Special
Feature
Kyushu Electric recognizes improving the safety of nuclear power as a topmost management priority. Accordingly, we are complying
with the Japanese government’s new regulatory requirements. At the same time, we are working on both the tangible (facilities)
and intangible (operational) fronts, monitoring external opinions and undertaking voluntary and ongoing initiatives to augment safety.
Kyushu Electric applied in July 2013 to confirm that safety measures in place
at the Sendai Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 and the Genkai Nuclear
Power Station Units 3 and 4 are in compliance with the national government’s
new regulatory standards by submitting to the Nuclear Regulation Authority
applications for permission for a change in reactor installation license (basic
design), construction planning permission (detailed design), permission for
change in safety regulations (operational management). Applications for
Sendai were filed on June 8, 2013, and for Genkai on July 12, 2013.
Unit 1 of the Sendai Nuclear Power Station underwent a pre-operation test
on March 30, 2015 to confirm that actual safety measures were in accordance
with construction planning permission. Thereafter, fuel loading took place
on July 7, the reactor started up on August 11, operations recommenced on
August 14, and commercial operations began again on September 10.
Process of Recommencing Operations at Unit 1 of the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant
July 8, 2013
Revised
application
September 10, 2014
September 10,2015Authorization
Application
Commercial
operations
Screening for permission for a
change in reactor installation
license (for both Units 1 and 2)
Revised
application
May 27, 2015
Approval
Screening for permission for change in safety regulations
(for both Units 1 and 2)
Revised
application
March 18, 2015
Approval
Screening for construction planning permission Pre-operation test
Safety inspection
*We have obtained the understanding from the heads of local municipal bodies, the governor of Kagoshima Prefecture and the mayor of Satsumasendai, regarding safety enhancement initiatives and
the restarting of the Sendai Nuclear Power Station.
Unit 2 of the Sendai Nuclear Power Station underwent a pre-operation
test in June 2015, two months following the test for Unit 1, enabling us to
continue incorporating our experiences with Unit 1 testing.
We will continue implementing voluntary initiatives to further enhance
safety and reliability, ensuring the full safety of our nuclear power stations.
At the same time, we will respond meticulously and sincerely on govern-
ment reviews toward the early recommencement of operations at Unit 2 of
the Sendai Nuclear Power Station and Units 3 and 4 of the Genkai Nuclear
Power Station.
Restarting Commercial Operations at Unit 1 of the Sendai Nuclear Power Station
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Kyushu Electric Power Company Annual Report 2015
To further ensure the safety of nuclear power stations against damage
stemming from earthquakes and tsunamis, the new regulatory requirements
specify enhanced design base for anti-seismic and anti-tsunami functional-
ity, as well as power source reliability and cooling facility performance. The
requirements also call for large-scale disaster countermeasures for respond-
ing to situations that exceed design requirements.
Content of the Application for Permission for a Change in Reactor Installation License for Units 1 and 2 of the Sendai Nuclear Power Station
Overview of the Nuclear Regulation Authority’s New Regulatory Requirements
Intentional aircraft collision response*
<New Regulatory Requirements>
Containment of radioactive substances to
prevent spreading
Prevention of damage to containment vessels
Prevention of damage to reactor core
(scenario involving accidents with multiple equipment)
Precautions against the internal flooding (new)
Precautions against natural phenomena
(new; pertaining to volcanic activity, tornadoes and forest fires)
Power source reliability
Fire precautions
Specifications for other facilities
Earthquake and tsunami
resistance specifications
[Prepared from materials announced on July 3, 2013, by the Nuclear Regulation Authority]
Precautions against natural phenomena
*As an interim measure, a five-year grace period is set as an interim measure for facilities in responding to specific large-scale disasters
(restricting the abnormal emission of radioactive materials due to large-scale aircraft collisions or acts of terrorism)
Measures implemented from a voluntary
safety standpoint as accident
management measures
<Previous Regulatory Standards>
Overview of the New Standards
Design base assuming an accident that
does not damage the reactor core
(design base)
(Scenario involving an accident with a
single equipment, etc.)
Fire precautions
Power source reliability
Specifications for other facilities
Earthquake and tsunami
resistance specificationsNew(anti-terror;
severe
accident
measures)
Designbase(neworenhanced)
(1) Earthquakes
Standard seismic motion includes both
(1) Seismic movement that could conceivably occur along active fault lines in
the power station’s vicinity (seismic movement plotted out from a defined
epicenter at each site) and
(2) Past seismic movement that is difficult to attribute to the epicenter and ac-
tive fault lines (seismic movement not plotted out from a defined epicenter).
1. Strengthened and Newly Introduced Design Bases
Principal content
of new regulatory
requirements
• Power stations situated on sites with no active
fault lines
• Formulation of standard seismic motion, based
on the most recent scientific and technological
knowledge
Principal content
of applications
for permission
for a change in
reactor installa-
tion license
• Confirmation there are no active fault lines
within the power station grounds
• Formulation of standard seismic motion
(1) Evaluation of active fault lines in power sta-
tion vicinity: 540 gal
(2) Based on results of examination of the Hok-
kaido Rumoi–Nanbu earthquake: 620 gal
Distribution of Active Fault Lines in the Vicinity of the Sendai
Nuclear Power Plant
Active fault lines
[Legend]
*Faults that have not been active
since the late Pleistocene era
(since approximately
120,000–130,000 years ago)
Ichiki fault area
Ichiki region (M 7.2)
Ichiki fault area
Ichiki region (M 7.2)IchikifaultareaAreainthemiddleoftheKoshikichannel(M7.5)IchikifaultareaAreainthemiddleoftheKoshikichannel(M7.5)
Koshiki section of the
Koshiki fault (M7.5)Koshiki section of the
Koshiki fault (M7.5)Hidden faults*
Sendai Nuclear
Power Plant
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Section 1
Kyushu Electric Power Summary
Kyushu Electric Power Company Annual Report 2015
(2) Tsunamis
Principal content
of new regulato-
ry requirements
• Definition of a "standard tsunami" based on
the most recent scientific and technological
knowledge
• Buildings housing equipment crucial to safety
to be located at a height that a tsunami can-
not reach
• Establishment of protective facilities if
breached by tsunami
Principal content
of application for
permission for a
change in reac-
tor installation
license
• Definition of a standard tsunami
• A tsunami stemming from an interplate
earthquake in the Ryukyu Trench
to a generator at a maximum high-water
market of around 6m* above sea level
• Principal generator facilities to be situated
approximately 13m above sea level, ensuring
ample protection against run-up waves
• Erection of a protective wall around the sea-
water pump area
*Taking into consideration changes due to land subsidence from earthquake and full tide mark
(3) Natural Phenomena, Volcanoes, Tornadoes, etc.
Principal content
of new regulatory
requirements
• Survey volcanic activity in the power station’s
vicinity and evaluate the impact of volcanic
phenomena
• Design to ensure against the impact of volca-
nic activity during reactor operation and con-
firmation that the potential impact of volcanic
activity is sufficiently small
• Ensure the soundness of equipment crucial to
safety against tornadoes and flying objects
Principal content
of application for
permission for a
change in reac-
tor installation
license
• Evaluate that buildings and equipment neces-
sary to safety will not be affected in the event
of falling volcanic ash (depth of 15cm)
• Evaluations that the potential impact of cata-
strophic eruptions from calderas is sufficiently
small while reactor is operating
(Monitoring for volcanic activity monitoring)
• Erect a protective net outside equipment
necessary for safety to protect against collision
with flying objects in the event of a tornado
with winds of 100m/s
(Referencing the fact that the most severe
tornado recorded to date in Japan had winds
of 92m/s)
(4) Fires, Flooding
Principal content
of new regulatory
requirements
• Strengthen and thoroughly enact fire protec-
tion measures
• Implement measures to protect equipment
crucial to safety from flooding
Principal content
of application for
permission for a
change in reac-
tor installation
license
• Erect additional equipment, including automat-
ed fire-fighting equipment and fireproof walls
• Provide reinforced piping and watertight doors
to prevent water from flowing out in the event
of burst tank or piping
Locations of Calderas in Kyushu
Condensate tank tornado protection measure
Barrier wall in seawater pump area
Conceptual Image of the Reactor Site
BarrierwallBarrierwallContainment
vessel
Barrier dam
Approximately
15 m above
sea level
Intake channel
Retention dam
SeawaterpumpSeawater
pump Site height
approximately
13 m above
sea level
Retention dam
Seawater protection
from reactor cooling
water when the
tsunami recedes,
as well
Barrier dam
Protection from
tsunami and collision
with floating objectserBarrier wall
Protect seawater pump from tsunami
Legend
Caldera
Sendai Nuclear Power Plant
160km
Kikai caldera
Ata caldera
Aira caldera
Kakuto-Kobayashi
caldera
Aso caldera
Sendai Nuclear Power Plant
160km
Kikai caldera
Ata caldera
Aira caldera
Kakuto-Kobayashi
caldera
Aso caldera
Barrier wall
Barrier dam
Protective net
(made of metal)
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Management Message
Section 1
Kyushu Electric Power Summary
Kyushu Electric Power Company Annual Report 2015
2. Large-Scale Disaster Countermeasures
(1) Prevention of damage to reactor core
Principal content
of new regulatory
requirements
• Introduce measures to ensure against damage
to reactor core even if safety measures fail
Principal content
of application for
permission for a
change in reac-
tor installation
license
• Diversify power supply methods
• Installation of large-scale air-cooled generator
to provide for the event of damage to external
power supplies and permanent emergency
power supplies
• Diversify reactor cooling methods
• In addition to permanent pumps, add mobile
pumps and other equipment
(1) Use portable injection pumps (new) to
douse reactor and steam generator
(2) Douse reactor with permanently powered
injection pumps (new)
(3) Use the containment vessel spray pump
(functional addition) to douse the reactor
(4) Use large-volume pump truck (new) to
supply seawater to component cooling
water system
Seawater
Use portable injection
pumps to douse the
reactor core and
steam generator
Use large-volume
pump truck to provide
seawater
Component cooling
water system
To sea
CondensatetankRefueling
water
storage tank
Containment
spray pump
Containment vessel
Steam
Control rod
Turbine-driven auxiliary
feed water pump
Reactor vessel
Reactor coreFuelPressurizer
Steam
generator
Permanently
motor driven
injection pumps
To reactor core
Provide cooling water to
various auxiliary equipment
Seawater
system
To steam
generator
Inside
Outside
Freshwater
reservoir
Electric motor driven feed
auxiliary water pump
Electric
motor
Intermediate
holding tank
Previous cooling
water flow
New cooling water
flow due to
countermeasures
Douse reactor using
containment vessel spray pump
Douse core with permanently powered injection pumps
Prevention of Damage to Reactor Core
Mobile high-capacity generator
Large-volume pump truck
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Kyushu Electric Power Company Annual Report 2015
(2) Prevention of damage to containment vessels
Principal content
of new regulatory
requirements
• Introduce measures to ensure containment
vessel is not damaged, even in the event of
damage to the reactor core
Principal content
of application for
permission for a
change in reac-
tor installation
license
• Diversification of containment vessel cooling
methods
(1) Containment spray vessel using perma-
nently powered injection pumps (new)
(2) Containment spray vessel using portable
injection pumps (new)
(3) Use large-volume pump truck (new) to
supply seawater to containment vessel
recirculation unit*1
• Measures to reduce hydrogen concentration
• To prevent hydrogen explosions, enable re-
duction of hydrogen concentration if hydrogen
escapes from the containment vessel
(4) Static catalyst hydrogen recoupling
device*2
(5) Install electrical hydrogen igniter*3
*1 Device to cool air inside the containment vessel through heat exchange with cooling water
*2 Device using a catalyst (platinum, palladium) to prompt the reaction of hydrogen and oxygen into water
*3 Device using an electrical heater to force combustion of hydrogen into water
(3) Containment of radioactive substances to prevent spreading
Principal content
of new regulatory
requirements
• Introduce measures to control the spreading
of radioactive substances outside the site
even in the event of damage to the contain-
ment vessel
Principal content
of application for
permission for a
change in reac-
tor installation
license
• Use water canon to spray damaged areas of
the containment vessel, and erect a silt fence
(in-sea curtain) to prevent spreading into the
ocean
(4) Base equipment to handle severe accidents
Principal content
of new regulatory
requirements
• Establish emergency response posts as on-
site command centers in the event of severe
accidents
Principal content
of application for
permission for a
change in reac-
tor installation
license
• Establish alternative emergency operations
facility
• Establish alternative emergency operations
facility that satisfy new regulatory require-
ments for seismic resistance, communication
equipment, etc.
Condensatetank[Containment of radioactive substances
to prevent spreading]
Freshwater
reservoir
Intermediate
holding tank
Seawater
Containment spray pump
Large-volume pump truck Water canon
Permanently motor driven injection pumps
Containment spray vessel
using permanently motor
driven injection pumps
Containment spray vessel
using portable injection pumps
Use large-volume pump truck to
supply seawater to containment
recirculation unit
Component cooling
water system
Refueling
water
storage tank
Containment vessel
Electrical hydrogen igniter
Static catalyst hydrogen
recoupling device
Vaporizer
Hydrogen, airAir,water
vapor
Hydrogen, air, water vapor
Catalyst
plate
Electrical heater
Containment spray
Containment
recirculation unit
Reactor vessel
Previous cooling
water flow
New cooling water
flow due to
countermeasures
Inside
Outside
Control rod
Steam
generator
To sea
Prevention of damage to containment vessels and containment of radioactive substances to prevent spreading
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Special Feature
Section 4
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Section 5
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Management Message
Section 1
Kyushu Electric Power Summary
Kyushu Electric Power Company Annual Report 2015
At the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant, we have adopted a night-watch system
to ensure a rapid response in the event of a severe accident, even if it should
occur outside normal working hours, on a holiday or at night, by continuously
maintaining an on-alert squad of 52 people. These 52 people take part in
drills on a daily basis and manage their resources to form a rapid-response
team in the event of a severe accident.
Top management is taking a leadership role in addressing the risks of nuclear
power. While promoting an understanding of these risks both within and
outside the Company, we are working to identify the broad range of risk. We
have established an internal risk communication council comprising all layers
of management to deliberate risk from diverse perspectives and reinforce our
risk management initiatives.
Making use of a council composed of outside experts to perform checks
and offer advice related to our nuclear power business operations, we are
undertaking efforts to enhance safety with respect to nuclear power’s risks
and conducting monitoring from a third-party perspective.
We have also established a caldera volcano response committee, chaired
by the president. This committee, which receives third-party advice, oversees
the management of risk with respect to caldera volcanos.
Securing Necessary Personnel for Large-Scale Disaster Countermeasures and Conducting Various Drills
Reinforcing the Management of Nuclear Power Risks
Severe Accident Drills at Nuclear Power Stations
Organizations Reinforcing Nuclear Power Risk Management
Kyushu Electric
Board of Directors,
Corporate Management Committee
Power Generation Division,
related divisions
JANSI, Nuclear Risk Research Center,
WANO, manufacturers, etc.
Related government bodies,
local community, etc.
Council to perform checks and
offer advice related to our
nuclear power
business operations Meeting of the council to perform checks and offer
advice related to our nuclear power business operations
Nuclear power safety
enhancement
subcommittee
Internal risk communication council
(reinforce deliberation of nuclear power risks)
ɿ Identify and evaluate important risks ɿ Deliberate risk response policies, etc.
Reporting
Reporting
Deliberation results
Monitoring
New knowledge from inside and
outside the Company Communication of opinions, etc.
Liaison with JANSI, proactive participation in
initiatives by the entire nuclear power industry( )Japan Nuclear Safety Institute (JANSI)
To ensure ongoing efforts to address measures for enhancing
the safety of nuclear power stations, this organization leads
and supports operators and makes its judgments from an
independent perspective unaffected by nuclear power
facilities operators.
World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)
Fostering communication and friendly competition among
nuclear power facilities operators, this organization strives
to enhance the safety and reliability of nuclear power
station operations.
Transporting power cables Setting up a portable diesel
injection pump
Erecting a water canon Drill assuming a forest fire near
the site
Power supply drills (transporting power cables, etc.), cooling
water provision drills (portable diesel, etc.), radioactive substance
dispersion control drills, firefighting drills with dedicated fire-
fighting groups
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Section 5
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Management Message
Section 1
Kyushu Electric Power Summary
Kyushu Electric Power Company Annual Report 2015
We listen carefully to the opinions of local community members and encour-
age "risk communication," in which we share information about the risks
related to nuclear power.
We reflect uncertainties and questions from the local community in our
risk management and work to enhance community members’ safety and
peace of mind, cultivating a trust-based relationship.
Enhancing Communications with Local Communities about Nuclear Power
(1) Recognizing the importance of communications, given that risks exist, we
communicate thoroughly with employees and maintain ongoing commu-
nications with the members of the communities that house our nuclear
power sites, thereby strengthening local organizations.
(2) Throughout our communication activities, we listen carefully to the con-
cerns and questions raised by members of the local community.
(3) By sharing input from the local community throughout the Company,
including with management, we endeavor to foster an awareness that
our operations are safe and provide peace of mind.
In the Past: Efforts to Understand From Here on out: Risk Communication
Members of the
local community
Kyushu Electric
Explanation of safety
measures
Questions regarding the
explanations
Members of the
local community
Safety,
peace ofmindUncertainty,
questions
Kyushu Electric
Efforts to heighten the safety and
peace of mind of members of the
local community
Cultivate a
trust-based
relationship
Shared throughout
the Company,
including among
management
Listening closely to
uncertainties and questions
In July 2015, we established the Genkai Office as an ongoing organization to serve as a forum for communication activities with members of the local community.
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Section 3
Special Feature
Section 4
Management Base
Section 5
Financial Information
Section 2
Management Message
Section 1
Kyushu Electric Power Summary
Kyushu Electric Power Company Annual Report 2015