| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Bypass Protection Mechanism |
Scope: Access Control |
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Architecture and Design |
Funnel all access through a single choke point to simplify how users can access a resource. For every access, perform a check to determine if the user has permissions to access the resource.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 306 | Missing Authentication for Critical Function |
| ParentOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 425 | Direct Request ('Forced Browsing') |
| ParentOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 1299 | Missing Protection Mechanism for Alternate Hardware Interface |
| PeerOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 420 | Unprotected Alternate Channel |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1010 | Authenticate Actors |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. | 284 | Improper Access Control |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic. |
| Architecture and Design | This is often seen in web applications that assume that access to a particular CGI program can only be obtained through a "front" screen, when the supporting programs are directly accessible. But this problem is not just in web apps. |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
Register SECURE_ME is located at address 0xF00. A mirror of this register called COPY_OF_SECURE_ME is at location 0x800F00. The register SECURE_ME is protected from malicious agents and only allows access to select, while COPY_OF_SECURE_ME is not.
Access control is implemented using an allowlist (as indicated by acl_oh_allowlist). The identity of the initiator of the transaction is indicated by the one hot input, incoming_id. This is checked against the acl_oh_allowlist (which contains a list of initiators that are allowed to access the asset).
Though this example is shown in Verilog, it will apply to VHDL as well.
The bugged line of code is repeated in the Bad example above. Weakness arises from the fact that the SECURE_ME register can be modified by writing to the shadow register COPY_OF_SECURE_ME, the address of COPY_OF_SECURE_ME should also be included in the check. That buggy line of code should instead be replaced as shown in the Good Code Snippet below.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
Router allows remote attackers to read system logs without authentication by directly connecting to the login screen and typing certain control characters.
|
|
|
Attackers with physical access to the machine may bypass the password prompt by pressing the ESC (Escape) key.
|
|
|
OS allows local attackers to bypass the password protection of idled sessions via the programmer's switch or CMD-PWR keyboard sequence, which brings up a debugger that the attacker can use to disable the lock.
|
|
|
Direct request of installation file allows attacker to create administrator accounts.
|
|
|
Attackers may gain additional privileges by directly requesting the web management URL.
|
|
|
Bypass authentication via direct request to named pipe.
|
|
|
User can avoid lockouts by using an API instead of the GUI to conduct brute force password guessing.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 721 | OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A10 - Failure to Restrict URL Access |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 947 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Authentication Bypass |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1353 | OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1364 | ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1396 | Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.Relationship
| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLOVER | Authentication Bypass by Alternate Path/Channel | ||
| OWASP Top Ten 2007 | A10 | CWE More Specific | Failure to Restrict URL Access |
| Submissions | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
PLOVER | ||
| Contributions | |||
| Contribution Date | Contributor | Organization | |
|
2024年09月29日
(CWE 4.16, 2024年11月19日) |
Abhi Balakrishnan | ||
| Contributed usability diagram concepts used by the CWE team | |||
| Modifications | |||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | |
|
2024年11月19日
(CWE 4.16, 2024年11月19日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Diagram | |||
| 2023年10月26日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | |||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships | |||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2022年10月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2021年10月28日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2021年07月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |||
| 2020年12月10日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2020年08月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships | |||
| 2017年05月03日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | |||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | |||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences | |||
| 2011年03月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2008年11月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples | |||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, Relationships, Observed_Example, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Type | |||
| Previous Entry Names | |||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | ||
| 2008年09月09日 | Authentication Bypass by Alternate Path/Channel | ||
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