On Jul 30, 2008, at 11:38 AM, Len Yabloko wrote:
> Chris,
>
> Thank you for clarifications and references about Wittgenstein's 
> theory.  (01) 
Sure thing.  (02)
> While I can't argue (due to lack of expertize in mathematical logic) 
> about its theoretical applications, it seems to me that summarily 
> writing off his work is a bit premature.  (03) 
My "write off" here is hardly premature. As I note, it is the upshot 
of 80+ years of extensive analysis and discussion.  (04)
> Firstly due to the lack of any viable alternative theory of meaning 
> and information (please correct me if I am wrong).  (05) 
Well, ok. :-) First of all, a more or less niggling point is that W's 
picture theory is a theory in name only; it can't really be called a 
"theory" in any meaningful, scientific sense of the word. It is 
little more than a series of (admittedly, philosophically rich and 
evocative) aphorisms. More substantively, though, there is, to say 
the least, hardly a lack of alternatives. Indeed, to say a bit more 
than the least, with respect, saying there are no viable alternatives 
to W's picture theory is a bit like saying there are no viable 
alternatives to Aristotelian physics. The theory of meaning is 
perhaps the single most important topic in philosophy and linguistics 
(and among the more important topics in artificial intelligence) in 
the last 50 years. The literature on is vast, indeed overwhelmingly 
so. Somewhat randomly and off the top of my head: There is, to begin 
with, so-called "Tarskian" semantics for first-order predicate logic 
and the influential Davidsonian project of using that semantics as a 
basis for a theory of meaning. There is possible world semantics for 
intensional logics and the extensive program of Montague grammar built 
upon possible world semantics, which was the dominant program in 
natural language semantics among linguists well into the 90s and is 
still influential. Among alternatives to Montague grammar are the 
file-change semantics of Irene Heim and the more or less equivalent 
discourse representation theory of Hans Kamp. Some sense of the 
landscape here can be found in Porter and Partee, _Formal Semantics: 
The Essential Readings_, Blackwell, 2002.  (06)
Additionally, there are less formal, more philosophical theories of 
meaning as well. Notably, possible world semantics spawned a huge and 
influential literature on naming and reference that, in particular, 
breathed new life into Mill's view that (in contrast to Frege) the 
meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent. Equally important are 
theories arising from W's own later work focusing on use and developed 
more rigorously by the likes of Austin and Searle. There's also 
important work that's been done on metaphor, conceptual roles, 
propositional attitudes, mental spaces, languages of thought, etc 
etc. For the lay of the land here, see e.g., Martinich, _The 
Philosophy of Language_, Oxford UP, 2006.  (07)
>> The general consensus among philosophers and linguists is that W's 
>> so-called "picture theory of meaning" (based on the passages above) 
>> is utterly untenable as a general semantic theory.
>
> Secondly calling his work "picture theory of meaning" does not do 
> justice,  (08) 
Eh? It's just a standard label for the theory of meaning in the 
Tractatus. And a quite accurate one, as it is practically lifted from 
the pages themselves.  (09)
> even given what you call "general consensus" (are you referring to 
> mathematicians, philosophers or computer scientists?)  (010) 
Yes. :-) And linguists.  (011)
> I came across a very different characterization of his work as 
> theory of "language as use" (perhaps another consensus). Despite 
> all these stamps put on his work over 80 years his main thesis of 
> what I called "application as context" remain very viable.  (012) 
I'd bet a fair sum that W himself would not recognize "application as 
context" as his thesis. At best, it's going to be a theory that is 
perhaps *inspired* by W with only the vaguest family resemblances to 
anything he actually said. And are you sure you're talking about the 
Tractatus here? Your reference to language as use sounds much more 
like the W of the Philosophical Investigations.  (013)
> Here is an example that supports this point of view:
> This book is an extension of the discussions presented in Blair's 
> 1990 book Language and Representation in Information Retrieval, 
> which was selected as the "Best Information Science Book of the 
> Year" by the American Society for Information Science
> http://www.springer.com/computer/book/978-1-4020-4112-9  (014) 
I'm sure it's a fine book. I'm equally sure that it's quite a stretch 
to think it is anything more than loosely connected to W's work. 
Indeed, this *must* be the case, as W had the bulk of his ideas in the 
Investigations worked before there was even such a thing as 
information retrieval.  (015)
-chris  (016)
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