Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process

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Authors:

• Hirokazu Kikuchi ⁰

1. Hirokazu Kikuchi

   1. Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, Chiba, Japan
      

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This book rethinks gubernatorial effects on national politics using the case of the Argentine Senate. Simultaneously analyzing senatorial behavior in committees and on the floor, Kikuchi argues that senators strategically change their actions according to stages in the legislative process, and that longstanding governors may influence national politics, causing their senators to shelve unwanted presidential bills at the committee stage. He explains senatorial behavior focusing on varieties in the combinations of principals, whose preferences senators must take into account, and shows that legislators under the same electoral system do not necessarily behave in the same way. He also demonstrates that this argument can be applied to cases from other federal countries, such as Brazil and Mexico. Based on rich qualitative evidence and quantitative data, the book offers a theoretical framework for understanding how some governors may influence national politics.

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1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xx

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2. Introduction

   • Hirokazu Kikuchi

   Pages 1-17

3. Political Careers and the Legislative Process under Federalism

   • Hirokazu Kikuchi

   Pages 19-88

4. Committees, Floor, and the Four Types of Senators

   • Hirokazu Kikuchi

   Pages 89-144

5. The Drawer of Committees

   • Hirokazu Kikuchi

   Pages 145-190

6. Bosses at the Frontline

   • Hirokazu Kikuchi

   Pages 191-247

7. Conclusion

   • Hirokazu Kikuchi

   Pages 249-277

8. Erratum to: Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process

   • Hirokazu Kikuchi

   Pages E1-E1

9. Back Matter

   Pages 279-295

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"Who influences lawmakers when they vote on public policy? In federal and presidential systems, accountability is especially complex because the set of potential actors exerting influence over legislators is large. Kikuchi delivers the most careful and detailed study to date, on how these forces interact to shape legislative representation in Argentina, a critical case of presidential federalism, explaining how federalism shapes prospects for presidential success in the legislature."(John M. Carey, Wentworth Professor in the Social Sciences, Dartmouth College, USA)

"This book is a fascinating study on the influence of subnational politicians at the national legislative process. It shows how the upper chamber —the Argentine Senate— functions as the arena where governors, through their legislators, seek to amend or veto presidential policies. This thorough analysis of the Argentine legislativeprocess is an enormous theoretical and empirical contribution on how the institutions of presidentialism and federalism work." (Mariana Llanos, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Germany)

• Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, Chiba, Japan

  Hirokazu Kikuchi

Hirokazu Kikuchi is an associate senior research fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO), Chiba, Japan. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh. His research focuses on legislative politics, executive-legislative relations, electoral systems, and civil society organizations.

• National politics
• Federalism
• Political decentralization
• Regional governors
• Legislator behaviour
• Tenure power
• Gubernatorial effects
• Argentine Senate
• Legislative politics
• latin american politics

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