 1 and August 1 1972 less than 2% of the families which were forced to flee from their homes had eight or more members (including parents). From the evidence of interviews it is clear that the major reason for this is the much greater difficulty which larger families encounter in finding suitable alternative accommodation. Thus the families which come under most pressure are those which are often forced to remain in an antagonistic or deprived environment.
HOW COMMUNITIES ARE AFFECTED
In the main study we looked closely at the process of intimidation
in six areas in the Greater Belfast area - Rathcoole - Newtownards,
The Bone (Oldpark Road), New Barnsley, Lenadoon - Twinbrook, Castlereagh
- Cregagh and Willowfield.
Main Findings1. Organisations play major roles at all stages of the intimidation process; but it is important to distinguish between different types of organisations. Tenants' Associations have sometimes been responsible for maintaining stability in communities (Twinbrook in 1971, the Springfield estates in 1970 and others). On the other hand, the Provisional IRA has been responsible for intimidating families in Catholic areas like New Barnsley, Andersonstown and Lenadoon; and the UDA, with the 'Junior UDA' or Tartans, has been responsible for many families leaving East Belfast and Rathcoole.2. The combination of housing shortages in the Catholic parts of Belfast and an influx of intimidated families to those districts has had a number of serious effects. The resulting overcrowding produced inevitable pressure on the borders of these areas - notably in Lenadoon and the 'Ballybone' - and an increase in the likelihood of sectarian conflict. Furthermore, there has been an observable decline in the social, recreational and welfare facilities in many of these areas. 82% of the housing movements resulting from intimidation between May 1 and August 1 1972 were Catholic.3. There have been demographic changes in some areas resulting from enforced housing movements which are dramatic, but which frequently escape the attention of the public and the Agencies. In The Bone, for example, the population has not greatly altered in number since 1969, but there has been a radical change in the age and income structures of the districts. The social needs of this and other areas have completely altered.4. Many public housing estates in the Belfast area have become segregated along religious lines, and many others are fast moving in that direction. Segregation has lead to polarization of attitudes and lack of positive contacts with other communities. It is possible to construct a model which summarises the process of change resulting from intimidation in many districts of the Belfast urban area.
In August 1969 many of the potential conflict areas in Belfast resembled Stage 1 on the model. The dividing line between Catholic and Protestant areas was not clearly defined, as there was often a middle area where the two communities mingled peacefully. When the area came under pressure, the mixed area was the first to go. Thus in August 1969 the boundary between the Lower Falls and the Lower Shankill became sharply defined - a definition later to be confirmed by army barriers. It was not uncommon in August 1971 for families in east Belfast to exchange their homes for houses on the other side of the road - the road becoming the new recognisable boundary between the communities.
The next stage, one evident this year in The Bone and in east Belfast, for example, is a further 'purification' of the boundary by the removal of any stray families left isolated in alien territory. This can be a difficult period for mixed-marriage families which feel insecure in both communities and who are often among the most tragic victims of growing polarisation.
It may even be true, though it is too early to generalise, that there are further stages in the process. This is pressure against any non-conformist in the area - the man who criticises the IRA, or the family which refused to pay its UDA dues, even the drug addict or the sexually promiscuous. In a desperate search for security, anyone who is not completely conformist within the community and/or within organisations is a risk. The whole process represent an increase in polarisation, interpreted as 'a socia1 situation in which all the positive bonds are within the groups, and all the negative bonds are between the groups'.
OUTSIDE BELFAST
There are significant differences in the patterns of intimidation in other parts of the province to that in Belfast. The main reason for this is the greater availability of suitable housing (ie, houses in 'suitable' areas for intimidated families). Consequently squatting is less prevalent outside Belfast. Those who feel that they wish to move from an estate can often arrange to exchange their house by advertising in the local paper.
Intimidation is not a universal problem. There is very little enforced housing movement in Londonderry or Dungannon, for example. Their main problem has been that of coping with families intimidated from the Belfast area.
Nevertheless there are some towns which have been badly hit by intimidation. These include the Lurgan/Portadown/Craigavon complex and the Larne/Carrickfergus area. In these districts, the situation has been steadily deteriorating.
OTHER EFFECTS OF INTIMIDATION
The effects of intimidation and the resulting housing evacuations on both individuals and communities are perhaps the most underestimated aspects of the problem.
SQUATTING
No one knows exactly how many people are squatting in Northern Ireland. The NI Housing Executive has data on the incidence of squatting in public housing estates, but it is neither complete nor up-to-date. There is no reliable information on the extent of squatting in private housing. Our estimate, based on projections on the available data, is that between 2,500 and 4,500 families were squatting in public housing in February 1973. The figure released by NI Housing Executive in February 1973 was 3,300. The first destination of intimidated families is often the home of a relative or, in circumstances like those prevailing in August 1971, in church halls, hostels or schools. From there the family attempts to find a house. Available empty houses have long since been occupied by squatters in the major reception districts of Belfast, and desperate families have occupied incompleted houses, often without gas, electricity, water or roofs.
There is no doubt that some families which have not been intimidated have been taking advantage of the general situation by moving into more attractive accommodation. It is not possible to estimate what percentage of squatters are opportunists.
In some areas, housing allocation has fallen into the hands of unofficial groups. The UDA and Provisional IRA in particular, and more ad hoc combinations, install families of their choice and often charge them for the right to squat. While this sometimes take place with the acquiescence of the local community, most residents of the affected areas were clearly opposed to such practices.
The main effect of this uncontrolled squatting is that new houses are occupied as soon as, and sometimes before, they are completed. There is thus no possibility of building up a reserve of houses for emergency families, who are often forced to squat.
THE AGENCIES
The research involved an examination of the major agencies involved in coping with the problems of intimidation.
Working with a dedicated and small staff, composed largely of volunteers, the BHAS has succeeded in adopting a flexible and humane approach to its task and responded to real needs from intimidated families.
The Corporation also operate a Criminal Injuries Claims department which deals with compensation claims for property damaged during riots. Despite numerous expansions of staff, the number of unsettled claims has steadily increased, and some 1969 claims are still outstanding.
Even considering these problems there are still some RUC stations which have consistently failed to take action when intimidation was reported and have shown little sympathy for the plight of distressed families by their unwillingness to confirm intimidation.
One example is the institutional complexity facing intimidated families. These families have considerable difficulty in finding out to which agencies they must go. The compartmentalisation of social needs causes real hardship when, even if the family does succeed in finding the right connection, it discovers that it must contact up to a dozen agencies for its different needs.
Another consequence of lack of co-ordination between the agencies is occasional conflict on policy. An outstanding example of this is their attitudes towards squatting - almost all other agencies are opposed to what they see as the Housing Executive's over-willingness to accept squatters as legitimate tenants. Another example is the use of the police to assess whether intimidation has taken place, which many agencies oppose.
Finally, none of the agencies have the resources, and sometimes the willingness, to carry out action research. This means they rarely assess their own performances, and are unable to react quickly to a dynamic situation.
Outside the Belfast area it is more difficult to estimate the extent of population movement. However, in the Lurgan/Portadown/Craigavon area alone, the evidence indicates that around 750 families have left their homes as a result of intimidatory pressure.