[ANNOUNCEMENT] openssh 8.9p1-1

Wed Feb 23 20:48:36 GMT 2022

The following packages have been uploaded to the Cygwin distribution:
* openssh-8.9p1-1
OpenSSH is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
	executing commands on a remote machine. It can replace rlogin and rsh,
	providing encrypted communication between two machines.
Cygwin release message:
========================================================================
WinHello support:
Apart from the following official upstream release message, this release
contains support for WinHello. That is, users of Windows 10 1909 or
later will now be able to uses FIDO2 tokens in conjunction with
WinHello. Create keys with one of
 ssh-keygen -t ed25519-sk [-O verify-required]
 ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk [-O verify-required]
Please note that keys created with `-O no-touch-required' won't work,
because WinHello doesn't support authenticating FIDO2 tokens without
checking user presence.
WinHello support is supposed to go upstream, but the changes didn't
make it into 8.9p1 in time.
Official upstream release message:
========================================================================
OpenSSH 8.9 has just been released. It will be available from the
mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/ shortly.
OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support.
Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
https://www.openssh.com/donations.html
Future deprecation notice
=========================
A near-future release of OpenSSH will switch scp(1) from using the
legacy scp/rcp protocol to using SFTP by default.
Legacy scp/rcp performs wildcard expansion of remote filenames (e.g.
"scp host:* .") through the remote shell. This has the side effect of
requiring double quoting of shell meta-characters in file names
included on scp(1) command-lines, otherwise they could be interpreted
as shell commands on the remote side.
This creates one area of potential incompatibility: scp(1) when using
the SFTP protocol no longer requires this finicky and brittle quoting,
and attempts to use it may cause transfers to fail. We consider the
removal of the need for double-quoting shell characters in file names
to be a benefit and do not intend to introduce bug-compatibility for
legacy scp/rcp in scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol.
Another area of potential incompatibility relates to the use of remote
paths relative to other user's home directories, for example -
"scp host:~user/file /tmp". The SFTP protocol has no native way to
expand a ~user path. However, sftp-server(8) in OpenSSH 8.7 and later
support a protocol extension "expand-path@openssh.com" to support
this.
Security Near Miss
==================
 * sshd(8): fix an integer overflow in the user authentication path
 that, in conjunction with other logic errors, could have yielded
 unauthenticated access under difficult to exploit conditions.
 This situation is not exploitable because of independent checks in
 the privilege separation monitor. Privilege separation has been
 enabled by default in since openssh-3.2.2 (released in 2002) and
 has been mandatory since openssh-7.5 (released in 2017). Moreover,
 portable OpenSSH has used toolchain features available in most
 modern compilers to abort on signed integer overflow since
 openssh-6.5 (released in 2014).
 Thanks to Malcolm Stagg for finding and reporting this bug.
Potentially-incompatible changes
================================
 * sshd(8), portable OpenSSH only: this release removes in-built
 support for MD5-hashed passwords. If you require these on your
 system then we recommend linking against libxcrypt or similar.
 * This release modifies the FIDO security key middleware interface
 and increments SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR.
Changes since OpenSSH 8.8
=========================
This release includes a number of new features.
New features
------------
 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): add a system for
 restricting forwarding and use of keys added to ssh-agent(1)
 A detailed description of the feature is available at
 https://www.openssh.com/agent-restrict.html and the protocol
 extensions are documented in the PROTOCOL and PROTOCOL.agent
 files in the source release.
 * ssh(1), sshd(8): add the sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com hybrid
 ECDH/x25519 + Streamlined NTRU Prime post-quantum KEX to the
 default KEXAlgorithms list (after the ECDH methods but before the
 prime-group DH ones). The next release of OpenSSH is likely to
 make this key exchange the default method.
 * ssh-keygen(1): when downloading resident keys from a FIDO token,
 pass back the user ID that was used when the key was created and
 append it to the filename the key is written to (if it is not the
 default). Avoids keys being clobbered if the user created multiple
 resident keys with the same application string but different user
 IDs.
 * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): better handling for FIDO keys
 on tokens that provide user verification (UV) on the device itself,
 including biometric keys, avoiding unnecessary PIN prompts.
 * ssh-keygen(1): add "ssh-keygen -Y match-principals" operation to
 perform matching of principals names against an allowed signers
 file. To be used towards a TOFU model for SSH signatures in git.
 * ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): allow pin-required FIDO keys to be added
 to ssh-agent(1). $SSH_ASKPASS will be used to request the PIN at
 authentication time.
 * ssh-keygen(1): allow selection of hash at sshsig signing time
 (either sha512 (default) or sha256).
 * ssh(1), sshd(8): read network data directly to the packet input
 buffer instead indirectly via a small stack buffer. Provides a
 modest performance improvement.
 * ssh(1), sshd(8): read data directly to the channel input buffer,
 providing a similar modest performance improvement.
 * ssh(1): extend the PubkeyAuthentication configuration directive to
 accept yes|no|unbound|host-bound to allow control over one of the
 protocol extensions used to implement agent-restricted keys.
Bugfixes
--------
 * sshd(8): document that CASignatureAlgorithms, ExposeAuthInfo and
 PubkeyAuthOptions can be used in a Match block. PR#277.
 * sshd(8): fix possible string truncation when constructing paths to
 .rhosts/.shosts files with very long user home directory names.
 * ssh-keysign(1): unbreak for KEX algorithms that use SHA384/512
 exchange hashes
 * ssh(1): don't put the TTY into raw mode when SessionType=none,
 avoids ^C being unable to kill such a session. bz3360
 * scp(1): fix some corner-case bugs in SFTP-mode handling of
 ~-prefixed paths.
 * ssh(1): unbreak hostbased auth using RSA keys. Allow ssh(1) to
 select RSA keys when only RSA/SHA2 signature algorithms are
 configured (this is the default case). Previously RSA keys were
 not being considered in the default case.
 * ssh-keysign(1): make ssh-keysign use the requested signature
 algorithm and not the default for the key type. Part of unbreaking
 hostbased auth for RSA/SHA2 keys.
 * ssh(1): stricter UpdateHostkey signature verification logic on
 the client- side. Require RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA hostkeys
 except when RSA/SHA1 was explicitly negotiated during initial
 KEX; bz3375
 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix signature algorithm selection logic for
 UpdateHostkeys on the server side. The previous code tried to
 prefer RSA/SHA2 for hostkey proofs of RSA keys, but missed some
 cases. This will use RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA keys if the
 client proposed these algorithms in initial KEX. bz3375
 * All: convert all uses of select(2)/pselect(2) to poll(2)/ppoll(2).
 This includes the mainloops in ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-agent(1)
 and sftp-server(8), as well as the sshd(8) listen loop and all
 other FD read/writability checks. On platforms with missing or
 broken poll(2)/ppoll(2) syscalls a select(2)-based compat shim is
 available.
 * ssh-keygen(1): the "-Y find-principals" command was verifying key
 validity when using ca certs but not with simple key lifetimes
 within the allowed signers file.
 * ssh-keygen(1): make sshsig verify-time argument parsing optional
 * sshd(8): fix truncation in rhosts/shosts path construction.
 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): avoid xmalloc(0) for PKCS#11 keyid for ECDSA
 keys (we already did this for RSA keys). Avoids fatal errors for
 PKCS#11 libraries that return empty keyid, e.g. Microchip ATECC608B
 "cryptoauthlib"; bz#3364
 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): improve the testing of credentials against
 inserted FIDO: ask the token whether a particular key belongs to
 it in cases where the token supports on-token user-verification
 (e.g. biometrics) rather than just assuming that it will accept it.
 Will reduce spurious "Confirm user presence" notifications for key
 handles that relate to FIDO keys that are not currently inserted in at
 least some cases. bz3366
 * ssh(1), sshd(8): correct value for IPTOS_DSCP_LE. It needs to
 allow for the preceding two ECN bits. bz#3373
 * ssh-keygen(1): add missing -O option to usage() for the "-Y sign"
 option.
 * ssh-keygen(1): fix a NULL deref when using the find-principals
 function, when matching an allowed_signers line that contains a
 namespace restriction, but no restriction specified on the
 command-line
 * ssh-agent(1): fix memleak in process_extension(); oss-fuzz
 issue #42719
 * ssh(1): suppress "Connection to xxx closed" messages when LogLevel
 is set to "error" or above. bz3378
 * ssh(1), sshd(8): use correct zlib flags when inflate(3)-ing
 compressed packet data. bz3372
 * scp(1): when recursively transferring files in SFTP mode, create the
 destination directory if it doesn't already exist to match scp(1) in
 legacy RCP mode behaviour.
 * scp(1): many improvements in error message consistency between scp(1)
 in SFTP mode vs legacy RCP mode.
 * sshd(8): fix potential race in SIGTERM handling PR#289
 * ssh(1), ssh(8): since DSA keys are deprecated, move them to the
 end of the default list of public keys so that they will be tried
 last. PR#295
 * ssh-keygen(1): allow 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' to match
 wildcard principals in allowed_signers files
Portability
-----------
 * ssh(1), sshd(8): don't trust closefrom(2) on Linux. glibc's
 implementation does not work in a chroot when the kernel does not
 have close_range(2). It tries to read from /proc/self/fd and when
 that fails dies with an assertion of sorts. Instead, call
 close_range(2) directly from our compat code and fall back if
 that fails. bz#3349,
 * OS X poll(2) is broken; use compat replacement. For character-
 special devices like /dev/null, Darwin's poll(2) returns POLLNVAL
 when polled with POLLIN. Apparently this is Apple bug 3710161 -
 not public but a websearch will find other OSS projects
 rediscovering it periodically since it was first identified in
 2005.
 * Correct handling of exceptfds/POLLPRI in our select(2)-based
 poll(2)/ppoll(2) compat implementation.
 * Cygwin: correct checking of mbstowcs() return value.
 * Add a basic SECURITY.md that refers people to the openssh.com
 website.
 * Enable additional compiler warnings and toolchain hardening flags,
 including -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical, -Wmisleading-indentation,
 -fzero-call-used-regs and -ftrivial-auto-var-init.
 * HP/UX. Use compat getline(3) on HP-UX 10.x, where the libc version
 is not reliable.
Checksums:
==========
 - SHA1 (openssh-8.9.tar.gz) = 653310ba1a63959fe2df503fe7ad556445180127
 - SHA256 (openssh-8.9.tar.gz) = mJigktP+Bk0sB7uRPuWgjcCOYZ+mIMdvRlZe66irtQA=
 - SHA1 (openssh-8.9p1.tar.gz) = 205cdf0040a238047e2c49f43460e03d76e5d650
 - SHA256 (openssh-8.9p1.tar.gz) = /Ul2VLerFobaxnL7g9+0ukCW6LX/zazNJiOArli+xec=
Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not
hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP
key used to sign the releases is available from the mirror sites:
https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc
Please note that the OpenPGP key used to sign releases has been
rotated for this release. The new key has been signed by the previous
key to provide continuity.
Reporting Bugs:
===============
- Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html
 Security bugs should be reported directly to openssh@openssh.com