Why China’s mediation can manage but not resolve the Afghanistan-Pakistan deadlock

As China lays the groundwork for a second round of Afghanistan-Pakistan dialogue, cross-border terrorism remains the central obstacle to any breakthrough. In May, Chinese Special Envoy for Afghanistan Ambassador Yue Xiaoyong met separately with Taliban and Pakistani officials to review progress from the Urumqi talks. Though tensions have not fully subsided since the April talks in Urumqi, they have not escalated into open conflict, keeping hopes for the second round of dialogue alive. Nonetheless, the simmering conflict continues to exact a real cost on transit, trade, cross-border movement and the daily lives of people living near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.

Critically, both sides have reposed trust in China’s mediation efforts and expressed hope for reaching a workable mechanism to address their security challenges. Unlike Qatar, Turkiye and Saudi Arabia, China is well positioned to mediate Afghanistan-Pakistan security challenges for three reasons: it shares common borders with both countries, has well-entrenched economic stakes on either side, and commands the trust and goodwill of both governments. A widening Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict would directly undermine China’s economic interests, especially the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its broader investments in Afghanistan, making Beijing a genuine stakeholder rather than merely a facilitator. China has consistently urged both sides to resolve their security challenges through dialogue rather than force.

Yet despite apparent optimism ahead of the second round, neither side has shown flexibility on the core issues: border security, terrorism, the reopening of government channels, and the movement of people and trade. Pakistan is also set to initiate the second phase of mass deportation of more than eight million Afghan refugees, a measure aimed at building further pressure on Kabul. Pakistani officials believe that showing leniency on core issues without first securing credible guarantees from the Taliban regime would be counterproductive. Pakistan wants concrete progress on security issues before reopening its border for trade and people’s movement.

Mistrust on the Pakistani side runs deep. The Taliban have taken some steps to address Pakistan’s security concerns. Reportedly, their authorities have detained and relocated TTP and other Pakistan-focused militants from Khost, Paktia, Paktika and Kunar provinces. Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada is also said to have informally warned the TTP to halt attacks inside Pakistan or risk losing the regime’s allegiance. Pakistan, however, views these measures as necessary but insufficient. The Taliban have taken similar administrative steps in the past to ease mounting pressure without tackling the problem’s root cause. What Pakistan wants is written, not verbal, assurances; a verifiable mechanism to map progress; and, ultimately, the disarmament, demobilization and handover of Afghanistan-based, Pakistan-focused militant groups to Islamabad, or their dismantlement if the Taliban cannot deliver them.

The Taliban maintain that terrorism is Pakistan’s internal problem and that Islamabad should negotiate with these groups rather than use force. They have offered to use their influence to bring these groups to the table. Pakistan’s considered position, however, is that no negotiations are possible with groups responsible for killing Pakistani civilians and law enforcement personnel.

The Taliban’s reluctance to go beyond tactical measures has both ideological and operational roots. If the regime moves against the TTP, it risks undermining its own legitimacy within the militant fraternity by appearing to act under Pakistani pressure. It would also expose the Taliban’s decentralized movement to dangerous internal fissures. Opinions within the movement remain divided between hard-line and pragmatic factions on how to handle TTP under Pakistani pressure. Any unilateral action by the top leadership risks gifting Daesh-Khorasan a propaganda opening to poach disgruntled TTP elements and undermine the Taliban’s ideological standing.

China has kept Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions from boiling over. But the Urumqi dialogue is a pressure valve, not a solution. Until the Taliban change their thinking on the TTP, the deadlock holds.

-Abdul Basit Khan

Operationally, the TTP fields an estimated 6,000 to 7,000 fighters at the very least. That is a significant force for the Taliban to confront from a law enforcement or counterterrorism perspective. They simply do not have the capacity, and keeping in view their existing governance and economic challenges, the political will to open that front against the TTP. Pakistan is acutely aware of these limitations and has signaled readiness to provide assistance. However, without first obtaining verifiable assurances from the Taliban regime, Pakistan cannot extend that help.

The result is a deadlock that is likely to shape the Urumqi process into a long-term diplomatic track for managing, rather than resolving, Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions. The dialogue has been valuable in preventing the conflict from escalating further, but it has not achieved any breakthrough. The deadlock persists and will give these tensions the shape of a simmering, low-intensity conflict punctuated by periodic flare-ups. Substantive progress will remain out of reach until the Taliban are willing to revisit their strategic and ideological calculus toward the TTP. In a region where a wider war is already raging in the Middle East, keeping Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions below the threshold of full escalation is itself significant, even as it falls well short of the durable resolution that both countries urgently need.

The author is a Senior Associate Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. X: @basitresearcher.