New Construction Identified at Taleghan 2, a Former AMAD Plan Nuclear Weapons Development Site
New construction activity, which began before the June 12-Day War and continued afterwards, has been occurring at the former Taleghan 2 site, which was destroyed by an Israeli bombing on October 25th, 2024. Starting around mid-May, efforts were made to rebuild the structure destroyed in the October 2024 attack. Satellite imagery from May 20, 2025, shows a black temporary cover that had been hastily installed over the destroyed building (see Figure 1). By June 12, 2025, imagery shows ground preparations and the laying of foundations in front of the temporary reconstructed cover building (see Figure 2). The site was not bombed during the 12-Day War.
Imagery Update on the Esfahan Tunnel Complex
In imagery dated to late September and early October all three tunnel entrances show recent or ongoing activity to different extent. However, the visible activity does not indicate a dash to remove possible centrifuge or enriched uranium stocks inside the tunnel complex; rather it points more towards preparing controlled and secure access to two of the three tunnel entrances, and hardening the entrances and utilities against future strikes.
China's Plutonium Production for Nuclear Weapons
China has the means to make more plutonium for nuclear weapons, a type of plutonium typically referred to as "weapon-grade." We evaluated two of the most likely potential sources of weapon-grade plutonium: the civilian China Fast Reactor 600 (CFR-600), and the old 821 Plant reactor that was built several decades ago as part of China’s military plutonium complex.
IAEA Makes Progress on Syria’s Undeclared Past Nuclear Program
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in its latest safeguards report on Syria’s past undeclared nuclear program that environmental sampling at one of three sites "functionally related" to the undeclared nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour site, aka Al Kibar reactor, showed the strong presence of uranium particles, produced as a result of chemical processing. This is consistent with the long-standing view that the site, Marj as Sultan, was an important, undeclared uranium conversion and fuel fabrication site. Director General Rafael Grossi in a June 2025 press conference confirmed these earlier findings when he stated that this site was "where uranium conversion, processing, and fuel fabrication for the reactor at Dair Alzour was taking place."
Iranian Engineering Company CEO Arrested for Allegedly Shipping Sophisticated Electronics from the U.S. to Iran
Iranian national Bahram Ostovari, a U.S. permanent resident since 2020, used two front companies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to conceal the identity of Iranian end-users and acquire export-controlled electronics and other items from U.S. suppliers. Under this scheme, the criminal complaint indicates that the primary end-user of these electronics and electrical components was the Iranian railway entity. However, given the success of this operation, Iranian military entities could have easily taken advantage of this or a similar scheme, outfitting programs like the Shahed drone program, which extensively rely on Western electronics.
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New Construction Identified at Taleghan 2, a Former AMAD Plan Nuclear Weapons Development Site
New construction activity, which began before the June 12-Day War and continued afterwards, has been occurring at the former Taleghan 2 site, which was destroyed by an Israeli bombing on October 25th, 2024. Starting around mid-May, efforts were made to rebuild the structure destroyed in the October 2024 attack. Satellite imagery from May 20, 2025, shows a black temporary cover that had been hastily installed over the destroyed building (see Figure 1). By June 12, 2025, imagery shows ground preparations and the laying of foundations in front of the temporary reconstructed cover building (see Figure 2). The site was not bombed during the 12-Day War.
Imagery Update on the Esfahan Tunnel Complex
In imagery dated to late September and early October all three tunnel entrances show recent or ongoing activity to different extent. However, the visible activity does not indicate a dash to remove possible centrifuge or enriched uranium stocks inside the tunnel complex; rather it points more towards preparing controlled and secure access to two of the three tunnel entrances, and hardening the entrances and utilities against future strikes.
Update on Iran’s Mountain Facilities South of the Natanz Enrichment Plant
Satellite imagery taken over the last months show that Iran is continuing construction activities at the Natanz "Pickaxe" mountain, or Mt Kolang Gaz-La, in line with activity at the site prior to the June war. As of September 2025, Iran’s visible activities point towards late stages of construction, including improving security, but represent neither an expansion of the site nor an acceleration of activity.
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October 15, 2025
NEW in-depth report on China’s plutonium production for nuclear weapons: While it remains unclear if China needs new plutonium, China does have the means to make more plutonium for nuclear weapons, a type of plutonium typically referred to as "weapon-grade." We evaluated two of the most likely potential sources of weapon-grade plutonium: the twin civilian China Fast Reactors (CFR-600), and the old 821 Plant reactor that was built several decades ago as part of China’s military plutonium complex.
China claims that the CFR-600s are strictly civilian reactors, and Russia has imposed explicitly peaceful use constraints on the first reactor, referred to as a demonstration reactor in the China/Russia agreement for cooperation. However, China’s lack of nuclear transparency and the less-than-watertight agreement with Russia on the first and especially the second CFR-600 reactor create significant doubt that China would currently refrain from secretly using one or both of these reactors to make weapon-grade plutonium for nuclear weapons.
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