KCDSA
KCDSA (Korean Certificate-based Digital Signature Algorithm) is a digital signature algorithm created by a team led by the Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA). It is an ElGamal variant, similar to the Digital Signature Algorithm and GOST R 34.10-94. The standard algorithm is implemented over {\displaystyle GF(p)}, but an elliptic curve variant (EC-KCDSA) is also specified.
KCDSA requires a collision-resistant cryptographic hash function that can produce a variable-sized output (from 128 to 256 bits, in 32-bit increments). HAS-160, another Korean standard, is the suggested choice.
Domain parameters
[edit ]- {\displaystyle p}: a large prime such that {\displaystyle |p|=512+256i} for {\displaystyle i=0,1,\dots ,6}.
- {\displaystyle q}: a prime factor of {\displaystyle p-1} such that {\displaystyle |q|=128+32j} for {\displaystyle j=0,1,\dots ,4}.
- {\displaystyle g}: a base element of order {\displaystyle q} in {\displaystyle \operatorname {GF} (p)}.
The revised version of the spec additional requires either that {\displaystyle (p-1)/(2q)} be prime or that all of its prime factors are greater than {\displaystyle q}.
User parameters
[edit ]- {\displaystyle x}: signer's private signature key such that {\displaystyle 0<x<q}.
- {\displaystyle y}: signer's public verification key computed by {\displaystyle y=g^{\bar {x}}{\pmod {p}},} where {\displaystyle {\bar {x}}=x^{-1}{\pmod {q}}}.
- {\displaystyle z}: a hash-value of Cert Data, i.e., {\displaystyle z=h({\text{Cert Data}})}.
The 1998 spec is unclear about the exact format of the "Cert Data". In the revised spec, z is defined as being the bottom B bits of the public key y, where B is the block size of the hash function in bits (typically 512 or 1024). The effect is that the first input block corresponds to y mod 2^B.
- {\displaystyle z}: the lower B bits of y.
Hash Function
[edit ]- {\displaystyle h}: a collision resistant hash function with |q|-bit digests.
Signing
[edit ]To sign a message {\displaystyle m}:
- Signer randomly picks an integer {\displaystyle 0<k<q} and computes {\displaystyle w=g^{k}\mod {p}}
- Then computes the first part: {\displaystyle r=h(w)}
- Then computes the second part: {\displaystyle s=x(k-r\oplus h(z\parallel m)){\pmod {q}}}
- If {\displaystyle s=0}, the process must be repeated from the start.
- The signature is {\displaystyle (r,s)}
The specification is vague about how the integer {\displaystyle w} be reinterpreted as a byte string input to hash function. In the example in section C.1 the interpretation is consistent with {\displaystyle r=h(I2OSP(w,|q|/8))} using the definition of I2OSP from PKCS#1/RFC3447.
Verifying
[edit ]To verify a signature {\displaystyle (r,s)} on a message {\displaystyle m}:
- Verifier checks that {\displaystyle 0\leq r<2^{|q|}} and {\displaystyle 0<s<q} and rejects the signature as invalid if not.
- Verifier computes {\displaystyle e=r\oplus h(z\parallel m)}
- Verifier checks if {\displaystyle r=h(y^{s}\cdot g^{e}\mod {p})}. If so then the signature is valid; otherwise it is not valid.
EC-KCDSA
[edit ]EC-KCDSA is essentially the same algorithm using Elliptic-curve cryptography instead of discrete log cryptography.
The domain parameters are:
- An elliptic curve {\displaystyle E} over a finite field.
- A point {\displaystyle G} in {\displaystyle E} generating a cyclic subgroup of prime order {\displaystyle q}. ({\displaystyle q} is often denoted {\displaystyle n} in other treatments of elliptic-curve cryptography.)
The user parameters and algorithms are essentially the same as for discrete log KCDSA except that modular exponentiation is replaced by point multiplication. The specific differences are:
- The public key is {\displaystyle Y={\bar {x}}G}
- In signature generation, {\displaystyle r=h(W_{x}||W_{y})} where {\displaystyle W=kG}
- In signature verification, the verifier tests whether {\displaystyle r=h(sY+eG)}
External links
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